Nice thread and OP! — javra

Thanks, Javra. Allow me to begin with your second post before moving to your first, for I think others may find the second post especially enticing:

Here's a concrete example that might help out: In one's morning routine, ought one brush one's teeth before brushing one's hair or, otherwise, brush one's hair before brushing one's teeth? Whichever alternative one chooses, the action one will engage in will in this example be a fully conscious volitional act (in contrast, for example, to haphazardly touching one's beard in unthinking manners). Yet, because there is no discernible morally best alternative - for both alternatives are to be deemed equally good or bad - irrespective of the choice made the volitional act can nevertheless be deemed amoral. — javra

Good thoughts! Suppose an evil genius (or maybe an evil non-genius :sweat:) rigs up a scenario where he will murder one of two people given a decision you make. As you are standing still, he tells you, "If you begin walking with your left foot I will kill person A, and if you begin walking with your right foot I will kill person B." You know nothing about either person beyond these simple facts. According to your argument, "because there is no discernible morally best alternative - for both alternatives are to be deemed equally good or bad - irrespective of the choice made the volitional act can nevertheless be deemed amoral."

What are your thoughts about this? I don't think this alternative scenario necessarily undermines your reasoning, but I am curious what you would say.

---

I first want to mention that, as with all others, the English language has its own idiosyncrasies via which possible conceptualizations find themselves limited to certain linguistic expressions. There is no one word in the English language with addresses this generalized state of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness in impartial manners. I think the closest English comes to it is in the word “responsibility”—this in the strict sense of being the primary cause for an effect/consequence (rather than, for example, in the sense of being accountable, or answerable, for an effect/consequence). As is also the case with at least the Romanian language (which I also speak fluently), existent words also overwhelmingly tend to emphasize the wrongness of effects/consequences: e.g., what or who is at fault for, what or who is to blame for, or culpable for, etc. — javra

Yes, very true.

That said, when considering the goodness or badness of an effect or else consequence—via what I will here specify as “responsibility for” in the strict sense just mentioned of being the primary cause—the responsible cause can either be in any way accountable, or answerable, for the given effect or not. If the primary cause is deemed answerable for its responsibility in having brought about the effect, then we likewise deem the same given cause’s future effects to be alterable (or else reinforceable) via rewards or punishments. This first broad category of cause-types then subsumes that category the thread addresses as moral evils. — javra

Good, I agree.

Other primary causes which we deem incapable of being in any way answerable for their responsibility in having brought about a certain effect, we then deem fully unalterable via the (yet possible) administration of rewards or punishments—with tornadoes being one example of such latter types of causes. In this second generalized category of cause-types we then place all natural evils. Here, though the wind is responsible for the tree’s leaves movements, we neither blame nor praise the wind in an attempt to either alter or reinforce its doings (this because the wind as primary cause is incapable of in any way answering, or taking responsibility, for what it does). — javra

I think this may be a helpful way to reframe my debate with @Bob Ross.

This outlook I then find can be itself reduced to a dichotomy between (a) agent-caused effects (with individual agents being, as I believe you’ve previously mentioned, in at least some ways causa sui originators of the effects they willfully produce) and b) effects caused by non-agential causes (which are then basically deemed fully deterministic in their nature). [edit: just as I take your own arguments to generally be] — javra

Yes, I fully agree.

For one example, while people will blame and praise their dog’s doings with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) their dog’s behaviors, tmk most will not blame or praise an AI’s doings in their interactions with the AI program with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) the AI program’s behaviors. The first is deemed an agent whereas the second is not. (If dogs are too controversial in terms of moral doings, then one can just as well replace their example with the example of fellow humans.)

Not sure if this is of significant benefit to the discussion, but to me at least it does serve to further illustrate the divide between moral evils and natural evils. — javra

Thanks - I think it is very relevant to the discussion I am having with @Bob Ross, and this distinction between agent-causes and non-agent-causes is central to the OP, because for the OP morality is bound up with agency.

Well, what is the example you have in mind? Presumably you have an example that parallels the "wind"? — Leontiskos

The aesthetic might parallel wind here: there are gradients within the aesthetic. The beautiful and the sublime come to mind; and here these gradients need not have opposites but rather can be more or less relative to itself. And if you establish some kind of standard to judge more and less then you'd establish a gradient.

Though I had meant the example you presented.

I can think of more plausible examples that mimic the arbitrary nature of your example. The choice between regular M&M's and M&M's with peanuts seems morally arbitrary or amoral (not sure which phrase I prefer). We can have arbitrary rules that we follow and even though they mimic or can be interpreted within a moral dimension I'd say they're amoral actions -- outside the scope of moral thinking.

Yes, and the finger-crossing example was risky in that it is easily misunderstood. I was only trying to illustrate the role of susceptibility and negligence. It is (intentionally) artificial because no one holds that rule. Of course, there is a sense in which it is important to consider subjective moral evaluations (in part because conscience is always a moral factor), but I think we can leave that to the side for the moment. — Leontiskos

Ah ok. Hopefully the above example does a better job, then. It did strike the thought in me, at least!

You might argue that the new category of "amoral" act I am talking about above could still be good or bad based on whether it violates some arbitrary set of rules. I admit that it could be. What if it doesn't break any rules? — ToothyMaw

I dont think it does break any rules because although Amorals are regarding "intent" I would more define it as a word that can describe those actions with no moral consequence or intention. ex. "When Rationalization doesnt respect THE REASON"

edit: I now understand why you liked the OP...you can contribute with HIGH quality. Good stuff

The aesthetic might parallel wind here: there are gradients within the aesthetic. The beautiful and the sublime come to mind; and here these gradients need not have opposites but rather can be more or less relative to itself. And if you establish some kind of standard to judge more and less then you'd establish a gradient. — Moliere

Yes, but I suppose I am not convinced that the aesthetic gradient and the moral gradient are distinct. When Plato applies the form of the beautiful to human life he seems to arrive at the noble, and I think nobility of life or action would be moral in Aquinas' sense. Actually I think Plato's approach is especially compelling morally.

Concretely we might say that certain settings (such as nature) are more ennobling and life-giving than others, and that this aesthetic consideration coincides with morality whenever it touches on volition or choice. For example, when a city must decide whether to carve out spaces of natural beauty for its current and future citizens, it seems to me that it is considering a moral question (or at least a question that is intrinsically bound up with morality).

I can think of more plausible examples that mimic the arbitrary nature of your example. The choice between regular M&M's and M&M's with peanuts seems morally arbitrary or amoral (not sure which phrase I prefer). — Moliere

Blasphemy! :angry:

We can have arbitrary rules that we follow and even though they mimic or can be interpreted within a moral dimension I'd say they're amoral actions -- outside the scope of moral thinking. — Moliere

Can we have arbitrary rules that we follow? :chin: This may turn out to be an important question in the thread, and I'm not sure we can. I suspect that as soon as we recognize a rule as arbitrary then we will tend to stop following it, or that its force will become nothing more than the inertia of the habit.

The choice between M&M's does seem morally arbitrary. Between this and the hairbrush example I think we are coming upon the case of the choice between two morally insignificant options, a la Objection 2.

Presumably the 'end' of eating M&M's is pleasure, and it seems to me that seeking or giving pleasure is a moral act. It's just that in this case the pleasure differential is so miniscule that the decision is unimportant, a la Objection 5. If morality were alcohol, then an M&M is like diluting a bottle of whiskey in 5 gallons of water and then asking whether taking a drink counts as drinking alcohol. It goes back to that question of the OP of qualitative differences vs. quantitative differences, and whether it is philosophically rigorous to base morality on the latter.

Let me put it more precisely, then: “the events which transpire directly due to a tornado are intrinsically bad”. Do you disagree with that statement, or find it likewise idiosyncratic? If not, then I think we are just disagreeing on semantics: I identify intrinsic goodness with moral goodness — Bob Ross

I don't disagree with that statement, and I admit that the critique is a matter of language. Too-many-scare-quotes is a linguistic critique.

I added a bit to my last post in an edit and I'm not sure if you saw it:

The predication of generic “being” (i.e., generic ‘to exist’) is univocal predication, just like “Brk”. — Bob Ross

You are right that generic being is univocal. I suppose the problem is that it doesn't apply to everything like Brk does. For example, "Grandma does not exist anymore." We talk about things losing and lacking being.

Either way, I don’t see how univocally predicating a property to everything, would make it vacuous. If it is clearly outlined what “Brk” actually is, then it is not vacuous. For example, imagine that everything happens to be red: does that make ‘redness’ vacuous? — Bob Ross

Yes, because if everything happened to be red then we wouldn't be capable of identifying or distinguishing red. In that case we wouldn't have a name for the color. The only reason we are tempted to think that "red" would make sense in that world is because we live in a world of colors.

I am no longer claiming that a tornado is a moral agent; I was referring to the adjective, which I guess in a sense is a property, of ‘moral’ (perhaps ‘moralness’). — Bob Ross

Correct, it is still a property.

I highly doubt this. Would you not agree, that “moral” also signifies “that which is within the sphere of moral discourse”? You left that out in your analysis here. — Bob Ross

What does the word "moral" in your term, "moral discourse," mean? Does it mean something other than the two senses I already gave? I think not. Moral discourse is precisely discourse about things that are moral or immoral, or else things that are capable of moral or immoral acts. (As in the OP, "acts" is shorthand, and is not meant to exclude other moral or immoral things, such as habits.)

If you deny this, then I must admit your theory of ethics is entirely too act-centric for me. The study is fundamentally about what is “good”, and this in a “moral” sense, and only as a biproduct does one discuss moral or immoral acts. — Bob Ross

I don't think so. We can talk all day about good trees, or good birds, or good sunsets, and no one will suppose that we are engaged in moral discourse.

