materialism, via absential materialism, offers an explanation how these supposed immaterial phenomena are really higher-order, emergent properties still grounded in lower-order, dynamical processes that are physical. — ucarr

Suppose I amend my claim: ententional things, such as computation, “reference to” and meaning emerge from and remain grounded in lower-order, dynamical processes that are physical.

I think this claim hues closely to Deacon’s central thesis. His subtitle is: “How Mind Emerged From Matter.”

Deacon is proposing a way of thinking about nature that is very different from previous forms of materialism - is it still materialism? — Wayfarer

My understanding of Deacon is that he’s not leaving entirely the naturalist, physical_material category. He’s an evolutionary biologist.

MORPHODYNAMIC WORK

Thermodynamic orthograde processes are vastly more likely to appear spontaneously in the universe than morphodynamic orthograde processes. Correspondingly, examples of spontaneously occurring morphodynamic work are rare in comparison to thermodynamic work, and are also easily missed because their form is unfamiliar. To help identify them, we can begin by defining our search criteria by considering some thermodynamic analogies and disanalogies.

Any change of state is ultimately a thermodynamic change, but some thermodynamic changes are more complex than others. In describing forms of work that are more complex than thermodynamic work, we are not implying the existence of some new source of energy or a form of physical change that is independent of thermodynamic change, and certainly not an ineffable influence. Higher-order forms of work inevitably also involve—and indeed require— thermodynamic work as well.

So, surprisingly, this view of self shows it to be as non-material as Descartes might have imagined, and yet as physical, extended, and relevant to the causal scheme of things as is the hole at the hub of a wheel. — Terrence W. Deacon

It’s clear to me Deacon rejects neither material absence nor material presence in his thesis about how mind emerged from matter.

I don't know if your interpretation of Deacon does justice to that element of his work. It seems to me you're intent on using it to defend the very kind of reductionism that he is seeking to ameliorate. — Wayfarer

You seem to misunderstand the definition of emergent property, as in the case of mind emergent from matter. Emergent properties have radically different agendas from their lower-order substrates, to which they remain bound and without which that could not exist. This, by definition, is not simplistic, material reductionism. It articulates a mutually constraining symbiosis. I think the mental constraints upon physical things is what you refer to when you credit such restraints with being examples of mental causation controlling empirical phenomena. Neither causal mind nor causal, material substrate is excluded.

I think you’re the one trying to bias Deacon towards immateriality. I don’t think he’s biased in either direction. He pays heed to immateriality, not because he prioritizes it over materiality, as you do. Instead, he pays it heed in order to bring it back into balance with materialistic science, which he eschews no more than he does immateriality.

Since, by now, it should be clear I embrace Deacon’s thesis, it should also be clear neither do I prioritize one over the other.

... you claimed that mind is matter. — Corvus

I did not "claim" this. :roll:

So you can't answer my questions .

Okay, I'll move on to someone who has some idea of what s/he is talking about.

But the significance of what he calls abstentials is that while they have physical consequences, they're not physical in nature. He himself says that he is trying to move the scientific account in a less materialist direction. I agree he's trying to work within a naturalist framework, but he's doing that by extending the meaning of naturalism beyond materialism. Again, the term 'absential materialism' does not appear in the book.

Emergent properties have radically different agendas from their lower-order substrates, to which they remain bound and without which that could not exist — ucarr

Only agents have agendas. This is where Deacon coins the neologism 'ententionality'. It refers to the goal-directedness that characterises organic life and is absent in chemical or physical reactions: 'both life and mind have corssed a threhold to a realm whjere more than just what is materially present matters'.

Mind causes matter to change, move and work. A simple evidence? I am typing this text with my hands caused by my mind. If my mind didn't cause the hands to type, then this text would have not been typed at all.

Mind is immaterial substance. Although I know it is in me, and works for me in being conscious and perceive, think, feel, intuit and imagine etc, I cannot see it, touch it, or measure it. The mind has no physical or material existence, but it works for all the actions of humans as they please or want their bodies to perform or act according to their wills. — Corvus

If your brain were removed from your cranium, would you be using your hands to type messages to me?

Without body, the mind evaporates. Where the mind goes to is still a mystery. But one thing clear is that, mind is not body itself, and mind is not material. — Corvus

Our conversation here is specifically concerned with the location, structure and functioning of mind in relation to body. If you think we’re wrong in our thesis that mind emerged from matter via upwardly evolving, dynamical processes, then you need to specifically address that claim by pointing out its flaws.

