Which one is that you mean to convey? — Bob Ross
These are incoherent taken together. — Bob Ross
I need a bit of clarification on this one: do you NOT think rape is wrong, if it is committed by a dog? I seriously doubt that is what you are trying to convey, but that seems (to me) to be the implication of the above quote.
All I think you mean to convey, is that the dog isn’t a moral agent; which wasn’t ever in contention in the first place. I am saying that the act of rape that the dog committed is wrong, and the dog is not a moral agent (in the sense that the dog is not capable of being held responsible for their acts). — Bob Ross
What do you mean by “engage” here? I would say that a tornado does not “engage” in immoral or moral acts insofar as it is not culpable for the acts its commits but NOT that the tornado cannot perform what is an immoral or moral act (although it isn’t deliberate). — Bob Ross
I see your point to a certain extent, that you distinguish natural and moral evil; but this use of ‘evil’ just seems circular: isn’t that just a reference to something that is immoral? — Bob Ross
Just so we can find common ground, let’s forget semantics for a second. I agree with you that there is a difference between ‘evil’ (i.e., moral badness) which is done by indeliberate (i.e., natural) vs. deliberate (i.e., what you call “moral”) actions/events. I would merely add that the action/event is still ‘evil’ (i.e., morally bad: what I call ‘immoral’) if it is natural. I think, stripping the semantics out, you can agree with that. — Bob Ross
If natural evil is not moral evil, then some evil is not immoral. — Bob Ross
My interpretation of your view, and correct me if I am still misunderstanding, is that you mean to denote a subtype of immorality (i.e., of evil) which is the realm of these 'moral realities' that you refer to; and in that sense I have no problem with it. — Bob Ross
Evil in the broad sense has been divided into two categories: natural evil and moral evil. — SEP | The Concept of Evil
The semantics just seem weird to me. — Bob Ross
Kick rocks!!!My model helps me to understand. Fear, anger, and desire are all three consciousness. They are all three involved in choice. The choice to be, anger, is still a choice. The choice to comply with instantiated patterns, involuntary acts, as you just gave an example for, are indeed still choices.
The power of choice is effectively infinite. But a weak will (desire in general) is hard pressed to carry out 'deliberate' acts that violate the tendencies of the weak current state. We are slowly evolving into more capable moral agents. That is a law of the universe. It is happening everywhere and it is, from what we can determine so far, reasonably rare that what we call life happens. As mentioned, that is a misunderstanding. The call of desire, the existence of nothing but consciousness in the universe, empowers free will for every particle in existence. The STATE of that particle determines the difficulty of choice. So it is nigh unto impossible for a rock to play poker for example. But that is only nigh and not finally actually impossible. Understanding and accepting these extremely rare cases of truth delving is a better way than what most people have of being aware what is going on.
Most people will not be comfortable discussing rocks that choose. But any other assertion is more than just incoherent. Everything in this universe is choosing constantly. And moral scrutiny DOES apply to rocks as well as humans. I realize I am probably alone in this assertion. No worries. — Chet Hawkins
no, literally!Which is every single act in the universe that has happened, is happening, or will happen. No narrowing down of the scope occurred here. If you think it did, you are only deluding yourself and those that believe you. — Chet Hawkins
thats wise of you, chet!....What clearly stated to you determines a non-hypothetical state? I promise you there is not one. To any experience of any chooser, any act past or present is hypothetical only. — Chet Hawkins
I think even if its knowable (chet assumes BELIEVES its NOT (with good enough reason) the part or answer to the question, begs the questioning...if unknowable (due to capabilities) how does TIME influence or constrain something that can be known only by observation of existence in reality and from there judged rightfully and agreed upon from the place of judgement with good reasons that warrant detailed explanations in the decision its self? The jury should explain consensus and how they got there should be examined, for cases that are harder or easier than others to get to an answer, those decision making moments in group setting vs individual beliefs how they affect or alter that timeline, convincing, and doubting, and power....willing...justice serves itself in all natures, at certain/specific times for us. What do we do with that intel? Ignore it? Thats your call...or Bobs....we cant see what time tells us now, then! How could we?So to us moral agents that are not perfectevery act is hypothetical even after decisions are made and a new state is formed. We do not know the past. We do not know the present state. We do not know the future. All of it is hypothetical. — Chet Hawkins
They are not. Someone who does something right is someone who is capable of moral acts. Similarly, someone who does something wrong (or immoral) is someone who is capable of moral acts.
