Carlo Rovelli's highly expert and deeply thoughtful popularizations are, no doubt, excellent though. — 180 Proof

Kastrup on Rovelli

It may be a missing aspect in Daniel Dennett's materialistic take on this. — Jack Cummins

Dennett says that there’s basically no difference between human beings and computers, that we’re ‘moist robots’.

“I’m a robot, and you’re a robot, but that doesn’t make us any less dignified or wonderful or lovable or responsible for our actions,” he said. “Why does our dignity depend on our being scientifically inexplicable?” — Daniel Dennett

Philosophy and physics come at the issue from separate perspectives. A key point of philosophy, I would assert, is that it is grounded in rational contemplation of the human condition. It ought not to overly rely on science, except perhaps insofar as scientific discoveries impact the human condition. But Wittgenstein himself said that “even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all.” — Wayfarer

I think you have touched on the antithetical Frames of Reference that divide many of the posters on this forum : Empirical vs Theoretical (metaphysical) Philosophy and Theoretical vs Empirical (physical) Science. Adherents of those disparate worldviews find it difficult to communicate with their opposite number. They speak mutually unintelligible dialects of the same language*1, because they approach "Reality" from different directions (presumptions) as noted by Joshs in the quotes below*2*3.

I am totally ignorant of Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy, but your quote seems to hit the same presumptive nail on its convictional creedal head. Ironically, those advocating Empirical Philosophy, typically define Metaphysics as religious nonsense. On the other head, I have asked several posters who seek empirical evidence to support philosophical conjectures, "why are you posting on a Philosophical Forum?" They are typically scornful of my references to Metaphysics and Essences, which apparently don't exist in their worldview, except as examples of Antiscience babble. So, where can we obtain a Babble-fish*4 to translate for us? Are you available for that multilingual job? :joke:


*1. There's a saying from the days of England's great war-time leader Sir Winston Churchill in which he describes the United States and his own country as being two nations "divided by the same language."

*2. "they show the empirical sciences what is hidden to them in their own naive assumptions." —

*3. " Its self-evi­dence lacks scientific grounding in the universal life-world a priori, which it always presupposes in the form of things taken for granted, which are never scientifically, universally formu­lated, never put in the general form proper to a science of essence"


*4. What is the Babelfish ?
Adams' novel The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy features the Babel Fish, “probably the oddest thing in the universe” (Adams 60), which gives its host the ability to “instantly understand anything said…in any form of language”
https://www.scienceandfiction.fiu.edu/library-of-babel-fish

BABELFISH with optional BS detector (gas bladder)

those advocating Empirical Philosophy, typically define Metaphysics as religious nonsense. — Gnomon

That’s more characteristic of positivism, really. There is a school of thought called ‘constructive empiricism’. Constructive empiricism is a philosophical perspective on the nature of scientific theories proposed by Bas van Fraassen in his 1980 book "The Scientific Image." It contrasts with scientific realism in important ways. Scientific realism holds that science aims to give us true descriptions of the world, including unobservable phenomena. Constructive empiricists, on the other hand, argue that the goal of science is not to find true theories, but rather to develop theories that are empirically adequate.

Empirical adequacy, a key concept in constructive empiricism, means that a scientific theory is successful in accounting for observable phenomena. Constructive empiricists maintain that a theory can be empirically adequate without necessarily being true, especially in its claims about unobservable entities or processes. Therefore, they focus on how theories relate to what we can observe and test, rather than committing to the true existence of entities posited by those theories.

This stance has significant implications for how we understand scientific progress and the role of science in explaining the natural world. It suggests a more modest, but still rigorous, understanding of what science can achieve..

Constructive empiricism, while sharing the emphasis on empirical adequacy with positivism, doesn’t take such a hard line against metaphysics. Instead, it simply refrains from making metaphysical commitments about the reality of unobservable entities. Bas van Fraassen posited that science doesn’t need to make claims about the true nature of reality beyond what is observable; thus, it sidesteps many deep metaphysical debates, whilst not necessarily being dismissive of them. This is more of a suspension of judgment than a dismissal, reflecting a more open, albeit cautious, attitude towards metaphysical questions compared to the more dismissive view of logical positivism.