I am not familiar with the idea you tells, but I quickly scanned the internet search of the term. It sounds like teleodynamics of the ententional sounds like a type of evolutionary theory. I am not sure if evolutionary theory has strong grounds for its claims. It seems to have some interesting points but also many vague parts in the theory too. Anyhow, my standpoint for it is that matter alone, and evolution theory alone seem to have some problems in explaining fully on the mind / body problems. — Corvus

I think you should deepen your investigation beyond the level of quick scans on the internet. Doing so might empower you to more specifically address perceived flaws in the proffered explanations of the mind/body problem.

All of the above: energy, mass and matter are material_physical. Your job, as immaterialist, involves showing the structure of the immaterial making causal contact with the material. — ucarr

First of all, I'm not an Immaterialist or Idealist --- in the sense of denying material reality. Second, you conflate Material with Physical, whereas I think of them as separate aspects of Reality*1. For me, Material (chemistry) is concerned with the stuff we see & touch. But Physics (energy ; force) focuses on how stuff changes : growing, developing, becoming*2. That is an important philosophical distinction.

Regarding "causal contact" between physical stuff and metaphysical power : a> It's the "action at a distance" that puzzled Newton about his theory of Gravity ; b> it's what Einstein disparagingly dismissed as "spooky action at a distance" in quantum physics. In what sense is a Force material? My answer is Aristotle's definition of "substance", not as Material but as Essential ; not as Physical but as Meta-physical ; not as Stuff, but as Power/Potential.

Are those absences made of material stuff? If so, what kind of matter is the Gap made of? Is the hole in a wagon wheel made of some invisible/intangible material? Do you think Energy/Force is a material object? Or could they be better described as causal Potentials? Note --- Star Trek writers invented the notion of a Tractor Beam to pull objects toward the Enterprise, like a grappling hook, except without ropes & hooks. Is that beam Physics or Fiction? :smile:


*1. Difference Between Physics vs Chemistry :
Both fields deal with matter, though physics focuses on how matter moves and interacts, while chemistry examines the composition of matter at the atomic level.
https://study.com/learn/lesson/physics-vs-chemistry-overview-difference-examples.html

*2. Physics is about Change :
The Greek word physis can be considered the equivalent of the Latin natura. The abstract term physis is derived from the verb phyesthai/phynai, which means “to grow”, “to develop”, “to become”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physis

Mind is a process or activity like respiration or digestion and not a static thing. Mind-ing is what sufficiently complex brains (which are material-physical systems) do. To ask "where is mind?" is nonsensical like asking "where is breathing?" or "where is walking?" — 180 Proof

... you claimed that mind is matter.
— Corvus
I did not "claim" this. :roll:

So you can't answer my questions ↪180 Proof. — 180 Proof

Claiming mind is a process or activity like respiration or digestion and not a static thing sounds weird and illogical. And I never said anything about a static thing at all with mind, because my stance is mind is immaterial substance.

Those activities are the functions of the biological bodily organs. Equating them to mind seems to be a deep confusion. When I saw your post contained that statement, I didn't imagine that you would be serious to claim that. :)

Because they are, to reiterate, the basic biological functions of the bodily organs to maintain the life of the living agent. They have nothing to do with sentients, feelings, thoughts, ideas of self or cognitions which are the prime signs of having intelligence or mind. We cannot locate where the mind is situated as its own existence, because, as my claim say, it is not a matter.

We can only identify the core of our minds via those mental events and operations I have listed above, and that is all we can confirm and prove at the present. That is my belief for now.

Okay, I'll move on to someone who has some idea of what s/he is talking about. — 180 Proof

You must first know what you are asking about. :)

If your brain were removed from your cranium, would you be using your hands to type messages to me? — ucarr

Your "If" statement is implying that it is not a relevant condition for the point, hence your concluding question in your statement is absurd. No one has been denying that brain is the location for the mind. It is a poor logic (again :D)

Our conversation here is specifically concerned with the location, structure and functioning of mind in relation to body. If you think we’re wrong in our thesis that mind emerged from matter via upwardly evolving, dynamical processes, then you need to specifically address that claim by pointing out its flaws. — ucarr

For that info, you must contact a neurologist, and they will be able to provide the info in detail to you. I am not a neurologist, hence I do not have the detailed info off hand.

I think you should deepen your investigation beyond the level of quick scans on the internet. Doing so might empower you to more specifically address perceived flaws in the proffered explanations of the mind/body problem. — ucarr

Thank you for your advice. I will try to do that. My point was trying to clarify on materialism for its problems in the theory.

