It's a question of preference, of what "parlance" one chooses, but I'll go with there being one table, described in two ways, participating in two language games, and hence that the table one sits at is the space mostly strung together with forces. — Banno

This response nicely sets up what for me is a key meta-philosophical problem. Traditional metaphysics, in my understanding, isn’t willing to concede that basic ontological questions are verbal disputes. And by “traditional,” I don’t simply mean historic; I think this is still the case with people like Kit Fine, Karen Bennett, Ted Sider, and many others. Of course the other position is attractive: Maybe there isn’t really a fact of the matter, and we are simply faced with a choice of parlance, a preference among various ways of assigning words to concepts and/or objects. Which position is true, I’m not sure. At a guess, I’d say it varies depending on the ontological topic. But the point I want to make is that this very question remains philosophically meaningful. It requires argument, in other words, to demonstrate – if one can – that problem X is a matter of terminology and hence not worthy of metaphysical argument. Or the reverse, of course.

Here? Following on from the OP. — Banno

The OP refers to Kant and post Kantian thinking. The muddle is what is in question. It is a difficult question for anyone who takes the categories of empirical science as a sound board for philosophical inquiry, but what you call muddle is simply the nature of our world, which is foundational indeterminacy. If you don't deal with Kant and his legacy and try to imagine two centuries of continental philosophy (I continuing on into the present through Levinas, Derrida and post Heideggerians) as something you can just "skip" and still remain in in good faith, then you are simply deluded.

No offense intended in saying this, but to speak of a cupboard, as you do above, like Moore speaks of his hands, then you really haven't even begun.

Not sure I can use this and I have, of course, heard such things expressed for much of my life. I spent my early life with Theosophists, followers of various forms of Buddhism, Hinduism, Gnosticism and mysticism. What is the discovery that one actually exists mean? — Tom Storm

This is a huge question, and I have found reading mysticism and the Eastern descriptions of deeper insight simply assumes what has to be shown. The Cloud of Unknowing and Meister Eckhart sermons, say, are extraordinary statements, but how does one get there, to the essential thought and experience, from here, this everyday world, given that the latter constitutes a level of engagement history has really never seen before. This didn't exist when Eckhart was around, this inflated cultural construction that is entirely open to expansion, reducing our world to stereo instructions, if you will.

Only way competent inquiry can begin, is with the infamous phenomenological reduction of Husserl. Husserl speaks through European tradition, so we can understand as he does and follow along, and not in some exotic distant language of another time and mentality. Husserl is meticulous (boringly so) but he takes this OP line of thinking to its only possible conclusion: when we start asking those Kantian questions about the relation between a thought, its consciousness, and the world, the original relation is between transcendence and and me, not to put to fine a point on it. Transcendence here is really just a simple concept: I am me and there is a cup, so the cup transcends me because it is over there and not me at all. So how is it that one spans the gap between the two? Notice that if this cannot be dome, the cup is simply, and rightly called, transcendent.

Kant never went this way. He held transcendence to be perceptually beyond access. Husserl puts it there, right in your face. This is where the entire body of mystical writing humans have ever produced begins, in this simple encounter with transcendence: this cup is noumenal; phenomena are noumenal, if you want to talk like that. Husserl was no mystic, but this is because he was like Kant, strong intellectual gifts, but weak on intuition.

I don't disagree, but how far to take it? I think of science as a tool for acquiring tentative models that are useful in certain contexts. Is the gap between science and reality or the gap between anything and reality worth filling with speculations? For me it isn't. An issue for me is that reality itself is a gap. It's an abstract idea, we fill with our values and anticipations. — Tom Storm

Take Kastrup's Is Reality Made of Consciuosness (someone mentioned earlier and I looked him up): Certainly not that he is wrong. Not at all! But this is more at scienctific speculation than it is philosophy. But, I won't quibble about words. Talk about particles and particle interactions just beg the question: how does anything out there get in here, a brain? He is right to dismiss ontological divisions and tossing out mind body pseudo problems, but he stays in the scienctific speculative mode. The problem of consciousness is always personal, in the extreme personal, for there is no actual collective consciousness, and therefore the concrete evidence lies not public affirmation that science makes, but in the actuality of consciousness itself. The premises one seeks for one' argument about the nature of consciousness and the world lie in the objectivity of scientific inquiry (there is no other than the scientific method. Tying my shoes and affirming the Eiffel Tower is in Paris are applications of the scientific method) into consicousness itself. That is, in "me".