"Pseudo-science makes for bad philosophy."
~180 Proof

Kastrup on Rovelli — Wayfarer

Okay, so non-physicist Kastrup disagrees with physicist Rovelli's theoretical prediction from RQG. Big whup. In the article I see that Kastrup cannot refute Rovelli without the crutch of a fallacious appeal to incredulity that amounts to nothing more than an ad hoc "non-physical" stuff-of-the-gaps fiat. :roll:

I am totally ignorant of Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy. — Gnomon

:up:

Better yet (since, for instance, planck-scale entities are not "empirical"): Hawking-Mlodinow's model-dependent realism.

It is with sadness that every so often I spend a few hours on the internet, reading or listening to the mountain of stupidities dressed up with the word 'quantum'. Quantum medicine; holistic quantum theories of every kind, mental quantum spiritualism – and so on, and on, in an almost unbelievable parade of quantum nonsense. — Carlo Rovelli, Hegoland, pp. 159-60

@Jack Cummins

so non-physicist Kastrup — 180 Proof

Non-physicist Kastrup’s first job was at CERN. He’s quite conversant with physics. But plainly you’ve missed the whole point of the article so I won’t labour it.

Non-physicist Kastrup’s first job was at CERN. He’s quite conversant with physics. — Wayfarer

:sweat: A "PhD in computer engineering" does not make one remotely as "conversant with physics" as a world-class, theoretical physicist like Carlo Rovelli. The article you provided, Wayf, illustrates Kastrup's deficit.

Better yet (since, for instance, planck-scale entities are not "empirical"): Hawking-Mlodinow's model-dependent realism. — 180 Proof

Model Dependent Realism is a dubious metaphysical proposition in itself. For how does MDR avoid collapsing into either George Berkeley's instrumentalism, or into naive realism?

When it comes to interpreting any theory T containing a set of observation variables O and a set of 'hidden' variables H, there are only two possibilities

1) T can eventually be rewritten as another theory T' that only contains O terms, such that the original variables H in T aren't considered to be hidden after all.

or

2) T can never be rewritten as a theory containing only O terms.

MDR comes across as decrying the metaphysical speculation that is inevitable in the face of theoretical uncertainty, and disguising this attitude as epistemological substance.

BTW, planck-scale entities are empirical - for why would they be proposed otherwise? Rather, their empirical meaning remains open and is relative to context, as is also the case for "molecules", "optical redness", "cats", "cars" and my dear old mother.

As the logical positivists discovered, there isn't a clear meta-theoretical distinction between O terms and H terms. For example, electrons are observation terms in the context of using an electron microscope, whereas in macroelectronics they are hidden terms in the sense of having indirect phenomenal relevance .

So did Hawking believe in mind-independent reality or not?

Model Dependent Realism is a dubious metaphysical proposition in itself. — sime

It is the natural outcome of relativity theory, when relativity theory is taken to be true. Relativity is a very useful category of theories which allow activities, events, to be looked at from different perspectives. Each perspective is assigned equal validity. But if we deny that there is anything real, or true, which would serve to provide the principles required to distinguish one perspective as better than another, assuming that equal validity implies equally true, and opt instead for other principles to make that judgement, we end up with model dependent realism.

those advocating Empirical Philosophy, typically define Metaphysics as religious nonsense. — Gnomon

That’s more characteristic of positivism, really. There is a school of thought called ‘constructive empiricism’. Constructive empiricism is a philosophical perspective on the nature of scientific theories proposed by Bas van Fraassen in his 1980 book "The Scientific Image." It contrasts with scientific realism in important ways. Scientific realism holds that science aims to give us true descriptions of the world, including unobservable phenomena. Constructive empiricists, on the other hand, argue that the goal of science is not to find true theories, but rather to develop theories that are empirically adequate. . . .
it simply refrains from making metaphysical commitments about the reality of unobservable entities. — Wayfarer

Thanks. I had never heard of "Constructive Empiricism". CE sounds like a good policy for Practical Scientists : "to refrain from making metaphysical commitments about the reality of unobservable entities". The old "refrain" of "shut-up and calculate" seems like a similar pragmatic attitude toward impractical scientists who dabble in the Meta-Physical aspects of Quantum Physics --- sometimes mis-labeled as "Quantum Mysticism"*1 --- but are actually "abstract" & "unobservable" entities & forces, and open questions about Being & Reality.

