we can't get away from accepting that there are things-in-themselves causing our impressions of them — AmadeusD

In Kant, this is wrong.

we can't get away from accepting that there are things-in-themselves causing our impressions
— AmadeusD

This is correct. IFF one accepts that the thing that appears to our senses, is the thing of the thing-in-itself. — Mww

I left off the part of your post which parted ways with CPR. Our impressions cannot be of the things in themselves, else they wouldn’t be in themselves. The very meaning, as Kant intended it, for “-in-itself”, is merely…..not in us. What is in us are representations, so if not in us means representations not in us, and from that, as you said…impressions of them is exactly what is not in us.

But those representations in us must have a cause. That which makes an impression on the senses, an appearance, from which follows a sensation, is sufficient cause. But, as already proved, it cannot be the thing-in-itself that causes the impression on the senses, which leaves only the thing of the thing-in-itself.
————-

Kant tells us that there are real, material objects 'out there' of which we can know nothing things in themselves. But that these objects cause our intuitions... which are not, as far as we care capable of knowing, anything like hte thing-in-itself.. — AmadeusD

We can’t know they are alike, because our knowledge is of representations of things, but not the things-in-themselves. But we have given to us the appearance of things, what Kant calls the matter of those representations, which gives us something to go on, when we subject the thing we perceive, to the system that informs of us of how we should know it.

So it isn’t the thing-in-itself that causes our intuitions. The matter of things we perceive, is all we get from the thing “out there”, via the sensation we get from it, hence the cause of our intuitions is much more than the mere sensation of a perceived thing. It is here that two of the necessary predicates of transcendental philosophy enter the speculative metaphysical fray, re: synthesis, and imagination.
————-

These seem cautious admissions that the only inference is that things-in-themselves cause us to receive empirical intuitions of them, — AmadeusD

I think it rather a warning, that the only inference allowed to us, is that things-in-themselves are the cause of things we perceive. If he doesn’t cover that base, and stifle that logical inconsistency, it remains that the human cognitive system is both sufficient and necessary causality, as he says here….

“….out of that which I should reckon as phenomenon, I made mere illusory appearance….”
————-

Going to leave this here, though, as it directly contradicts what I've come to think is what Kant meant:

"The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding) — AmadeusD

Just break down the statement itself: conception…of a thing….cogitated…as a thing in itself.

Switch from 18th century Enlightenment Prussian to modern English and you get: However a thing-in-itself is thought, that is how a noumenon is thought.

Ok, so…solely through the pure understanding. Because understanding has already been said to stand for the faculty of thought, and cognition….being cogitated, in old Prussian…..is the synthesis of conceptions, we have….noumena is nothing but conceptions understanding synthesizes into a cognition, all by itself, for no particular reason. Maybe it was just bored, has nothing better to do. Maybe it follows from an earlier aphorism….

“…..I can think whatever I please, provided only that I do not contradict myself….”

The text itself, however, just says understanding, because it’s been entitled to think whatever it wants, has no limits on its capacities. Nevertheless, the entire Critique is an exposition on limiting various functions of the human intelligence, so if he doesn’t nip this unlimited stuff in the bud, his system won’t work.

So it is, then, both noumena and things-in-themselves are nothing but conceptions, that which understanding takes upon itself to cognize, and, of course, no empirical knowledge is at all possible from a mere conception alone.

This is where Kant confuses the average reader, by connecting noumena to things-in-themselves. All he means when he does that, is that understanding thinks them in the same way, and NEVER EVER that they are the same thing.
————-

This seems to restrict noumena to merely things-in-themselves…. — AmadeusD

That is impossible, for us anyway, insofar as things-in-themselves are real existences, of which the representations are known by us, whereas noumena are nothing but conceptions, having no phenomenal representations at all, hence cannot even be known to exist.

…..perceived by something other than sensuous intuition. — AmadeusD

Sorta right, except we can’t say anything about a non-sensuous intuition. We can say, if noumena are perceivable by a non-sensuous intuition, for that kind of intuition then, noumena could be like the thing-in-itself is for us.

