Nice thread and OP! — javra
Here's a concrete example that might help out: In one's morning routine, ought one brush one's teeth before brushing one's hair or, otherwise, brush one's hair before brushing one's teeth? Whichever alternative one chooses, the action one will engage in will in this example be a fully conscious volitional act (in contrast, for example, to haphazardly touching one's beard in unthinking manners). Yet, because there is no discernible morally best alternative - for both alternatives are to be deemed equally good or bad - irrespective of the choice made the volitional act can nevertheless be deemed amoral. — javra
I first want to mention that, as with all others, the English language has its own idiosyncrasies via which possible conceptualizations find themselves limited to certain linguistic expressions. There is no one word in the English language with addresses this generalized state of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness in impartial manners. I think the closest English comes to it is in the word “responsibility”—this in the strict sense of being the primary cause for an effect/consequence (rather than, for example, in the sense of being accountable, or answerable, for an effect/consequence). As is also the case with at least the Romanian language (which I also speak fluently), existent words also overwhelmingly tend to emphasize the wrongness of effects/consequences: e.g., what or who is at fault for, what or who is to blame for, or culpable for, etc. — javra
That said, when considering the goodness or badness of an effect or else consequence—via what I will here specify as “responsibility for” in the strict sense just mentioned of being the primary cause—the responsible cause can either be in any way accountable, or answerable, for the given effect or not. If the primary cause is deemed answerable for its responsibility in having brought about the effect, then we likewise deem the same given cause’s future effects to be alterable (or else reinforceable) via rewards or punishments. This first broad category of cause-types then subsumes that category the thread addresses as moral evils. — javra
Other primary causes which we deem incapable of being in any way answerable for their responsibility in having brought about a certain effect, we then deem fully unalterable via the (yet possible) administration of rewards or punishments—with tornadoes being one example of such latter types of causes. In this second generalized category of cause-types we then place all natural evils. Here, though the wind is responsible for the tree’s leaves movements, we neither blame nor praise the wind in an attempt to either alter or reinforce its doings (this because the wind as primary cause is incapable of in any way answering, or taking responsibility, for what it does). — javra
This outlook I then find can be itself reduced to a dichotomy between (a) agent-caused effects (with individual agents being, as I believe you’ve previously mentioned, in at least some ways causa sui originators of the effects they willfully produce) and b) effects caused by non-agential causes (which are then basically deemed fully deterministic in their nature). [edit: just as I take your own arguments to generally be] — javra
For one example, while people will blame and praise their dog’s doings with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) their dog’s behaviors, tmk most will not blame or praise an AI’s doings in their interactions with the AI program with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) the AI program’s behaviors. The first is deemed an agent whereas the second is not. (If dogs are too controversial in terms of moral doings, then one can just as well replace their example with the example of fellow humans.)
Not sure if this is of significant benefit to the discussion, but to me at least it does serve to further illustrate the divide between moral evils and natural evils. — javra
Well, what is the example you have in mind? Presumably you have an example that parallels the "wind"? — Leontiskos
Yes, and the finger-crossing example was risky in that it is easily misunderstood. I was only trying to illustrate the role of susceptibility and negligence. It is (intentionally) artificial because no one holds that rule. Of course, there is a sense in which it is important to consider subjective moral evaluations (in part because conscience is always a moral factor), but I think we can leave that to the side for the moment. — Leontiskos
I dont think it does break any rules because although Amorals are regarding "intent" I would more define it as a word that can describe those actions with no moral consequence or intention. ex. "When Rationalization doesnt respect THE REASON"You might argue that the new category of "amoral" act I am talking about above could still be good or bad based on whether it violates some arbitrary set of rules. I admit that it could be. What if it doesn't break any rules? — ToothyMaw
The aesthetic might parallel wind here: there are gradients within the aesthetic. The beautiful and the sublime come to mind; and here these gradients need not have opposites but rather can be more or less relative to itself. And if you establish some kind of standard to judge more and less then you'd establish a gradient. — Moliere
I can think of more plausible examples that mimic the arbitrary nature of your example. The choice between regular M&M's and M&M's with peanuts seems morally arbitrary or amoral (not sure which phrase I prefer). — Moliere
We can have arbitrary rules that we follow and even though they mimic or can be interpreted within a moral dimension I'd say they're amoral actions -- outside the scope of moral thinking. — Moliere
Let me put it more precisely, then: “the events which transpire directly due to a tornado are intrinsically bad”. Do you disagree with that statement, or find it likewise idiosyncratic? If not, then I think we are just disagreeing on semantics: I identify intrinsic goodness with moral goodness — Bob Ross
The reason we don't call natural evils immoral is because they are appreciably different from moral evils. Both natural evils and moral evils are evil or bad (and this is their common genus: evil or badness). So what makes them different? The difference lies in whether their cause is a responsible agent—something that can be held responsible for producing the evil effect. We have a special word to denote this difference because the distinction is enormously important in human life, and that word is "morality." The difference determines whether blame can apply, and whether we should punish the thing that caused the evil.