Not sure, if science has to be consulted for that assurance. Wouldn't common sense or intuition do? And we don't really care about a set of atoms unless for some peculiar reason. To me atoms are just an abstract concept, that doesn't exist in the real world. Or if it did, it has nothing to do with me, or daily life. — Corvus

Science can tell us things that intuition cannot, such as when we perceive a red object, such as a post-box, the object may have emitted a wavelength of 700nm.

I only mentioned science to try to distinguish between a subjective mind and objective world. Coming from a position of mereological nihilism, my belief is that the cup as appearance does exist in the mind but the cup as thing-in-itself doesn't exist in a world independent of any mind.

In a sense, "atoms" are a convenient figure of speech for mereological simples, whatever they may be, but could be fundamental forces and fundamental particles existing in time and space.

What is crucial is a logical connection between the thing-in-itself in the world and the appearance in the mind, and this connection is what Kant understands as the Category of Cause. Kant's Category of Cause is what ensures that there is only one cup, even though the cup may exist in different forms, first as a set of atoms in three dimensional space in the world and then as a two-dimensional appearance in the mind.

Kant's Category of Cause is crucial to the viability of his Transcendental Idealism. — RussellA

I looked into this further, and it seems to me Kant's Category of Cause is a concept to be applied to the external world events as cause and effect.  It is not to do with perceptions or the mental principles of reasoning.

I still think the process of reasoning coming to judgements activated by intuitions, perceptions or thoughts is operated by Logic.   Could you please confirm your thoughts on this? Thanks.

Science can tell us things that intuition cannot, such as when we perceive a red object, such as a post-box, the object may have emitted a wavelength of 700nm. — RussellA

Strictly speaking, wouldn't it be the instruments (invented and calibrated for their own convenience by humans) which tells the wave length of 700nm emission, rather than science? It would still be a mental idea when read by humans. The reading would be a contingent figure which has no meaning to the people in daily life. If the aliens made the instrument, it could be calibrated to read it as 10nm or 100 million nm.

n a sense, "atoms" are a convenient figure of speech for mereological simples, whatever they may be, but could be fundamental forces and fundamental particles existing in time and space. — RussellA

See, could be, not necessarily or for definite. "could be" sounds a negativity in disguise here. :)

This morning, when making a cup of tea, it didn't pass my mind whether the cup was an appearance or a thing-in-itself. But this is a Philosophy Forum, where such considerations are of interest. — RussellA

Well, philosophy isn't necessarily devoted to questions or issues which make no difference. It's been called the love of wisdom, for example, and wisdom to me doesn't involve doubting where is no reason to doubt. It would seem wiser to accept that the cup we use every day without mishap is, indeed, a cup rather than something else.

Regardless, I think that what you call Indirect and Direct Realism reflect a pseudo-problem.

Let's take as an example what you say in response to Banno:

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist see a red cup, take it out of the cupboard, boil the kettle and make themselves a cup of tea.

However, the Indirect Realist takes into account the fact that science has told us that the cup we perceive as red is actually emitting a wavelength of 700nm. This causes them to question whether what they perceive as a red object is actually red. They then begin to question the relation between the appearance of an object and the object as a thing-in-itself. — RussellA

Judging from this, both Direct and Indirect Realists see a cup emitting a wavelength of 700nm. If that's the case, both see the same thing. They can agree that there is a cup emitting a wavelength of 700nm which isn't part of them. What is the problem? What are they supposed to see? Presumably, they're not supposed to see a cup which doesn't emit a wavelength of 700nm. Is the problem the fact that a cup emitting a wavelength of 700 mn looks red to us? Why is that a problem? It might look to be another color to a hamster. It remains a cup emitting a wavelength of 700mn, though. It looks to be another color to a hamster because it's a hamster, not a human being.

The cup is made up of atoms (another example). We see a cup made up of atoms, then. Does that make it any less a cup? Might it be a plate or pan?

Strictly speaking, wouldn't it be the instruments (invented and calibrated for their own convenience by humans) which tells the wave length of 700nm emission, rather than science? — Corvus

Difficult to escape from a metaphorical use of language. I am using "science" is a figure of speech that includes the instruments of science.

See, could be, not necessarily or for definite. "could be" sounds a negativity in disguise here — Corvus

Wholes have parts, which in turn have parts, which in turn have parts. But sooner or later one assumes there are parts which have no parts, ie, simples. In contemporary mereology, a simple is any thing that has no proper parts. Sometimes the term "atom" is used, although in recent years the term "simple" has become the standard.(Wikipedia - Simple (philosophy)). It may be that fundamental forces and fundamental particles are simples, but science may discover it to be something else altogether.

I think that what you call Indirect and Direct Realism reflect a pseudo-problem.........................We see a cup made up of atoms, then. Does that make it any less a cup? — Ciceronianus

As Bertrand Russell in The Problems of Philosophy wrote:"But the notion of being 'in' the mind is ambiguous. We speak of bearing a person in mind, not meaning that the person is in our minds, but that a thought of him is in our minds."

