Yes... but I guess it still leaves us with open questions about which metaphysical models we may be willing to engage with, or accept as worth our time. — Tom Storm

:up: :up:

One must somehow choose a set of 'categorical axioms', so to speak, as non-Euclidean geometers have done in order to explore both possible and impossible versions of the world.

So if poor old @Bob Ross had answered that there were only one cup, I'd have skewer'd him on the other horn of the dilemma, that since there was only one cup there is no difference between observed cups and cups-in-themselves. — Banno

*Boom!* :smirk:

:up:

How can the Direct Realist justify that a perception of red in the mind and a wavelength of 700nm in the world are the very same thing? — RussellA

It doesn't.

But when we talk about the cup, the pot, the cupboard, we are not talking about our private perception-of-cupboard, or the pot in itself, or one's mental image of a cupboard, but about the cup, cupboard and pot.

This has been pointed out previously.

By fabrication, I just mean it in the sense of something being simulated and not real. — Bob Ross

That’s fine. Intuitions are made up, fabricated. Kant calls it something else, but works out to be close enough.

….why would you say that (….) there exists real things that impact our sensibility (and are not just made up)? — Bob Ross

Sensibility is a big place involving the entirety of the non-cognitive human intellect; best break it up into proper parts.

Because without real things that impact us there is no accounting for sensations. Sensation is just a message that there is an object present and affecting the senses, but can offer nothing as to what the object is. As for making it up….there is nothing in the physiology of perception that permits making stuff up. That is to say, under the assumption making it up implies contingency, all the human sensory devices function according to mode-specific natural laws, which do not lend themselves to being contingent. In other words, for that range of wavelengths there will be that impact on the eyes; for that chemical composition there will be either that impact on the nose or that impact on the tongue, or both, and so on.

T.I. exhausts precious little effort on the impacts on sensibility; it just is that which is given on the one hand, and that of which we are not conscious on the other. What is done with the given at the point of becoming conscious of it….that’s where the fun is.
————

…..in order for the mind to be represented for experience….. — Bob Ross

I can’t unpack this. The mind is represented conceptually, but no mere conception is an experience. To represent the mind for experience requires the intuition of it as phenomenon, which requires the mind to be a real object conditioned by space and time, which contradicts the conception. You’ve got me over the proverbial barrel here, I must say.

I understand you’ve qualified this entire thread with your interpretation of the original view of transcendental idealism, which is fine, you’re perfectly entitled. Perhaps for my benefit you could re-phrase the “in order for….” to elaborate on how it relates to that original view.

Going back to the two cups,

It is talk of the same ontological thing. I am not saying there are ontologically two worlds: I am saying epistemically there must be two, ontologically one. — Bob Ross

I think Banno is confusing the ontological with the epistemic consideration of the cup (in their hypothetical situation they posited): just because epistemically we must treat the ontological object as two (viz., the thing-in-itself and the thing) does not entail in any manner that there are actually two objects in reality which we are describing. — Bob Ross

That you have to make such sophisticated an argument, sundering ontology from epistemics, what is from what we know, does not bode well.

I suggest, humbly, one cup, about which you and I and others hereabouts may talk, may see, may hold, fill with tea, drink from, put back in the cupboard. Doing such things is evidence enough that there is a cup; we need not doubt that without good reason.

And I rather think that you might agree with me, were it not for the need to hold your own on this forum.

A chemist may talk of the ceramics that go into the making of the cup, a physicist may talk of the interaction of the particles that make up the cup. And both are talking about the cup. The cup need not cease to be a cup by being described in another way.

This ordinary language is where we all start, even Kant. Doubt is learned.


Edit: about the image. Lots of folk get as far as "question everything". It has a huge pop status, a mark of rebellion, sticking it to the man, talking truth to power, and so on. "Why?" goes a step further, asking what grounds our skepticism, when we should doubt and when we are obliged to certainty. Does the one spraying graffiti question the paint can? The wall? What must be taken as granted in order to engage in doubt?

But it seems to me that in the unpacking of our experience, phenomenology may well show us that much of what take to be reality in the first place is a construction of culture, emotion and perception, with brains busily at work, sense making. Or something like that. — Tom Storm

I wonder whether the purely descriptive activity of phenomenology can tell us where our experience originates or what explains it: that seems to be more in the domain of epistemological and metaphysical conjecturing.

This is not to say that phenomenologists have not ventured beyond the bounds of description into the realms of speculation and hypothesizing.

Sure. I think most people would agree. But many might say this approach is a mistake. — Tom Storm

It's fine to say that the scientific methodology which leaves the subject out of the picture and just focuses on the phenomena as they present themselves is a mistake if you can explain how incorporating the subject into scientific investigations would make a difference to the results and also how it could even be done. For example, how would you incorporate the subject into chemistry, biology or geology? are there any sciences that would accommodate the incorporation of the subject? I just can't see any conceivable way of doing it. Am I missing something?

I guess this is fair but we can dissolve most metaphysical problems by simply pronouncing that we'll bracket them off. Is that fair? — Tom Storm

I don't say we shouldn't indulge in metaphysical speculation; I think it's a great creative exercise of the imagination; but I don't think metaphysical question are decidable and I can't see how they could be incorporated into scientific investigations. Findings in QM and biology, for example, may give rise to metaphysical questions for some folk, and be subject to metaphysical interpretations, but that wouldn't seem to change the findings themselves.

That you have to make such sophisticated an argument, sundering ontology from epistemics, what is from what we know, does not bode well. — Banno

Is there not a coherent conceptual distinction between what is and what we know, or in other words between what we believe to be so and what is true or actual? Not to say that the two might not coincide, but there seems to be no guarantee that they must.