The same could be said for "good" (as opposed to "evil"). There are moral goods and non-moral goods. A moral good is the meal cooked by your mother. A non-moral good is the rain that waters your crops. What they have in common is goodness; what differentiates them is whether they are caused by an intentional agent. The word <moral> and its antecedents have always been used to describe the behavior of intentional agents, and they have never been used to describe the behavior of non-intentional agents. — Leontiskos
The predication of generic “being” (i.e., generic ‘to exist’) is univocal predication, just like “Brk”. — Bob Ross
Either way, I don’t see how univocally predicating a property to everything, would make it vacuous. If it is clearly outlined what “Brk” actually is, then it is not vacuous. For example, imagine that everything happens to be red: does that make ‘redness’ vacuous? — Bob Ross
I am no longer claiming that a tornado is a moral agent; I was referring to the adjective, which I guess in a sense is a property, of ‘moral’ (perhaps ‘moralness’). — Bob Ross
I highly doubt this. Would you not agree, that “moral” also signifies “that which is within the sphere of moral discourse”? You left that out in your analysis here. — Bob Ross
If you deny this, then I must admit your theory of ethics is entirely too act-centric for me. The study is fundamentally about what is “good”, and this in a “moral” sense, and only as a biproduct does one discuss moral or immoral acts. — Bob Ross
If you think there is a morally ideal possible world EVEN WHEN there is no possible world in which agents exist; then you are admitting that morality is not dependent on, nor gets its core substance from, analyzing acts. — Bob Ross
By #2, are also referring to moral and immoral acts, or what is morally bad or good simpliciter? I read it as acts, but if it is about just moral badness and goodness (in general); then I would say that my use of "moral agent" falls within this category, because #2 makes no reference to any sort of capacity for responsibility (of anything). 'moral' in #2's sense, assuming you aren't referring to only acts, would include uses like "this agent is doing moral things, even though they cannot be held responsible for their actions, because their actions align with what is morally good". — Bob Ross
Good thoughts! Suppose an evil genius (or maybe an evil non-genius :sweat:) rigs up a scenario where he will murder one of two people given a decision you make. As you are standing still, he tells you, "If you begin walking with your left foot I will kill person A, and if you begin walking with your right foot I will kill person B." You know nothing about either person beyond these simple facts. According to your argument, "because there is no discernible morally best alternative - for both alternatives are to be deemed equally good or bad - irrespective of the choice made the volitional act can nevertheless be deemed amoral."
What are your thoughts about this? I don't think this alternative scenario necessarily undermines your reasoning, but I am curious what you would say. — Leontiskos
I think this may be a helpful way to reframe my debate with Bob Ross. — Leontiskos
Tricky counterexample. My current best thoughts: — javra
All the same, in this scenario, unlike the first, irrespective of which choice we make we know that we will be committing a wrong beforehand.
[...]