At this point I'm getting impatient because you're not even reading my responses.
…
Thus someone who does something right (and not wrong) is a moral agent who is in no way culpable, and therefore it is flatly false to claim that moral agents are necessarily culpable
If the dog is not a moral agent then it is not capable of committing immoral acts, such as rape.
Then it's high time you defined what you mean by an immoral act.
If you think evil just means immoral then you didn't read or understand the SEP articles, because they clearly distinguish moral evil from natural evil.
What is the breadth of the moral sphere? The common view is that some acts are moral, such as giving a starving man food or committing murder, and some acts are non-moral, such as taking one’s dog for a walk.1 You should immediately notice that by “moral” I do not mean morally good; by “moral” I am not talking about the opposite of immoral. Instead, when I use the term “moral act” I am referring to an act that belongs to the species of moral-and-immoral-acts; or an act that belongs to the species of good-and-bad-acts. More simply, I am referring to an act that is susceptible to (moral) scrutiny, evaluation, or judgment. A moral act is an act that can be legitimately (and, thus, morally) judged good or bad; a non-moral act is an act that cannot.
In order to understand why all human acts are moral acts we must understand the difference between applying scrutiny to an act and applying moral scrutiny to an act
What do you suppose it means to be an amoral or non-moral reality? You may as well say that non-colored realities can be red.
Given the way you use words like "culpable" and "immoral," I think what you are in need of is a dictionary.
you should consider all interactions to your OP, and be thankful that anyone acknowledges it at all. — Kizzy
We may be at an impasse, so please feel free, if you see nothing new or noteworthy to add to my response here, to just have us agree to disagree. That is not to say that I don’t want to continue discussing, and I will, but I just don’t want you feel that you have to keep circling back and reiterating (if that starts to happen, as I suspect it might). — Bob Ross
Which implied that by ‘moral agent’, you are referring to not merely an agent capable of moral action but, rather, one that does right action. See what I mean? — Bob Ross
If it is that you just mean the former, then I was right in thinking that ‘moral agent’, for you, is an agent capable of moral action and, thusly, one which can be held responsible for their actions (which, for you, is one which has deliberate actions). OR, if you mean that a ‘moral agent’ is the latter, then it is not true, and patently incoherent, to posit that anyone capable of moral action is a ‘moral agent’ (because they also, in order to meet the definition, must be doing the right acts, not just acts of which they are capable of being held responsible). — Bob Ross
There are two broad, traditional senses of the adjective ‘moral’, which you even expounded in your OP, which are a signification of (1) what is within moral discourse and (2) what is actually good. — Bob Ross
1. ‘moral’ in the sense of within moral discourse (e.g., whether or not to rape someone is a moral matter [which is not to make a comment on if it is immoral or not]).
2. ‘moral’ in the sense of morally right (e.g., being kind is moral, being mean is immoral).
3. ‘moral’ in the sense of moral responsibility (e.g., you have a moral duty to not rape people, tornadoes are not moral agents, etc.). — Bob Ross
By ‘moral evil’ in ‘natural vs. moral evil’, one is denoting with the adjective ‘moral’ what is evil in a deliberate sense: it is to use ‘moral’ in all three senses. — Bob Ross
So, let me break down what I mean by way of my dog example: — Bob Ross
I was meaning ‘morally bad’, which to me is ‘to be intrinsically bad or relate to something intrinsically bad such that it bad relative to it’, and this is in the second sense (I mentioned above). I am not commenting on whether or not, by saying it is an ‘immoral’ act in this manner, this act is within the ‘moral reality’ of moral responsibility talk—I just mean that it is morally bad.
