those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions "of a man," but not properly "human" actions, since they are not proper to man as man.
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moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end, for moral acts are the same as human acts. — Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, Q. 1, A. 1 & A. 3
I commend you for the thoughtfulness which is exemplified in your OP, as it is well-written, succinct, and substantive. — Bob Ross
The classical example, in my mind, is the common idea in modern society that 'morality' is personal, and that one should not mix their morals with what they vote into law: it is all a load of nonsense that, at worst, is deployed as a moral deception to silence moral views. — Bob Ross
...but [negligence can only be moral] if not just deliberate acts are within the sphere of moral scrutiny. — Bob Ross
There only two areas that I would disagree with you, and that is (1) the credence that you give to the idea that "morality is nothing more than justice" — Bob Ross
morality is broader than just acts — Bob Ross
With respect to #1, Morality is the study of intrinsic goodness and what is intrinsically good: both components are necessary to capture what ethics is about. — Bob Ross
an action is the synthesis, at least, of an intention, an effect, and an essence — Bob Ross
We can say that kicking people is generally wrong, for example, because it produces consequences which violate our morals (whatever they may be); and so the act of kicking the doctor was still wrong, although we wouldn't hold the person, in this case, responsible for it. — Bob Ross
Ok, back to #1. Actions which are not deliberate, can still be analyzed, to some extent, in terms of their effects and essences, being that it is a synthesis of intention and effect. For example, other species cannot, for the most part, be meaningfully considered deliberately acting (like humans) so we don't really consider their intentions within moral scrutiny, but we do still analyze the effects and natures of the acts that they perform. If morality is just about justice or, more generally, human acts, then we lose this valid aspect of the study. — Bob Ross
A human act is any act that we do on purpose; any act that proceeds from a deliberate will. Objection 3 to the first article gives the complement of human acts, “But man does many things without deliberation, sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent on something else.” In his reply to objection 3 Aquinas says, “Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the proper principle of human actions.” — Leontiskos
I said, "Morality is therefore not only about what someone does or considers. It is also about what they fail to do or fail to take into consideration."
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If someone neglects to do something with invincible ignorance, then they are not culpable for their "negligence" because their omission is not in any way deliberate.
I agree that morality involves a study of goodness, but in the OP I am focusing on the question of the breadth of the moral sphere. The idea is that we determine how far the moral sphere extends by comparing the set of all acts to the set of moral acts.
Now, I did add Objection 5, and perhaps this is what you are concerned with?
• K1: If something is not a human act, then it is not a moral act
• K2: Only moral acts are moral or immoral, right or wrong
• K3: Therefore, if something is not a human act, then it is not moral or immoral, right or wrong
• K4: A reflex-kick at the doctor's office is not a human act
• K5: Therefore, a reflex-kick at the doctor's office is not moral or immoral, right or wrong
The effects of human acts are moral insofar as they touch on volition
:up:I am a moralrealist[naturalist] who disagrees with both theses — Leontiskos
I don't think these statements make sense or are useful (re: if "all" x = y, then ~x = y).Thesis 1 and thesis 2 represent two categorical claims:
All human acts are moral acts
All interpersonal acts are justice acts
In the metaethical framework of moral naturalism, I think "the moral sphere" consists of natural creatures (i.e. any sentient species) which can suffer from – fears of – arbitrary harm (or injustice), especially, though not exclusively, moral agents who are also moral patients.What is the breadth of the moral sphere?
In the normative framework of negative utilitarianism, I think only judgments/conduct which (actively or passively) (a) prevents or reduces harm or (b) inflicts or increases harm are moral; however, those activities which are neither (a) nor (b) are non-moral (e.g. phatic, instrumental, involuntary) so that most "human acts", in fact, are non-moral.Some human acts are not moral acts
In the applied framework of negative consequentialism, I do not think "interpersonal acts are justice acts" because "justice" pertains to impacts on individuals by institutional or group practices (i.e. policies) and not "interpersonal" – what happens between individuals.Some interpersonal acts are not justice acts
A popular view would hold that acts exist on a moral spectrum, such as the following:
| Heroically virtuous | Mildly good | Neutral | Mildly bad | Heinous |
According to this objection the “neutral” acts are not moral acts.