In the expression "we see a cup made up of atoms", the underlying problem is the inherent ambiguities within language. It is not a cup that is the object of consciousness, but rather the thought of a cup that is the object of consciousness. There is no cup in our minds, only the thought of a cup.

There is the act of apprehending a cup in a mind-independent world, but this does not mean that there is a cup in a mind-independent world that is being apprehended.

The question as to whether cups exist or not in a mind-independent world is certainly not a pseudo-problem, as it is crucial to our understanding of the nature of reality.

Difficult to escape from a metaphorical use of language. I am using "science" is a figure of speech that includes the instruments of science. — RussellA

I am still saying that, just the red patch colour visual perception would be more meaningful than the scientific instrument reading of the red patch emission of 700nm to the most ordinary people. :)

Wholes have parts, which in turn have parts, which in turn have parts. But sooner or later one assumes there are parts which have no parts, ie, simples. In contemporary mereology, a simple is any thing that has no proper parts. Sometimes the term "atom" is used, although in recent years the term "simple" has become the standard.(Wikipedia - Simple (philosophy)). It may be that fundamental forces and fundamental particles are simples, but science may discover it to be something else altogether. — RussellA

ChatGPT says that atoms can be viewed with the special technical setup in the lab with the powerful laser powered microscopes, but I don't subscribe to that.  There have been too many fabrications in science theories and allegations on what they have achieved, and what is possible by the new technologies and scientific discoveries, but soon found out to be hoax fabrications.  ChatGpt can be handy for quick reference of simple queries, but it tends to spew out meaningless and groundless stories at times too, so I don't take it seriously.

Unless I am in front of the microscope and seeing the atoms, I won't believe the allegations on the existence of atoms claimed by ChatGpt, some shady Sci-Fi forums or web sites.  Even if the supposed Atom images are seen in the microscope, how do you know they are atoms?  The concept atom was first made by the ancient Greek philosopher Democritus to denote the micro substance making up the universe.

There is no legitimate conceptual, definitional or essential connection between what is being seen in the microscope and the concept "atom" apart from pure random arbitrary fanciful imagination, yes?

It is shocking to see some people blindly believe and trust without questioning or reasoning whatever is thrown to their faces under the label of science , and then try to push that to the others. In that sense, science can be just like religions. It might be just symptoms of the popular science in general devoid of metaphysics.

It is not a cup that is the object of consciousness, but rather the thought of a cup that is the object of consciousness. There is no cup in our minds, only the thought of a cup. — RussellA

Sorry, but I don't think there is such a thing as a "thought of a cup." We may think of a cup, certainly, but no "thought of a cup" results; we create no "thought of a cup" thereby.

Do you mean to say that we shouldn't bother to pursue philosophy unless we want to? — Janus

No. I meant that if you have a choice, you'd perhaps best not do philosophy.

Have you managed to find Sense and Sensibilia? It would be worth your while to have a look at it.

No. I meant that if you have a choice, you'd perhaps best not do philosophy. — Banno

This is an interesting observation and you have suggested as much in other places.

Can you say some more about what you mean by 'if you have a choice'?

I don't think of myself as someone who 'does philosophy' and I find much of it irrelevant or dull, but I am interested in what people think and why.

When I look at a cup, in my mind is a two-dimensional appearance, but science tells me that what I am actually looking at is a set of atoms in a three-dimensional space. — RussellA

You don't see the cup as having depth? Odd.

If you want to do something and nothing stands in your way, do you have any choice about doing it? Only in principle I would say, which doesn't count for much.

Do you regret having done it or wish you could stop doing it? I don't.

Can you say some more about what you mean by 'if you have a choice'? — Tom Storm

Wittgenstein's philosophy as remediation, or Midgley's plumbing.

You do philosophy when you pick at folk's thinking, trying to get at what is going on underneath. Isn't there something you should be doing instead? Are you just procrastinating, or is reading this really more important? Do you have the feeling that there is something wrong in what is being said, together with a compulsion to put your finger on what, exactly, it is? To show the fly out, to fix the leak.

q.v.

When I look at a cup, in my mind is a two-dimensional appearance, but science tells me that what I am actually looking at is a set of atoms in a three-dimensional space. — RussellA

Are you not familiar with the depth perception due to parallax? Is there really any such things as a two-dimensional image? Even lines and the paper they are on are really three-dimensional. A truly two-dimensional surface would be non-existent. Where is this purportedly two-dimensional image of yours to be found, and where the "surface" upon which it is purportedly projected?