Think of it this way, for my view, you can just, in this sense of ‘immoral’ (i.e., the second), just substitute ‘immoral’ for ‘evil’ (although I do think that ‘evil’ is specifically moral badness to an extreme, but that doesn’t matter for now). — Bob Ross
Correct me if I am wrong, but all I got out of the SEP was that they are making a distinction between two general types of moral badness: those which are natural, and those which are done purposefully. — Bob Ross
“moral scrutiny” is being used in the first and third sense, and not the second; which is completely different from how it is used in the natural vs. moral evil distinction. By your own admission, “moral” in “moral scrutiny” is not referring to something morally right nor wrong: “moral” in “moral evil” is referring to something morally wrong, deliberate, and in the sphere of moral discourse. — Bob Ross
By ‘moral reality’, I am assuming you mean ~”a society (or perhaps framework) comprised of beings capable of moral responsibility”. Is that not what you mean? — Bob Ross
I apologize, by ‘moral agents’ that are culpable for their actions; I meant capable of being culpable for their actions. — Bob Ross
Hopefully my expounding of the terms helps. — Bob Ross
If we continue you may need to begin to shoulder more of the burden of proof, for your posts are becoming increasingly opaque to me.
"What do you suppose it means to be an amoral or non-moral reality?"
Not at all. As I have already mentioned many times in this thread, stating things with confidence as a belief IS NOT stating that one has objective knowledge. The assertions are hypotheses only and anyone may argue against it at any time.Despite the delusions of all people, morality is the only thing going on. Morality is objective and true. All acts are only of course moral acts in that they SHOULD be judged morally. There is no act, no substantive state, that is not merely a succession of choices amid free will. This universe is alive. It emerges life as a natural law. The seeds of life exist as choice down to the sub-atomic level. Choice is effectively the only act thing in the universe. States are all the consequential arrangements of matter and energy and we will say consciousness as well. Really though we could JUST say consciousness because matter and energy are both just forms of consciousness.
These and other seemingly absolute statements seem sort of at odds with your prior claims that no one can know anything and that any pretension to knowledge is a sort of delusion/vainglory, no? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes, clearly.That is incorrect.
All morals are forced to be hypothetical ought-judgments. We cannot know. So all beliefs are effectively hypotheses.
But I take it you don't actually know if what you've just. claimed is true or not. Is it only a hypothesis? — Count Timothy von Icarus
I did not say that at all. I said the use of the word 'know' and its derivatives is inclined in the wrong direction. People more often take that to mean certainty. Stating your beliefs confidently is not the same thing at all. And here I am again saying, 'everything I say is partially wrong, by admission. What I say is my belief only. I am willing to argue the points based on evidence and reasoning.'Weren't you saying something about how people shouldn't speak/write in such a way that they seem certain about things, but instead should always piously acknowledge their ignorance. But then... — Count Timothy von Icarus
I didn't use the word knowledge and they are only beliefs. Still my belief is that KNOWLEDGE IS ONLY BELIEF. That's the thread title. Is there something I said that denies that belief? No. What it means is that the colloquial use of the term 'know' and 'knowledge' partakes in our culture of too much certainty when it is only belief. I again, despite my ringing confidence, claim to know anything at all. I do claim to have strong beliefs and speaking JUST FOR ME I do not confuse those two things. Others do all the time.Consequentialism is a dangerous lie. Deontological morality is the only thing that makes any sense...
The good is objective.
Etc.
look like knowledge claims. — Count Timothy von Icarus
You do not say why. You leave others to fill in the gaps AS IF your point is merely obvious. You believe in certainty then, at least more than I do.All thinking is incoherent.
You should have led with this. — Count Timothy von Icarus
It is often consider rude to stand in the way of stupidity, but, I find myself called.Aside from the piety of declaring ignorance, you might want to consider not being so rude lol. — Count Timothy von Icarus
With respect to your use of ‘moral agent’, the issue was really due to my accidental conveyance of ‘an moral agent is one which is capable of being held culpable for their actions’ with ‘an moral agent is one which is culpable for their actions’: I apologize, that was my mistake. The whole time I was thinking the former, but conveyed the latter. Your definition, in light of that, is fine and perfectly consistent. — Bob Ross
I honestly don’t know what a ‘moral reality’ is, at all (other than what I understand you to be meaning). I have never used that phrase, and don’t see any need to use it. Perhaps this is an indication of my ignorance...I don’t know. — Bob Ross
‘Evil’, by my lights, is a morally-loaded term: there cannot be such a thing as amoral evil; and perhaps if you could elaborate on why you think that, then I may be able to account better for your position. — Bob Ross
Evil in the broad sense has been divided into two categories: natural evil and moral evil. Natural evils are bad states of affairs which do not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents. Hurricanes and toothaches are examples of natural evils. — SEP | The Concept of Evil
But I still need to know what you mean by "amoral," as you continue to use this term. In the thread you have spoken about amoral agents and amoral acts. What are amoral agents and amoral acts?
