Not exactly. I'm saying that society says "you ought not kill babies" and then we either obey or we don't, and if we don't then we're doing what society says we ought not do. Moral subjectivists claim that there is nothing more to morality than this. According to them, when we say "you ought not kill babies" we are implicitly (or explicitly) saying "according to society you ought not kill babies." — Michael

Sure, then we're back to a theory of "morality," and you're safe again! Of course your claim here does seem to run up against your earlier claim, "We ought to obey the law, and not just for practical reasons." ().

Moral subjectivists think this nonsensical as they believe one cannot have a rule without a rule-giver. — Michael

Okay, I'm not sure I agree with this but I'm going to leave it to the side.

1. "one ought not harm another" means "society says one ought not harm another"
2. "society says one ought not harm another" is true iff society says one ought not harm another.
3. Therefore, "one ought not harm another" is true iff society says one ought not ham another.

The argument is valid. — Michael

Valid and coherent, but it erroneously divorces morality from oughtness, as noted above. Society saying something does not intrinsically obligate anyone to obey. This seems like Unenlightened's claim, where the moral premise is tacit and yet denied. I think a theory is either normative or else it is not, and there's no use trying to straddle the line and be both. But if you are here propounding a non-normative theory then I accede.

But moral realists (and error theorists) believe that (1) is false, whereas (some) moral subjectivists believe that (1) is true. — Michael

Okay, agreed.

This is the reason for my discomfort with the idea of moral truth. — AmadeusD

I wondered about that.

There's a difference between some moral statements being true and there being some incontestable moral laws. Realism does not imply that there are moral principles carved in stone. It's just that morality is open to rational discussion, that it's more than just competing preferences.

Rules without a rule-giver does seem spurious. — Michael

Plus there's no fact about which rules you've been following all this time. Augustine's solution: Love and do what you will.. No need for a rule-giver. No need for rules at all.

It's just that morality is open to rational discussion, that it's more than just competing preferences. — Banno

Understood and thanks for bumper-stickering it.

I suppose my position on that is that, I don't think it's open to rational discussion in terms of establishing moral rules - But i think competing preferences are open to being judged as more or less reasonable. I just don't think you could say any conclusion is 'right' or 'true' unless there's something to back-stop the claim other than just discussion - though, I personally think that's enough tobe getting on with

For sure. I wrestle with it a lot - I guess i see society as an arbitrary rule-giver. Assenting to just plum majority rule does not sit well. — AmadeusD

Is there such a thing as a non-arbitrary rule giver?

Huh...the buggers have updated the SEP page since then. — Banno

I thought they might have.

Then you would go along with the modus tollens reading...? — Banno

No, I tend to think Anscombe was wrong about (1). Aquinas didn't read Aristotle the way Anscombe reads him in that article, and her thesis cuts against the grain of Catholic thought. But it's not altogether easy to circumvent her argument. Kant's attempt is perhaps the most famous, but it is also convoluted and probably wrong. Her article probably bothers me as much as it does you.

These are difficult debates and I would have to review the literature. Also, I have come to these questions from the perspective of Catholic philosophy and you have come to them from the perspective of more secular philosophy, so translation is required. In any case, Catholics tend to hold that a substantial version of morality can be attained without believing in God. Protestants would be likely to disagree.

Valid and coherent, but it erroneously divorces morality from oughtness, as noted above. — Leontiskos

If the argument is valid and if the premises are true then the conclusion that one ought not harm another iff society says one ought not ham another is true.

Society saying something does not intrinsically obligate anyone to obey. — Leontiskos

What exactly do you mean by “intrinsic”? Isn’t this the very thing that realists and subjectivists disagree over? Realists say that moral rules and obligations are “intrinsic” (i.e objective) and subjectivists say that they aren’t.

If so then it’s begging the question to argue that moral subjectivism is false (or incoherent) if it entails that moral rules and obligations are not intrinsic.

You appear to just be saying that subjectivism fails because it isn’t realism.

If the argument is valid and if the premises are true then the conclusion that one ought not harm another iff society says one ought not ham another is true. — Michael

Yes, but (1) is false.

What exactly do you mean by “intrinsic”? Isn’t this the very thing that realists and subjectivists disagree over? Realists say that moral rules and obligations are “intrinsic” (i.e objective) and subjectivists say that they aren’t. — Michael

I am speaking about sufficiency. "Society said so, therefore I ought to obey," is a false statement.
knows why. A further premise is required to get to the consequent. For example, "The societal rulers are ordained by God, . . . therefore I must obey." An extrinsic normativity or authority must be applied to society, for it does not possess it in itself.