If, however, no other conceivable choice were to be available, then we’d literally have no choice but to knowingly commit the wrong of killing some unfortunate stranger via our actions. In which case, because a) we hold no choice in the matter of so doing despite the two alternatives available to us and b) the two alternatives are morally identical in impact to the best of our knowledge—were we to not then so step with the explicit intent and pleasure of killing a stranger—I’d then conclude that our walking either via a first left step or a first right step would be amoral. We would be attributively responsible for (i.e., we’d be a/the primary cause for) the killing of a stranger but we’d not be morally responsible for it (EDIT: here meaning in any way either blameworthy of praiseworthy for the action taken and its consequence). — javra
All the same, in this scenario, unlike the first, irrespective of which choice we make we know that we will be committing a wrong beforehand. This will then be a crucial difference. — javra
And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.
If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from some act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his beard, or moves his hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not moral or human; since this depends on the reason. Hence it will be indifferent, as standing apart from the genus of moral actions. — Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Question 18, Article 9
Apropos, as to the evil genius being not so genius: It is interesting to me that in Romanian there are two adjectives for the English word “bad” (with no adjective for “evil”); one is rău, which can just as well mean either “sick” or “mean spirited”; the second is prost, which can just as well mean “stupid” or “idiotic”. (The only relatively close proximity to the term “evil” is the noun form of rău, but, again, it doesn't occur as an adjective). Which when literally translated into English to me at least presents the connotative understanding that the property of badness could be interpreted as “the stupidity of being mean spirited and, thereby, psychologically sick”. Your expression somehow reminded me of this. :grin: Though, of course, so understood the concept can only apply to agents. — javra
Not to float my own boat, but back when I wrote my midterm essay for some 100-level ethics course, my choice of normative principle was along the lines of "avoid the greatest amount of harm, even if it means also avoiding a greater amount of welfare (to another party)". That seems to be the same as some version of negative utilitarianism, particularly threshold NU and weak NU. — Lionino
One of my justifications for the principle is that harm violates the object's free will, (not giving) welfare does not. — Lionino
I will check the theses and the objections when I am in an ethics mood and when I have time. — Lionino
I added a bit to my last post in an edit and I'm not sure if you saw it:
The reason we don't call natural evils immoral is because they are appreciably different from moral evils. Both natural evils and moral evils are evil or bad (and this is their common genus: evil or badness). So what makes them different? The difference lies in whether their cause is a responsible agent—something that can be held responsible for producing the evil effect.
A moral good is the meal cooked by your mother. A non-moral good is the rain that waters your crops
For example, "Grandma does not exist anymore." We talk about things losing and lacking being.
Yes, because if everything happened to be red then we wouldn't be capable of identifying or distinguishing red
What does the word "moral" in your term, "moral discourse," mean?
Does it mean something other than the two senses I already gave?
…
(As in the OP, "acts" is shorthand, and is not meant to exclude other moral or immoral things, such as habits.)
We can talk all day about good trees, or good birds, or good sunsets, and no one will suppose that we are engaged in moral discourse.
If you think there is a morally ideal possible world EVEN WHEN there is no possible world in which agents exist; then you are admitting that morality is not dependent on, nor gets its core substance from, analyzing acts. — Bob Ross
Earlier in our conversation I already told you that I don't think this.
Other primary causes which we deem incapable of being in any way answerable for their responsibility in having brought about a certain effect, we then deem fully unalterable via the (yet possible) administration of rewards or punishments—with tornadoes being one example of such latter types of causes. In this second generalized category of cause-types we then place all natural evils. Here, though the wind is responsible for the tree’s leaves movements, we neither blame nor praise the wind in an attempt to either alter or reinforce its doings (this because the wind as primary cause is incapable of in any way answering, or taking responsibility, for what it does). — javra
I think this may be a helpful way to reframe my debate with @Bob Ross.
For one example, while people will blame and praise their dog’s doings with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) their dog’s behaviors, tmk most will not blame or praise an AI’s doings in their interactions with the AI program with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) the AI program’s behaviors. The first is deemed an agent whereas the second is not. (If dogs are too controversial in terms of moral doings, then one can just as well replace their example with the example of fellow humans.)