Another thing, for background, maybe. The argument has been that Kant painted himself into a corner, by positing the understanding can think whatever it wants, which he had to do on the one hand, because it is clear imagination is nothing if not pure thought and ever single otherwise rational human bing ever, images stuff at one time or another. But on the other hand, part of the overall Kantian transcendental system resides in the condition that reason is the caretaker of understanding, in that reason is what prevents understanding’s imaginings from running away with themselves and causing all kindsa harm to our knowledge.

So if phenomena are the representations given from human sensibility, noumena cannot be either the representations, or the means for the possibility of them. Otherwise, we have exactly what the aforementioned aphorism says…..something is thought that is self-contradictory.
————

Curious, and unhelpful — AmadeusD

Yeah, most unhelpful. I can see why he brought those stupid noumena thingys into the fold, but when it comes right down to comprehending the overall system, they are very unhelpful. We want to know what we can do, what our system allows us to do, not so much what we can’t, because it doesn’t.

Anyway….hope that helps.

I take issue with the "idiotic insistence" suggestion, as if the equation of the noumena and thing in itself is such an unsustainable suggestion — Hanover

Yeah, my bad. I get a little carried away sometimes. Nevertheless, and despite Kant’s apparent textual contradictions, there are entries where the equation(s) is (are) clear-cut, thus making the conceptions quite distinguishable.

I understand it’s hard, when a simple, maybe even a one-line statement gets lost in the massive amount of information, to bear in mind the system as a whole. Thing is, those one-liners are in there, in black and white. And if that wasn’t enough, it should be apparent the two of those things have no business being connected to each other, when it is the case they are each individually connected to understanding alone. The whole empirical side of transcendental philosophy depends on it.

Or….I got it all wrong. There is that, of course, so……

Or….I got it all wrong. There is that, of course, so…… — Mww

You better not.

If so I am doomed. And will say that Kant considers monads to be negative noumena available to introspection!

You have been warned. :grimace:

HA!!! I consider myself warned.

Kant considers monads to be negative noumena available to introspection! — Manuel

Yes, regarding monads. “…. And so would it really be, if the pure understanding were capable of an immediate application to objects, and if space and time were determinations of things in themselves…”

He respected Leibnitz but held this against him:

“…. This philosopher’s celebrated doctrine of space and time, in which he intellectualized these forms of sensibility, originated in the same delusion of transcendental reflection.

The great utility of this critique of conclusions arrived at by the processes of mere reflection consists in its clear demonstration of the nullity of all conclusions respecting objects which are compared with each other in the understanding alone, while it at the same time confirms what we particularly insisted on, namely, that, although phenomena are not included as things in themselves among the objects of the pure understanding, they are nevertheless the only things by which our cognition can possess objective reality, that is to say, which give us intuitions to correspond with our conceptions…..”

The delusion of transcendental reflection is the attribution of objective validity to objects by the understanding alone. If that is the case, such that understanding does that and it is not a delusion but is a valid methodology, the proposition…..

“…. Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind….”

….is meaningless, and Kantian metaphysics falls apart.

As with most philosophies, one can pick and choose which he favors. The professionals, though, they who construct the philosophies the rest of us choose from, invariably reject others in favor of his own. Sometimes for the better, sometimes not.

With Kant, I'm never sure if I'm just not following it or whether it's just not followable. — Hanover

I am sure that not only is it the case that for each paragraph making a substantive point, another paragraph may be found making a contradictory point but also that for each academic’s interpretation of a particular paragraphs, another academic may be found with an opposing viewpoint.

For me, the CPR becomes worthwhile when the individual paragraphs are used in support of a sensible whole rather than trying to take each of them literally, ie, for the CPR to be read in the spirit of the text rather than in the letter of the text.
===============================================================================

the equation of the noumena and thing in itself — Hanover

It seems right to distinguish between two seemingly different aspects of objects as they appear in our sensibilities regardless of what they are named, whether as an abstracted generality or concrete particular, whether epistemological or ontological or whether noumena or Thing in Itself.