You appear to just be saying that subjectivism fails because it isn’t realism. — Michael

The funny thing about your defenses of moral subjectivism is that the self-proclaimed subjectivists in this thread have consistently disagreed with them, and along the same lines that I have. I find it curious, although certainly not definitive. In any case, this claim of yours falls flat in light of that fact.

Yes, but (1) is false. — Leontiskos

That’s where realists and subjectivists disagree.

Subjectivism claims that (1) is true, and if (1) is true then the conclusion follows. Subjectivism allows for obligations. It just doesn’t allow for realist obligations, which is obvious given that it’s anti-realist.

Protestants would be likely to disagree. — Leontiskos

With each other as well as the Papists.

That’s where realists and subjectivists disagree. — Michael

Well, not quite. You said something similar and I already agreed. You said:

Moral realists (and error theorists) believe that (1) is false, whereas (some) moral subjectivists believe that (1) is true. — Michael

Note, "some." Two self-proclaimed subjectivists in this thread have already disagreed with (1), and none have agreed with it.

Your edit:

Subjectivism claims that (1) is true, and if (1) is true then the conclusion follows. Subjectivism allows for obligations. — Michael

If (1) is true then subjectivism allows for obligations. Everyone here seems to be in agreement that (1) is false, including you. This seems about right to me. This is the case that I would call obviously false but not incoherent.

Two self-proclaimed subjectivists in this thread have already disagreed with (1), and none have agreed with it. — Leontiskos

Yes, subjectivism covers a variety of different positions.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethical_subjectivism

There is some debate among philosophers around the use of the term "ethical subjectivism" as this term has historically referred to the more specific position that ethical statements are merely reports of one's own mental states (saying that killing is wrong just means you disapprove of killing). While this is an ethically subjective position (the truth of your statement does depend on your mental states), it is not the only one.

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-anti-realism/

According to John Rawls (1971), fairness is determined by the results of an imaginary collective decision, wherein self-interested agents negotiate principles of distribution behind a veil of ignorance. Decision-making, negotiation, and agency all require mental activity.

…

According to Frank Jackson (1998), ethical terms pick out properties that play a certain role in the conceptual network determined by mature folk morality. “The folk” necessarily have minds, and the relevant process of “maturing” is presumably one that implicates a variety of psychological events.

I was simply using an example that better fits my breakdown here.

If (1) is true then subjectivism allows for obligations. Everyone here seems to be in agreement that (1) is false, including you. This seems about right to me. This is the case that I would call obviously false but not incoherent. — Leontiskos

Well that’s the issue. I think that (1) is false, I think that some moral sentences are true, and I think that obligations without a rule-giver are nonsensical. Yet these three positions are incompatible.

Perhaps I’m a fictionalist.

Is there such a thing as a non-arbitrary rule giver? — Michael

I take theistic theories of morality to take such as given.

I was simply using an example that better fits my breakdown here. — Michael

My consistent point throughout has been that "moral subjectivism" doesn't hold up under scrutiny. Some versions are incoherent, others are plainly false. Even in the literature and SEP I don't see much representation for this position. I think you have made a bit of progress showing that there are versions which are false, but not incoherent. Fair enough?

---

Well that’s the issue. I think that (1) is false, I think that some moral sentences are true, and I think that obligations without a rule-giver are nonsensical. Yet these three positions are incompatible. — Michael

They're not incompatible. Convert! Make straight the way! :grin:

That's interesting, though. Is there an implicit atheistic premise, here? Or is that baked in as a rejection of divine command theory or something like it?

(To clarify any confusion, my position is that morality is overdetermined, being derivable in both a religious and non-religious manner.)

being derivable in both a religious and non-religious manner.) — Leontiskos

Are the determinations compatible across each sector of assessment?

I would be interested to hear a moral theory that comports with a religion, and an atheist, naturalistic world-view.

They're not incompatible. — Leontiskos

1. Some "one ought not X" is true
2. "one ought not X" doesn't mean "according to some rule-giver Y, one ought not X"
3. There are no obligations without a rule-giver

These cannot all be true. It seems to me that non-cognitivists and error theorists must reject (1), subjectivists must reject (2), and realists must reject (3).

Are the determinations compatible across each sector of assessment? — AmadeusD

Yes, but the "range" is not entirely overlapping. Specifically, there are some religious moral truths that are not accessible to natural reason.