If you think there is a morally ideal possible world EVEN WHEN there is no possible world in which agents exist; then you are admitting that morality is not dependent on, nor gets its core substance from, analyzing acts. — Bob Ross

Earlier in our conversation I already told you that I don't think this.

By #2, are also referring to moral and immoral acts, or what is morally bad or good simpliciter? I read it as acts, but if it is about just moral badness and goodness (in general); then I would say that my use of "moral agent" falls within this category, because #2 makes no reference to any sort of capacity for responsibility (of anything). 'moral' in #2's sense, assuming you aren't referring to only acts, would include uses like "this agent is doing moral things, even though they cannot be held responsible for their actions, because their actions align with what is morally good". — Bob Ross

(1) and (2) are both using "moral" in the dictionary sense that SEP also highlights, where it pertains to intention and responsibility. So yes, you can read (2) as speaking about acts. I didn't specify that because of what footnote 1 in the OP says.

Good thoughts! Suppose an evil genius (or maybe an evil non-genius :sweat:) rigs up a scenario where he will murder one of two people given a decision you make. As you are standing still, he tells you, "If you begin walking with your left foot I will kill person A, and if you begin walking with your right foot I will kill person B." You know nothing about either person beyond these simple facts. According to your argument, "because there is no discernible morally best alternative - for both alternatives are to be deemed equally good or bad - irrespective of the choice made the volitional act can nevertheless be deemed amoral."

What are your thoughts about this? I don't think this alternative scenario necessarily undermines your reasoning, but I am curious what you would say. — Leontiskos

Thanks!

Tricky counterexample. My current best thoughts:

Unless the individual will then walk with the explicit intention (and pleasure) of killing some stranger, I wouldn’t term it “murder”. All the same, in this scenario, unlike the first, irrespective of which choice we make we know that we will be committing a wrong beforehand. This will then be a crucial difference.

Because we are committing a wrong, we then will most likely not walk without care but, instead, search for additional alternatives prior to walking: maybe choosing to skip on two legs to where we need to go, or maybe choosing to not move but debate with the evil genius/daemon in hopes of tricking it into stopping its imposition.

If, however, no other conceivable choice were to be available, then we’d literally have no choice but to knowingly commit the wrong of killing some unfortunate stranger via our actions. In which case, because a) we hold no choice in the matter of so doing despite the two alternatives available to us and b) the two alternatives are morally identical in impact to the best of our knowledge—were we to not then so step with the explicit intent and pleasure of killing a stranger—I’d then conclude that our walking either via a first left step or a first right step would be amoral. We would be attributively responsible for (i.e., we’d be a/the primary cause for) the killing of a stranger but we’d not be morally responsible for it (EDIT: here meaning in any way either blameworthy of praiseworthy for the action taken and its consequence).

To me this so far makes ethical sense.

-------

Apropos, as to the evil genius being not so genius: It is interesting to me that in Romanian there are two adjectives for the English word “bad” (with no adjective for “evil”); one is rău, which can just as well mean either “sick” or “mean spirited”; the second is prost, which can just as well mean “stupid” or “idiotic”. (The only relatively close proximity to the term “evil” is the noun form of rău, but, again, it doesn't occur as an adjective). Which when literally translated into English to me at least presents the connotative understanding that the property of badness could be interpreted as “the stupidity of being mean spirited and, thereby, psychologically sick”. Your expression somehow reminded me of this. :grin: Though, of course, so understood the concept can only apply to agents.

I think this may be a helpful way to reframe my debate with Bob Ross. — Leontiskos

I neglected to give @Bob Ross a mention in my previous post, but yes, the primary focus was the debate between the two of you.

Not to float my own boat, but back when I wrote my midterm essay for some 100-level ethics course, my choice of normative principle was along the lines of "avoid the greatest amount of harm, even if it means also avoiding a greater amount of welfare (to another party)". That seems to be the same as some version of negative utilitarianism, particularly threshold NU and weak NU.

One of my justifications for the principle is that harm violates the object's free will, (not giving) welfare does not.

I will check the theses and the objections when I am in an ethics mood and when I have time.

Tricky counterexample. My current best thoughts: — javra

I want to first say that I think your thoughts are wonderfully cogent, but let me pick at them a little bit.

All the same, in this scenario, unlike the first, irrespective of which choice we make we know that we will be committing a wrong beforehand.

[...]

If, however, no other conceivable choice were to be available, then we’d literally have no choice but to knowingly commit the wrong of killing some unfortunate stranger via our actions. In which case, because a) we hold no choice in the matter of so doing despite the two alternatives available to us and b) the two alternatives are morally identical in impact to the best of our knowledge—were we to not then so step with the explicit intent and pleasure of killing a stranger—I’d then conclude that our walking either via a first left step or a first right step would be amoral. We would be attributively responsible for (i.e., we’d be a/the primary cause for) the killing of a stranger but we’d not be morally responsible for it (EDIT: here meaning in any way either blameworthy of praiseworthy for the action taken and its consequence). — javra

So according to your earlier statement which I quoted* (and assuming we have no other choice), the act would be amoral. Here it seems like you want to say that it is simultaneously amoral and wrong. Or perhaps more accurately, the act would be amoral and yet in so acting we would be "committing a wrong." There is thus an interesting way in which immorality and wrongness are separating.

All the same, in this scenario, unlike the first, irrespective of which choice we make we know that we will be committing a wrong beforehand. This will then be a crucial difference. — javra

I think Aquinas would somewhat agree with you, but would instead say that the primary difference between the hairbrush scenario and the evil genius scenario is that in the former we are choosing between two goods and in the latter we are choosing between two evils (or that it is two good options as opposed to two bad options). Then he might note that, in most cases, instead of choosing between two evils one could also abstain from choosing (by abstaining from acting). I think all of these ideas are found within your reply.

For Aquinas the moral decision of which foot to begin walking with is, I think, not a human act. This is because there are no rational criteria upon which to deliberate. Because the reason has nothing to act on, therefore it cannot be an act that flows from reason. The act could only become rational (and moral) if perchance the agent fastened upon some aspect that could support rational deliberation. (Nevertheless, the natural act of walking and the moral act in question are not identical, and therefore to choose to begin walking with the right foot on account of a limp would be a human act distinct from the moral decision under consideration. Cf. ST I-II.20.6)

The hairbrush scenario is similar. For many people the choice of which order in which to brush hair and teeth is not a rational act and therefore not a moral act (because they give it no consideration). Yet for some it may well be a rational act. Suppose, for example, that a superstitious person believes that if they brush their hair within 5 minutes after brushing their teeth, plaque will begin to grow in their hair. This is a rational act (an act flowing from the deliberate reason), and for Aquinas it is an immoral act (because it is an irrational act, falsely ordered to the end of health). Another person, knowing they have lice, may avoid brushing their hair first for fear of getting lice in their mouth. This seems to be a moral act, for it both flows from rational deliberation and is rational in the secondary sense, being rightly ordered to the (legitimate) end of health. On the other hand, excessive caution in this regard could be an irrational form of OCD.

Here is a related quote from Aquinas:

And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.

If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from some act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his beard, or moves his hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not moral or human; since this depends on the reason. Hence it will be indifferent, as standing apart from the genus of moral actions. — Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Question 18, Article 9

Apropos, as to the evil genius being not so genius: It is interesting to me that in Romanian there are two adjectives for the English word “bad” (with no adjective for “evil”); one is rău, which can just as well mean either “sick” or “mean spirited”; the second is prost, which can just as well mean “stupid” or “idiotic”. (The only relatively close proximity to the term “evil” is the noun form of rău, but, again, it doesn't occur as an adjective). Which when literally translated into English to me at least presents the connotative understanding that the property of badness could be interpreted as “the stupidity of being mean spirited and, thereby, psychologically sick”. Your expression somehow reminded me of this. :grin: Though, of course, so understood the concept can only apply to agents. — javra

Ha - very interesting! Aquinas follows Augustine, and for Augustine evil is a privation of what ought to be, which dovetails nicely with some of this. Further, as you may have noticed from the above, for Aquinas irrationality and immorality are closely related.

* "because there is no discernible morally best alternative - for both alternatives are to be deemed equally good or bad - irrespective of the choice made the volitional act can nevertheless be deemed amoral" ().

Not to float my own boat, but back when I wrote my midterm essay for some 100-level ethics course, my choice of normative principle was along the lines of "avoid the greatest amount of harm, even if it means also avoiding a greater amount of welfare (to another party)". That seems to be the same as some version of negative utilitarianism, particularly threshold NU and weak NU. — Lionino

Interesting! This thread is the first I have ever heard of the term "negative utilitarianism," although I was aware of harm-based ethics that are not based on classical justice.

One of my justifications for the principle is that harm violates the object's free will, (not giving) welfare does not. — Lionino

In general I am apt to prefer classical justice to negative utilitarianism, but that debate is somewhat tangential to this thread (at least at this early stage). For example, I would suggest that harm and the withholding of welfare are both contrary to the object's will, if in slightly different ways—harm is certainly more contrary. But I don't know if you are using "free will" in a special sense.

I will check the theses and the objections when I am in an ethics mood and when I have time. — Lionino

Sounds good. No rush.

I added a bit to my last post in an edit and I'm not sure if you saw it:

I saw it, but it didn’t seem to address our issue (between us). Let me address some of it in ways that avoid reiteration to help further the conversation.

The reason we don't call natural evils immoral is because they are appreciably different from moral evils. Both natural evils and moral evils are evil or bad (and this is their common genus: evil or badness). So what makes them different? The difference lies in whether their cause is a responsible agent—something that can be held responsible for producing the evil effect.

You hold that some ‘evil’ is amorally bad, and is thusly outside of the scope of morality; whereas I think that all ‘evil’ is intrinsically bad, and is thusly within the scope of morality. I cannot tell if your use of this sort of ‘amoral badness’ is equivalent to my ‘intrinsic badness’ (which I call likewise moral badness).