I made-up the descriptive term "Empirical Philosophy" to refer to posters on this forum, who do not "refrain from making metaphysical commitments". When they accuse me of avoiding the traditional referent of "metaphysics", from Catholic Metaphysics*2 (4th - 5th centuries AD) ; I typically point back to an even older antecedent of the term, in Aristotle's (5th century BC) encyclopedia of Nature. The section of his documents, that later came to be labeled "metaphysics"*3, was literally placed "after" the documentation about the physical world. And it discussed non-physical & abstract topics that distinguished Greek Philosophy from both Material Nature, and from Greek Religions. Philosophy is not a science of Things, but of Ideas. "Meta-Physics" is not about mysticism, but about the "unobservable", but inferrable, underpinnings of Nature.

I haven't been successful in convincing the "Empirical Philosophy" posters, such as , to look past Augustine & Aquinas to the man who literally wrote the book. Being a non-religious naturalist, Aristotle is harder to pin the "mystical" label on. So they mis-direct the thread toward a well-known taboo of science, in order to avoid dealing with the philosophical ideas I'm actually talking about. When I post about Quantum Physics, I'm referring to its philosophical implications, not to its physical facts. But it's easier to apply prejudicial Straw-Man labels, such as "New Age", than to argue non-empirical abstract concepts and "unobservable entities", such as those raised by the quantum pioneers of invisible subatomic physics. Such distracting labels don't prove anything, except blind prejudice. :smile:


*1. Quantum mysticism :
Before the 1970s the term was usually used in reference to the von Neumann–Wigner interpretation, but was later more closely associated with the purportedly pseudoscientific views espoused by New Age thinkers such as Fritjof Capra and other members of the Fundamental Fysiks Group, who were influential in popularizing the modern form of quantum mysticism. . . . .
Physicists Werner Heisenberg and Erwin Schrödinger, two of the main pioneers of quantum mechanics, were interested in Eastern mysticism, but are not known to have directly associated one with the other. In fact, both endorsed the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mysticism

*2. Catholic Metaphysics :
The Marginalization of Metaphysical Thinking . . . .
The most powerful intellectual movement during the last two centuries has been the Enlightenment Project. The Enlightenment Project comprises both the view known as scientism, namely, that science is the whole truth about everything and that it is the ground of its own legitimation, as well as the program to transcend the human predicament by gaining complete technological mastery of the physical and social environment. It is a project that was originally formulated by French philosophes in the last half of the eighteenth century, was preserved by positivist movements in the nineteenth century, and has dominated universities in the twentieth century. . . . .
What room is there for metaphysics in such a view? The only version of metaphysics permissible is secular Aristotelian naturalism.
https://metanexus.net/catholic-metaphysics-wake-collapse-enlightenment/

*3. Metaphysics (Aristotle) :
The work is a compilation of various texts treating abstract subjects, notably substance theory, different kinds of causation, form and matter, the existence of mathematical objects and the cosmos, which together constitute much of the branch of philosophy later known as metaphysics.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics_(Aristotle)

I made-up the descriptive term "Empirical Philosophy" to refer to posters on this forum, who do not "refrain from making metaphysical commitments" — Gnomon

Sure, I get that. The key point about empiricism generally is 'only trust what you can see, touch and measure.' So in practise it usually amounts to a kind of 'scientism'. That Nicholas Capaldi essay you've linked seems to cover that (although haven't read it yet, but he's a mainstream scholar). At this late stage in life, I've accepted that I'll never read all of Aristotle's metaphysics, but I've come to appreciate some aspects of him through his modern interpreters.

That wikipedia article is unfortunate on Quantum Mysticism. There really is a subject matter there, but due to its nature, it is open to all kinds of misinterpretation and exploitation, as I already mentioned above. But, as the old saying has it, there would be no fools gold, were there no actual gold.

So, I am raising the question of the nature of metaphysics and perception and how may the nature of 'reality' be understood in the most helpful way? — Jack Cummins

In the most helpful way for what purposes? Is to gain a better intuition about what the world is made of? Then you should continue to read what physicists say about these things.

Is metaphysics about what physics says? Well, based on the meaning of the word, not entirely. One should at least be able to say, that whatever metaphysics you think is most persuasive, it should not go against what our best science predicts, or it is likely wrong.

This may be where the issues of what is metaphysics may come into play, in trying to understand the nature of ' reality'. I struggle with this area of thinking, but am not sure how many is my psychological issue or one of metaphysics. — Jack Cummins

In modern terms based on how the issue is talked about today, say "physicalism" or "realism" or whatever, there is indeed no sharp distinction between "metaphysics" and psychology, especially the more speculative side of it.