For me, there is a similarity between the concepts abstracted generality, epistemological and noumena and there is a similarity between the concepts concrete particular, ontological and Thing in Itself.

The analogy of the colour red

Using an analogy, we perceive the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm.

The object that appears in our sensibilities, the colour red, has been caused by the wavelength of 700nm. Although the colour red and wavelength of 700nm are of two very different kinds, they are two aspects of the same event.

We can think of the colour red and the wavelength of 700nm as "the same concept viewed from two different perspectives" (Wikipedia – Noumenon)

The colour red as an object as it appears in our sensibilities can be thought of as an abstracted generality that has been determined by a concrete particular wavelength of 700nm.

The colour red as an object as it appears in our sensibilities gives us epistemological knowledge about an ontologically existing wavelength of 700nm.

For me, the colour red as an object as it appears in our sensibilities may be described as a (Negative) Noumena, and the wavelength of 700nm may be described as a Thing in Itself.

The (Negative) Noumenon and Thing in Itself are two aspects of our thoughts about objects as they appear in our sensibilities.

I agree that Kant in the CPR never discussed wavelengths of 700nm, but this does not take away the power of an analogy to explain a complex topic.

That's in the Amphiboly if I don't misremember. Allais breaks down that section impeccably, and says pretty much what you say.

The question is, what do we make of it? Me feeling is that Kant was right, though we do not know how Leibniz would have replied. I have not read the Monadology, opting for his New Essays instead.

The issue with Descartes and Leibniz, as I see it, is that they were way too ambitious and too confident in the reach of reason, which Locke and Hume clearly saw as being a total mistake, correctly.

Yet, even after Kant wrote his Critique, we continue with "metaphysics", in manners he may not have approved of. The distinction between what counts and does not count as the bounds of legitimate speculation is not so clear to me.

Him arguing that metaphysics is essentially the topic of God freedom and immortality sounds off to modern ears. Freedom is still relevant.

But I suspect there may be other speculations which are near the borders "beyond all possible experience".

It's tough.

That's in the Amphiboly if I don't misremember — Manuel

Yes, an altogether fascinating appendix to The Analytic of Principles. It solidifies what some consider the gibberish of that preceding book. Kinda funny, too, in that it makes explicit, in relatively plain speech, the errors in thinking that no one really even knew they were doing anyway.

I mean, c’mon, man. When was the last time either of us stopped to think….opps, can’t do that, can’t substitute a transcendental conception in that for which an empirical one is expressly required. Shame on us, I must say, for attempting such an illusory cognition!!!
(Grin)

This seems a contradiction from the above. We now know two things about the thing in itself: (1) it is unknowable and (2) it causes intuitions. #1 appears definitionally true, but #2 an empirical statement. If X (the thing in itself) causes me to see a flower, I can say something pretty substantive of X, specifically that it elicits a particular intuition, but I don't think I can say that because it's noumenal. I can only say there are Xs out there and intuituions in here, but I can't say any particular X is consistently responsible for any particular intuition. — Hanover

Having not yet replied to Mww, maybe he's said something relevant, so apologies if i've not seen that yet..

I do not see the issue. We can understand (in Kant, anyway) that intuitions arise from things-in-themselves, of which we know nothing as an empirical deduction. We know for certain that our perceptions are necessarily askance from whatever causes them. So, the need to say 'it's unknowable' arises - but this isn't the noumenal. The noumenal is that which arises in a perception other than sensory perception and so is theoretically knowable, but unattainable for humans. The 'thing-in-itself' as for itself is not available to any intuition, is how i read this. Therefore, we can infer its existence, despite knowing nothing of it, other than it may be hte basis for our intuitions.

I am also shit at Kant, so this is probably way off.