It seems likely moral discourse is being conflated with discourse about culpability (although perhaps I am reading too much in between the lines): for example, I think it is perfectly valid to analyze whether or not a tornado is inherently immoral or not, and I see that, although a reflex-kick would not render a person culpable, a reflex-kick that is to the detriment of an innocent person is still wrong — Bob Ross
it seems like, and correct me if I am wrong, Acquinas is trying to limit the sphere of moral discourse to just "human acts". — Bob Ross
If all that is being conveyed here is that only acts which a person performs that is deliberate, or traced back to some deliberation prior, can be validly called a ‘human act’ in the sense of an act that would bind the person with responsibility for it, then I agree. — Bob Ross
This is the conflation I am talking about (between moral discourse and discourse about culpability): morality is not just the study of culpability and responsibility. We can say, just like when analyzing a tornado, that a foot + leg kicking another (innocent) person is bad, without conceding that the person that performed the action is culpable for it; which is an eliminated possibility if I take the above quote seriously. A tornado is inherently (morally) bad, but we wouldn't say it is culpable for its effects (or 'actions' in a loose sense of the word). — Bob Ross
Fair enough. I think your idea of “invincible negligence” clarified quite a bit of my contentions; and I am inclined to agree with you. — Bob Ross
I think I understand what you are going for, but it doesn’t seem correct to depict it as about “the breadth of the moral sphere”: that would imply that you are discussing and analyzing what can be constituted as ‘moral’ whatsoever, and not about particularly what set of [human] acts can be constituted as ‘moral’ (which is what I believe you are trying to discuss).
As long as it is acknowledged that the breadth of the moral sphere is not limited to acts; then I am content. — Bob Ross
In the metaethical framework of moral naturalism, I think "the moral sphere" consists of natural creatures (i.e. any sentient species) which can suffer from – fears of – arbitrary harm (or injustice), especially, though not exclusively, moral agents which are also moral patients. — 180 Proof
I don't think these statements make sense or are useful (re: if "all" x = y, then ~x = y). — 180 Proof
In the normative framework of negative utilitarianism, I think only judgments/conduct which (actively or passively) (a) prevents or reduces harm or (b) inflicts or increases harm are moral; however, those activities which are neither (a) nor (b) are non-moral (e.g. phatic, instrumental, involuntary) so that most "human acts", in fact, are non-moral. — 180 Proof
In the applied framework of negative consequentialism, I do not think "interpersonal acts are justice acts" because "justice" pertains to impacts on individuals by institutional or group practices (i.e. policies) and not "interpersonal" – what happens between individuals. — 180 Proof
A moral act is an act that involves a moral judgment, or an act that is susceptible to moral judgment. — Leontiskos
Cannot all of this be said more simply? It seems to me that whatever anything is, it is by reference to other things, whatever they may be. Thus whatever morality is, it is, ultimately, by agreement. — tim wood
What flavors? For primitives probably the example of nature. Socrates, truth. For Plato, finding nature imperfect, the prefect forms. Aristotle, the telos. Christians, God. Kant, the logic of the thing. Mill, utility. — tim wood
This is a good thread. — Count Timothy von Icarus
First, an additional argument that might help out with these claims can be found in the part of the Summa Contra Gentiles in the section On The Human Good. There, St. Thomas points out that we must have some ends in order to explain action. If we have no ends, then we will not have any reason to act one way rather than another, nor any reason not to simply be passive. When people say acts have no moral valence, what they often imply if that they are done for no particular ends. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But in the modern view, we seem to want to reduce everything to quantitative measure that can be placed on a scale like the number line, where we can point to "more is better," or "variance from this point is worse." It's clear that this isn't always the case in normative measure. Plato makes a similar point in the Phaedrus when he has Socrates discuss what would happen if he claimed to be a doctor because he had all sorts of medicines, but then has no clue "how much" he should give to a person. — Count Timothy von Icarus
...but to be thus affected at the right times, and on the right occasions, and towards the right persons, and with the right object, and in the right fashion, is the mean course and the best course, and these are characteristics of virtue. — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.vi
The point here is that I think part of what trips people up in ethics is the way in which the good is often filtered through practices that help us define our ends. These practices are socially constructed, but they are not arbitrary. They relate to "how the world is," prior to any practice existing and evolve according to things other than social practice. However, it seems impossible to reduce them to things outside social practices, and the human good is certainly quite bound up in practices and normative measure. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Practices relate to internal and external goods, and are situated within the pursuit of the higher human good. Without a "human good," it is impossible to explain how practices evolve. Practices make determining goodness difficult if we don't take account of them because they will seem arbitrary if we look at them in isolation, without their relevance to the human good. And they give us trouble because they are not easy to quantize into a model like the number line. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Hume famously denies this sort of good exists. However, I think he essentially just begs the question here. It isn't trivial question begging because he shows what follows from an attempt to reduce everything to the mathematical physics of his day, but it still assumes that oughts aren't observable in the way facts are. Obviously, for Aristotle, the human good is observable, and there are fact statements about (which entail ought statements.) This interacts with normative measure in an indirect way, in that Hume's view seems to end up denying normative measure if it isn't careful, even though it obviously exists. No one goes out to buy a car or house without any idea of what would make them good in mind. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Culpability talk is only one kind of moral talk.