The issue here is that there is no agreed upon meaning of the term metaphysics, and I don't think such a non-contentious definition will ever arise.

The blurred understanding of 'metaphysics' does seem to be the root of so much misunderstanding, ranging from transcendental idealism, realism and naturalism to materialistic reductionism. The problem is that no one perspective can be used in a fully explanatory way. Some argue for the claims of realism and materialism because they are evident to the senses but it does not rule out the intricate patterns and workings of processes, which work in systems and are often not visible directly.

Philosophy may unravel aspects of conceptual misunderstanding as a way of showing what appears to be nonsensical fabrications but, even so, a lot is not known. Ideas like 'God' may be used to fill the gaps and are questionable but gaps remain anyway. Quantum physics may provide new scope in the foundations of creative thinking about 'reality', especially the nature of 'fields' and 'energies' which are subtle in nature.

Often a lot of these debates in metaphysics are debates about terminology, as if saying the world is made of physical stuff or mental stuff is even clear or useful in any manner. Reductionism and eliminitavism may be rather different in the extreme view it tends to take, but I don't think it should be taken seriously.

QM can say some interesting things about the nature of the world, though one should be careful of extending the results of QM beyond its own field, which is (extremely) microscopic phenomena.

So far, most of the popular theories offer some quite wild speculations, like alternative universes or many worlds, or the argument that time may be emergent and hence not a fundamental part of the world. Maybe these theories are right, maybe they're wrong, I can't say.

But even if one of these is true, many of the problems of metaphysics remain as they were. Perhaps narrowing down what kind of metaphysics you are interested in, could help. Otherwise, the issue is too broad to tackle. Experience and physics though related in some manner, are perhaps too far apart to discuss fruitfully.

So did Hawking believe in mind-independent reality or not? — sime

Of course. "Mind-dependent reality" doesn't make sense except to idealists / antirealists (who tend to obey poison warning labels, not carry lightning rods in thunderstorms, purchase auto insurance and eat enough in order not to starve).

Model Dependent Realism is a dubious metaphysical proposition in itself.

AFAIK, metaphysical statements are not propositions. Also, MDR (which I raised in contrast to @Wayfarer's sketch of "constructive empiricism") is an epistemological criterion. The rest of your post seems besides the point.

Of course. "Mind-dependent reality" doesn't make sense except to idealists / antirealists (who tend to obey poison warning labels, not carry lightning rods in thunderstorms, purchase auto insurance and eat enough in order not to starve). — 180 Proof

The most famous western idealist George Berkeley wasn't a reality skeptic, precisely because his subjective idealism denied the status of the hidden variables of scientific theories as being representational. He was attacking representationalist materialism, and not the "model dependent realism" that is the narrow concern of a scientific theory under test.

I think that when talking about idealism, especially in the context of the philosophy of science, it should be interpreted more technically as referring to a strong form of instrumentalism in which both

1) The hidden variables of scientific theories are considered to be ontologically reducible to observation terms, even if the distinction between hidden variables and observation terms is considered to to be epistemically necessary in practice.

2) The meaning and existence of observation terms is considered to be ontologically dependent on perspective.

Ironically, Samuel Johnson demonstrated Berkeley's views when kicking a rock - for he demonstrated that his theoretical understanding of a rock's material qualities was ultimately in terms of his experiential perspective. Had he believed that the rock's theoretical properties were irreducible to his experiences, then he would not have believed that kicking a rock could prove it's material properties.

Metaphysical "propositions" are indeed propositions - but they are higher order propositions about theories, as opposed to being first-order propositions that are expressed by those theories.

Hawking indicated his disinterest in philosophy, which concerns these higher-order propositions, for his interest in physics, where I interpret his "model dependent realism" to refer to his view that the remit of physics is strictly in the analysis and testing of first-order physics propositions, as illustrated by his "world picture" analogy.

So it remains very unclear to me as what his philosophical views are, for his "model dependent realism" clearly wasn't meant to be a philosophical proposition, but only to express that as far as physics is concerned, philosophical questions are besides the point.

metaphysical statements are not propositions — 180 Proof

Could you talk a bit about why you think that?