…you misunderstand me… by confusing "void" (that's metaphysical, not just "physical") — 180 Proof

Let me read carefully what you’ve written: a) “…you misunderstand me…” So, I get your intended meaning wrong; b) “… by confusing ‘void…’” So, I blend together physical and meta-physical in my understanding of what you’re saying about “void.” c) “that is metaphysical, not just physical…” So, I equalize “void” with being both physical and meta-physical; In this instance, I don’t see any error of interpretation of what you’ve written because the verb “to be” and the adverb “just” directly identify “void as having both attributes .

I'm not "saying" the atomists' void is a "higher-order" anything (that somehow transcends the physical). — 180 Proof

You mis-read me when you ascribe to my intended communication that a physical thing i.e., “void,” in possessing a higher-order attribute (foundational), transcends the physical. Just as higher-order logic doesn’t transcend logic, higher-order ontic status doesn’t transcend the physical. Higher orders of a mode expand the range of domain within it; they don’t transcend it.

But the significance of what he calls abstentials is that while they have physical consequences, they're not physical in nature. — Wayfarer

I think this is a simplification. Constraints that create absences that, in turn, strategically constrain forward towards emergent properties, such as minds with brains, involves a complex of nested, mutual constraints and emergent properties. There are no abstentials acting as end-directed agents without physical constraints imposed by dynamical processes.

I seems to me this complex of physical_absential satisfies quite well your claim to desire a spiritualism sypatico with modern science.

Your confusion seems to be based on your misunderstanding that my stance is some sort of an idealist. I am not an idealist.

I am more in the direction of a dualist. A dualist accepts both mind and matter as different substance, like from Descartes. Hence I acknowledge matter exists as material substance, and mind exists as mental substance.

That's what he's working towards. As said, I quite like the book, I'm finding it pretty compelling, although I've also skipped ahead to some of his more philosophical chapters and critiques of those.

With consciousness, Deacon says that sentience — the capacity to feel — arises from a system being self-sustaining and goal-directed. So he sees individual cells as sentient. But, as he explains, an animal's sentience is not the sum of the sentience of its individual cells: the nervous system creates its own sentience at the level of the whole animal. Yet Deacon doesn't get to grips with the hard problem of explaining why and how we and other animals have conscious experience.

Simply pointing to the neural activity associated with sentience is not enough to answer this question. What we need to know is why this activity feels pleasant or painful to the animal, instead of being an absence of feeling. In my view, Deacon's error is not that he has no answers to such questions (no one does), but that he fails to recognize them. — Evan Thompson

Also, I've been well aware of what he is designating 'absentials' for a long time, but I conceptualise them in an entirely different way. As I explain in my Medium essay on the nature of number, what he refers to as absent or non-existent, I think of as being real in a different mode to phenomenal existents. Numbers, logical laws, principles, even scientific laws, are not existent as are chairs, tables, mountains, etc, but they are real as constituents of the meaning-world; perhaps they can be conceptualised as noumenal realities, as distinct from phenomenal existents. I don't feel any compulsion to try and account for them in physical terms, or reduce them to something a physicist might be comfortable with.

But I'll persist with reading Deacon for the time being, I find his prose style quite approachable.

I'm not an Immaterialist or Idealist --- in the sense of denying material reality. — Gnomon

You know I know this. You’ve told me repeatedly that you’re invested in the material, the physical, the in-between and the meta-physical. Am I mistaken in believing you think metaphysical principles immaterial yet causal, as in the case to “it from bit?” If I’m not mistaken about this, then you need to show how metaphysical principles “enform” matter with attributes only known in the abstract a priori.

It won’t due talking about potential energy as causal potential somehow manipulating matter. Such a description is too vague to be of use to anyone but you in salesman mode promoting your Enformaction Theory.

Your confusion seems to be based on your misunderstanding that my stance is some sort of an idealist. I am not an idealist

I am more in the direction of a dualist. A dualist accepts both mind and matter as different substance… — Corvus

I’m confused?

But if they say, mind is not made of matter, then it is a pointless view. Because, of course it is not. In that case, they would be saying only matter is made up of matter, which is a tautology. — Corvus

You’ve hoisted yourself on your own petard.

Numbers, logical laws, principles, even scientific laws, are not existent as are chairs, tables, mountains, etc, but they are real as constituents of the meaning-world; perhaps they can be conceptualised as noumenal realities, as distinct from phenomenal existents. — Wayfarer

The main issue in this conversation is whether these ententionals have reality and meaning because they’re bound together with phenomenal existents as emergents.

Do thoughts exist outside of the minds thinking them?

Do minds exist outside of the brains substrating them?

Do thoughts exist outside of the minds thinking them?

Do minds exist outside of the brains substrating them? — ucarr

A difficult and delicate question.

The bottom-up account of such entities is that they are the product of lower-level processes, beginning at the level of physical and chemical interactions, which evolve in such a way as to give h. sapiens the ability to produce such ideas. This is the mainstream consensus.

