I am more in the direction of a dualist. A dualist accepts both mind and matter as different substance, like from Descartes. Hence I acknowledge matter exists as material substance, and mind exists as mental substance. — Corvus
Please bear in mind that all meanings are mental, logical and conceptual, viz NON MATERIAL and NON PHYSICAL even if they are the product of the physical brain. — Corvus
No I don't think I was going on sentiment at all. I was just letting the OP know why he was confused when he posts an addlepated questions like "
If your brain were removed from your cranium, would you be using your hands to type messages to me?
— ucarr
, when I have never denied the existence of brain for the precondition of mind. — Corvus
…when I talk about a metaphysical Causal Principle (e.g. Energy) producing changes in Matter, I place it in a philosophical category more like metaphysical Essence (identity ; meaning). That's because Potential/Energy/Essence has no material properties : mass, hardness, plasticity. Energy's primary property is Causation. So, I'm making a philosophical distinction, not a scientific classification. — Gnomon
Energy's primary property is Causation. — Gnomon
I'm not aware of any specific discussion of "Metaphysics" in Incomplete Nature ; that word is not in the index. Also, the unscientific word "spirit" is not in the index. Besides, Deacon --- as a scientist --- seems to deliberately avoid making specific philosophical conjectures, such as you mentioned, beyond a space-time context. But other people have referred to the book as a "metaphysics of incompleteness".Does Deacon teach us that metaphysical principles are logically but not temporally prior to the natural world? Should we understand that spirit and nature are co-eternal? — ucarr
Of course Time is an important factor for perishable material bodies, and minds are dependent on bodies. So yes, Time is significant for making sense of the Mind/Body problem. However, philosophical principles are imaginary concepts, and not subject to the ravages of Time. I suppose the "metaphysical principle" you referred to is Energy, as if it was a philosophical concept. But I would say that Energy is instead a practical physical concept, while EnFormAction is a theoretical philosophical conjecture. Yet both are referring to the invisible Cause behind the obvious Effects (changes) we see in nature. The names don't "describe" causation, but merely label a phenomenon that humans infer intuitively : that physical Change is somewhat mysterious. Which is why the ancients labelled "spiritual" phenomena in terms of causal agents, rather than natural forces. :cool:Under Deacon’s influence I’ve learned to speculate temporal direction in application to the mind/body problem might be significant rather than trivial. You talk of metaphysical principles being causal. Might it be more correct to say metaphysical principles describe causation? — ucarr
Naturally! Physicists typically avoid any implication of Metaphysics in their descriptions of change. However, what you call "metaphysics in action" might be considered legitimate philosophical language. Since this is a Philosophy Forum, not a Physics Forum, the terminology would be expected to be different, and more focused on Ideas than Things. Deacon used the term "Absence" in lieu of more traditional philosophical appellations for immaterial (mental ; mathematical) notions. Scientists might prefer "statistical probability" to "absence" as the precursor of Actuality.When an elementary particle decays into two of its constituent particles, physicists don’t typically characterize this event as being metaphysics in action. — ucarr
Yes, it was that "upward evolution" that Deacon labeled "Teleology", in contravention of scientific protocol that evolution is directionless. But the increase in complexity & integration & interconnection of systems over time is undeniable. So, he also described Evolution as "downward causation", as-if the program of physical form-change was directed from above. That teleological direction was also implicit in Wheeler's "it from bit" notion, where mental Information was prior to physical instances. Is such Teleology also a "foundational truth"? :wink:That self-organizing processes working through nested tiers of upwardly evolving dynamics lead a trail of interconnection from it to bit seems to me, per the brilliant analysis of Deacon, foundational truth. — ucarr
Physical Truths are what philosophers refer to as Metaphysical Principles. Which are, by definition, logically prior to physical things and processes. So, the "causal force" of a Principle is in the before & after or if-then relationship. Traditionally, philosophers referred to Downward Causation as purposeful Teleology. But modern materialistic philosophers prefer to use the non-commital term Teleonomy. Personally, I find Teleology more descriptive, despite its implication of a Cosmic Mind as the First Cause. :nerd:The metaphysical description of physical processes has no causal force whatsoever. . . . Metaphysical understandings of physical truths are logically prior to physical processes as interpretive overviews of types of physical processes and their interrelations. — ucarr
Is Potential temporally prior to Actual, or is Potential timeless and Actual time-bound?* — Gnomon
However, philosophical principles are imaginary concepts, and not subject to the ravages of Time. — Gnomon
Do abstract concepts exist independent of minds contemplating them? — ucarr
I cannot prove scientifically that Truth must be conceived as a Truth that is valid independent of humanity; but I believe it firmly. I believe, for instance, that the Pythagorean theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of man.