So the claim is that if culpability does not, even in principle, pertain to tornadoes or reflex-kicks, then these are not moral realities.
If it is impossible to ever hold X responsible or culpable, then X is not a moral agent. Because of this "wrong" cannot be applied to tornadoes, for "wrong" is a moral predicate.
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That's basically it, but don't you think this also accounts for why a tornado is not a moral agent?
In moral philosophy a tornado is a natural evil, not a moral evil. Not all evil (i.e. bad things that happen) is moral
When I say that moral realities are not limited to acts, I am thinking about things like habits, intentions, societies, etc. I am not thinking about tornadoes. I hold the uncontroversial view that tornadoes are not moral realities.
Yes, and I think liberalism has made it hard for us to see the higher good shining through our practices. — Leontiskos
How is this not incoherent? You first say there exists a moral talk that is not culpability talk, and then say that all moral realities are culpability realities. Unless ‘reality’, as opposed to ‘talk’, is doing some heavy-lifting here that I am not following, this is incoherent. — Bob Ross
That something is a moral agent, is not relevant to if something can be predicated as doing something wrong or right. — Bob Ross
By being a moral agent, you are referring to the agent being culpable for their actions, — Bob Ross
I don’t disagree that the only moral agents are those which can be held responsible for their actions (or some subset of them); but this in no way implies that amoral agents are not doing morally bad nor good things. — Bob Ross
For example, cars and fuel go hand in hand. All cars run on fuel, and therefore to talk about something that has no relation to fuel is not to talk about a car. Nevertheless, not all car talk is fuel talk. We can talk about things like steering, brakes, or tires without talking about fuel.
Note that the things I am stating are not in any way controversial, so you may need to brush up on moral philosophy.
No, I have never said such a thing. In fact the word "culpable" appears only once in my OP. I'm not sure how you are drawing all these conclusions from that one sentence. They certainly don't follow.
I don’t disagree that the only moral agents are those which can be held responsible for their actions (or some subset of them); but this in no way implies that amoral agents are not doing morally bad nor good things. — Bob Ross
Read the bolded part of that sentence back to yourself. You are positing that amoral agents can be moral
For example, morality and culpability go hand in hand. All things relevant to culpability rely on morality, and therefore to talk about something that has no relation to morality is not to talk about culpability. Nevertheless, not all culpability talk is moral talk. — Bob Ross
All our disagreement boils down to, is that by ‘moral’ you are referring to moral talk that is culpability talk — Bob Ross
When a dog rapes another dog, we don’t say the dog can be held morally responsible and thusly, to your point, is not a moral agent; HOWEVER, we do still admit that the act of rape the dog committed is immoral. — Bob Ross
By ‘moral agent’, you clearly mean an agent which is culpable for their actions... — Bob Ross
the dog is not moral agent, but the dog’s action was immoral. This is not controversial — Bob Ross
Evil in the broad sense has been divided into two categories: natural evil and moral evil. Natural evils are bad states of affairs which do not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents. Hurricanes and toothaches are examples of natural evils. By contrast, moral evils do result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents. Murder and lying are examples of moral evils. — SEP | The Concept of Evil
Your OP is brilliant and everyone should read it. It will undoubtedly inform my own views on ethics, so if you were shooting for changing people's minds, you've changed at least one. :up: — ToothyMaw
At this point I'm getting impatient because you're not even reading my responses.
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Thus someone who does something right (and not wrong) is a moral agent who is in no way culpable, and therefore it is flatly false to claim that moral agents are necessarily culpable.
That's basically the definition of a moral agent: something that is capable of moral acts
This is incoherent. If the dog is not a moral agent that can be held responsible then it cannot commit immoral acts. You can't say that the dog is simultaneously non-moral and immoral. You are committing contradictions.