"A natural evil is a bad state of affairs that does not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents."
Suppose a tornado kills 100 people. The suffering and death of 100 people is evil; it is a bad state of affairs.
Therefore this evil is natural.
I thought about it some more and came up with a somewhat convoluted counterexample that, under certain constraints, might show that your first thesis is wrong. — ToothyMaw
Accordingly, if we bring “that which benefits humanity” into line with “that which advances knowledge”, by redefining that which benefits humanity to be the effects of advancements in knowledge, we end up with a one-to-one relationship between the two that does indeed maximize benefit to humanity through advancements in knowledge. — ToothyMaw
But this admits of some acts that must be neutral - not subject to moral scrutiny - because not every act furthers or hinders advancements in knowledge. This is different from the spectrum you describe in objection 2 because there are plainly acts that have no relation to what is good or bad now, even if there is still a sort of bifurcated spectrum. — ToothyMaw
...The scope of one’s non-hypothetical ought-judgments will extend as far as one’s normative end(s) extend(s). The breadth of one’s moral sphere will depend on what they conceive of as the end of their life and perhaps of all human life. Still, it seems to me that Aristotle conceived of this end and its scope rightly. — Leontiskos
By ‘amoral agent’, I was referring to an agent that is not capable of moral decision making (viz., not capable of being culpable for their actions); and by ‘amoral act’, I would be referring to an action which is not itself immoral or moral. — Bob Ross
Is this “bad” state, morally bad? — Bob Ross
Again, what do you mean by ‘bad’? — Bob Ross
I would say that the suffering and death of 100 people is morally bad, because it is a morally bad state of affairs. — Bob Ross
Would you agree that, although the tornado is not a moral agent, the tornado is doing something “bad” when in the event of destroying those 100 people’s lives? — Bob Ross
If so, then what kind of “bad”? — Bob Ross
Yes, but the only way this distinction makes sense (to me) is if this natural evil is still morally bad (being evil); — Bob Ross
then morality is restricted to essentially the sphere of deliberate acts and what relates thereto — Bob Ross
The way I see it, either 'natural evil' is a matter of amoral consideration and is, thusly, not evil (viz., it is really 'natural badness'); or 'natural evil' is a matter of moral consideration and is, thusly, evil. — Bob Ross
The fact that you and other 'readers' cannot connect connected ideas is not the fault of the poster, in any case. That goes as well from me to them and vice versa. I can accept these 'rude' comments about my efforts in stride, a tactic I advise you and many other fear-bound intellectuals (scoff) on this and many other sites to earn as wisdom. I like it that you have the strength to say such things and ostensibly mean them. I do not demand that you stop. You should not either.Although your intentions may be good, your responses are elongated, disrespectful, sporadic, intellectually lazy, and unsubstantive; and I say this with all due respect, as a person that wants to see you both grow and develop into better philosophers :kiss: . Please try to see it from your reader's perspective: they are reading an essay which conveys a plethora of different ideas (all of which are unrelated to each other) in incredibly confusing, convoluted, and incoherent ways...all while hurling insulting comments at them. How do you expect them to react? — Bob Ross
That is the trouble with supposed intellectual rigor. It isn't, finally. You can argue then that my approach is not then finally actually rigorous, and I would simply agree. That's how compromise really works. We are both failing some and we both contribute some. It is not just my views that are different, but my entire approach in all ways, and THAT is still good. Or, let's say it's better than ostracism or dismissal, the classic retreat of the cowards. Fear guy: 'We cannot convince you of the lies we have all settled for, so, exit stage left, if you please!' So kind in this immoral act!This forum is all about a congregation of people willing to learn from each other with genuineness, respectfulness, and intellectual rigor. It is completely fine and understandable to have different views than other people on this forum, but I would strongly suggest that you try to make your future comments more concise, respectful, and intellectually rigorous. — Bob Ross