Not sure if this is of significant benefit to the discussion, but to me at least it does serve to further illustrate the divide between moral evils and natural evils. — javra
Thanks - I think it is very relevant to the discussion I am having with @Bob Ross, and this distinction between agent-causes and non-agent-causes is central to the OP, because for the OP morality is bound up with agency.
So according to your earlier statement which I quoted* (and assuming we have no other choice), the act would be amoral. Here it seems like you want to say that it is simultaneously amoral and wrong. Or perhaps more accurately, the act would be amoral and yet in so acting we would be "committing a wrong." There is thus an interesting way in which immorality and wrongness are separating. — Leontiskos
For Aquinas the moral decision of which foot to begin walking with is, I think, not a human act. This is because there are no rational criteria upon which to deliberate. Because the reason has nothing to act on, therefore it cannot be an act that flows from reason. The act could only become rational (and moral) if perchance the agent fastened upon some aspect that could support rational deliberation. — Leontiskos
Here is a related quote from Aquinas:
And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. — Leontiskos
Ha - very interesting! Aquinas follows Augustine, and for Augustine evil is a privation of what ought to be, which dovetails nicely with some of this. Further, as you may have noticed from the above, for Aquinas irrationality and immorality are closely related. — Leontiskos
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical—wherein shall be held that it is a moral wrong to insult a stranger:
I am the summoned subject of a tyrannical and mad king who, simply for his own amusement, informs me upon my arrival to his citadel that a) either i) I insult a greatly starved, and thereby physically weakened, stranger that also stands before the king in my presence or ii) I beat this same starved stranger until the stranger becomes unconscious or, else, b) the king will insure that everyone I’ve grown close to will be brutally raped and tortured till they die. Granting that I have no reason to doubt the veracity of the king’s imposition, my first-order choice between alternative (a) and alternative (b) might be considered so coercive as to virtually grant me no choice [...] whatsoever, allowing me only one viable option: that of choosing alternative (a). In then granting this, I nevertheless am in no way coerced in my choosing between alternative (a. i) and (a. ii)—for, other than a potential harm to my conscience, neither alternative possess any significant negative repercussions to my personhood—and I happen to be capable of successfully implementing either alternative. I, in being indifferent to which alternative I presume would please this mad king most, then freely choose what I take to be the lesser of the two wrongs—and I thereby proceed to insult the stranger.
Given my alternatives, do I or others then find me culpable for the wrong of having insulted this stranger in front of the king?
While the answer to this question will be contingent on numerous variables (such as, for example, the given stranger’s, and others, degree of empathy for the conundrum into which I was placed through no fault of my own), it is fair to presume that everyone (including the stranger) will be aware that at least the second-order choice I made was freely made by me, was thereby an outcome I intentionally brought about, and, hence, was an outcome I am attributively responsible for. Furthermore, given that I have a generally goodhearted nature, it is also likely fair to presume that everyone (including the given stranger) will nevertheless neither find me blameworthy for my resulting transgression nor praiseworthy for so choosing it over its alternative (considering this outcome the only decent option to be had given the circumstances I was in).
If so, this case illustrates how an [ego or I-ness; i.e., the first person point of view] which is attributively responsible for an outcome commonly deemed a moral wrong—that of insulting a perfect stranger—might neither be blameworthy nor praiseworthy for said outcome, and, hence, how this [ego] might not be morally responsible for an outcome it is nevertheless attributively responsible for. — www.anenquiry.info / Chapter 11: Validating Our Free Will / Section 11.3.2.
Maybe I've missed it but could you briefly describe "classical justice" or link to a post upthread where you discuss it. Thanks.In general I am apt to prefer classical justice ... — Leontiskos
First off, thanks for the thoughtful reply. Your views are much appreciated. — javra
As one example, were a WWII Nazi to knock at the door to inquire as to whether there is a Jew in your house... — javra
Objection 4. Further, one ought to choose the lesser evil in order to avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb, lest the whole body perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion in a person's mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore a man may lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or another from being killed.