You hold that ‘moral’ refers to only meanings directly related to ‘acts’, whereas I use it in a much broader scope.

Morality, at its core, is about acts for you; intrinsic goodness, for me.

A moral good is the meal cooked by your mother. A non-moral good is the rain that waters your crops

I understand why you would say this, because you are holding a strictly act-centric theory of what ethics is about, but I think both of these are moral goods.

I think you think health, for example, is an amoral good (because it has no direct relation to deliberate acts, nor acts in general); whereas health, because of how it relates to flourishing (which is intrinsically good), is morally good to me.

There is another way one can say health, or rain nourishing plants is good, and it is, in fact, an amoral sense: extrinsic goodness. I can equally say that health is good for keeping a sane mind (or some other goal or [subjective] purpose): this kind of good is relative to a thing fulfilling a subjective purpose, and there is an infinite amount (subjective) purposes that a thing can be evaluated, as good or bad, relative to. This is the only kind of good which I concede is outside of the sphere of moral discourse.

For example, "Grandma does not exist anymore." We talk about things losing and lacking being.

Everything in reality can be attributed the property; and I can make a parody argument for redness: everything in reality is red, but we can say things that makes sense like “a block that doesn’t exist is not red”.

Yes, because if everything happened to be red then we wouldn't be capable of identifying or distinguishing red

Yes we can: just like ‘to exist’. I can say “red is this particular color that everything is a shade of”. Do you think colorblind people that see only grey don’t understand what grey is?

What does the word "moral" in your term, "moral discourse," mean?

It means discourse related to (1) intrinsic goodness and (2) what is intrinsically good.

Does it mean something other than the two senses I already gave?
…
(As in the OP, "acts" is shorthand, and is not meant to exclude other moral or immoral things, such as habits.)

For you, and commonly to people, morality is about behavior; but this is a major mistake: it is really about intrinsic goodness and what is intrinsically good.

We can talk all day about good trees, or good birds, or good sunsets, and no one will suppose that we are engaged in moral discourse.

It depends: when we discuss those things, are we supposing we are talking about actually good trees, actually good birds, etc.? If so, then we are definitely talking about ethics.

If you think there is a morally ideal possible world EVEN WHEN there is no possible world in which agents exist; then you are admitting that morality is not dependent on, nor gets its core substance from, analyzing acts. — Bob Ross

Earlier in our conversation I already told you that I don't think this.

You never explained why; and I think it is a consequence of your view. From my perspective, you can’t have cake and eat it too (;

Either morality is only about what is related to behavior and there is no morality in a world incapable of agents (i.e., things which have behaviors, can act, in the manner you describe) OR morality is not fundamentally about behavior (although it can include that in itself, even as a primary sub-subject).

Bob

Sorry, the forum did not notify me of the @s.

Other primary causes which we deem incapable of being in any way answerable for their responsibility in having brought about a certain effect, we then deem fully unalterable via the (yet possible) administration of rewards or punishments—with tornadoes being one example of such latter types of causes. In this second generalized category of cause-types we then place all natural evils. Here, though the wind is responsible for the tree’s leaves movements, we neither blame nor praise the wind in an attempt to either alter or reinforce its doings (this because the wind as primary cause is incapable of in any way answering, or taking responsibility, for what it does). — javra


I think this may be a helpful way to reframe my debate with @Bob Ross.

I completely agree: I am not contending that we should praise or blame tornados for what they do, but, rather, to acknowledge that what they do is intrinsically bad (or related directly thereto in a relevant manner) which makes them morally bad.

For one example, while people will blame and praise their dog’s doings with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) their dog’s behaviors, tmk most will not blame or praise an AI’s doings in their interactions with the AI program with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) the AI program’s behaviors. The first is deemed an agent whereas the second is not. (If dogs are too controversial in terms of moral doings, then one can just as well replace their example with the example of fellow humans.)

Not sure if this is of significant benefit to the discussion, but to me at least it does serve to further illustrate the divide between moral evils and natural evils. — javra


Thanks - I think it is very relevant to the discussion I am having with @Bob Ross, and this distinction between agent-causes and non-agent-causes is central to the OP, because for the OP morality is bound up with agency.

I completely agree. Again, I think my position is being confused, and it is (perhaps) myself that is to blame because I did not initially convey it with full clarity. I have no problem with the 'natural' vs. 'moral' evil distinction if one is merely denoting what is capable of moral responsibility with the adjective 'moral': HOWEVER, if one is attempting to make 'evil' merely a synonym for badness simpliciter (which is outside of the scope of morality), then they are gravely mistaken. Morality is not itself the study of behavior.

Hopefully that helps clarify my position.

Bob

First off, thanks for the thoughtful reply. Your views are much appreciated.

So according to your earlier statement which I quoted* (and assuming we have no other choice), the act would be amoral. Here it seems like you want to say that it is simultaneously amoral and wrong. Or perhaps more accurately, the act would be amoral and yet in so acting we would be "committing a wrong." There is thus an interesting way in which immorality and wrongness are separating. — Leontiskos

Ah, well said. Yes, I find there is distinction to be made between immorality and wrongness. I will be later posting an example that I find far more pertinent to the topic but, in general: there are actions which even the most mildly moral folk know to be wrongs. Telling lies and engaging in violence as just two examples. Especially from the viewpoint of what can be termed "the Good", these will always be wrongs in an ultimate sense. Notwithstanding, given the myriad complexities of life, there will be times when engaging in these very wrongs in the short-term will be necessary for optimizing that which is right, or good, in the long term. As one example, were a WWII Nazi to knock at the door to inquire as to whether there is a Jew in your house (granting that the latter would be greatly harmed unjustly by the former via the telling of truths, and that there are Jews in the house), here it will be right/good to lie to the Nazi - thereby resulting in the moral praiseworthiness of having committed what in ultimate analysis is a wrong in the short-term (telling a lie) so as to avert a far greater wrong in the long-term (unjust injury or even death befalling innocent people). The same can be said with physical violence undertaken in self-defense against an unjustly aggressive assailant. Or even in the act of partaking in a just war as a soldier.

Due to life's complexities, in these and like examples we in my view then act morally by engaging in lesser wrongs for the sake of preventing greater wrongs (given caveats such as that no other viable alternative in preventing the greater wrong is available to us).

Because of this, I do deem that on occasion being moral or else immoral is separate from the committing of wrongs. One can likewise appraise someone who does something good and thereby moral due to intentions that are ultimately evil - in so far as having been committed so as to result in the realization of an evil long-term goal. Here, given the overall situation, doing a right/good act can well be nevertheless appraised as immoral (as one possible example, such as when a liar reinforces their nefarious lies via the telling of truths in what is often enough termed "spin").

For Aquinas the moral decision of which foot to begin walking with is, I think, not a human act. This is because there are no rational criteria upon which to deliberate. Because the reason has nothing to act on, therefore it cannot be an act that flows from reason. The act could only become rational (and moral) if perchance the agent fastened upon some aspect that could support rational deliberation. — Leontiskos

In having thought about this, it yet seems to me that, in order for a human to consciously discern that there are no moral differences in the two alternatives available, the human must necessarily to some extent deliberate between the two alternatives - thereby consciously judge and weigh their differences and differing consequences via their reasoning faculties. So doing will itself be a consciously rational act. So, I presently believe that the very act of consciously discerning that the two alternatives have equal moral import can only be a human act - for it requires conscious rationality. Once this active deliberation between the alternatives arrives at the conclusion that the available alternatives are of equal moral import, then ... I'm thinking one could still make a reason-based conscious choice as to which alternative to act on (for example, choosing to start with the right foot with the aim of maintaining consistency were this scenario to ever befall again - thereby keeping the harm to a minimum (I know this is iffy, but its the best I've got at the moment)) or, else, one might at this juncture simply allow one's strongest unconscious impulse to precipitate a first step with whichever leg it might be - or else abide by the flipping of a coin. If the first, it would then still be a reason based conscious act. If the latter, then not.

All the same, in terms of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness, the individual's act would be beyond either. Given no other available alternative to choose from, in this sense alone the person's act of walking would then be amoral - despite resulting in an equal wrong regardless of alternative acted on. Yet the discernment of the act so being (both on the part of the individual or any onlooker) would then be fully rational - for the individual here was not negligent; he/she took to time to deliberate the situation so as to arrive at the rational discernment of being forced to commit an equal wrong regardless of what is chosen.

I'm hoping my reasoning here is explained well enough. In short, I yet see it as a human act (i.e. a rationally conscious act of volition) on grounds that the person reasoned the equivalency of the two alternatives - thereby deciding that there is no best and worst alternative to choose between. The person then in one way or another acts in accordance to this deliberation-resultant reasoned conclusion.

But do let me know if you find fault with this.

Here is a related quote from Aquinas:

And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. — Leontiskos

Nice quote! To me, again, the individual, in judging the merits of the two alternatives via deliberation, arrives at the conclusion that there isn't a more moral alternative to take via the use of "deliberate reason ... directed to the due end [of minimizing harm / maximizing eudemonia]" - and their action will then be accordant to this very deliberate reason directed to the due end. It just so happens that, on these very same grounds, the conclusion is that there is no alternative which is better/worse than the other. So, due to their faculty of conscious reasoning, they then know that they have no choice but to necessarily commit an identical wrong irrespective of which available alternative they choose. And, because in this hypothetical they must choose among one of the two alternatives, their either consciously made or else unconsciously resultant choice is then neither in any way blameworthy nor praiseworthy.

Ha - very interesting! Aquinas follows Augustine, and for Augustine evil is a privation of what ought to be, which dovetails nicely with some of this. Further, as you may have noticed from the above, for Aquinas irrationality and immorality are closely related. — Leontiskos

Precisely! :up: :smile: Nice to see your evaluation of it.