But those representations in us must have a cause. That which makes an impression on the senses, an appearance, from which follows a sensation, is sufficient cause. But, as already proved, it cannot be the thing-in-itself that causes the impression on the senses, which leaves only the thing of the thing-in-itself. — Mww

I'm not sure i understand this (or, possibly, just understand it to be the case). The impressions must be caused - and things-in-themselves are said to be at the bottom of that causal chain, so to speak. Obvious our impressions are not of the thing, for the reason you state, but cause by our interacting with it, via sense organs, doesn't seem to create any issues and seems to comport with the admittedly insanely hard-to-parse passages about it in CPR. Even if we can never have an impression proper of the thing, we must be actually engaging it somehow to get the impression we do get.

From this idea the the thing-in-itself isnt causal in this chain, I can only be left with things that have no effect on sense, and impressions that come from nowhere/nothing. But i suppose, that is transcendental idealism in some regard.

whereas noumena are nothing but conceptions, having no phenomenal representations at all, hence cannot even be known to exist. — Mww

My understanding is that Noumena are perceptions not found in sensory intuition, so yes, entirely unavailable to us - but not conceptions as such. I suppose though, you might be referring to our ability to conceive them in the understanding, as totally unrelated to what they actually are - which, yes. Fair enough. We can always imagine, as you note.

So if phenomena are the representations given from human sensibility, noumena cannot be either the representations, or the means for the possibility of them. — Mww

Agreed. But, I did admit I was entirely misunderstanding Noumena, and this comports with my updated understanding, in terms of relation to 'us'. They're just not there, even if they 'exist' some'where'

they are very unhelpful. — Mww

They seem to be entirely irrelevant to the system, other than to posit something medial.

And, thank you, so much, for continuing to engage. I did my best to go away for a while before responding so i really hope its not tedious and you turn into 180 Proof on me :P

Obvious our impressions are not of the thing — AmadeusD

Our impressions are not of the things-in-themselves; they must be of things, otherwise we couldn’t say where such impressions come from. Like here:

“…. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd.…”

From this, I can only be left with things that have no effect on sense, and impressions that come from nowhere/nothing. — AmadeusD

There is that which has no effect on the senses, re: things-in-themselves, but impressions cannot come from nowhere/nothing, for if such was the case there would be no sensations, no phenomenal representations given from them, hence nothing to experience. And it is obvious we have experiences, which presupposes the things we have experiences of.

Don’t worry too much about the things we perceive, at least as far as CPR is concerned. They are, after all, nothing but…

“…. The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical intuition. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon.…”

….so the thing we perceive? We don’t know anything about it anyway, at the point of its perception. All we know is that it is something with sufficient affect on our senses, a mere appearance. That’s it. Philosophers since Plato (knowledge of vs knowledge that), and lately, in Russell (knowledge by acquaintance vs knowledge by description), figured this out, setting the stage….or making a stronger case…..for the intrinsic duality of the human cognitive system, from which follows the subjective/objective dichotomy the postmoderns detest but cannot figure out how to escape.
————-

i really hope its not tedious and you turn into 180 Proof on me — AmadeusD

Nahhhh. I’ll play the game as long as it’s interesting. Truth be told, most people just sorta disappear, give it up, so to speak. Either found it too difficult to understand, or, understood it well enough to consider it a thoroughly stupid way to do things.

Thank you mate. I'm having a bit of a build up here at work, so will need to get to this when i get a quiet spell :) Shouldn't be a long reply though, as you;'ve covered most of what was in teh air for me.

All we know is that it is something with sufficient affect on our senses, a mere appearance. — Mww

Nice. Despite probably unfortunately saying something else, this strikes me as the same my understanding but in clearer words.

I suppose the thing remaining is that thing between the two -

1. Thing-in-itself appears to us as an unknowable entity;
2. ????;
3. Something is presented to our sensuous organs;
4. We receive that something, undetermined as sensory perceptions;
5. Off to the races with understanding/reason/judgement.

Sigh. Goddamn Kant.