Reply to Objection 4. A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x). — Aquinas, ST II-II.110.3.ad4
Due to life's complexities, in these and like examples we in my view then act morally by engaging in lesser wrongs for the sake of preventing greater wrongs (given caveats such as that no other viable alternative in preventing the greater wrong is available to us). — javra
Because of this, I do deem that on occasion being moral or else immoral is separate from the committing of wrongs. One can likewise appraise someone who does something good and thereby moral due to intentions that are ultimately evil - in so far as having been committed so as to result in the realization of an evil long-term goal. Here, given the overall situation, doing a right/good act can well be nevertheless appraised as immoral (as one possible example, such as when a liar reinforces their nefarious lies via the telling of truths in what is often enough termed "spin"). — javra
I'm hoping my reasoning here is explained well enough. — javra
In having thought about this, it yet seems to me that, in order for a human to consciously discern that there are no moral differences in the two alternatives available, the human must necessarily to some extent deliberate between the two alternatives - thereby consciously judge and weigh their differences and differing consequences via their reasoning faculties. So doing will itself be a consciously rational act. So, I presently believe that the very act of consciously discerning that the two alternatives have equal moral import can only be a human act - for it requires conscious rationality. — javra
Once this active deliberation between the alternatives arrives at the conclusion that the available alternatives are of equal moral import, then ... I'm thinking one could still make a reason-based conscious choice as to which alternative to act on (for example, choosing to start with the right foot with the aim of maintaining consistency were this scenario to ever befall again - thereby keeping the harm to a minimum (I know this is iffy, but its the best I've got at the moment)) or, else, one might at this juncture simply allow one's strongest unconscious impulse to precipitate a first step with whichever leg it might be - or else abide by the flipping of a coin. If the first, it would then still be a reason based conscious act. If the latter, then not. — javra
All the same, in terms of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness, the individual's act would be beyond either. Given no other available alternative to choose from, in this sense alone the person's act of walking would then be amoral... — javra
Yet the discernment of the act so being (both on the part of the individual or any onlooker) would then be fully rational - for the individual here was not negligent; he/she took to time to deliberate the situation so as to arrive at the rational discernment of being forced to commit an equal wrong regardless of what is chosen. — javra
Precisely! :up: :smile: Nice to see your evaluation of it.
I'll post the initially mentioned hypothetical I have in mind separately... — javra
Here is a hypothetical wherein the choice made is concluded to be amoral (this strictly in the sense of being neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy) despite a) the available alternatives not being of equal moral import, b) being an act of consciously made volition and, thereby, a human act, c) being a non-hypothetical ought-judgement and, hence, per the OP, a moral act, and, to top things of, d) the choice taken being a known wrong a priori. — javra
I am the summoned subject of a tyrannical and mad king who, simply for his own amusement, informs me upon my arrival to his citadel that... — www.anenquiry.info / Chapter 11: Validating Our Free Will / Section 11.3.2.
If this example holds, as I believe it does, it then illustrates how one could have a human act of conscious choice making which, as per the OP, can be defined as a moral act (for it involved non-hypothetical ought-judgements) that is nevertheless amoral in so far as being neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy. And, furthermore, this amoral quality of the act is upheld despite the committed wrong of insulting a perfect stranger. — javra
Maybe I've missed it but could you briefly describe "classical justice" or link to a post upthread where you discuss it. Thanks. — 180 Proof
Not if "incapacitating" the gunman is the only or least harmful way to prevent the gunman from doing greater, perhaps lethal, harm (e.g. like surgically removing a malignant tumor...) — 180 Proof
I think there are possible sets of moral rules that do not touch on all human acts, such as ↪180 Proof's negative utilitarianism. But after recognizing those sets of rules the next step is to ask ourselves whether there is a good reason to call the acts which fall under those rules "moral" while calling acts that do not fall under those rules "non-moral." More specifically, we want to probe the question of whether someone's distinction between the moral and the non-moral is a firm, defensible distinction. — Leontiskos
I was not expecting to receive this level of engagement in the thread! — Leontiskos
For Aquinas (as for Kant) it is not permissible to lie even in this case. Here is what he says in an article entitled, "Whether every lie is a sin?":
[...]