The next question I would ask, in what sense do such principles exist? Is the Pythagorean Theorem 'out there somewhere' - a popular expression for whatever is thought to be real. To which I'd respond in the negative - such principles are not situated in space and time, neither are arithmetical primitives or the other fundamental constituents of rational thought. But due to the influence of empiricism on philosophy, the nature of such principles must be relegated to the subjective or attributed to what you describe as 'brain phenomena'. — Wayfarer
I didn't think of "energy as causation" as insightful. I thought it was obvious. Perhaps the dictionary definition of energy as "ability" is vague. But even the notion of "force" as a mathematical "vector quantity" is less than clear. But then, the notion of "Causality" or "Causation" is more of a general philosophical concept than a specific physical phenomenon, in that it implies both Agency (executive) and Efficacy (ability). Actually, I consider the equation of "Information" (power to inform) and "Causation" (energy) to be more philosophically insightful. That notion probably goes back to Quantum theory, but Deacon discussed not only the causal role of Absence, but notes that its not-yet-real Potential was mostly overlooked in physical Science. :smile:Can you elaborate further your insightful characterization of energy as causation? — ucarr
The main contribution of Quantum Mechanics to Causation theory was its statistical nature. By that I mean quantum events are not absolute Cause >>> Effect, but mathematically subject to random interaction, hence probable. The chain of Cause & Effect has gaps or weak links or non-linear links. Philosophically, I attribute that non-linear behavior --- as defined in the Schrodinger equation --- to the Holistic effects of Entanglement. Randomness and non-linearity are the primary differences between Classical Newtonian physics and Non-classical Quantum physics. Like immaterial Absence, this random causal Probability has not been duly appreciated in pragmatic Physics. :nerd:What can you tell us about the QM version of causation? — ucarr
That's an excellent example of the difference in how the Materialist and Metaphysical worldviews imagine Ontological Existence. Ironically, imagination of abstractions, such as Principles, is not explainable in physical/material terms, except as philosophical metaphors. How anything immaterial or inferred or imaginary can "appear" in a gelatinous lump of matter is the essence of the "hard problem".The next question I would ask, in what sense do such principles exist? Is the Pythagorean Theorem 'out there somewhere' - a popular expression for whatever is thought to be real. To which I'd respond in the negative - such principles are not situated in space and time, neither are arithmetical primitives or the other fundamental constituents of rational thought. But due to the influence of empiricism on philosophy, the nature of such principles must be relegated to the subjective or attributed to what you describe as 'brain phenomena'. But notice that 'phenomena' means 'what appears' but that whatever we ascribe to the neural domain can only be a matter of inference; nothing actually appears in a brain as object of neuroscientific analysis, save patterns of bio-electrical activity. But it seems to me that in support of your materialist thesis, you must insist on the connection between abstract principles and neural configuration, to maintain the connection with a material substrate, as an 'output' or 'result' of 'neural activities'. — Wayfarer
How do you think the Pythagorean Theorem was discovered/ confirmed if not by observation and measurement? — Janus
Do abstract concepts exist independent of minds contemplating them? — ucarr
I would turn the question around, and ask if 'the law of the excluded middle' or 'the Pythagorean theorem' came into existence when humans first grasped them. It seems to me the answer is 'obviously not', that they would be discovered by rational sentient beings in other worlds, were they to have evolved. Yet they are the kinds of primitive concepts which constitute the basic furniture of reason.