I'll post the initially mentioned hypothetical I have in mind separately, this just in case the moderators might want me to delete it.

Here is a hypothetical wherein the choice made is concluded to be amoral (this strictly in the sense of being neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy) despite a) the available alternatives not being of equal moral import, b) being an act of consciously made volition and, thereby, a human act, c) being a non-hypothetical ought-judgement and, hence, per the OP, a moral act, and, to top things of, d) the choice taken being a known wrong a priori.

It's an excerpt from something I've already written regarding our free will. (If the moderators disagree with my posting this, or else with my providing a link in the quote for possible context, please inform me and I will delete the post and/or link.)

For reasons just given, I find this example to be pertinent to the thread/OP. And I would greatly appreciate any criticism you might have of its conclusion or contents.

Consider, for example, the following hypothetical—wherein shall be held that it is a moral wrong to insult a stranger:

I am the summoned subject of a tyrannical and mad king who, simply for his own amusement, informs me upon my arrival to his citadel that a) either i) I insult a greatly starved, and thereby physically weakened, stranger that also stands before the king in my presence or ii) I beat this same starved stranger until the stranger becomes unconscious or, else, b) the king will insure that everyone I’ve grown close to will be brutally raped and tortured till they die. Granting that I have no reason to doubt the veracity of the king’s imposition, my first-order choice between alternative (a) and alternative (b) might be considered so coercive as to virtually grant me no choice [...] whatsoever, allowing me only one viable option: that of choosing alternative (a). In then granting this, I nevertheless am in no way coerced in my choosing between alternative (a. i) and (a. ii)—for, other than a potential harm to my conscience, neither alternative possess any significant negative repercussions to my personhood—and I happen to be capable of successfully implementing either alternative. I, in being indifferent to which alternative I presume would please this mad king most, then freely choose what I take to be the lesser of the two wrongs—and I thereby proceed to insult the stranger.

Given my alternatives, do I or others then find me culpable for the wrong of having insulted this stranger in front of the king?

While the answer to this question will be contingent on numerous variables (such as, for example, the given stranger’s, and others, degree of empathy for the conundrum into which I was placed through no fault of my own), it is fair to presume that everyone (including the stranger) will be aware that at least the second-order choice I made was freely made by me, was thereby an outcome I intentionally brought about, and, hence, was an outcome I am attributively responsible for. Furthermore, given that I have a generally goodhearted nature, it is also likely fair to presume that everyone (including the given stranger) will nevertheless neither find me blameworthy for my resulting transgression nor praiseworthy for so choosing it over its alternative (considering this outcome the only decent option to be had given the circumstances I was in).

If so, this case illustrates how an [ego or I-ness; i.e., the first person point of view] which is attributively responsible for an outcome commonly deemed a moral wrong—that of insulting a perfect stranger—might neither be blameworthy nor praiseworthy for said outcome, and, hence, how this [ego] might not be morally responsible for an outcome it is nevertheless attributively responsible for. — www.anenquiry.info / Chapter 11: Validating Our Free Will / Section 11.3.2.

Fingers crossed. If this example holds, as I believe it does, it then illustrates how one could have a human act of conscious choice making which, as per the OP, can be defined as a moral act (for it involved non-hypothetical ought-judgements) that is nevertheless amoral in so far as being neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy. And, furthermore, this amoral quality of the act is upheld despite the committed wrong of insulting a perfect stranger.

In general I am apt to prefer classical justice ... — Leontiskos

Maybe I've missed it but could you briefly describe "classical justice" or link to a post upthread where you discuss it. Thanks.

First off, thanks for the thoughtful reply. Your views are much appreciated. — javra

You're welcome, and I thank you in the same way. I was not expecting to receive this level of engagement in the thread! In keeping with your own approach I will address your two posts separately.

As one example, were a WWII Nazi to knock at the door to inquire as to whether there is a Jew in your house... — javra

For Aquinas (as for Kant) it is not permissible to lie even in this case. Here is what he says in an article entitled, "Whether every lie is a sin?":

Objection 4. Further, one ought to choose the lesser evil in order to avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb, lest the whole body perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion in a person's mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore a man may lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or another from being killed.

Reply to Objection 4. A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x). — Aquinas, ST II-II.110.3.ad4

Due to life's complexities, in these and like examples we in my view then act morally by engaging in lesser wrongs for the sake of preventing greater wrongs (given caveats such as that no other viable alternative in preventing the greater wrong is available to us). — javra

I suspect that the disagreement here is over the principle of whether it is permissible to "do evil that good may come" (or whether a good end can justify an evil means). Would you object to my characterizing your view as (a robust form of) consequentialism?

I realize that this response is a bit abrupt, but hopefully the rest of the reply (and the second post) will elaborate on some of the related issues.

Because of this, I do deem that on occasion being moral or else immoral is separate from the committing of wrongs. One can likewise appraise someone who does something good and thereby moral due to intentions that are ultimately evil - in so far as having been committed so as to result in the realization of an evil long-term goal. Here, given the overall situation, doing a right/good act can well be nevertheless appraised as immoral (as one possible example, such as when a liar reinforces their nefarious lies via the telling of truths in what is often enough termed "spin"). — javra

Perhaps one of the most fruitful entry points is linguistic. First, to nitpick a bit, is the bolded an accurate depiction of your view? "Good and thereby moral"? Later in the same paragraph you give what seems to me the more consistent position, that, "doing a right/good act can well be nevertheless appraised as immoral"? In that case what is good is not thereby moral, and thus it would seem that someone who does a good deed as a means to an evil end is acting immorally when they do their good deed (I say "deed" instead of "act" only because for Aquinas the act is not separable from the remote intention). What's philosophically interesting here is that, according to your position, it would seem that a bad end/goal vitiates a good deed, but a bad deed does not vitiate a good end/goal. Or in other words, the former kind of act is impermissible (immoral) whereas the latter kind of act is permissible (moral or perhaps amoral). This also gets into the idea of coercion, which I will leave for the second post.

Second, it seems to me that in common language, to say that an act is wrong is to imply that it should not be done. Presumably, then, someone who believes the Nazi should be lied to would say, "One can sometimes use evil as a means to a good end," but they would not say, "One can do wrong as a means to doing right." In other words to advise X such that X non-hypothetically ought to be done is incompatible with X being wrong. Hence the commonly accepted idea that the end will "color" the means (e.g. If Y is necessary, and X is necessary in order to achieve Y, then X becomes necessary). What do you think of this?

I'm hoping my reasoning here is explained well enough. — javra

It certainly is. This gets tricky and it relates to the article I gestured to in my last response, ST I-II.20.6... Let me know if my reply to this ends up being too terse and requires additional explanation.

In having thought about this, it yet seems to me that, in order for a human to consciously discern that there are no moral differences in the two alternatives available, the human must necessarily to some extent deliberate between the two alternatives - thereby consciously judge and weigh their differences and differing consequences via their reasoning faculties. So doing will itself be a consciously rational act. So, I presently believe that the very act of consciously discerning that the two alternatives have equal moral import can only be a human act - for it requires conscious rationality. — javra

I think you are right that the comparison will itself be an act of deliberation. For Aquinas there would be two distinct acts of deliberation. The first act of deliberation is, "What should I do?" The second act of deliberation is, "How do my options compare?" This comparison performed in the second act is meant to provide an answer to the inquiry of the first act. Everything you say here is correct, and everything you say here seems to me to pertain to the second act. We might say that the comparison-act is complete and renders the conclusion that there is no difference at all between the two options (right foot vs. left foot). But in this case the first act will be incomplete due to the fact that the second act did not succeed in identifying an actionable difference between the two options, and this is precisely why the first act is not a human act. Or alternatively, perhaps it would be better to say that the decision that results from the first (and second) act is not a human act; or else that no decision in the proper sense can result from the first act given its incompleteness.

Once this active deliberation between the alternatives arrives at the conclusion that the available alternatives are of equal moral import, then ... I'm thinking one could still make a reason-based conscious choice as to which alternative to act on (for example, choosing to start with the right foot with the aim of maintaining consistency were this scenario to ever befall again - thereby keeping the harm to a minimum (I know this is iffy, but its the best I've got at the moment)) or, else, one might at this juncture simply allow one's strongest unconscious impulse to precipitate a first step with whichever leg it might be - or else abide by the flipping of a coin. If the first, it would then still be a reason based conscious act. If the latter, then not. — javra

Yes, I think the first is "iffy," as it assumes a consistency between events of this type. I would say that even if the decision of which foot to put first turns out to be a human act, it cannot involve a moral act of choosing who will live and who will die. It can (and I think it does) involve a moral act of accepting that someone will die, but no moral act exists which is based essentially on the comparison.

All the same, in terms of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness, the individual's act would be beyond either. Given no other available alternative to choose from, in this sense alone the person's act of walking would then be amoral... — javra

Let me save this question of coercion vs. duress for my reply to your second post.

Yet the discernment of the act so being (both on the part of the individual or any onlooker) would then be fully rational - for the individual here was not negligent; he/she took to time to deliberate the situation so as to arrive at the rational discernment of being forced to commit an equal wrong regardless of what is chosen. — javra

I agree that the individual was not negligent in choosing between their right foot and left foot. I think it is an interesting question to ask whether negligence in this was even possible.

Precisely! :up: :smile: Nice to see your evaluation of it.

I'll post the initially mentioned hypothetical I have in mind separately... — javra

Sounds good. :smile:

Here is a hypothetical wherein the choice made is concluded to be amoral (this strictly in the sense of being neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy) despite a) the available alternatives not being of equal moral import, b) being an act of consciously made volition and, thereby, a human act, c) being a non-hypothetical ought-judgement and, hence, per the OP, a moral act, and, to top things of, d) the choice taken being a known wrong a priori. — javra

Okay, great. As an aside, Peter Simpson has a paper related to a similar issue, "Justice, Scheffler and Cicero."