Deacon is concerned with just this issue. How intentional acts can have physical consequences, even though intentionality itself is not accomodated by physicalist accounts. That is the explanatory gap he's wanting to bridge. His account is that all living things posses a quality of goal-directedness - ententionality - which anticipates the more elaborate intentional abilities that rational sentient beings possess. Hence his lexicon of autogens and teleodynamics and so on.

But to provide an alternative 'top-down' account and framework would be too much of a digression for this discussion. I'll just note at this point that I'm more open to the platonist perspective on this question that Deacon says he is.

I’m confused? — ucarr

Your questions and posts have been mostly based on the false assumptions and misunderstandings on the other party's stance. Therefore they give impression that either the poster is confused or not reading the posts properly before replying.

Your questions and posts have been mostly based on the false assumptions and misunderstandings on the other party's stance. — Corvus

I’m in your corner, but so far you have nothing to go on but sentiment. You could benefit from some more reading, starting with one of the books this thread is about, "Incomplete Nature" by Terrrence Deacon. You may not agree with it, but considering Deacon’s arguments is instructive. And, as I said, I'm in your corner, I don't agree with materialism in the least.

In this interview Deacon discusses the main concepts of Incomplete Nature. I can't find too much to fault.

I’m in your corner, but so far you have nothing to go on but sentiment. You could benefit from some more reading, starting with the book this thread is about. You may not agree with it, but considering Deacon’s arguments would be instructive. — Wayfarer

No I don't think I was going on sentiment at all. I was just letting the OP know why he was confused when he posts an addlepated questions like "

If your brain were removed from your cranium, would you be using your hands to type messages to me? — ucarr

, when I have never denied the existence of brain for the precondition of mind.

He also seems to think I was an idealist, which I am not. If someone is not materialist, then it doesn't automatically place him into a position of being an idealist.

I did read the synopsis on Deacon's arguments, but it seemed a theory I don't quite agree with. It was good to know about the arguments in outline, but I don't think I would read more about it as it doesn't interest me as a serious theory. However, as I usually do, I would try to respond to all posts directed to me from the OP and all the participants in the thread even if it is not directly related to the topic.

I have never denied the existence of brain for the precondition of mind.

He also seem to think I was an idealist, which was not the case. If someone is not materialist, then it doesn't automatically place him into a position of being an idealist. — Corvus

Fair point. I don't agree much with ucarr either. I'm talking more about Deacon, which I give ucarr the credit for causing me (and no, that is not a matter of material causation!) to read more of.

Mind causes matter to change, move and work. A simple evidence? I am typing this text with my hands caused by my mind. If my mind didn't cause the hands to type, then this text would have not been typed at all. — Corvus

This is very much the kind of observation that Deacon starts his book with:

The meaning of a sentence is not the squiggles used to represent letters on a piece of paper or a screen. It is not the sounds these squiggles might prompt you to utter. It is not even the buzz of neuronal events that take place in your brain as you read them. What a sentence means, and what it refers to, lack the properties that something typically needs in order to make a difference in the world. The information conveyed by this sentence has no mass, no momentum, no electric charge, no solidity, and no clear extension in the space within you, around you, or anywhere. More troublesome than this, the sentences you are reading right now could be nonsense, in which case there isn’t anything in the world that they could correspond to. But even this property of being a pretender to significance will make a physical difference in the world if it somehow influences how you might think or act.

Obviously, despite this something not-present that characterizes the contents of my thoughts and the meaning of these words, I wrote them because of the meanings that they might convey.

So he does obviously consider these kinds of arguments. I'm still at early stages - it's a 608 page book! - but I haven't yet hit the point where I think, 'this just can't be right'.

Fair point. I don't agree much with ucarr either. I'm talking more about Deacon, which I give ucarr the credit for causing me (and no, that is not a matter of material causation!) to read more of. — Wayfarer

:ok:

This is very much the kind of observation that Deacon starts his book with:

The meaning of a sentence is not the squiggles used to represent letters on a piece of paper or a screen. It is not the sounds these squiggles might prompt you to utter. — Wayfarer

It is certainly an interesting writing in your quote. It sounds like a depiction of close link or cooperation between matter and ideas, rather than a standard materialism.

The reason I was put off by Deacon's argument in the synopsis was when I saw the word "evolution", which he seems to emphasis in the formation of sentience. I disagree with any evolution theories, hence stopped there.

I would give a good try reading the book based on your quote, but I have other books that I am reading, and trying to finish right now. Hence I would just wait for your finishing the book, and telling us about it. :)

Radar is not a pulsating machine gun shooting bullets (matter) & spaces (absence) at a target. Or is it? — Gnomon

Are photons a new concept for you?