1. Thing-in-itself appears to us as an unknowable entity; — AmadeusD

The 'thing in itself' is not anything, by definition. In order for it to be Something, it would have to appear.

ding-an-sich serves as a placeholder in Kant, to remind us that knowledge is limited to what appears to us, and the judgement we make ot it. We can't know what it really is, as it is in itself. But that doesn't make the thing in itself an unknowable something. Seeing it like that misreads or misunderstands why the term was used in the first place.


1. The "thing in itself" is not anything, by definition: the "thing in itself" is not an object of human knowledge or experience. Kant posited that human cognition is limited to what appears to us through our sensory perception and understanding. The "thing in itself" exists beyond the realm of human knowledge and experience.

2. In order for it to be Something, it would have to appear: it must be capable of appearing or being apprehended in some way. Kant argued that our knowledge is rooted in sensory experience and conceptual understanding, so the "thing in itself" cannot be known because it does not appear in this manner.

3. Ding-an-sich serves as a placeholder: Kant used the term "Ding-an-sich" as a placeholder or conceptual tool to emphasize the limits of human knowledge. It reminds us that our knowledge is contingent upon what appears to us and the judgments we can make about those appearances.

4. The thing in itself is not an unknowable something: while the "thing in itself" is unknowable in the sense that we cannot directly access it through human cognition, it should not be regarded as an entirely mysterious or unknowable entity. This view aligns with Kant's intent in using the concept to highlight the boundaries of human knowledge rather than making it completely unknowable.

The problem that Capital R realists have, is that they can't abide the notion that there's something about the proverbial Apple or Chair (='any object') which we don't see or understand. So they feel this burning urge to 'peek behind the curtain' and see what 'it really is'. That innate realism is a kind of barrier to understanding transcendental idealism in my view. The thing they need to learn is a kind of circumspection - rather Socratic in orientation, really.

Kant posited that human cognition is limited to what appears to us through our sensory perception and understanding. — Wayfarer

He did more than that.

In Bxxxix he writes:

"No matter how innocent idealism may be held to be as regards the essential ends of metaphysics (though in fact it is not so innocent), it always remains a scandal of philosophy and universal human reason that the existence of things outside us (from which we after all get the whole matter for our cognitions, even for our inner sense) should have to be assumed merely on faith, and that if it occurs to anyone to doubt it, we should be unable to answer him with a satisfactory proof.

From B275 onwards is Kant's Refutation of Idealism, where he states that our inner experience is only possible on the presupposition of outer experience.

He starts with the Theorem:

"The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me."

From B276 onwards is his proof of the existence of objects outside our sensory perception and understanding.

I’ve read up on Kant’s criticism of Berkeley, but I’m finding it hard to see how it connects to what I wrote in the post you responded to. I don’t deny that Kant believed there were objects outside us. Only that we don’t know what they really are.

The "thing in itself" exists beyond the realm of human knowledge and experience. — Wayfarer

I don’t deny that Kant believed there were objects outside us. Only that we don’t know what they really are. — Wayfarer

For Kant, it was more than a belief that objects exist outside us, as from B276 onwards he goes on to propose a proof that objects do exist outside us.

On the assumption that Things in Themselves are objects outside us, then if they were beyond the realm of human knowledge, then it would not be possible to prove that they exist.

I agree that Kant may not know what Things in Themselves really are, but he does know that they do exist beyond our sensibilities.

IE, Kant proposes a proof in the Refutation of Idealism that we do have knowledge beyond our experiences.

IE, Kant proposes a proof in the Refutation of Idealism that we do have knowledge beyond our experiences. — RussellA

What type of knowledge would it be?

What type of knowledge would it be? — Corvus

The knowledge as set out in his Theorem in B276 that objects exist in space outside us.

The knowledge as set out in his Theorem in B276 that objects exist in space outside us. — RussellA

I recall this part of CPR. It was about Refutation of Idealism.
What was Kan't intention for the proof?
Did he succeed in the Refutation?

All good, except….