1. Non-moral (or "amoral") realities do not engage in moral or immoral acts.
2. A tornado is a non-moral reality
3. Therefore, a tornado does not engage in immoral acts.
What I mean is this: to say that "all human actions are moral actions" (dogma) in effect negates itself (dialectically) by entailing that there are no non-moral actions to distinguish from, and thereby identify, "moral actions". Thus, for me at least, your OP's premises are incoherent.I don’t follow your objection. — Leontiskos
:fire:The desire for what is good does not mean that the good will be found in our practices. What the good is remains highly problematic.
Reading Aristotle as if his work is not dialectical makes it hard to see that he is guided by unanswered questions rather than dogmatic answers. — Fooloso4
What I mean is this: to say that "all human actions are moral actions" in effect negates itself by entailing that there are no non-moral actions to distinguish from, and thereby identify, "moral actions". — 180 Proof
No. However, injustice is a kind of harm perpetrated by a group (i.e. its institutional functionaries) against individuals.Is harm thought to be synonymous with justice? — Leontiskos
Not if "incapacitating" the gunman is the only or least harmful way to prevent the gunman from doing greater, perhaps lethal, harm (e.g. like surgically removing a malignant tumor or severing a foot caught in a bear trap or terminating an unwanted pregnancy before viability (or an unviable pregnancy that is more likely than not to kill the pregnant woman)).For example, if someone enters your house with a gun and you sneak up behind them and knock them unconscious in order to incapacitate them, would the negative utilitarian say that you have harmed them? If this does not count as harm ...
Not if "incapacitating" the gunman is the only or least harmful way to prevent the gunman from doing greater, perhaps lethal, harm — 180 Proof
This is incorrect as a disclaimer. Even by your ensuing description you ARE talking about moral goodness. The word moral effectively means, good. If you assert otherwise, it would make no sense (to me).Introduction
What is the breadth of the moral sphere? The common view is that some acts are moral, such as giving a starving man food or committing murder, and some acts are non-moral, such as taking one’s dog for a walk.1 You should immediately notice that by “moral” I do not mean morally good; by “moral” I am not talking about the opposite of immoral. — Leontiskos
Exactly. So this explanation refutes your own assertion from before that you do not mean morally good. You DO mean that as explained here by you, just now.Instead, when I use the term “moral act” I am referring to an act that belongs to the species of moral-and-immoral-acts; or an act that belongs to the species of good-and-bad-acts. More simply, I am referring to an act that is susceptible to (moral) scrutiny, evaluation, or judgment. A moral act is an act that can be legitimately (and, thus, morally) judged good or bad; a non-moral act is an act that cannot. — Leontiskos
All thinking is incoherent. That is not the relevant point. The relevant point is intent. Indeed moral scrutiny should be applied to all choices, past and present. The consequential patterns of the past that lead to the various states of now are informative to new intents. Consequentialism is a dangerous lie. Deontological morality is the only thing that makes any sense.There are two theses that I am prepared to defend regarding the breadth of the moral sphere. Both of them will clash with modern language and intuitions, for I am convinced that modern thinking about the moral sphere is confused and perhaps even incoherent. — Leontiskos
There is no difference.Thesis 1: All human acts are moral acts
For Aristotle, virtue and teleology permeate all aspects of life. For Aquinas, any act that flows from intention is a moral act.2 In order to understand why all human acts are moral acts we must understand the difference between applying scrutiny to an act and applying moral scrutiny to an act, for above I noted that a moral act is an act that is susceptible to (moral) scrutiny. Or in other words, we must attempt something that very few are willing to attempt: we must attempt to define the moral. — Leontiskos
This question is ridiculous. The happenstance that allows us to take conceit in the moral agents in the universe with the greatest known scope of moral awareness is indeed humans. But to argue in any way that this situation is special is foolish and indeed conceited. The entire universe is alive and other moral agents across the universe are highly probably more advanced morally than even humans are. But even still, that matters not at all.Before we do that, what is meant by a “human act”? — Leontiskos
This is only nonsense. There is no need whatsoever to separate acts by chooser type. That has no relevance to moral content or strength.those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions "of a man," but not properly "human" actions, since they are not proper to man as man. — Leontiskos
I agreemoral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end, for moral acts are the same as human acts.
— Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, Q. 1, A. 1 & A. 3 — Leontiskos
This is a fine thing to say. But I think when you say it you are not meaning it the right way and most people will also fail to mean it the right way.A human act is any act that we do on purpose; any act that proceeds from a deliberate will. — Leontiskos
This is nonsense.Objection 3 to the first article gives the complement of human acts, “But man does many things without deliberation, sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent on something else.” In his reply to objection 3 Aquinas says, “Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the proper principle of human actions.” — Leontiskos
That is incorrect.So what does it mean for something to be moral?3 In keeping with the foregoing, I will define morality by reference to a definition of moral judgments. A moral judgment isdf a non-hypothetical ought-judgment. — Leontiskos
Which is every single act in the universe that has happened, is happening, or will happen. No narrowing down of the scope occurred here. If you think it did, you are only deluding yourself and those that believe you.Strictly speaking, a moral act is an act that involves a moral judgment, but for the pedagogical purposes of this thread I am primarily thinking of a moral act as, “an act that is susceptible to (moral) scrutiny, evaluation, or judgment” (see above). — Leontiskos
There is no difference.Admittedly, there is a difference between an act that involves a moral judgment and an act that is susceptible to moral judgment, especially on non-Aristotelian theories. This difference should be largely irrelevant, although I will tease out some of the implications as we go.4 — Leontiskos
I disagree as mentioned.For clarity:
A moral act is an act that involves a moral judgment, or an act that is susceptible to moral judgment.
A moral judgment is a non-hypothetical ought-judgment. — Leontiskos
That is blatantly incorrect on the surface of the issue. The ought word means the ought statement is by its very nature hypothetical.What then is a non-hypothetical ought-judgment? An ought-judgment is simply a judgment about what to do, past, present, or future. For instance, “He should have done that; she oughtn’t do this.” But what does it mean to say that some ought-judgment is non-hypothetical? It means:
He ought to do X if he wants Y.
(including:)
He ought to do X because he wants Y.
A judgment that is non-hypothetical is not therefore a judgment that is necessarily non-instrumental. “He ought to do X because he wants Y,” is instrumental but it is not hypothetical, for it involves no hypo-thesis. — Leontiskos
These distinctions are not relevant, is my assertion. The one consideration is itself a belief. So, it is already hypothetical, meaning all consequences are also hypothetical, even after they occur. They are all hypothetical because we may experience them and they may be objective, but, we cannot know them objectively, so we are left adding hypotheticals to hypotheticals. There is nothing else going on.A variant of this sort of judgment could be written, “He ought to do X because he ought to want (or attain) Y.” A non-hypothetical ought-judgment is a judgment in the simplest sense, a judgment “all things considered.” A hypothetical ought-judgment merely presents one consideration that is intended to influence the inevitable all-things-considered judgment which will eventually take place. — Leontiskos
Incorrect. Both 'ought' and 'if' are instances of word use that show the hypothetical state.Let’s take an example:
You ought to fix your car. (non-hypothetical)
You ought to fix your car if you want to travel to work. (hypothetical)
You ought to fix your car because you need to travel to work. (non-hypothetical) — Leontiskos
This whole process is messy and covered in errors to me. The definitions of need and want should be addressed. For example your second proposition should be reworded to say, 'you ought to fix your car because you ought to travel to work. There is no such thing as a need to travel to work. We speak incorrectly in so many ways that language is becoming a barrier to understanding in this case. We employ SO MUCH DELUSION on a regular basis that many and most here will rise up against me just for pointing out how insanely silly it is.Let’s focus on the latter two examples in this set of three. These two judgments are not saying the same thing. The non-hypothetical judgment involves a secondary judgment that traveling to work is necessary, and the hypothetical judgment prescinds from this secondary judgment. Only non-hypothetical grounds can result in non-hypothetical conclusions. The statement, “You ought to fix your car if you want to travel to work,” is hypothetical because the antecedent of the conditional is not being asserted. Therefore it is not a judgment about “what to do” simpliciter (all things considered). Instead of saying, “This is what should be done,” it says, “This is something you should take into account when deciding what should be done.” — Leontiskos
Is it you that is fixing the car? Or would it be better to say, 'have your car fixed'?If you want to travel to work, then you should fix your car.
You want to travel to work.