Reply to Objection 4. A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x). — Aquinas, ST II-II.110.3.ad4 — Leontiskos
Would you object to my characterizing your view as (a robust form of) consequentialism? — Leontiskos
Perhaps one of the most fruitful entry points is linguistic. First, to nitpick a bit, is the bolded an accurate depiction of your view? "Good and thereby moral"? — Leontiskos
What's philosophically interesting here is that, according to your position, it would seem that a bad end/goal vitiates a good deed, but a bad deed does not vitiate a good end/goal. — Leontiskos
In other words to advise X such that X non-hypothetically ought to be done is incompatible with X being wrong. Hence the commonly accepted idea that the end will "color" the means (e.g. If Y is necessary, and X is necessary in order to achieve Y, then X becomes necessary). What do you think of this? — Leontiskos
I would suggest that harm and the withholding of welfare are both contrary to the object's will, if in slightly different ways—harm is certainly more contrary — Leontiskos
Second, I would want to inquire into the relevant definition of harm. — Leontiskos
to hurt someone or damage something: — Cambridge
to feel pain in a part of your body, or to injure someone or cause them pain: — Cambridge
On classical justice one can still act unjustly against the gunman even though he has forfeited some of his rights (by, say, using excessive force) — Leontiskos
You hold that some ‘evil’ is amorally bad, and is thusly outside of the scope of morality; whereas I think that all ‘evil’ is intrinsically bad, and is thusly within the scope of morality. — Bob Ross
You hold that ‘moral’ refers to only meanings directly related to ‘acts’, whereas I use it in a much broader scope.
Morality, at its core, is about acts for you; intrinsic goodness, for me. — Bob Ross
I think you think health, for example, is an amoral good... — Bob Ross
Everything in reality can be attributed the property; and I can make a parody argument for redness: everything in reality is red, but we can say things that makes sense like “a block that doesn’t exist is not red”. — Bob Ross
It means discourse related to (1) intrinsic goodness and (2) what is intrinsically good. — Bob Ross
For you, and commonly to people, morality is about behavior; but this is a major mistake: it is really about intrinsic goodness and what is intrinsically good. — Bob Ross
It depends: when we discuss those things, are we supposing we are talking about actually good trees, actually good birds, etc.? If so, then we are definitely talking about ethics. — Bob Ross
Either morality is only about what is related to behavior and there is no morality in a world incapable of agents (i.e., things which have behaviors, can act, in the manner you describe) OR morality is not fundamentally about behavior (although it can include that in itself, even as a primary sub-subject). — Bob Ross
Morality is not itself the study of behavior. — Bob Ross
I would say both are contrary to the object's desire, but not free will in the sense of freedom of choice. When we impart harm on someone, we are taking something away from them, which by the definition of "harm" is against their will; by withholding welfare, we are not attacking their free will, as we are basically not interacting with them at all — not giving them something appears to me as very different from taking something away. — Lionino
I am behind these definitions. The interesting thing about "harm" is that indeed it means to make something lose its qualities. So then we see that the word "harm" itself already carries some sort of aesthetic/moral judgement by evoking the word "quality". In many cases it seems uncontroversial. If I am shooting someone, I am making them lose qualities (health) that we hold universally as desirable.
However, if I offer someone alcohol, there will be wide disagreement about whether I am harming or helping them.