Do thoughts exist outside of the minds thinking them?

Do minds exist outside of the brains substrating them? — ucarr

The bottom-up account of such entities is that they are the product of lower-level processes, beginning at the level of physical and chemical interactions…

Deacon is concerned with just this issue. How intentional acts can have physical consequences, even though intentionality itself is not accomodated by physicalist accounts. That is the explanatory gap he's wanting to bridge.

I'm more open to the platonist perspective on this question that Deacon says he is. — Wayfarer

I think you give an excellent summary of Deacon’s purpose in Incomplete Mind.

I disagree somewhat with your characterization of bottom-up, physicalist causation as a process that renders the mind and its thoughts as products. Deacon provides a detailed analysis of nested, self-organizing, dynamical processes that create upwardly evolving, strategic constraints towards mind and its end-directed intentions. As an emergent property of physical substrates, mind is something quite beyond an automatic product. It has materially grounded parameters that afford it an agency distinct from the automatic mechanization of the more strictly material dynamics supporting it. Cartesian freedom, albeit limited by physical parameters, holds place among real things.

Top-Down Causation

Is top-down causation from mind to brain a process that includes an inflection point where immaterial mind makes causal contact with material things?

We’re examining a question much deeper than personal preference between equivalent options. We’re looking at whether or not top-down causation from immaterial mind holds place among real things.

Established top-down causation from emergent mind is exampled by Deacon’s triumvirate of teleodynamics_morphodynamics_thermodynamics. This chain of dynamics, being bi-directional, also includes bottom-up causation going in the opposite direction.

Likewise, emergent mind can run top-down to brain, or the reverse, brain bottom-up to emergent mind.

In Wayfarer’sMind Created World, he argues for a mind-organized world. Since his scenario features raw data being processed, it’s obvious the data pre-dates this action of the mind and thus there is no mind-created world extant in this example.

Has it been established that formatting of raw data incoming through the senses is a top-down causation from mind to brain?

To the contrary, it’s established the brain organizes info processing autonomically, with various components and aspects of sensory data assigned to various parts of the brain. No one consciously decides which part of their brain will process which sub-component of the sensory data of the phenomenal world. Brain processing is autonomic with little or no control by conscious mind.

Moreover, the brain components, via bottom-up causation, assemble a perceptual composite that is a brain-created assemblage. As for the mind’s part in this process, wherein comprehension and learning, with ancillary features including interpolation, extrapolation, induction and deduction get utilized, it’s a case of bottom-up causation from brain to mind, not the reverse.

Likewise, machine processing of raw data is a material_physical, bottom-up dynamic of processing and assemblage into a coherent and logical composite.

A common example of bottom-up, material_physical organization of raw data into a coherent, logical whole is DOS running in the background organizing the Graphical User Interface seen and manipulated by the general public when they turn on and use their computers.

Emergent mind, as the current pinnacle of self-organizing, dynamical processing, appears to be an absentially material designer. As designer, mind holds power over the natural world.

Human mind and natural world co-exist within an ergonomical co-dependence.

…I have never denied the existence of brain for the precondition of mind. — Corvus

As a favor to me, can you respond to this post by talking about the operations of mind as they relate to brain as a precondition of mind? Immediately below I’ve quoted Wayfarer in order to explain why I’m asking this favor of you.

The bottom-up account of such entities (minds and their thoughts) is that they are the product of lower-level processes, beginning at the level of physical and chemical interactions, which evolve in such a way as to give h. sapiens the ability to produce such ideas. This is the mainstream consensus.

Deacon is concerned with just this issue. How intentional acts can have physical consequences, even though intentionality itself is not accomodated by physicalist accounts. That is the explanatory gap he's wanting to bridge. — Wayfarer

I believe that only by working from the bottom up, tracing the ascent from thermodynamics to morphodynamics to teleodynamics and their recapitulation in the dynamics of brain function, will we be able to explain the place of our subjective experience (mind and its thoughts)* in this otherwise largely insentient universe. — Terrence W. Deacon

*Parenthetical clarification inserted by ucarr.

Deacon makes it clear beyond doubt he endorses bottom-up causation from the material to the absentially material i.e., towards mind and its intentions.