I think the basic idea here is fairly straightforward. It is the question, "Does duress excuse?" Or, "Is one still culpable when they act under duress?" (Or coercion, or compulsion, etc. Cf. ST I-II.6.4&5, ST Sup.47.1, as well as Nicomachean Ethics, Bk III)

Aquinas would basically say that culpability is mitigated but not destroyed.

I am the summoned subject of a tyrannical and mad king who, simply for his own amusement, informs me upon my arrival to his citadel that... — www.anenquiry.info / Chapter 11: Validating Our Free Will / Section 11.3.2.

I think your analysis is reasonable in general. Also, your book looks interesting!

If this example holds, as I believe it does, it then illustrates how one could have a human act of conscious choice making which, as per the OP, can be defined as a moral act (for it involved non-hypothetical ought-judgements) that is nevertheless amoral in so far as being neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy. And, furthermore, this amoral quality of the act is upheld despite the committed wrong of insulting a perfect stranger. — javra

First, let me try to short-circuit the counterargument. What we are apt to say on such occasions is that the person's action is understandable (rather than "praiseworthy" or "blameworthy"). What I believe this means is that, given the extreme circumstances, the person's action was morally acceptable or morally mediocre. If this is correct then what is at stake is not an amoral act. Second, extreme circumstances are a sufficient condition for heroic virtue. If—even in the circumstances of extreme threats and duress—a person nonetheless stays true to what is right, we are apt to account them a hero. If the heroic act is not amoral, then is it possible that the non-heroic act in the same circumstance could be amoral? (This seems to relate to Objection 2)

More technically, I want to say that coercion of this kind can only ever be partial coercion. The person is still responsible for their action, but their culpability is mitigated due to the duress. In fact it seems to me that in these situations their responsibility is an important factor in the tyrant's motive. The tyrant is acting immorally, and to aid or abet him is to participate in his immoral actions. The tyrant wants others to participate and aid him in this way, because it tends to justify his cause (and/or destroy the morale of dissenters). It seems to me that to say that such acts are amoral would be to say that the tyrant is wrong about all of these calculations, and I don't believe he is wrong about all of these calculations. I think this deeper level of tyranny is bound up with causing other people to freely* participate.

* The act is partially free and partially coerced, but without the partial freedom the tyrant's motive and special malice would disappear. If, over time, he could decrease the coercion and increase the freedom while achieving the same effect, he would deem this all the better.

Maybe I've missed it but could you briefly describe "classical justice" or link to a post upthread where you discuss it. Thanks. — 180 Proof

I don't know that I've really discussed it on this forum, but I began to broach the topic in my earlier post to you. You said:

Not if "incapacitating" the gunman is the only or least harmful way to prevent the gunman from doing greater, perhaps lethal, harm (e.g. like surgically removing a malignant tumor...) — 180 Proof

Roughly speaking, for classical justice everyone has a right to not be harmed by others, but when the gunman trespasses while brandishing his weapon he forfeits that right. For classical justice due harm and undue harm are not commensurable, and so it is not merely a matter of weighing harms. It sounds like on negative utilitarianism the harm done to the gunman is commensurable with the potential harm he will cause, and knocking him unconscious is permissible only because the former harm outweighs the latter harm. On classical justice one can still act unjustly against the gunman even though he has forfeited some of his rights (by, say, using excessive force), but the harm needed to incapacitate him is not only not unjust, but is also within the special moral genus of "self-defense" (and it thereby trumps a first-order harm analysis). As a caveat I should admit that I don't know the ins and outs of negative utilitarianism, so much of this is guesswork.

(Aquinas is not opposed to the principle of removing malignant tumors, but in the case of criminals he would see this as the prerogative of the state rather than of the individual.)

---

There is also an issue a bit closer to the OP. Negative utilitarianism passes muster insofar as it does not fall prey to the problems that I have commonly seen on TPF, namely those that plague Objections 2 and 5. Nevertheless, in line with my response to (link):

I think there are possible sets of moral rules that do not touch on all human acts, such as ↪180 Proof's negative utilitarianism. But after recognizing those sets of rules the next step is to ask ourselves whether there is a good reason to call the acts which fall under those rules "moral" while calling acts that do not fall under those rules "non-moral." More specifically, we want to probe the question of whether someone's distinction between the moral and the non-moral is a firm, defensible distinction. — Leontiskos

So I would want to ask, first, why "positive utilitarianism" is not partially correct (i.e. why consideration of the harm-complement is non-moral). Second, I would want to inquire into the relevant definition of harm.

(CC: @Lionino)

I was not expecting to receive this level of engagement in the thread! — Leontiskos

I'm myself finding it a good means of honing my reasoning skills (or lack thereof :smile: )

For Aquinas (as for Kant) it is not permissible to lie even in this case. Here is what he says in an article entitled, "Whether every lie is a sin?":

[...]

Reply to Objection 4. A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x). — Aquinas, ST II-II.110.3.ad4 — Leontiskos

Myself, I so far find the idealizations of what should be which are presented in this reply contrary to "deliberate reason ... directed to the due end" which Aquinas also makes mention of. Were this due end, for example, to be that of completely obeying or else holding duty to a set of rules set up by some supreme rule-maker, this might then make sense to me. But consider this hypothetical: either one tells oneself a white lie (say, that today the appearance of one's clothes is decent when, in reality, one does not feel this to be so) or, else, all of humanity perishes (one can affix whatever daemon scenario on pleases to this). If the end pursued is absolute obedience/duty to the rule-maker's rule that one does not ever lie, then it might be correct, or right, to destroy all of humanity by not lying. Yet - not only does this intuitively seem very wrong - but, in changing the end one directs one's actions toward to that of, say, maximal eudemonia, it would then necessarily be rationally incorrect, or worng, to do so as well.

As I believe this illustrated, the issue pivots on what one's ultimate goal is - via which one's current best choices are teleologically determined, and via which one can rationally appraise the rightness or wrongness of one's actions. To this effect:

Would you object to my characterizing your view as (a robust form of) consequentialism? — Leontiskos

This is not an easy question for me to answer. But I'll try. My own views on morality are thoroughly teleological. And, in so deeming, find that this outlook can well be concluded an emphatically complex form of consequentialism just as readily as it can be concluded a form of deontology (wherein one holds a duty to best approximate or else actualize that ultimate long-term goal which is itself of pure intrinsic value). For example, for Kant, this ultimate goal one ought to dutifully pursue to the best of one's ability is the Kingdom of Ends - wherein at least every human is deemed of intrinsic value and never viewed as instrumentally valuable for the benefit of any one human or cohort of these. Maybe I could also point out that, absent any such goal, deontological duty loses meaning (other than, again, duty to obey some other psyche's already made rules ... yet such latter obedience too holds an at least implicit goal in mind, such as that of being rewarded rather than punished by the rule-maker).

That said, any system of consequentialism that does not look upon such literally ultimate long-term goal but, instead, focuses one merely intermediate goals will, to me, necessarily be less than moral. One here deems eating candy a good due to the intermediate goal of satisfying one's sweet-tooth despite so doing leading to tooth decay and the loss of one's teeth ... sort of mindset. And I don't find that typical utilitarianism holds any such ultimate long-term goal in mind - just a generalized heuristic that might or might not eventually lead to such goal (depending on its interpretation and administration).

Perhaps one of the most fruitful entry points is linguistic. First, to nitpick a bit, is the bolded an accurate depiction of your view? "Good and thereby moral"? — Leontiskos

Yes, language is important, and I was clumsy in how I applied it. To try to better explain, an important synonym for good is "beneficial", which can be interpreted as being of proper fit. One then can further interpret good as that which is of proper fit to one's goal, or telos. There are always different teloi we actively hold at the same time: some proximate, some distal, some intermediate (and, in my own musing, as per what I mentioned above, one's ultimate telos, which I shall here address as "the Good"). That which fits the Good is always good/right in an ultimate sense. That which is antithetical to the Good is then always bad/wrong in an ultimate sense. Then, if one's actively held ultimate goal "X" is antithetical to the Good, one's intentions will always be bad/wrong in an ultimate sense. This even if, to further approach or actualize goal X, one needs to engage in acts that are of themselves a proper fit to the Good. Example: one wants to sadistically destroy humanity at large but finds that in order to do so one needs to rescue an innocent baby from drowning; one than is compelled to save the baby from drowning (something one would not have otherwise done) in order to destroy humanity and then so proceeds to do. The deed of saving the baby is good, for it of itself as deed is fit to the Good, but the intentions with which this deed is done are bad, for as intentions they are of proper fit to goal X. Otherwise expressed, the saving of the baby does not hold intrinsic value to the saver or the baby - as it would for anyone whose ultimate telos is the Good - but, instead, is strictly of instrumental value in allowing for goal X. In brief, the deed of a saved baby is of itself moral but the intention with which it was saved is immoral.

What's philosophically interesting here is that, according to your position, it would seem that a bad end/goal vitiates a good deed, but a bad deed does not vitiate a good end/goal. — Leontiskos

I would most definitely not express things as they are in the boldfaced text. Rather, I'd say that a good end/goal vitiates those bad deeds mandatory for [edit: one's optimal proximity - given all contexts and available alternatives - to] the good end's/goal's actualization [edit: for the given good end might not be at all actualizable via these very same bad deeds, this despite these bad deeds being mandatory for one's optimal proximity to the good end, all things considered ... with an example of this provided below as pertains to Ukraine's engaging in war]. To me it makes for a world of difference. My beating some complete stranger to a pulp strictly out of the pleasure to do so directly estranges my from the Good. However, where I to be aiming to remain optimally aligned to the Good, and were a horrendous attack on an innocent to occur right in front of me, my then beating to a pulp the assailant so as to prevent the innocent's death (were I to be so capable of doing and were this to somehow be the only viable alternative to take) would be vitiated as an intentionally performed bad/evil/wrong. Here, (were I to be so capable) I would be proud of risking my own life to save the innocent despite the violence I willfully engaged in - and would feel very deep shame and guilt, i.e. profound culpability, where I to do nothing while the innocent died right before me with me doing nothing about it (though, in the latter case, I would not have engaged in any violence myself).