And actually I have. The fact that you again do not realize this because I still disagree is telling, but not really of me, if you follow. I find here, as usual, people cannot escape their cage of patterns. And of course fear is more prone to that error in the first place. But that is just hyperbolic unconcise blather to you, isn't it? Who is not taking the time to really research and consider other points of view here? It is not me, I assure you.By 'intellectually rigorous', I do not mean that you need to have extensive knowledge of the topic-at-hand; but, rather, demonstrate in your responses that you took the time to reflect on the topic and the person's post you are responding to (as opposed to just ranting). It goes a long way, when the reader of your response can see that you took the time to genuinely reflect, dissect, and contend with their ideas. — Bob Ross
I could repeat the backhanded compliment to you. But why stand on ceremony? It is not disrespectful to state a belief that nonsense is nonsense, even if that nonsense is not nonsense. All we have is belief. If the intent was genuine, then that is still ok.I say none of this with any ill-will intentions nor disrespect in mind: as I said before, I want to see you both become great philosophers (: — Bob Ross
Excellent, and it is the corollary that you seem to transgress at various points throughout the thread, "Amoral agents can only produce amoral acts." Or similarly, "Amoral agents cannot produce acts which are moral or immoral." Do you accede to this corollary?
But someone who holds that the suffering and death of 100 people are bad would just say that death and suffering are intrinsically bad (or evil)
You think it is immoral because you have idiosyncratically defined "immoral" to include natural evil, as I noted above (
↪Leontiskos
). You agree with SEP that it is a "bad state of affairs which did not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents," but instead of using the common philosophical parlance of "natural evil" you call it "immoral." According to moral philosophy that which does not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents is in no way moral or immoral.
You will never hear newscasters or other people speak about the immorality or wickedness of tornadoes
Arthritis is bad, but it's not immoral
Yes, but the only way this distinction makes sense (to me) is if this natural evil is still morally bad (being evil); — Bob Ross
If SEP is making a distinction between natural evil and moral evil, then it makes no sense for you to say, "Okay that distinction makes sense to me so long as natural evil is moral evil." To say such a thing is to fail to understand that any distinction is being made at all!
Morality is restricted to the realm of deliberate acts. As SEP demonstrates, this is not controversial.
I see what you mean, and now recognize that I need to be more clear with my terminology.
To answer your question outright: I accept the corollary as valid, but this leaves me no choice but to deny the existence of amoral agents and acts (in the sense of ‘moral’ qua what is within its sphere [of discourse]) because I do think we can analyze acts and agents which are not responsible for their actions within [the study of] morality.
However, it is important (for me) to note that there are amoral agents and acts in the sense of ‘moral’ qua what is morally wrong/right.
In other words, all agents/acts are within the sphere of moral talk, but not all agents/acts are necessarily being immoral/moral or doing immoral/moral things.
Moreover, there are two subtypes of immoral agents (in both senses of the term I expounded above): those capable of culpability and those that are not.
A tornado is a moral agent in the sense of being an agent subject to moral analysis; and it is, in fact, doing things and that are morally wrong and is being something that is inherently immoral—it is not just being or doing things that are amorally bad.