Albert Einstein said
I cannot prove scientifically that Truth must be conceived as a Truth that is valid independent of humanity; but I believe it firmly. I believe, for instance, that the Pythagorean theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of man.
I think that is true, but that it's also true that while the theorem might exist independently of man, it can only be understood by humans. So it's mind-independent, on one hand, but only perceptible to a mind, on the other. — Wayfarer
This is a thread for you to understand, explicate and defend "absential materialism". It is not for "to articulate with maximum precision of detail the structure wherein brain, albeit being a precondition of mind,"n your stance, you declare a hard boundary between material substance and mental substance. Your job now is to articulate with maximum precision of detail the structure wherein brain, albeit being a precondition of mind, nonetheless inhabits a structure featuring a hard partitioning of brain from mind. Per your stance as a hard-boundary dualist, you must explain a structure wherein the hard-partitioning (like parallellism) of brain/mind at the same time features brain as a precondition for mind. — ucarr
If you really asked me about this issue from my own perspectives, then mind is not something emerged from matter. You could say that, but then you will find much problem explicating further for the connection.The core issue of this conversation is articulation of the structure of connection linking mind with matter in the mode of Deacon’s theme: that mind emerged from matter. This clause declares the interweave connecting matter and mind. — ucarr
…the notion of "Causality" or "Causation" is more of a general philosophical concept than a specific physical phenomenon, in that it implies both Agency (executive) and Efficacy (ability). — Gnomon
I consider the equation of "Information" (power to inform) and "Causation" (energy) to be more philosophically insightful. — Gnomon
No. Why do you ask? Are you trying to determine if I am a Platonic Idealist, like Kastrup? He makes some good arguments for Idealism as prior to Real, but I'm not so sure. The term "to exist" has multiple meanings.This claim begs the question: Do abstract concepts exist independent of minds contemplating them? — ucarr
No. My concept of Causation applies only to Philosophy. I don't do Chemistry or Physics. However, I do gain some philosophical insights from scientific enigmas, such as quantum paradoxes (wave/particle ; energy/mass). :nerd:Do you make your claim of causation being primarily philosophical in application to: a) chemistry; b) elementary particle physics? — ucarr
Your questions indicate that you still don't understand what Enformationism is all about. It's a philosophical model of reality, not a scientific description of materiality. As an alternative to Materialism and Idealism, it postulates that Generic Information (First Cause) is all-of-the above : agency, matter, etc. During physical evolution, from plasma to people, the Universal Power (potential) remains the same, and only the specific Form (actual instances) changes as the world evolves. Wheeler didn't use the term "generic information", but his "bit" refers to something general instead of specific. It's not a thing, but a principle. For example, Newton's Principia Mathematica refers to ideal abstractions, not to agents or material things. Of course, he believed in an absolute Agent who knows (imagines) such ideas into reality.I understand this sentence as a reference to Wheeler’s “It from bit.” Do you think information: a) an agent of material things; b) a material aspect of material things? — ucarr
Good! Deacon is one a handful of practicing scientists who are not afraid to think outside the Reductionist box about Holistic concepts. Although he skirts the taboo line between empirical Science and theoretical Philosophy, he provides tasty fodder for philosophical rumination. For empirical purposes, Absence is non-nutritious. But for theoretical models, it is filling. :smile:↪Gnomon
But with deference to Deacon, he is certainly no lumpen materialist. He holds up Francis Crick’s neural materialism as an example of same. I am suspicious of the claim of the necessity of a ‘neural substrate’, that an idea is only real if it is instantiated in a physical brain, but I’m still considering Deacon’s book. — Wayfarer
This claim begs the question: Do abstract concepts exist independent of minds contemplating them? — ucarr
No. Why do you ask? Are you trying to determine if I am a Platonic Idealist, like Kastrup? He makes some good arguments for Idealism as prior to Real, but I'm not so sure. The term "to exist" has multiple meanings. — Gnomon
The only thing we know for sure is our own ideas (solipsism paradox). But we can infer, and collectively agree as a convention, that there is a reality out there conforming to our individual imaginary concepts. — Gnomon
My concept of Causation applies only to Philosophy. I don't do Chemistry or Physics. — Gnomon
Your questions indicate that you still don't understand what Enformationism is all about. It's a philosophical model of reality, not a scientific description of materiality. — Gnomon