Metaphysics proposes statements about 'reality in the most general sense'. Propositions are truthbearer statements with possible truth-makers; otherwise, without possible truthmakers, interpretations (e.g. critiques, criteria) or suppositions (e.g. counterfactuals, thought-experiments) are undecidable or prefered for reasons other than truth-value. As far as I can tell, metaphysics consists only of the latter – a kind of axiomatic concept-poetry – because 'reality in general' cannot be both an object (i.e. a fact that either is or is not the case) and 'the ground' of all possible objects. I find metaphysics, like each area of philosophy, useful (i.e. clarifying, insightful), not true itself (or theoretical).

Metaphysical "propositions" are indeed propositions - but they are higher order propositions about theories, as opposed to being first-order propositions that are expressed by those theories. — sime

Okay, this is where we differ: I think meta-statements are either interpretative or suppositional and only object-statements are propositional. To my mind, "theories" may be epistemic objects.

I've accepted that I'll never read all of Aristotle's metaphysics, but I've come to appreciate some aspects of him through his modern interpreters. — Wayfarer

Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics is itself something of a metaphysical conundrum that's worth exploring. Aristotle has expended much effort in the rest of the N.E. on exploring phronesis, practical wisdom that pursues eudaimonia. But it has occasionally nagged at him that theoretical nous is in some way a higher form of understanding, involving contemplation, and without necessarily practical outcomes. Book X doesn't resolve this tension, for he both says that (old Gutenberg version)

'...the Working of the Intellect, being apt for contemplation, is thought to excel in earnestness, and to aim at no End beyond itself and to have Pleasure of its own...'

...and yet concludes that active 'Practice' is the key to eudaimonia. My tutor a few years ago, a practical man said, What do the gods talk about all day then? Do they exchange quadratic equations?. Aristotle is not a great explorer of the divine but he acknowledges it is there, and that human speculation and meditation are paths towards it.

I wonder about the nature of 'theories' and how they stand in philosophy, especially in relation to propositions, which may be concepts rather than empirically measurable. Within science and, in support of theory, there is an emphasis on evidence based ideas. This is fair enough because ideas and concepts without evidence are questionable.

The issue which I see is the way in which evidence and argument come together in the construction of this because it may not be straightforward. It is here that the nature of propositions themselves may be flimsy because they are based on interpretative understandings and hermeneutic assumptions.
'

As far as Dennett's understanding of qualia, it does seem that his idea of the 'user- illusion'of consciousness seems to omit reflective consciousness from the picture. It can be asked what is this? It may come down to the issue of intentionality and where this fits into the evolution of consciousness? In this way, it connects the problem of consciousness and determinism.

Dennett looks at the role of language but what he may fail to recognise is the way in which language itself may result in agency. Language may be the basis of metaphysics, even if the objective aspects are not about human understanding. In life, language and its creative elements may be an important way of enabling reflective choice and agency, central to human life.

Get over Dennett. He's the poster boy for scientism and scientific materialism. It's scandalous that his output is regarded as philosophy, when by his own reckoning, anything that's ever been understood as philosophy has been dissolved by the 'universal acid' of Darwin's dangerous idea.

https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-illusionist

https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/books/review/the-god-genome.html

I wonder about the nature of 'theories' and how they stand in philosophy, especially in relation to propositions, which may be concepts rather than empirically measurable. Within science and, in support of theory, there is an emphasis on evidence based ideas. This is fair enough because ideas and concepts without evidence are questionable. — Jack Cummins

The concept of 'theoria' in ancient Greek philosophy, especially in Aristotle, held a different meaning to the modern understanding of 'theory.'

In ancient Greek philosophy, 'theoria' referred to a form of intellectual contemplation. It was about the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, focusing on understanding the fundamental principles and truths of the world. This contemplative approach was seen as a higher, more noble form of activity, often associated with the life of a philosopher or a sage. It was considered an end in itself, a way of achieving a form of intellectual virtue and, ultimately, happiness (eudaimonia).

This stands in contrast to 'praxis,' which was concerned with action and practical application. Praxis was about how knowledge and principles are applied in the real world, focusing on ethical and political action. It involved the practical aspects of living a good life, including moral choices and social responsibilities.