This is one very limited conception of what it means to be doing philosophy.

It's a very odd thing for @RussellA to say - even folk with one eye have depth perception.

It's not the whole of philosophy. It is a part of it. If you want to do Philosophy to earn fame and fortune, good luck to you...

You do philosophy when you pick at folk's thinking, trying to get at what is going on underneath. — Banno

It's a dirty job, but someone's got to do it. Not me necessarily.

I think most reflective people can't help but wonder to what extent they can justify their ideas and what's going on in presupposition land (or underneath in the realm of plumbing) when people say out loud some of the odd things they believe in.

Traditional metaphysics, in my understanding, isn’t willing to concede that basic ontological questions are verbal disputes. — J

We might be in agreement here, I'm not sure. Some folk would read the above as diminishing the import of verbal disputes. But I suspect that what we are doing in these disputes is choosing between various logics, grammars or language games; stetting up the game, as it were.

Wittgenstein sets the ground for this way of thinking about metaphysics, but it's seen in Popper, at least via Watkins; and I think Gillian Russell lends it some weight with Logical Nihilism. Midgley is more explicit on much the same point.

I don't see why we should take any interest in your acts of faith.

:ok:

Wholes have parts, which in turn have parts, which in turn have parts. But sooner or later one assumes there are parts which have no parts, ie, simples. In contemporary mereology, a simple is any thing that has no proper parts. Sometimes the term "atom" is used, although in recent years the term "simple" has become the standard — RussellA

The atom used to be the stand-in for 'simple' in that it was 'indivisible', not composed of parts. Regrettably, nature did not oblige, as it turns out atoms are far from simple. Nevertheless the model of simple, quantifiable particles has been extremely fruitful pragmatically, as mathematical physics lies at the basis of a great deal of science, and much of science is built around the scaffolding of such mathematical simples related through hypotheses and algorithms. But as you point out, that is not what we experience. That is where the phenomenological analysis comes in, which considers that object as experienced. That can be traced directly back to Kant, although Schopenhauer states it more clearly: no object without subject.

A fact exists only when a mind extrudes it from the undivided flow of ongoing physical process. Indeed, the external world is a seething cauldron of activity where every molecule is in continual random motion. What we take to be a fact is deeply embedded in this maelstrom, and must be painstakingly and precisely cut out by a living mind. This feat is accomplished by an almost uncanny process which requires huge amounts of unconscious mental computation. The mind-independent world is not naturally divided into individual parts: At the most fundamental level, we can say that external reality is a continuous flow of ongoing cosmic process. — Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order (p. 92). Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition.

Do you have the feeling that there is something wrong in what is being said, together with a compulsion to put your finger on what, exactly, it is? — Banno

I think the intuition behind philosophy is something wrong with what we understand as the reality of existence, that there's some kind of deep error in the way we understand the world, which can't be mitigated by glib phrases about flies and bottles.

It's a dirty job, but someone's got to do it. Not me necessarily. — Tom Storm

I've noted your playing at cat-and-mouse on this thread.

We may think of a cup, certainly, but no "thought of a cup" results — Ciceronianus

This means, I take it, that “thought of a cup,” understood as some sort of object or newly created ontological entity, doesn’t exist. Very well. What language would work better to talk about thinking of a cup? Might we call it an event? A process? A heebeejeebee? (that is, coin a new term?) Using “existence” in a particular way that privileges thing-hood doesn’t change the fact that we still need some designation for what happens when we think of a cup. Thinking of a cup is no less real because it doesn’t qualify as “existing-like-things-exist.” Or, if you want to put it in terms of quantifier variance, “Ex” requires an interpretation at the quantifier level, not just the domain of possible Xs.

Sure. I think it also all too easy to grab a passing answer and take it as verity. Indeed, this is far and away the most common approach - making shite up. Of course, the shite might be right, but who's to say? But I do know that there is bacon ready for the pan, and fresh coleslaw and tomato to go with it. Each to their own verity?

Again I think the major underlying point is that we orient ourselves in respect of science, but that science assumes the separation of subject and object. The 'mind-independent' 'external' world. But the reality of our existence is not something we're ever outside of or apart from. That's the existential plight of modernity in a nutshell, and it's a very difficult plight to resolve.

"The Cartesian anxiety refers to the notion that, since René Descartes posited his influential form of body-mind dualism, Western civilization has suffered from a longing for ontological certainty, or feeling that scientific methods, and especially the study of the world as a thing separate from ourselves, should be able to lead us to a firm and unchanging knowledge of ourselves and the world around us. The term is named after Descartes because of his well-known emphasis on "mind" as different from "body", "self" as different from "other" - Richard Bernstein