I know things can get more complex, but maybe this serves as good enough explanation?

In other words to advise X such that X non-hypothetically ought to be done is incompatible with X being wrong. Hence the commonly accepted idea that the end will "color" the means (e.g. If Y is necessary, and X is necessary in order to achieve Y, then X becomes necessary). What do you think of this? — Leontiskos

You are right, it's not easy to phrase these disparate notions of wrongness in common speech. But to try to clarify my position: X is not a wrong (an incorrect or else unfit) course of action to take as a necessary means of achieving Y which is itself optimally fitting to an eventual achieving of the ultimate good goal Z - this even though, in direct respect to ultimate good Z, X can only be ascertained as ultimately being a wrong (this because it does not allow for the ultimate achievement of Z). More concretely, let Z = Kant's Kingdom of Ends; Ukraine's engaging in war against an unjustly invading Russia is then something that cannot of itself directly achieve a Kingdom of Ends and, so, is a wrong in this ultimate sense (I do have trouble calling Ukraine's war of self-deference an evil, though, even when termed a "lesser evil"); nevertheless, Ukraine's engaging in war is necessary to achieve Ukraine's maintaining of autonomy, which is itself optimally aligned to an eventual Kingdom of Ends. As regards common speech: although we all know that war is ultimately bad, it is good for Ukraine to engage in war against an unjust invader rather then allowing itself to be decimated by not engaging in such war.


I'll reply to the second post later on.

I would suggest that harm and the withholding of welfare are both contrary to the object's will, if in slightly different ways—harm is certainly more contrary — Leontiskos

I would say both are contrary to the object's desire, but not free will in the sense of freedom of choice. When we impart harm on someone, we are taking something away from them, which by the definition of "harm" is against their will; by withholding welfare, we are not attacking their free will, as we are basically not interacting with them at all — not giving them something appears to me as very different from taking something away.

Second, I would want to inquire into the relevant definition of harm. — Leontiskos

to hurt someone or damage something: — Cambridge

To hurt:

to feel pain in a part of your body, or to injure someone or cause them pain: — Cambridge

The definition of "to damage" circularly says "to harm". So I translated "to harm" to another language and translated the definition to English:
"To make lose qualities".

I am behind these definitions. The interesting thing about "harm" is that indeed it means to make something lose its qualities. So then we see that the word "harm" itself already carries some sort of aesthetic/moral judgement by evoking the word "quality". In many cases it seems uncontroversial. If I am shooting someone, I am making them lose qualities (health) that we hold universally as desirable.
However, if I offer someone alcohol, there will be wide disagreement about whether I am harming or helping them.

So perhaps it is the case that negative utilitarianism simply pushes the issue back and leaves the conclusion up to subjectivity, instead of grounding it objectively (on something like freedom or serotonin or reproductive success).

On classical justice one can still act unjustly against the gunman even though he has forfeited some of his rights (by, say, using excessive force) — Leontiskos

And in many countries that is indeed the case. Shooting someone brandishing a knife is allowable if done so to incapacitate, but going behind him and shooting him in the head may be seen as undue use of force and execution.

More broadly on this example, perhaps a distinction between potential harm and actual (more accurately certain/guaranteed) harm is due.

You hold that some ‘evil’ is amorally bad, and is thusly outside of the scope of morality; whereas I think that all ‘evil’ is intrinsically bad, and is thusly within the scope of morality. — Bob Ross

I would say that all evil is intrinsically bad (and evil), but that not all evil is moral evil. Again, I don't have a strong position on whether natural evil exists, but for the foreseeable remainder of our discussion I will just pretend it does exist.

You hold that ‘moral’ refers to only meanings directly related to ‘acts’, whereas I use it in a much broader scope.

Morality, at its core, is about acts for you; intrinsic goodness, for me. — Bob Ross

For me morality relates directly or indirectly to intention. SEP states this well by talking about "intentions or negligence" (for negligence captures indirect intention).

I think you think health, for example, is an amoral good... — Bob Ross

I would suggest following the SEP definition that I have given very many times now. Rain is non-moral because it is not caused by intention or negligence. Health is not a non-moral good, for health can obviously be influenced by intention and negligence.

Everything in reality can be attributed the property; and I can make a parody argument for redness: everything in reality is red, but we can say things that makes sense like “a block that doesn’t exist is not red”. — Bob Ross

To restrict the predication of "being" to what exists "in reality" is tautologous and artificial. We don't limit our use of the predication in that way. We really do talk about grandma no longer existing. Your so-called "moral" is altogether different.

I think the argument from vacuity is a defeater for your idiosyncratic use of the term "moral." We talk about things that do not exist because things do not exist. In a world where everything is red there would be no possibility of talking about non-red things. We would have no concept of red or non-red.

It means discourse related to (1) intrinsic goodness and (2) what is intrinsically good. — Bob Ross

So you think that every time we use the word "good" we are engaged in moral discourse? This would explain some of your recent threads.

For you, and commonly to people, morality is about behavior; but this is a major mistake: it is really about intrinsic goodness and what is intrinsically good. — Bob Ross

If that were the case then the word "moral" would not exist, just as the word "red" does not exist in the possible world you were considering. As I said, the reason humans distinguish the moral from the non-moral is because it turns out to be an enormously important distinction in human life. On your view it is a minor distinction that requires lots of words to tease out.

It depends: when we discuss those things, are we supposing we are talking about actually good trees, actually good birds, etc.? If so, then we are definitely talking about ethics. — Bob Ross

Claims like this are self-evidently false to those of us who are familiar with the English language. Rocks, trees, and birds are not moral entities.

Either morality is only about what is related to behavior and there is no morality in a world incapable of agents (i.e., things which have behaviors, can act, in the manner you describe) OR morality is not fundamentally about behavior (although it can include that in itself, even as a primary sub-subject). — Bob Ross

For the third or fourth time, I choose the former. If you think there is something problematic with the former you will need to give an actual argument.

Morality is not itself the study of behavior. — Bob Ross

It is in the sense that if you are talking about something 100% unrelated to behavior, then you are not talking about morality.

I would say both are contrary to the object's desire, but not free will in the sense of freedom of choice. When we impart harm on someone, we are taking something away from them, which by the definition of "harm" is against their will; by withholding welfare, we are not attacking their free will, as we are basically not interacting with them at all — not giving them something appears to me as very different from taking something away. — Lionino

First I should again note that harm is more contrary to the will than withholding welfare. With that said, by the definition of "welfare," imparting welfare to someone is in accord with their will, and thus it would seem that withholding welfare is contrary to their will.

I think you are right to note that there is a difference of expectation. In the case of interpersonal harm one expects that it should not happen to them, whereas in the case of interpersonal welfare one does not expect that it should not be withheld (or more simply: one does not expect that it should occur). Yet this matter of expectation is, I think, related to rights rather than will. They are different because we have a right to not-be-harmed, whereas we have no right to receive welfare. Thus such a version of negative utilitarianism seems to be a form of classical justice (because it is rights-based). The analysis seems to be presupposing rights.

I am behind these definitions. The interesting thing about "harm" is that indeed it means to make something lose its qualities. So then we see that the word "harm" itself already carries some sort of aesthetic/moral judgement by evoking the word "quality". In many cases it seems uncontroversial. If I am shooting someone, I am making them lose qualities (health) that we hold universally as desirable.
However, if I offer someone alcohol, there will be wide disagreement about whether I am harming or helping them.

So perhaps it is the case that negative utilitarianism simply pushes the issue back and leaves the conclusion up to subjectivity, instead of grounding it objectively (on something like freedom or serotonin or reproductive success). — Lionino

Yes, and I think this gets at why the definition of 'harm' becomes important. Is it merely physical harm? Does it include psychological harm? I want to say that "to harm something is to make something lose its qualities," is too broad, because not all qualities are self-consciously believed to be valuable. For example, on your definition if I cause someone to lose weight I have harmed them. Yet we are apt to say that, prima facie, the exact opposite is the case. Or to use your example, if I take alcohol away from an alcoholic, does it necessarily follow that I have harmed him?

And in many countries that is indeed the case. Shooting someone brandishing a knife is allowable if done so to incapacitate, but going behind him and shooting him in the head may be seen as undue use of force and execution. — Lionino

Right.

The analysis seems to be presupposing rights. — Leontiskos

It seems like it.

I want to say that "to harm something is to make something lose its qualities," is too broad, because not all qualities are self-consciously believed to be valuable — Leontiskos

Which is why I say:

pushes the issue back and leaves the conclusion up to subjectivity, instead of grounding it objectively (on something like freedom or serotonin or reproductive success) — Lionino

Because the word "quality" here is often up to personal preference, as I note: If I am shooting someone, I am making them lose qualities (health) that we hold universally as desirable. However, if I offer someone drugs, there will be wide disagreement about whether I am harming or helping them because what the drug is supposed to counteract may or may not be held positively, or may or may not be held more negatively than the other effects of the drug.

For example, on your definition if I cause someone to lose weight I have harmed them. — Leontiskos

Well, being fat would not be a quality — so would everybody say prior to 2013.

if I take alcohol away from an alcoholic, does it necessarily follow that I have harmed him? — Leontiskos

In most cases no, because being addicted is something that (almost) all would agree is not a quality but the inverse of it.