Reframing the concept of sentience in emergent dynamical terms will allow us to address questions that are not often considered to be subject to empirical neuroscientific analysis. Contrary to many of my neuroscience colleagues, I believe that these phenomena are entirely available to scientific investigation once we discover how they emerge from lower-level teleodynamic, morphodynamic, and thermodynamic processes. Even the so-called hard problem of consciousness will turn out to be reconceptualized in these terms. This is because what appeared to make it hard was our predisposition to frame it in mechanistic and computational terms, presuming that its intentional content must be embodied in some material or energetic substrate. As a result, the vast majority of descriptions of brain function tend to be framed in terms that not only fail to make the connection between the cellular-molecular processes at one extreme and the intentional features of mental experience at the other; they effectively pretend that making sense of this relationship is irrelevant to brain function. — Terrence W. Deacon

Fair point, but he also makes it clear that what is at 'the bottom' of the 'bottom-up process' are not atoms as such. At the end of Chapter One, he says:

The current paradigm in the natural sciences conceives of causal properties on the analogy of some ultimate stuff, or as the closed and finite set of possible interactions between all the ultimate objects or particles of the universe. As we will see, this neat division of reality into objects and their interaction relationships, though intuitively reasonable from the perspective of human actions, is quite problematic. Curiously, however, modern physics has all but abandoned this billiard ball notion of causality in favor of a view of quantum processes, associated with something like waves of probability rather than discretely localizable stuff.

Here he's expressing the idea that physics itself has undermined physicalism, insofar as this was conceived as being reliant on the existence of 'ultimate objects'. Instead, it suggests a process-oriented approach associated with "waves of probability". So again, how this can be described as materialism escapes me. He's explicitly distancing himself from that, which he identifies as the 'current paradigm'. This is why he remarks that his 'absentials' are likely to be dismissed as mysticism by a lot of hard-nosed scientists (which I'm sure they have been). Sure, he has to thread the needle of not asserting immaterial forces or objects, while at the same time showing the inherent falsehoods of mechanistic materialism and the 'machine' analogy, which he explicitly rejects. But I don't see him as favourable to any form of atomistic materialism (and if it ain't atomistic, then what is it :yikes: ? )

The other subtle point is that constraints themselves, which are central to his model, are top-down by nature. Top-down constraints impose order and coherence within a system by providing a framework or set of rules that guide the behavior of its parts. They are essential for ensuring that the system functions in a coherent and organized manner. In his model, anything that exists does so as a consequence of the adaption of bottom up processes to top-down constraints. He mentions in Chapter One the relevance of universals - 'types of things have real physical consequences' . And these can hardly be said to originate at the base level - they act as the kinds of delimitations on possibility that dictate the form of particulars. The requirement for the wing to be lightweight is a top-down constraint. It is imposed because a heavy wing would make whatever can fly less able to stay aloft. Flatness is another top-down constraint, as the shape s crucial for generating lift, which is essential for flight. If the wing were small and dense or had a different shape, it will not generate the necessary lift. And that is 'multiply realised' in birds, bats, flying mammals, and aeroplanes (hence 'the wing', or rather, 'flight', as an Idea or universal.)

As far as the hard problem of consciousness is concerned, the review I quoted from Evan Thompson points out:

an animal's sentience is not the sum of the sentience of its individual cells: the nervous system creates its own sentience at the level of the whole animal. Yet Deacon doesn't get to grips with the hard problem of explaining why and how we and other animals have conscious experience. Simply pointing to the neural activity associated with sentience is not enough to answer this question. What we need to know is why this activity feels pleasant or painful to the animal, instead of being an absence of feeling. In my view, Deacon's error is not that he has no answers to such questions (no one does), but that he fails to recognize them. — Evan Thompson

(It should be mentioned that Evan Thompson's 'Mind in Life' is of a very similar genre to Deacon's. Thompson is overall positive about Deacon's book, with the above caveat.)

That criticism is also made in the long and difficult review I posted in by R Scott Bakker, who says that throughout the book, Deacon fails to comes to terms with the role of the observer in the formulation of his theory, meaning that it is in some sense 'a massive exercise in question-begging'.

None of that is the last word of course and Deacon's book has considerable depth and subtlety, but I do think there is something in those criticisms.

Here he's expressing the idea that physics itself has undermined physicalism, insofar as this was conceived as being reliant on the existence of 'ultimate objects'. Instead, it suggests a process-oriented approach associated with "waves of probability" — Wayfarer

…how this can be described as materialism escapes me. — Wayfarer

You perceive kinship between spirit and probable particles neighboring about a cloud of positions? Does the nature of spirit insist it be not too hard of boundary nor too discrete in location?

Regarding how this can be materialism, you have an answer below with interacting dynamical processes that mutually constrain in the mode of a distributed waveform .