Evil, then, is always moral. There is no such thing as ‘natural evil’ in the sense that you outlined; instead, what I mean by ‘natural evil’ is evil which is does indeliberately (viz., in a way of which no one can be held responsible for it)—that’s it. — Bob Ross
The problem with this, is that under my theory moral goodness is identical to intrinsic goodness; so the obvious antithesis to this is intrinsic badness. Thusly, if what the tornado is doing is intrinsically bad, then it is morally bad. See what I mean? — Bob Ross
(1) I don’t think it is idiosyncratic (but that’s a mute point) — Bob Ross
To your point, if I were to say to the common man “that tornado is immoral”, they will find it nonsense because they would interpret it the way you are. — Bob Ross
To my point, if you said “evil is not always immoral”, they would also find this to be nonsense. — Bob Ross
Likewise, to my point, if I clarified my statement about the tornado, such as “the tornado is immoral insofar as its acts (or the events it brings about) are immoral”, the common man would find no problem with it. — Bob Ross
The only reason they would find it initially nonsensical, is because within the context of the use of ‘immoral’ in that particular sentence makes it sound like I am saying the tornado is culpable for its evil actions. — Bob Ross
Cancer is immoral, because I think it is intrinsically bad; and intrinsic badness is the antithesis to intrinsic goodness; and intrinsic goodness is moral goodness. — Bob Ross
No, so what I was pointing out is that the ‘natural’ vs. ‘moral’ evil distinction makes sense if (1) ‘evil’ is interpreted as immoral AND (2) ‘moral’, in ‘moral evil’, is interpreted as signifier the capability of being responsible (as opposed to being an assertion about it being within the sphere of moral discourse). Again, you have to admit (at least) that the adjective ‘moral’ is used in many senses. — Bob Ross
For example, imagine agents could not exist in reality: it is, let’s say, metaphysically or logically impossible. Does that mean that there isn’t a state of supreme and ultimate (moral) good that would be applicable to that reality? I don’t think so. Do you? — Bob Ross
. The fact that you have a hard time communicating your thoughts with idiosyncratic language is no coincidence, for idiosyncratic language undermines the purpose of language itself.
It is moot insofar as it does not impact the formal soundness of your arguments. It is not moot insofar as it will prevent you from easily talking with other people and engaging in dialogical philosophy.
Only because "evil" in that sentence will be interpreted as, "evil (human) acts." If you ask the same person whether a devastating tornado is evil, and whether it is immoral, they will probably say yes/no.
And they are right, for immorality implies culpability. I showed you that SEP affirms this. We could also go to IEP and Wikipedia, but if you distrust SEP then I doubt these other sources will avail.
Are we perhaps at the end of our conversation? SEP says that we call something morally evil, morally bad, or immoral insofar as it "results from the intentions or negligence of moral agents." I agree with SEP; you disagree. You think entities incapable of intention can truly be called immoral, such as tornadoes. For me, this is the key takeaway.
Edit: I suppose I should raise the customary toast to the argument from vacuity. That if everything is "moral" then nothing at all is "moral."
• Jake: That tree is brk.
• Sue: What does 'brk' mean?
• Jake: Brk is a property of everything whatsoever.
• Sue: So nothing is non-brk?
• Jake: Nope, nothing.
• Sue: Well if there is nothing which is non-brk then it would seem that 'brk' means nothing at all.
The true word 'moral' has meaning because there are realities which are truly non-moral (or amoral)
Firstly, you are absolutely right to point out that a tornado is not an agent, as an agent is self-caused, and that it isn’t acting (in the strict sense of the word that relates to agents) either; and I apologize if I suggested otherwise. However, this doesn’t takeaway from my main point, which is is that what the tornado is “doing” is immoral. — Bob Ross
I would also point out, to my favor, that ‘evil’ is traditionally a morally-loaded term; and so, technically, it doesn’t make sense to say “moral evil”: it’s redundant. — Bob Ross
It’s just because I have my own ethical theory, which we haven’t discussed in depth. — Bob Ross
This does not mean that I am wrong; and surely doesn’t entail that I should stick to all the traditional terms IF there are better ones (for formative purposes). — Bob Ross
I say all agents are “moral agents” insofar as they are capable of moral analysis, but some are not held capably blameworthy for their actions; and if one wants to use “moral agent” in the sense of an agent which can be held responsible for their actions, then I have no problem using it that way if it helps them wrap their head around things. Anyone can understand this easily. — Bob Ross
I’ve never had a problem with the SEP article, as, like I said, I have interpreted it as making a distinction between two types of evil; and that ‘evil’ still was completely in the sphere of moral discourse. — Bob Ross
It makes absolutely no sense to claim that some amoral bad is evil. Something that is amorally bad is just pragmatically bad. — Bob Ross
Fair enough! As always, great conversation Leontiskos! Feel free to stop the conversation whenever you wish...I will let you have the last word. — Bob Ross