So perhaps it is the case that negative utilitarianism simply pushes the issue back and leaves the conclusion up to subjectivity, instead of grounding it objectively (on something like freedom or serotonin or reproductive success). — Lionino
And in many countries that is indeed the case. Shooting someone brandishing a knife is allowable if done so to incapacitate, but going behind him and shooting him in the head may be seen as undue use of force and execution. — Lionino
The analysis seems to be presupposing rights. — Leontiskos
I want to say that "to harm something is to make something lose its qualities," is too broad, because not all qualities are self-consciously believed to be valuable — Leontiskos
pushes the issue back and leaves the conclusion up to subjectivity, instead of grounding it objectively (on something like freedom or serotonin or reproductive success) — Lionino
For example, on your definition if I cause someone to lose weight I have harmed them. — Leontiskos
if I take alcohol away from an alcoholic, does it necessarily follow that I have harmed him? — Leontiskos
As an aside, Peter Simpson has a paper related to a similar issue, "Justice, Scheffler and Cicero." — Leontiskos
Also, your book looks interesting! — Leontiskos
I think the basic idea here is fairly straightforward. It is the question, "Does duress excuse?" Or, "Is one still culpable when they act under duress?" — Leontiskos
I don't understand the question. :confused:So I would want to ask, first, why "positive utilitarianism" is not partially correct (i.e. why consideration of the harm-complement is non-moral). — Leontiskos
From a 2023 thread Convince Me of Moral Realism, by 'harm' (in some of its various forms) I mean this:Second, I would want to inquire into the relevant definition of harm.
And by 'injustice' I mean harm to individuals as a direct or indirect consequence of a social structure, or lack thereof, reproduced by customs, public policies, legistlation, jurisprudence or arbitrary violence. Thus, utilitarianism is a kind (or subset) of consequentialism.- deprivation (of e.g. sustanence, shelter, sleep, touch, esteem, care, health, hygiene, trust, safety, etc)
- dysfunction (i.e. injury, ill-health, disability)
- helplessness (i.e. trapped, confined, or fear-terror of being vulnerable)
- stupidity (i.e. maladaptive habits (e.g. mimetic violence, lose-lose preferences, etc))
- betrayal (i.e. trust-hazards)
- bereavement (i.e. losing loved ones & close friends), etc ...
... in effect, any involuntary decrease, irreparable loss or final elimination of human agency — 180 Proof
So I would want to ask, first, why "positive utilitarianism" is not partially correct (i.e. why consideration of the harm-complement is non-moral). Second, I would want to inquire into the relevant definition of harm.
I'm myself finding it a good means of honing my reasoning skills (or lack thereof :smile: ) — javra
Myself, I so far find the idealizations of what should be which are presented in this reply contrary to "deliberate reason ... directed to the due end" which Aquinas also makes mention of. Were this due end, for example, to be that of completely obeying or else holding duty to a set of rules set up by some supreme rule-maker, this might then make sense to me. But consider this hypothetical: either one tells oneself a white lie (say, that today the appearance of one's clothes is decent when, in reality, one does not feel this to be so) or, else, all of humanity perishes (one can affix whatever daemon scenario on pleases to this). If the end pursued is absolute obedience/duty to the rule-maker's rule that one does not ever lie, then it might be correct, or right, to destroy all of humanity by not lying. Yet - not only does this intuitively seem very wrong - but, in changing the end one directs one's actions toward to that of, say, maximal eudemonia, it would then necessarily be rationally incorrect, or worng, to do so as well. — javra
That said, any system of consequentialism that does not look upon such literally ultimate long-term goal but, instead, focuses one merely intermediate goals will, to me, necessarily be less than moral. One here deems eating candy a good due to the intermediate goal of satisfying one's sweet-tooth despite so doing leading to tooth decay and the loss of one's teeth ... sort of mindset. And I don't find that typical utilitarianism holds any such ultimate long-term goal in mind - just a generalized heuristic that might or might not eventually lead to such goal (depending on its interpretation and administration). — javra