… anything that exists does so as a consequence of the adaption of bottom up processes to top-down constraints. — Terrence W. Deacon

The other subtle point is that constraints themselves, which are central to his model, are top-down by nature. Top-down constraints impose order and coherence within a system by providing a framework or set of rules that guide the behavior of its parts. They are essential for ensuring that the system functions in a coherent and organized manner. In his model, anything that exists does so as a consequence of the adaption of bottom up processes to top-down constraints. — Wayfarer

Does Deacon teach us that metaphysical principles are logically but not temporally prior to the natural world? Should we understand that spirit and nature are co-eternal?

I'm not an Immaterialist or Idealist --- in the sense of denying material reality. — Gnomon
You know I know this. You’ve told me repeatedly that you’re invested in the material, the physical, the in-between and the meta-physical. Am I mistaken in believing you think metaphysical principles immaterial yet causal, as in the case to “it from bit?” If I’m not mistaken about this, then you need to show how metaphysical principles “enform” matter with attributes only known in the abstract a priori.

It won’t due talking about potential energy as causal potential somehow manipulating matter. Such a description is too vague to be of use to anyone but you in salesman mode promoting your Enformaction Theory. — ucarr

Apparently you "know" what I say, but not what I mean. Our communication problem may be that you are thinking like a Scientist, while I am trying to think like a Philosopher. Consequently, when I talk about a metaphysical Causal Principle (e.g. Energy) producing changes in Matter, I place it in a philosophical category more like metaphysical Essence (identity ; meaning). That's because Potential/Energy/Essence has no material properties : mass, hardness, plasticity. Energy's primary property is Causation. So, I'm making a philosophical distinction, not a scientific classification.

Yet, you seem to lump Energy into the more general category of Physical or Natural, and interpret my meta-physical notion of Energy as Spiritual or Supernatural. From that perspective, all philosophical language would be indistinguishable from Religion. And that's how Materialists (realists ; physicalists) seem to pigeonhole theoretical Philosophy (theorist ; idealist) as in opposition to pragmatic Science. Personally, I view them as complementary, providing a more complete worldview than either alone.

While you have acknowledged that Deacon's Incomplete Nature*1 attempts to bridge that gap between Science (pragmatism & materialism) and Philosophy (theoretical & idealistic), you seem to lean toward the scientific side. Hence, if you want to pin the negative "immaterialist" label on me, what does that make you, in an either/or sense?*2. Whereas philosophically, I am a substance Dualist and Information Monist*3 : {everything is a form of causal information}, you appear to be a Matter Monist : {everything is a material thing}. We just reverse the priority of active Sculptor & passive Clay*4, as in the "it from bit" metaphor.

I could "show" how the "metaphysical principle", Energy, enforms (changes properties) of Matter with a demonstration of the photochemical reaction. But that's not what I'm talking about. As a meta-physical philosophical principle, Energy is simply the causal power to transform one conceptual Kind into another category. Causation is a philosophical concept, not a thing with material properties. Hence, it is not knowable via the physical senses, but only by means of mental reasoning.

Therefore, I could parse your term "Absential Materialism" as a mashup of different aspects of reality : metaphysical ideas and material things. Yet, Absence is not a real thing, it's the conceptual negation of material Presence : nothing, nada, emptiness. "Absence" per Deacon is a a state of things not yet realized", hence Potential, not Actual. Ironically, a Materialist/Physicalist/Naturalist thinks of a chemical battery as an example of philosophical Potential. It's that type of reification of ideas that we are dealing with here. What I'm "selling" is affirmation of the power of Absence. :smile:

*1. Terrence Deacon :
Deacon's triad levels represent the material, the ideal, and the pragmatic.
https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/deacon/

*2. Materialism vs Metaphysics :
Basically they reject each other. Materialism states that ALL is simply matter, even thoughts. If everything is matter (and obviously energy), everything in the end falls under Physics, so there is nothing that is “beyond” (meta) Physics.
https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-relationship-between-materialism-and-metaphysics

*3. Informational Monism :
Although a substantial number of papers is published on the topic of consciousness, there
is still little consensus on what its nature is and how the physical and phenomenal worlds
are connected
https://philarchive.org/archive/EVOIMA-2

*4. Naturalism vs Philosophy :
A central thought in ontological naturalism is that all spatiotemporal entities must be identical to or metaphysically constituted by physical entities. Many ontological naturalists thus adopt a physicalist attitude to mental, biological, social and other such “special” subject matters.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/
Note --- Matter is spatio-temporal, but Mind is non-local & noumenal*5.