Newton's Principia Mathematica refers to ideal abstractions, not to agents or material things. — Gnomon
Deductive truths are inferred from rational principles. That It is true of any triangle doesn’t need to validated by observing every particular . — Wayfarer
How do you think the Pythagorean Theorem was discovered/ confirmed if not by observation and measurement? — Janus
By your empirical definition of "exist", Abstract concepts do not exist. That's because they are in an ideal state : private, knowable, and fleeting. So, they do not come under the purview of empirical Science. Yet, in a different meaning of "exist", abstractions (metaphors) are the substance of Philosophy. :smile:Since you agree concepts do not exist independent of the minds contemplating them, I now know we agree on something important to both of us. My use of “exist” simply means “dwell in a real state of being” public, measurable and repeatable. — ucarr
Everything we say about ideas is metaphorical. That's because abstractions are bereft of material substance, leaving only the logical skeleton of an idea. So, we manipulate such non-things rationally, not empirically. If you can't accept that distinction, you shouldn't attempt to do philosophy, and stick to physics.then I ask you to name the extra-mental, supposed loci for your concepts. — ucarr
Yes, but my eccentric worldview accepts Newton's physics as applicable to the tangible stuff of the macro world. However, quantum physics undermined the determinism of his logic,and the certainty of his mathematics on the fuzzy foundations of reality. Both theories may be true in their respective realms, but there is an "extreme difference" in their philosophical interpretation. While quantum theory is "useful" for cell phones & computers*3, it is also applicable to 21st century philosophy*4. :wink:The above quotes show the extreme difference between your work and Newton’s. Newton’s mathematical abstractions notwithstanding, his corpus of work in physics has many useful applications to the everyday world of life in general. — ucarr
Why do you hold me accountable for the "hard work" of scientific scholarship? I'm not a science scholar, so why should I do that kind of "hard work"? You may be doing Science on a philosophy forum, but I'm not. Responding to your critical reviews is hard enough for me. I do however link to science sites for those who want to see the results of the professionals' hard work. And to see that some science scholars, such as Deacon, are not "hard" Newtonian materialists. Scientific paradigms come & go. Which paradigm do you subscribe to?*5You continue to blockade and avoid the hard work of rigorous scientific scholarship and practice by artificially partitioning philosophy from the sciences. Legitimate philosophy doesn’t hold itself aloof from science. — ucarr
Since mind is different substance from matter, you can say, you simply have no mental capacity to perceive the mind itself. — Corvus
Why should ententional explanations tend to get eliminated with the advance of technological sophistication? The simple answer is that they are necessarily incomplete accounts. They are more like promissory notes standing in for currently inaccessible explanations, or suggestive shortcuts for cases that at present elude complete analysis. It has sometimes been remarked that teleological explanations are more like accusations or assignments of responsibility rather than accounts of causal processes. Teleological explanations point to a locus or origin but leave the mechanism of causal efficacy incompletely described. Even with respect to persons, explaining their actions in terms of motives or purposes is effectively independent of explaining these same events in terms of neurological or physiological processes and irrespective of any physical objects or forces.
...Like an inscrutable person, an ententional process presents us with a point at which causal inquiry is forced to stop and completely change its terms of analysis. At this point, the inquiry is forced to abandon the mechanistic logic of masses in motion and can proceed only in terms of functions and adaptations, purposes and intentions, motives and meanings, desires and beliefs. The problem with these sorts of explanatory principles is not just that they are “incomplete, but that they are incomplete in a particularly troubling way. It is difficult to ascribe energy, materiality, or even physical extension to them.
In this age of hard-nosed materialism, there seems to be little official doubt that life is “just chemistry” and mind is “just computation.” But the origins of life and the explanation of conscious experience remain troublingly difficult problems, despite the availability of what should be more than adequate biochemical and neuroscientific tools to expose the details. So, although scientific theories of physical causality are expected to rigorously avoid all hints of homuncular explanations, the assumption that our current theories have fully succeeded at this task is premature.
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