1. The thing-in-itself is not that which appears. As I said, it is “-in-itself”. In German, it is ding an sich, which some translators make into “thing as it is in itself”, in order to separate it from “thing as it is in us”, which is, of course, mere representations of things. Copies, if you will. Constructions. Manufactured look-alikes. Whatever. As long as the thing out there is not the same in kind as the thing in here, while at the same time at least corresponding to it, call it anything you like.

5. Off to the races indeed, and has all the right constituency, but not quite in the proper sequence. Called the “higher powers” to distinguish them from sensibility and phenomena, they are understanding/judgement/reason. Kant treats the higher powers as a standard Aristotelian tripartite logical syllogism in form, where understanding is the major, re: a conception, judgement is the minor, re: a unity of conceptions into a proper cognition, and reason determines the relation between them or between that immediate conclusion and those antecedent in consciousness a priori or experience a posteriori.

I recall this part of CPR. It was about Refutation of Idealism. What was Kan't intention for the proof? Did he succeed in the Refutation? — Corvus

As our only access to a possible outside us is through our senses, how can we prove that there is a world on the other side of these senses when we only know of this possible world through our senses?

Not everyone believes that Kant succeeded. For example, George Dicker in his article Kant's Refutation of Idealism wrote: "I analyse Kant's Refutation of Idealism as he presents it in the Critique of Pure Reason and show that it is a failure".

His "proof" in B276 may be summarised as:
1) I am conscious of my existence though time
2) I can only be conscious of one moment in time
3) Therefore, there must be something outside me enabling my consciousness that I exist through time
However, assuming 2) to be correct, rather than being conscious of my existence through time, I could be conscious of memories at this one moment in time, thereby negating the proof.

I may be able to find justifications that there are objects outside me, but I doubt that a proof is possible. For example, if there are no objects outside me, if there is no world outside me, then I wrote "Anna Karenina", "To Kill a Mockingbird", "The Great Gatsby", "One Hundred Years of Solitude", "A Passage to India" and the "Invisible Man", which, although possible, I find highly unlikely.

As our only access to a possible outside us is through our senses, how can we prove that there is a world on the other side of these senses when we only know of this possible world through our senses? — RussellA

Surely we perceive the world via our senses doesn't necessarily mean that the world doesn't exist?
If it is due to limits and faults of human senses, then why does he have to doubt the existence of the world? Wouldn't it rather be fair to say our senses are imperfect, than trying to prove the objects exist outside us?

Not everyone believes that Kant succeeded. For example, George Dicker in his article Kant's Refutation of Idealism wrote: "I analyse Kant's Refutation of Idealism as he presents it in the Critique of Pure Reason and show that it is a failure". — RussellA

What is the reasons for George Dicker to claim that Kant's Refutation of Idealism has failed? Does it mean that Idealism prevails in CPR?

Surely we perceive the world via our senses doesn't necessarily mean that the world doesn't exist? — Corvus

Yes, if we perceive the world through our senses, then, of necessity, the world exists.

We perceive things in our senses, including touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing.

However, how do you know that these sensations are caused by a world that exists outside your mind rather than by a world that exists inside your mind?
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What is the reasons for George Dicker to claim that Kant's Refutation of Idealism has failed? Does it mean that Idealism prevails in CPR? — Corvus

George Dicker argues that the main difficulty with Kant's argument in B276 is the part "All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception".

The problem is, how can we step outside of time in order to see ourselves existing in time

This doesn't mean that Idealism prevails in CPR, but rather, that Kant should have come up with a better argument to justify his belief that objects exist in space outside us.

However, how do you know that these sensations are caused by a world that exists outside your mind rather than by a world that exists inside your mind? — RussellA

Possible worlds, and worlds in your imagination and memories exist in your mind, but they don't cause your perception for the external world.

George Dicker argues that the main difficulty with Kant's argument in B276 is the part "All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception". — RussellA

Kant's first premise in the refutation is that he is conscious in time. Some might ask to prove how does he know he is conscious in time? What if he was dreaming, or hallucinating?