*5. Meta-Physics : philosophy, not-theology
The branch of philosophy that examines the nature of reality, including the relationship between mind and matter, substance and attribute, fact and value.
1. Often dismissed by materialists as idle speculation on topics not amenable to empirical proof.
2. Aristotle divided his treatise on science into two parts. The world as-known-via-the-senses was labeled “physics” - what we call "Science" today. And the world as-known-by-the-mind, by reason, was labeled “metaphysics” - what we now call "Philosophy" .
3. Plato called the unseen world that hides behind the physical façade: “Ideal” as opposed to Real. For him, Ideal “forms” (concepts) were prior-to the Real “substance” (matter).
4. Physics refers to the things we perceive with the eye of the body. Meta-physics refers to the things we conceive with the eye of the mind. Meta-physics includes the properties, and qualities, and functions that make a thing what it is. Matter is just the clay from which a thing is made. Meta-physics is the design (form, purpose); physics is the product (shape, action). The act of creation brings an ideal design into actual existence. The design concept is the “formal” cause of the thing designed.
5. I use a hyphen in the spelling to indicate that I am not talking about Ghosts and Magic, but about Ontology (science of being).
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page14.html

Radar is not a pulsating machine gun shooting bullets (matter) & spaces (absence) at a target. Or is it? — Gnomon
Are photons a new concept for you? — wonderer1

A wavy photon zooming through the Aether has the potential for mass, and can transform into mass, but while traveling at lightspeed (zero mass), is not massive like a bullet. Ironically, Some physicists and physicalists like to imagine it metaphorically as a little ball of matter. Radar photons are a focused field of statistical possibility. Like all sub-atomic "particles" a photon is non-local, until it interacts with matter, in which case the probability wave "collapses" into a point. At which point it is no longer a photon. :smile:

Is the photon really a particle? :
Abraham Pais [14, p. 350−1] writes that although the photon has zero mass, physicists “… nevertheless call a photon a particle because, just like massive particles, it obeys the laws of conservation of energy and momentum in collisions, with an electron say (Compton effect).”
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030402621003983

Secondly, the photon is now thought of as a particle, a wave, and an excitation—kind of like a wave—in a quantum field.
https://www.symmetrymagazine.org/article/what-is-a-photon?language_content_entity=und

…I have never denied the existence of brain for the precondition of mind.
— Corvus

As a favor to me, can you respond to this post by talking about the operations of mind as they relate to brain as a precondition of mind? Immediately below I’ve quoted Wayfarer in order to explain why I’m asking this favor of you. — ucarr

It seems undeniable that the gap between actions and intentionality is meaning. Meaning is purely conceptual and logical.  If I see rain coming down, then I will close the window.

The perception of rain coming down, generated meaning that it might come into the room, and make things get wet and ruined, if the window was left open.  It is also a logic in inductive reasoning .  Hence there are causal chain effects in the process.

Seeing the rain coming down -> Noticing the window was open -> Reasoning that the rain will get into the room if the window was left open, and make the books get wet and ruined (inductive reasoning) ->  Closed the window (physical action).
Therefore the meaning combined with the reasoning caused the physical action.

However, Deacon's theory seems to be interpreting the actions via some sort of interactions between the physical objects via the physical causes and even physical meanings :roll: . 

The waveform as physical phenomenon is a fog of mass-energy in the mode of a mathematically determined cloud of probability describing the range of possible positions of an elementary particle. An apt physicalization of a fog of mass-energy is a gravitational field. When two gravitational fields interact, they generate meaning physically. Meaning, a narrative about a narrative, in its physical manifestation, is absential materialism. Meaning is about-ness signified in a language.

The physical generation of meaning via interacting gravitational fields suggests a bounded infinity of fate within a specified universe as bounded by interacting gravitational fields. If collapse to black hole density is possible in such a universe, then what will happen phenomenally_historically is pre-determined by said black hole density. Infinite gravity seems to mean that what can happen must happen. — ucarr

This is a contradictory view, and I feel that this is an incorrect explanation of his Absential materialism. Your claim seems to have gone this way.

1. Material things cannot think.
2. But they interact with other material things. (the waveforms, gravities, the writings with no meanings themselves ... etc)
3. Therefore material things create physical meanings. ==> FALSE, A poor logic and contradiction. :roll:

How can non-thinking things create meanings? What on earth is physical meaning?

All meaning is mental and conceptual in nature.  The material existence doesn't know anything about meaning.  They just behave as according to the laws of physics. Material objects don't care about the cause and effect either. They just exist, interact and change according to the rules. Humans observe and notice the interactions, changes and operations, and make inferences, reasoning, and set up the rules and laws in conceptual manner.

Thinking that the physical objects create the physical meanings when they interact with each other creating some visible or noticeable events and changes sounds like panpsychism or superstitious totem ideas.

Please bear in mind that all meanings are mental, logical and conceptual, viz NON MATERIAL and NON PHYSICAL even if they are the product of the physical brain.