Therefore, you should fix your car. — Leontiskos
Moral acts are all acts, not just normative ones, but yes, all of those are included.The non-hypothetical judgment includes (1), (2), and (3). The hypothetical judgment affirms (1) but not (2) or (3). Those who are paying attention may recognize that on this account moral acts are bound up with normative ends. — Leontiskos
I think this is intentional semantic blather. The because of ... phrasing does not in any way remove the nature of the statement as hypothetical. The state transition from now to any future may have causes, but those causes are themselves hypothetical because understanding them as causes can be in error (and is always in error to some degree). You may prefer not to answer to my post because it is too disintegrating of many of the assumptions not mentioned that went into this entire formulation. I understand, but, presumably, we are after truth, hunting it, here.Note that this is a logical analysis, not a linguistic analysis. Sometimes in everyday speech people will equivocate between, “He ought to do X if he wants Y,” and “He ought to do X because he wants Y.” Tone of voice, for example, often indicates whether the locution is hypothetical. — Leontiskos
Just more semantic blather.Note that a non-hypothetical judgment is not the same thing as a categorical imperative. We could say that all categorical imperatives are non-hypothetical judgments, but not all non-hypothetical judgments are categorical imperatives. For example, “You should fix your car,” is not a categorical claim because it only holds given certain circumstances. — Leontiskos
Yeah they are rare alright. They don't exist.Acts and regrets are non-hypothetical
Following in the footsteps of Philippa Foot, many are accustomed to claim that morality is merely a matter of hypothetical judgments, or that non-hypothetical judgments are rare. — Leontiskos
We have zero chance to make any all-things-considered judgements. We are weak and immoral in so many ways that all beliefs and acts are flawed in many ways at the same time. One of those ways that is always true is that we cannot consider all things, ever. So saying that, using that phrasing, is foolish.5 To give an indication of how gravely mistaken this opinion is, consider the fact that acts and regrets are all non-hypothetical. Each time we concretely choose and act we are making a non-hypothetical, all-things-considered judgment. — Leontiskos
This is nonsense. Choices all involve failure, and all states involve the failures of other previous choices. No state is known. Known means 'in its entirety'. Only an objectively perfect being, 'God' could know anything. So to us moral agents that are not perfect every act is hypothetical even after decisions are made and a new state is formed. We do not know the past. We do not know the present state. We do not know the future. All of it is hypothetical.As soon as I decide whether to fix my car all of the previously-hypothetical considerations become non-hypothetical, and this is a large part of what it means “to make a decision” or “to decide.” To make a decision is to gather up all the hypothetical considerations and render an all-things-considered judgment. — Leontiskos
No, we are not. There is no such thing as a belief that is held at or with 100% certainty. So even the holding of the belief is hypothetical, let alone the belief itself and holding a belief is an act.Similarly, when we regret some act we are also making a non-hypothetical judgment. — Leontiskos
No it is not. You can still regret an act and still believe that you should have carried it out. This is just all too messy.To say that one regrets an act is to judge that they should not have carried out that act, — Leontiskos
Welcome to limbo.and this sort of judgment is never hypothetical; it never means, “I should not have done that if…” Such a hypo-thesis would undermine the regret itself, placing it in limbo. Therefore the idea that one can get along in life with only hypothetical judgments is absurd. — Leontiskos
These are all moral acts and choices. Even unconscious acts are a choice, finally. The fact that we immorally allow the structure of the body to carry them out without our consent is a lie. We consent to live therefore we consent to all these acts. It is still choice.What are examples of non-moral acts?
As noted above, the only non-moral acts are acts that do not flow from rational deliberation, such as absentmindedly stroking one’s beard. Or if the doctor hits your knee to check your reflexes and you kick him, you are not morally culpable because the kick did not flow from rational deliberation; it did not flow from you. The difference in these cases is that I am not choosing to act in any way. My body is doing something of its own accord, and these things do not count as moral acts. “Deliberation” is not for Aquinas something that must involve taking time in premeditation. The split-second braking to avoid a pedestrian is therefore a moral act, an act which flows from our humanness, our rational and intentional nature. — Leontiskos
Despite the delusions of all people, morality is the only thing going on. Morality is objective and true. All acts are only of course moral acts in that they SHOULD be judged morally. There is no act, no substantive state, that is not merely a succession of choices amid free will. This universe is alive. It emerges life as a natural law. The seeds of life exist as choice down to the sub-atomic level. Choice is effectively the only act thing in the universe. States are all the consequential arrangements of matter and energy and we will say consciousness as well. Really though we could JUST say consciousness because matter and energy are both just forms of consciousness.
That is incorrect.
All morals are forced to be hypothetical ought-judgments. We cannot know. So all beliefs are effectively hypotheses.
Consequentialism is a dangerous lie. Deontological morality is the only thing that makes any sense...
The good is objective.
Etc.
All thinking is incoherent.
I will stop with Thesis 1 to see how this is received. — Chet Hawkins
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