I would be interested to hear a moral theory that comports with a religion, and an atheist, naturalistic world-view. — AmadeusD

Thomas Aquinas and the Thomistic tradition enunciate such a theory. I don't think I will raise it in these forums any time soon, but you could read around that tradition. (Or Augustine, or Maimonides' Jewish version, or Averroes' and Avicenna's Islamic version)

1. Some "one ought not X" is true
2. "one ought not X" doesn't mean "according to some rule-giver Y, one ought not X"
3. There are no obligations without a rule-giver

These cannot all be true. — Michael

Sure. Note that your (2) here is a bit different from (1) up above.

So yeah, you've got a logical tension there. I personally reject (3) outright (), but I also think morality has a transcendent aspect or ...augmentation, so maybe I could leave (2) as well.

The thread on Anscombe that started four years ago is about (3), and might make for a fruitful discussion.

non-cognitivists and error theorists must reject (1) — Michael

Agreed.

subjectivists must reject (2) — Michael

As I noted above, I don't think this is right. Presumably self-legislation would be rule-giving, even though I agree with Anscombe that this approach doesn't work. And apparently some subjectivists think law, such as a king's decree, would be legitimate.

and realists must reject (3) — Michael

I don't really understand why this would be true, but I don't want to get off onto too many tangents...

Maimonides' Jewish version — Leontiskos

I understand the little i do of Maimonides (and Spinoza) through a psychiatrist trying to treat the Jewish Patriarch stories from a psychological perspective - he finds much agreement in their work.

Aquinas I understood (obviously as the originator of Thomism in some sense) to require faith for his moral system. If i'm wrong - neat! Should be fun to go through.

- Yes, good luck. Aquinas draws heavily on Aristotle, and Aristotle is also a good source even though he wasn't a religious thinker in the same way as these others. I also think Plato is great, and he strikes me as being more "religious" than Aristotle.

With each other as well as the Papists. — Banno

Contrarian folk. Sort of like philosophers.

I did find a link to the archived article on the SEP site itself if you wanted to use it for that thread: https://plato.stanford.edu/Archives/win2021/entries/anscombe/

(I assume this is the same one)

Aristotle — Leontiskos

It has been a serious failing of mine to have waltz right over Aristotle. I took Plato, then Aurelius.

I will purchase a complete works of Aristotle this week - mark my words! Or don't. Not at issue :D

I will purchase a complete works of Aristotle this week - mark my words! — AmadeusD

Well that's ambitious! Don't let me deter you, but if you want to start slow I would recommend his Nicomachean Ethics, which has become the go-to ethical text in Aristotle's corpus.

Nicomachean Ethics — Leontiskos

Thread put me in mind of this once you mentioned him. Nice. Thank you :)

Ethics is difficult - intractable - to the point of there perhaps being no solution; after all, why must there be an answer to "what should we do"? — Banno

That's a very interesting observation which I mainly share. In the West, a history of divine command theory, linking morality to compliance and hellfire, via a foundational guarantee from a magic man with anger management issues, has probably messed with our thinking.

a history of divine command theory, linking morality to compliance and hellfire, via a foundational guarantee from a magic man with anger management issues, has probably messed with our thinking. — Tom Storm

:snicker:

Well, you did make a series of silly mistakes. — Banno

Hilarious, when your posts pointing out my "silly mistakes" have been rats nests of mistakes.

"Society said so, therefore I ought to obey," is a false statement. — Leontiskos

Valid and coherent, but it erroneously divorces morality from oughtness, as noted above. Society saying something does not intrinsically obligate anyone to obey. — Leontiskos

I keep seeing this mistake. Banno also makes it when he says "that we do cooperate does not imply that we ought cooperate."

You are confusing metaethical theories for ethical ones. A metaethical theory, unlike an ethical theory, is under no obligation to itself be ethically compelling. That is because it is claiming what ethics is, not what you ought to do. The fact might be that ethics originates from something that is not ethical at all.

For instance, suppose someone proposed that all ethical reasoning was instinctual. You might agree or disagree, but you can't say, "just because I have instincts doesn't mean I should obey them". The theory isn't saying that. It says, when you moralize, you are following instincts. Its just the fact of the matter, nothing to do with what you ought to do.

And you can't escape it. If the theory were true, and you say, "well, then I am under no obligation to be ethical, since I have no obligation to follow my instincts", the ethical reasoning which led you to reject instincts as a suitable ground for ethical reasoning would itself be instinctual.

Do you see the difference?