That everything is capable of moral analysis does not in any way entail that nothing is capable of moral analysis; and just because a property can be applied to everything, it does not follow it is vacuous (e.g., beingness). — Bob Ross
I would also like to note that by saying everything is capable of moral analysis, I am not claiming there is a property of "moralness" that can be predicated to everything. "moral" was being used as an adjective, not a property. — Bob Ross
I feel like you keep forgetting that, by your own lights, ‘moral’ has multiple meanings; and you then proceed to conflate them. — Bob Ross
The difference lies in whether their cause is a responsible agent—something that can be held responsible for producing the evil effect. — Leontiskos
Nah, I don't think I have conflated this once in the entire thread. For traditional language-users "moral" has only two basic meanings, and both are closely related: 1) capable of moral or immoral acts, and 2) moral or immoral (and in both of these cases the term "moral" is meant in the sense of praiseworthy or morally good). This is standard language, where a cause can be named according to its effect (see, for example, my "corollary" above). — Leontiskos
You could, of course, expand the moral sphere by eliminating space for such amoral acts and judgements, but they could never be fully eliminated, I think. — ToothyMaw
Objection 5: Morality correlates to importance
Moral acts are important acts
Not all human acts are important acts
Therefore, not all human acts are moral acts
This is similar to Objection 2. I would respond by saying that everything someone does is something they consider worthwhile or worth doing. The simple fact that time is scarce leads us to try to use our time wisely and do things that are worthwhile.
On the other hand, not everything is equally worthwhile, and someone might use the idea of morality to denote those things or rules that are worth taking especially seriously. This is fine so long as we do not forget that there is no qualitative difference between more important things and less important things, for all things that are worth doing have a minimum level of importance. — Leontiskos
<The tornado is a "moral" "agent" "acting" "immorally">
"Being" involves analogical predication and degrees. For example, propositions exist in a different way than giraffes or colors. "Brk" is a univocal predication, as is your predication of "moral (agent)."
Oh, but you are saying it is a property. You think the tornado has the property of "moral agent," and this property applies to all things without exception.
For traditional language-users "moral" has only two basic meanings, and both are closely related: 1) capable of moral or immoral acts, and 2) moral or immoral
Great OP. — Moliere
I would have said your example of the person with the rule to not cross their fingers while urinating is a good example of a non-moral act in the wider sense you're talking about. It's not morally evaluable because it's not morally significant. So that leads me to objection 5. — Moliere
Along with objection 2 -- I'd say there are moral acts as you use the term, and non-moral acts -- or, rather, I think I'd prefer "activity" so as to encompass more than a singular act, but rather the patterns within a world.
But rather than saying "this one falls in the middle and so is neither good nor bad", I'm thinking that some acts simply don't fall on the spectrum. To use the light/dark spectrum as analogy, "wind" is real but has no brightness because it's a pressure gradient, rather than a light gradient.
But then when it comes to "What makes activity moral?", in the wider sense, I haven't an answer there. All I have is an example that seems troublesome, but you seem to bite the bullet with your example of the rule to not cross your fingers while urinating as morally evaluable. — Moliere
Part of me wonders here, though: Surely we can evaluate any action on a subjective basis of an arbitrary rule -- but that ability doesn't indicate something about moral life, just as your finger-crossing example doesn't really seem to, though it can be evaluated along a subjective rule. — Moliere
I thought about it even more and came up with another argument. I hope you and Bob haven't hashed this one out yet, because I'm not going to read your guys' entire conversation right now. — ToothyMaw
I start by defining an amoral act as: an act that results from deliberation that is not intended towards a moral end. Note that this is a statement about intent. I also define an amoral judgement as: a non-hypothetical ought judgement resulting from consideration of non-moral hypothetical oughts (a non-moral all things considered judgement). — ToothyMaw
You might argue that the new category of "amoral" act I am talking about above could still be good or bad based on whether it violates some arbitrary set of rules. I admit that it could be. What if it doesn't break any rules? What if there is an amoral act that flows from an amoral judgment that neither breaks nor acts in furtherance of any rules that could be made? — ToothyMaw
Not only would it be neither good nor bad, but it would be amoral in the sense of being informed purely by non-moral hypothetical oughts and considerations, and thus would not be subject to moral scrutiny; given no intended moral consequences, there is no calculation that could be considered moral if you accept my definitions. — ToothyMaw
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.