Yes, language is important, and I was clumsy in how I applied it. To try to better explain, an important synonym for good is "beneficial", which can be interpreted as being of proper fit. One then can further interpret good as that which is of proper fit to one's goal, or telos. There are always different teloi we actively hold at the same time: some proximate, some distal, some intermediate (and, in my own musing, as per what I mentioned above, one's ultimate telos, which I shall here address as "the Good"). That which fits the Good is always good/right in an ultimate sense. That which is antithetical to the Good is then always bad/wrong in an ultimate sense. Then, if one's actively held ultimate goal "X" is antithetical to the Good, one's intentions will always be bad/wrong in an ultimate sense. This even if, to further approach or actualize goal X, one needs to engage in acts that are of themselves a proper fit to the Good. Example: one wants to sadistically destroy humanity at large but finds that in order to do so one needs to rescue an innocent baby from drowning; one than is compelled to save the baby from drowning (something one would not have otherwise done) in order to destroy humanity and then so proceeds to do. The deed of saving the baby is good, for it of itself as deed is fit to the Good, but the intentions with which this deed is done are bad, for as intentions they are of proper fit to goal X. Otherwise expressed, the saving of the baby does not hold intrinsic value to the saver or the baby - as it would for anyone whose ultimate telos is the Good - but, instead, is strictly of instrumental value in allowing for goal X. In brief, the deed of a saved baby is of itself moral but the intention with which it was saved is immoral. — javra
My beating some complete stranger to a pulp strictly out of the pleasure to do so directly estranges my from the Good. However, where I to be aiming to remain optimally aligned to the Good, and were a horrendous attack on an innocent to occur right in front of me, my then beating to a pulp the assailant so as to prevent the innocent's death (were I to be so capable of doing and were this to somehow be the only viable alternative to take) would be vitiated as an intentionally performed bad/evil/wrong. Here, (were I to be so capable) I would be proud of risking my own life to save the innocent despite the violence I willfully engaged in - and would feel very deep shame and guilt, i.e. profound culpability, where I to do nothing while the innocent died right before me with me doing nothing about it (though, in the latter case, I would not have engaged in any violence myself).
I know things can get more complex, but maybe this serves as good enough explanation? — javra
You are right, it's not easy to phrase these disparate notions of wrongness in common speech. But to try to clarify my position: X is not a wrong (an incorrect or else unfit) course of action to take as a necessary means of achieving Y which is itself optimally fitting to an eventual achieving of the ultimate good goal Z - this even though, in direct respect to ultimate good Z, X can only be ascertained as ultimately being a wrong (this because it does not allow for the ultimate achievement of Z). More concretely, let Z = Kant's Kingdom of Ends; Ukraine's engaging in war against an unjustly invading Russia is then something that cannot of itself directly achieve a Kingdom of Ends and, so, is a wrong in this ultimate sense (I do have trouble calling Ukraine's war of self-deference an evil, though, even when termed a "lesser evil"); nevertheless, Ukraine's engaging in war is necessary to achieve Ukraine's maintaining of autonomy, which is itself optimally aligned to an eventual Kingdom of Ends. As regards common speech: although we all know that war is ultimately bad, it is good for Ukraine to engage in war against an unjust invader rather then allowing itself to be decimated by not engaging in such war. — javra
I skimmed through the paper. The principal example given - that of killing one person to save five - has always been irksome to me due to its ambiguity/non-specificity: ought one kill a Mother Teresa to save five Hitlers or, else, ought one not kill one Hitler and allow five Mother Teresas to die instead? — javra
I think the basic idea here is fairly straightforward. It is the question, "Does duress excuse?" Or, "Is one still culpable when they act under duress?" — Leontiskos
But the issue to this hypothetical, within its own context of argument, is as follows: must the person in this case then be answerable for the goodness/badness of the deed they brought about?
In other words, are they in any way morally responsible for their choice (a choice which they now are attributively responsible for)? Specifically, this for having insulted a stranger rather than having done a far worse bad/evil/wrong against this same stranger. — javra
(unlike the choice between (a) and (b) - which, due to being made under extreme duress, the person can be argued to not be attributively responsible for) — javra
It's not about the choice or deed being excusable due to the duress - there was no duress in the two alternatives of the second choice that was taken (there was only a necessary choice between a fixed set of alternatives, with complete liberty to choose either). It's about the individual not being answerable for the goodness or badness (depending on perspective) of the choice of insulting a stranger rather than beating them unconscious. (In contrast, were the person to choose not to insult but to instead beat the stranger unconscious, then they would be morally responsible for their choice - for, in this case, they would now be answerable for the goodness/badness of their choice.) — javra
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