Thus, in Aristotle's philosophy and other Greek thought, 'theoria' and 'praxis' represented two distinct but complementary aspects of human life: the contemplative pursuit of knowledge and the practical application of that knowledge in everyday life. This dichotomy was central to much of ancient philosophy and has influenced various philosophical traditions over time. But it's very different to the modern attitude which is more instrumental and technologically and economically focused. That conditions a lot of the debates about the scope of theory, the limits of knowledge, and so on.

and yet concludes that active 'Practice' is the key to eudaimonia. My tutor a few years ago, a practical man said, What do the gods talk about all day then? Do they exchange quadratic equations?. Aristotle is not a great explorer of the divine but he acknowledges it is there, and that human speculation and meditation are paths towards it. — mcdoodle

But if happiness [εὐδαιμονία] consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then this be the Intellect [νοῦς], or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the virtue proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness; and it has been stated already* that this activity is the activity of contemplation [θεωρητική]. — 1177a11

I’ve become rather intrigued by the association of reason, virtue, and divinity in the ancient and medieval tradition, although it’s very difficult theme to find a summary account of. For Aristotle, reason (nous) was distinct from the processing of sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory, which other creatures possess. For him, discussion of nous is connected to discussion of how the human mind sets definitions in a consistent and communicable way, and whether people must be born with some innate potential to understand the same universal categories in the same logical ways. Hence the connection with universals, on the whole lost to modern philosophy.

It is here that the nature of propositions themselves may be flimsy because they are based on interpretative understandings and hermeneutic assumptions. — Jack Cummins

What? :chin:

:up:

Y'know, sir, a minimum of intellectual integrity requires that you criticize Daniel Dennett by quoting those of his own words and arguments with which you take issue rather than vacuously parrotting polemical misteadings (at best) of his work disquised as "reviews". Apparently, Wayf, you've never read Dennett, have no intention of ever reading his books, and nonetheless keep on bashing him whenever his name comes up – your m.o. for at least the last fifteen years. :roll:

parently, Wayf, you've never read Dennett, have no intention of ever reading his books, and nonetheless keep on bashing him whenever his name comes up — 180 Proof

Part of my civic duty, I feel. The first I heard of Dennett was when he published a book called 'Consciousness Explained', which I suspected would be fraudulent, and indeed Galen Strawson called for him to be charged under Trade Practices for false advertising.

Although that said, you’re right, I will cease from commenting on Dennett henceforth. I’ve made my feelings clear.

Hawking indicated his disinterest in philosophy, which concerns these higher-order propositions, for his interest in physics, where I interpret his "model dependent realism" to refer to his view that the remit of physics is strictly in the analysis and testing of first-order physics propositions, as illustrated by his "world picture" analogy.

So it remains very unclear to me as what his philosophical views are, for his "model dependent realism" clearly wasn't meant to be a philosophical proposition, but only to express that as far as physics is concerned, philosophical questions are besides the point. — sime

I think you misrepresent Hawking's intentions sime. In "The Grand Design" he presents himself as having an adequate understanding of philosophical problems, and proposes model-dependent realism as a superior alternative to other philosophical theories. So he is not suggesting that philosophical problems are beside the point, he is proposing model-dependent realism as a solution to those philosophical problems.

:100:

I think you misrepresent Hawking's intentions sime. In "The Grand Design" he presents himself as having an adequate understanding of philosophical problems, and proposes model-dependent realism as a superior alternative to other philosophical theories. So he is not suggesting that philosophical problems are beside the point, he is proposing model-dependent realism as a solution to those philosophical problems. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think Hawking misrepresents his own intentions, judging by the wildly different interpretations I have seen of MDR, for I've witnessed both realists and idealists defending MDR.

At the very least, its definition is too ill-defined to be distinguished from other forms of instrumentalism, or for allowing critical comparison against other epistemological stances such as positivism and Bayesian epistemology. Notably, MDR isn't mentioned even once in the SEP article discussing models in science.

MDR doesn't explain the relationship of theoretical models to their observational semantics and truth-conditions, neither does it give any guidance as to how and when to select a model among "equally good" alternatives, let alone for deciding what is a good model, and neither does it serve as an explanation for theory-change.

So what exactly does MDR solve?

MDR doesn't explain the relationship of theoretical models to their observational semantics and truth-conditions, neither does it give any guidance as to how and when to select a model among "equally good" alternatives, let alone for deciding what is a good model, and neither does it serve as an explanation for theory-change.

So what exactly does MDR solve? — sime

MDR has no provision for "truth-conditions". And that's what it solves, the need to define truth conditions.