As an aside, Peter Simpson has a paper related to a similar issue, "Justice, Scheffler and Cicero." — Leontiskos

I skimmed through the paper. The principal example given - that of killing one person to save five - has always been irksome to me due to its ambiguity/non-specificity: ought one kill a Mother Teresa to save five Hitlers or, else, ought one not kill one Hitler and allow five Mother Teresas to die instead? Or, as per the trolley problem, if all six are of exact same moral worth, why kill one of them to save the five instead of choosing to jump off the bridge oneself in a blaze of glory (... all lives considered being equal in moral worth and all)? But getting back to your reply ...

Also, your book looks interesting! — Leontiskos

I could deprecate it galore, but thanks for so saying.

I think the basic idea here is fairly straightforward. It is the question, "Does duress excuse?" Or, "Is one still culpable when they act under duress?" — Leontiskos

I'm thinking I didn't present the hypothetical sufficiently well. The hypothetical is strictly aiming to illustrate the possibility of a person being attributively responsible for deed X without however then being morally responsible for deed X. Here, let attributive responsibility for X be understood as "being the primary cause for X" and let moral responsibility for X be understood as "being answerable for the goodness or badness of X".

I might be wrong, but I'm thinking this definition of moral responsibility will hold in all cases.

Alternative (b) was provided so as to force the person into freely choosing of their own will between (a. i) and (a. ii) - such that the choice between (a. i) and (a. ii) is in no way constrained by threats or ultimatums (unlike the choice between (a) and (b) - which, due to being made under extreme duress, the person can be argued to not be attributively responsible for). In this second, non-coerced choice between the given wrongs, the person of their own liberty then chooses what they deem to be the lesser of two wrongs (or evils as you say), and thereby commits a relatively minor transgression of mores.

But the issue to this hypothetical, within its own context of argument, is as follows: must the person in this case then be answerable for the goodness/badness of the deed they brought about?

In other words, are they in any way morally responsible for their choice (a choice which they now are attributively responsible for)? Specifically, this for having insulted a stranger rather than having done a far worse bad/evil/wrong against this same stranger.

To either celibate or deride the individual for his choice so far to me makes little to no sense. And, if so, the person is not morally responsible for their (in this example) freely willed choice - a choice which was thereby a human act (which the OP affirms to always be a moral act).

It's not about the choice or deed being excusable due to the duress - there was no duress in the two alternatives of the second choice that was taken (there was only a necessary choice between a fixed set of alternatives, with complete liberty to choose either). It's about the individual not being answerable for the goodness or badness (depending on perspective) of the choice of insulting a stranger rather than beating them unconscious. (In contrast, were the person to choose not to insult but to instead beat the stranger unconscious, then they would be morally responsible for their choice - for, in this case, they would now be answerable for the goodness/badness of their choice.)

So the hypothetical presents a human act that, as per the OP, is a moral act, which the given agent is nevertheless not morally responsible for (this by the very definition of moral responsibility provided). A choice for which the agent is attributively responsible that is nevertheless amoral in its characteristics - here strictly meaning that it is beyond the realms of moral responsibility wherein the agent can be either praised for taking a good choice or blamed for taking a bad one.

Lots of explaining done. If you still feel that the example is not of significant interest, I'm more than willing to let this one possible counterexample go in the context of this thread.

So I would want to ask, first, why "positive utilitarianism" is not partially correct (i.e. why consideration of the harm-complement is non-moral). — Leontiskos

I don't understand the question. :confused:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_utilitarianism (I interpret this reducing harm-caused-by-personal-conduct / judgment as normative morality )

Second, I would want to inquire into the relevant definition of harm.

From a 2023 thread Convince Me of Moral Realism, by 'harm' (in some of its various forms) I mean this:

- deprivation (of e.g. sustanence, shelter, sleep, touch, esteem, care, health, hygiene, trust, safety, etc)

- dysfunction (i.e. injury, ill-health, disability)

- helplessness (i.e. trapped, confined, or fear-terror of being vulnerable)

- stupidity (i.e. maladaptive habits (e.g. mimetic violence, lose-lose preferences, etc))

- betrayal (i.e. trust-hazards)

- bereavement (i.e. losing loved ones & close friends), etc ...

... in effect, any involuntary decrease, irreparable loss or final elimination of human agency — 180 Proof

And by 'injustice' I mean harm to individuals as a direct or indirect consequence of a social structure, or lack thereof, reproduced by customs, public policies, legistlation, jurisprudence or arbitrary violence. Thus, utilitarianism is a kind (or subset) of consequentialism.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_consequentialism (I interpret this reducing injustice (i.e. reducing harm-caused-by-social-structure / violence) as applied morality )

So I would want to ask, first, why "positive utilitarianism" is not partially correct (i.e. why consideration of the harm-complement is non-moral). Second, I would want to inquire into the relevant definition of harm.

I can think of one reason to preference the reduction of the negative over the maximization of some positive principle (e.g., pleasure for J.S. Mill).

Like I said earlier, the human good is bound up in normative good, which changes over varying historical contexts, even if it is not "arbitrary" or "unconnected to the world outside social practices." If we accept this, it seems somewhat obvious that most normative measure does not result in a measure where we can simply maximize some value as a means of "maximizing goodness." To take the Athenian Stranger's self-referential example from the Statesman, we don't maximize the good of a speech by maximizing (or minimizing) its length, but by making it "just right," for its purpose. A speech can certainly be "too long," or "too short," but identifying this on any sort of clear spectrum seems like it is going to miss something.

Minimizing harm seems to be less likely to fall into the "min/max" trap. We are inclined to think of disease, dysfunction, etc. as a variation from some stability point or harmony. We don't always think like this, but it seems sort of natural. Most basic human ailments are the result of a variance from some "golden mean." E.g., mania or depression are both bad for a person, a heart rate that is too high or too low are both bad, etc. If we wanted to look into the origins of this, I would say it partially lies in biology. Animals need to maintain homeostasis. We don't want to be "too hot" or "too cold," to eat "too much" or "too little," to have too many of some sort of blood cells or too few, etc.

However, when it comes to the acquisition of positive things, we often tend to look to maximize the good. For example, Mill wants to maximize pleasure (and we might consider here Plato's distinction of which pleasures are better than others in the Philibus or Aristotle's in Book X of the Ethics as counter examples). This makes a certain sense to me, because when it comes to the acquisition of external goods, food stores, money, etc., it is always nice to have more as a sort of "backup." More won't hurt, we can always just not use a resource we have "extra," of, or share it in exchange for some other good.

Research in economics tends to line up with this to some degree. People preference the threat of losing $1,000 over the potential of gaining $1,000. The idea here is that agents' utility functions are curved, such that losses bring you down the steeper part of the curve while gains are upwards, along a flatter part of the curve. Other experiments have brought out the difference between the fear of loss, variance from the current stability point, versus the desire to maximize gain

Of course, my point would be that neither minimization/maximization or looking for some variance from an ideal spot works for many types of normative measure. However, the variance model is likely to be "more right," more often. If we insist on trying to conceptualize the human good mathematically, I would insist on it being an n-dimensional object, with very many dimensions whose shape is determined in part by normative measure.

We might think of a cube here instead of a line, where each dimension is some factor, and maybe we are aiming for some middle point in the cube. Since the human good varies by historical context, we could suppose that the "shape of the human good," has a very high number of dimensions, and in fact, a shifting number of dimensions depending on which normative measures are relevant. These shapes won't be tidey and equilateral, meaning that "finding the center," is not only hard, but that, depending on the shape, the center could be very far from the "golden mean point," on some dimensions. That is, we can't get to the "right spot," on all the meaningful dimensions at once, depending on what the human good looks like in our context.

But, this doesn't doom us to unhappiness. It also seems that a person, and even moreso a culture, can change the shape of the human good relevant to them by changing their values and normative measure. So, part of "trying to get to an ideal society," would involve getting to a shape were being in "the right place," on some measures doesn't entail that you are "in a bad place," on others.

Have I contradicted myself with this geometric analogy? Absolutely. I don't think we can actually measure the human good in this way, even as a point in some n-dimensional space. But the analogy is useful in illustration how shifting personal and cultural norms change the landscape of solutions. The "shape" of the human good varies in this way, according to practices and historical events, but it isn't solely determined by these things. Human nature itself, and the grand gyre of history, plays an essential role in which shapes will allow for better solutions (i.e. being in "the right place" on one dimension doesn't entail being in the wrong place on others).

For example, current American cultures focus on status and wealth makes it such that it is difficult to balance the good of having regard from others and avoiding Aristotle's vice of grasping/acquisitiveness. We have made a vice into a virtue, and so the shape of the human good is such that finding a balance across different dimensions becomes difficult.

I think we have exhausted our conversation. There's only one last question I have (that won't circle us back to our pre-existing disagreements): am I right in thinking that, for you, that the study of intrinsic goodness (i.e., actual goodness) is outside of the sphere of morality? That is certainly NOT what the SEP is intending, nor does the commoner agree with that. If so, what is that study called to you?

Besides that, I want to say, again, I appreciated the conversation; and I look forward to ones in the future! (:

Bob

- Sounds good, Bob. Thanks and take care.

@Leontiskos – Assuming you intend to reply, I've just edited my previous post so that (hopefully) my statements are clearer.

I'm myself finding it a good means of honing my reasoning skills (or lack thereof :smile: ) — javra

Yes, it is a good exercise! - haha.