The problem is, how can we step outside of time in order to see ourselves existing in time — RussellA

How can you step outside of your concept or intuition?

I don’t deny that Kant believed there were objects outside us. Only that we don’t know what they really are. — Wayfarer

If it wasn't clear (because I'm shit at philosophical exposition) this was what I was trying to point out.

It is inductively true that there must be actual objects, but we are precluded from any knowledge of them. I'm unsure that your wording means anything different rather htan more precise, than mine. In any case, it strikes me as commensurate with what I was trying to get across, having finally worked out separating the thing-in-itself from the noumenon (lets say, of it).

1. The thing-in-itself is not that which appears. — Mww

Well, it doesn't appear in intuition, but for the system to make any sense it must appear to our sense organs to impart an impression outside of our ability to perceive that process. Otherwise, again, we're left with impressions from absolutely nothing, instead of something for which we have no concept or knowledge. I don't see any reason we can't grasp this idea.. The 'thing in itself' cannot be 'nothing'. Only nothing in intuition.
Beyond that, yes, i'm describing the same process so neat-o.

The thing-in-itself is not that which appears.
— Mww

Well, it doesn't appear in intuition, but for the system to make any sense it must appear to our sense organs to impart an impression outside of our ability to perceive that process. — AmadeusD

Actually, it doesn’t. Looks like you’ll need some sort of self-generated epiphanic episode to catch the philosophical drift. But, as I said, most folks just give up.

But I get it. When a mosquito bites, it’s really hard to think it isn’t the mosquito itself that bit you.

Not at all. I just think you're clearly wrong. Something must be presented to our sense organs to even perceive that something has happened (viz a viz being bitten by a mosquito). It need not be anything we ahve any knowledge of - in fact, cannot be. But it is presented to the sense organs.
RussellA seems to have 'caught the philosophical drift' i'm on.

Again, denying this is to deny that impressions come from anywhere but ourselves. Either, you think impressions arise from nowhere and no-thing, or you understand that some object must be presented to the sense organs to facilitate any intuition whatsoever.
This isn't even a problem for Kant, it's a problem for you.

Possible worlds, and worlds in your imagination and memories exist in your mind, but they don't cause your perception for the external world. — Corvus

How can you step outside of your concept or intuition? — Corvus

But that is what Kant is saying in the CPR, that the a priori intuitions of space and time and a priori pure concepts of the Understanding, ie the Categories, are conditions for the possibility of experience. Kant is saying that we cannot "step outside of your concept or intuition".

We perceive a world through our senses. You are assuming that there is one world in your mind and a different word that is external to your mind.

How do you know that the world you perceive in your senses has been caused by the world external to your mind rather than the world internal to your mind?

For example, when you perceive in your senses the colour red in the world, how do you know that the colour red exists in a world external to your mind rather than in the world internal to your mind?

Can you justify, for example, that the colour red exists in a world independent of any mind?
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Kant's first premise in the refutation is that he is conscious in time. Some might ask to prove how does he know he is conscious in time? What if he was dreaming, or hallucinating? — Corvus

I would agree with "I am conscious of my existence". The problem is, am I conscious of my existence at this one moment in time, or am I conscious of my existence through time.

If the latter, then I must be existing at two moments in time in order to be conscious of the passage of time. But such a possibility is beyond my powers of comprehension.

I don't think Kant's proof in the Refutation of Idealism is the best.

How do you know that the world you perceive in your senses has been caused by the world external to your mind rather than the world internal to your mind? — RussellA

How do you know you have a world internal to your mind? Is it a real world? How do you know it is the real world or just a imagination?

Something must be presented to our sense organs to even perceive that something has happened — AmadeusD

How can I be “clearly wrong” when we agree? That, however, is different from your…..

1. Thing-in-itself appears to us as an unknowable entity; — AmadeusD

….and therein the discord with CPR which is my objection.