Myself, I so far find the idealizations of what should be which are presented in this reply contrary to "deliberate reason ... directed to the due end" which Aquinas also makes mention of. Were this due end, for example, to be that of completely obeying or else holding duty to a set of rules set up by some supreme rule-maker, this might then make sense to me. But consider this hypothetical: either one tells oneself a white lie (say, that today the appearance of one's clothes is decent when, in reality, one does not feel this to be so) or, else, all of humanity perishes (one can affix whatever daemon scenario on pleases to this). If the end pursued is absolute obedience/duty to the rule-maker's rule that one does not ever lie, then it might be correct, or right, to destroy all of humanity by not lying. Yet - not only does this intuitively seem very wrong - but, in changing the end one directs one's actions toward to that of, say, maximal eudemonia, it would then necessarily be rationally incorrect, or worng, to do so as well. — javra

But now you're saying that not-lying is immoral, and this seems to prove my point. If I think lying is immoral and you think not-lying is immoral, then we are in agreement that lying is not amoral.

That said, any system of consequentialism that does not look upon such literally ultimate long-term goal but, instead, focuses one merely intermediate goals will, to me, necessarily be less than moral. One here deems eating candy a good due to the intermediate goal of satisfying one's sweet-tooth despite so doing leading to tooth decay and the loss of one's teeth ... sort of mindset. And I don't find that typical utilitarianism holds any such ultimate long-term goal in mind - just a generalized heuristic that might or might not eventually lead to such goal (depending on its interpretation and administration). — javra

But doesn't classical utilitarianism hold to the long-term goal of maximizing pleasure? In this case pleasure is the goal or telos, and it is appraised in terms of consequences (i.e. "Will this act lead to maximal pleasure?"). On first blush it would seem that you simply have more goals than this utilitarian, but that all of your goals are similarly appraised in terms of consequences. I wouldn't call your system deontological because none of your goals are immune to being overridden on account of consequences. Kant does have such immunities, and for this reason he seems to be interested in rules, not goals. He has rules which must be universally applied, not goals which must be worked toward. So Kant's rules preclude him from lying, and they preclude him regardless of any alluring consequences that could be foreseen. Unlike consequentialism, Kantianism is therefore not quantitative or calculative. It seems to me that his system is intended to be a priori in the sense that it does not advert to consequences and inclinations (but I am not a Kantian).

Yes, language is important, and I was clumsy in how I applied it. To try to better explain, an important synonym for good is "beneficial", which can be interpreted as being of proper fit. One then can further interpret good as that which is of proper fit to one's goal, or telos. There are always different teloi we actively hold at the same time: some proximate, some distal, some intermediate (and, in my own musing, as per what I mentioned above, one's ultimate telos, which I shall here address as "the Good"). That which fits the Good is always good/right in an ultimate sense. That which is antithetical to the Good is then always bad/wrong in an ultimate sense. Then, if one's actively held ultimate goal "X" is antithetical to the Good, one's intentions will always be bad/wrong in an ultimate sense. This even if, to further approach or actualize goal X, one needs to engage in acts that are of themselves a proper fit to the Good. Example: one wants to sadistically destroy humanity at large but finds that in order to do so one needs to rescue an innocent baby from drowning; one than is compelled to save the baby from drowning (something one would not have otherwise done) in order to destroy humanity and then so proceeds to do. The deed of saving the baby is good, for it of itself as deed is fit to the Good, but the intentions with which this deed is done are bad, for as intentions they are of proper fit to goal X. Otherwise expressed, the saving of the baby does not hold intrinsic value to the saver or the baby - as it would for anyone whose ultimate telos is the Good - but, instead, is strictly of instrumental value in allowing for goal X. In brief, the deed of a saved baby is of itself moral but the intention with which it was saved is immoral. — javra

Okay thanks for explaining that. It makes sense to me and I can agree to much of it. The question I would have—and this may be somewhat tangential—is: What is the difference between intrinsic value and instrumental value? If both baby-savers are saving the baby for the sake of their goal, then why is only one of them acting instrumentally? I think this question may also help get at the consequentialism inquiry.

My beating some complete stranger to a pulp strictly out of the pleasure to do so directly estranges my from the Good. However, where I to be aiming to remain optimally aligned to the Good, and were a horrendous attack on an innocent to occur right in front of me, my then beating to a pulp the assailant so as to prevent the innocent's death (were I to be so capable of doing and were this to somehow be the only viable alternative to take) would be vitiated as an intentionally performed bad/evil/wrong. Here, (were I to be so capable) I would be proud of risking my own life to save the innocent despite the violence I willfully engaged in - and would feel very deep shame and guilt, i.e. profound culpability, where I to do nothing while the innocent died right before me with me doing nothing about it (though, in the latter case, I would not have engaged in any violence myself).

I know things can get more complex, but maybe this serves as good enough explanation? — javra

Hmm. We are considering my thesis that on your system "a bad deed does not vitiate a good end/goal." The qualm I have with your explanation is that the "bad deed" is arguably not a bad deed at all (i.e. defending the innocent by fighting an aggressor). I would rather take something that we commonly accept to be a bad deed, such as raping a woman. If my thesis is correct, then on your view it would be reasonable to say that, in some cases, raping a woman is not only not immoral, but is morally necessary and praiseworthy, if it achieves some proportionately good end (such as avoiding "the perishing of all humanity"). The idea here is that any deed, no matter how evil, is always justifiable in principle. There is apparently no deed of which we can say that it is impermissible in all circumstances (except for "deeds" which are abstractions, such as "causing maximal suffering").

You are right, it's not easy to phrase these disparate notions of wrongness in common speech. But to try to clarify my position: X is not a wrong (an incorrect or else unfit) course of action to take as a necessary means of achieving Y which is itself optimally fitting to an eventual achieving of the ultimate good goal Z - this even though, in direct respect to ultimate good Z, X can only be ascertained as ultimately being a wrong (this because it does not allow for the ultimate achievement of Z). More concretely, let Z = Kant's Kingdom of Ends; Ukraine's engaging in war against an unjustly invading Russia is then something that cannot of itself directly achieve a Kingdom of Ends and, so, is a wrong in this ultimate sense (I do have trouble calling Ukraine's war of self-deference an evil, though, even when termed a "lesser evil"); nevertheless, Ukraine's engaging in war is necessary to achieve Ukraine's maintaining of autonomy, which is itself optimally aligned to an eventual Kingdom of Ends. As regards common speech: although we all know that war is ultimately bad, it is good for Ukraine to engage in war against an unjust invader rather then allowing itself to be decimated by not engaging in such war. — javra

As above, I have a hard time with this attempted reframing of Kantianism in terms of consequences—even the consequence of a Kingdom of Ends. Let me therefore leave Kantianism to the side for the moment.

Regarding your X, Y, Z analysis, I would want to say that if X is necessary to achieve Y and Y is necessary to achieve Z, then X is necessary to achieve Z. In fact this would seem to prove that it is false to claim that, "[X] does not allow for the ultimate achievement of Z." Or am I underestimating the work that your term "optimally fitting" is doing? (Note that if, as you seem to say, Z precludes X, then it cannot simultaneously be true that X is necessary to achieve Z)

In my post there was a paragraph that began, "I think you are right that the comparison will itself be an act of deliberation..." (). Given that this had to do with your counterexample to the OP, I am curious if you agree with it.

Best,
Leontiskos

I skimmed through the paper. The principal example given - that of killing one person to save five - has always been irksome to me due to its ambiguity/non-specificity: ought one kill a Mother Teresa to save five Hitlers or, else, ought one not kill one Hitler and allow five Mother Teresas to die instead? — javra

I'd say the idea is that it doesn't matter who's who, as long as they are innocent. It will always be wrong to kill "one innocent person to save two or five innocent persons from being killed by someone else" (1).

I think the basic idea here is fairly straightforward. It is the question, "Does duress excuse?" Or, "Is one still culpable when they act under duress?" — Leontiskos

But the issue to this hypothetical, within its own context of argument, is as follows: must the person in this case then be answerable for the goodness/badness of the deed they brought about?

In other words, are they in any way morally responsible for their choice (a choice which they now are attributively responsible for)? Specifically, this for having insulted a stranger rather than having done a far worse bad/evil/wrong against this same stranger. — javra

For me the important question is whether they are responsible for (a). I can agree with everything else you say as being fairly straightforward (e.g. it is good that they chose a.i rather than a.ii ; it is at least understandable that they chose (a) rather than (b)).

As an aside, was the bolded here a typo?

(unlike the choice between (a) and (b) - which, due to being made under extreme duress, the person can be argued to not be attributively responsible for) — javra

By "attributively" did you mean to write "morally"?

It's not about the choice or deed being excusable due to the duress - there was no duress in the two alternatives of the second choice that was taken (there was only a necessary choice between a fixed set of alternatives, with complete liberty to choose either). It's about the individual not being answerable for the goodness or badness (depending on perspective) of the choice of insulting a stranger rather than beating them unconscious. (In contrast, were the person to choose not to insult but to instead beat the stranger unconscious, then they would be morally responsible for their choice - for, in this case, they would now be answerable for the goodness/badness of their choice.) — javra

This strikes me as the same issue I tried to address earlier in my paragraph that began, "I think you are right that the comparison will itself be an act of deliberation..." (). What is happening in both cases, I believe, is that you are conflating two acts with a single act.

Here are the two acts as I see them:

1. Choose between (a) and (b)
2. If (a), then choose between a.i and a.ii

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think you are saying that you are "attributively responsible" for both (1) and (2), and morally responsible for (2) but not for (1) (because of the duress involved in (1)). Similarly, you think (2) is a human act but (1) is not (because of the duress involved in (1)).

If this understanding is correct, then the response that I already gave should be on point. If this understanding is incorrect, then the response that I already gave may be missing something. Again, it seems to me that the central question is whether the duress involved in act (1) makes it non-moral and non-human, and this is the question I tried to address in my last response.

I should add that, in the same way that you think lying to the Nazi is praiseworthy, presumably choosing (a) is deemed praiseworthy. If it is praiseworthy, then it must be moral in the OP's sense.

(It is possible to parse the acts differently than I did, but I think that in any case there will be multiple acts.)