Yes, there is a chair in the world that we interact with, but does this world of chairs exist in our minds or outside our minds? — RussellA

I think this is a question only if we assume that we or our "minds" are separate from (outside) of the world. That's not an assumption I think we should make.

We are a part of the world, not outside it. The chair is a part of the world as well. The chair isn't part of us. We aren't a part of the chair. We are a part of the world. The world isn't inside us, as we're a part of it.

We have certain characteristics as human beings. We interact with the world as human beings do. We see as human beings do, hear as they do, etc. There's nothing surprising about this, and it doesn't establish in itself that we can't know what it is we encounter or interact with. And, if we can't know what "things in themselves" really are, what possible difference would it make?

It's fine to say that the scientific methodology which leaves the subject out of the picture and just focuses on the phenomena as they present themselves is a mistake if you can explain how incorporating the subject into scientific investigations would make a difference to the results and also how it could even be done. — Janus

I can't see a ready answer to this either, but I'm not philosophically inclined to such views. Possibly @Wayfarer would provide us with an account of how this might be of use. It's probably not so much that adding the personal experience is possible, but recognizing that our scientific views are a form, perhaps, of intersubjective agreement, which ultimately fall short of that elusive thing: reality.

Sure. Bob wants to use Kant's ideas to build two ontologies - the thing perceived and the thing unperceived.

It's not as if one's ontology can be utterly seperate from one's epistemics. Each informs the other. Indeed, if what we know does not "coincide" with what we know there is, there is a big problem.

This is how philosophy often proceeds; There's an initial conjecture, in this case that there is a something about which we can know nothing. Objections are raised, replies are found, and a protective accretion forms around the initial conjecture. With someone of Kant's vintage, there's a veritable atoll surrounding the initial speculation.

There is a need to go back to the question: how many cups are there?

I can't see a ready answer to this either, but I'm not philosophically inclined to such views. Possibly Wayfarer would provide us with an account of how this might be of use. It's probably not so much that adding the personal experience is possible, but recognizing that our scientific views are a form, perhaps, of intersubjective agreement, which ultimately fall short of that elusive thing: reality. — Tom Storm

I'm with you on this, I think, though I don't think the problem of recognizing that science only deals with things as they appear to us should find too much opposition, at least among those who have thought at all about it at all; I mean I think it is pretty much tautologously true.

It's not as if one's ontology can be utterly seperate from one's epistemics. Each informs the other. Indeed, if what we know does not "coincide" with what we know there is, there is a big problem. — Banno

I agree, but what we know there is for our experience does not necessarily coincide with whatever there is absent us, and that is not at all a problem really, well at least not a practical problem, even if it might be a metaphysical problem for some folk; and if that is so, then that is really a psychological problem for them.

There is a need to go back to the question: how many cups are there? — Banno

There is only one cup for us; the one we all perceive. Do our perceptions of it exhaust what it is? Will there always remain something unknowable about the cup?

There is only one cup for us; the one we all perceive. — Janus

But for Bob, there are two cups:

Irregardless, I would say that, in terms of your cup example, there are two. — Bob Ross

Is the difference merely a difference of parlance, or is there a deeper issue? I don't think it makes sense to say there are two cups, but I am okay with saying that the cup can be considered as something perceived and as something that also exists unperceived, even if we don't know what kind of existence the latter is beyond saying that it exists as something to be perceived and that in its interactions with us it manifests its humanly perceptible qualities.

Historically, artists, philosophers & scientists were the ones who were willing to put-in the effort to look beneath the surface, and "see" the universal essence of chairness : — Gnomon
Nicely put. But as someone who is neither an artist, philosopher or scientist, I feel I don't need to concern myself with idealism and such speculative frames. They add nothing to my experience. — Tom Storm

That's OK. I am also none of those professions. But, my retirement from the money-grubbing world, allows me to dabble in metaphysical speculation, with no expectation for learning practical knowledge. I don't "need" to concern myself with essences to put food on the table. I just enjoy sampling possibilities, like fine wine, searching for that sine qua non.

If you have "no need", or desire for metaphysics, why are you posting on a philosophy forum? What does it "add to your experience"? Are you simply looking for arguments against Idealism & Metaphysics? You'll find plenty of that negativity here, but you might have to wade through some mushy unfounded "speculations", including materialistic metaphysics, to get to the hard stuff. :smile:

Metaphysics :
In modern philosophical terminology, metaphysics refers to the studies of what cannot be reached through objective studies of material reality.
https://www.pbs.org/metaph-body.html

Sine qua non : an essential condition; a thing that is absolutely necessary.
Literally "don't know what", but "it means more or less "Without (something), (something else) won't be possible."

Is the difference merely a difference of parlance, or is there a deeper issue? — Janus

The difference in parlance is a deeper issue.

Sure, there are things about the cup that are unperceived, and things about the cup that we don't know. But perhaps you want to say something more than that?

The difference in parlance is a deeper issue.

Sure, there are things about the cup that are unperceived, and things about the cup that we don't know. But perhaps you want to say something more than that? — Banno

No, I would not want to say more than that except I might say "can't know" instead of "don't know", because I want to acknowledge that there could be things about the cup which are just not perceptible at all.

I mean as implausible as we might think it is, there is the metaphysical or logical possibility that the cup is, as Berkeley would have it, an idea in the mind of God or some collective entangled consciousness rather than just being a physical existent, but we can never know which is true or what the differences between such existences could be, because it is beyond the range of perceptibility.

It's fine to say that the scientific methodology which leaves the subject out of the picture and just focuses on the phenomena as they present themselves is a mistake if you can explain how incorporating the subject into scientific investigations would make a difference to the results and also how it could even be done. For example, how would you incorporate the subject into chemistry, biology or geology? are there any sciences that would accommodate the incorporation of the subject? I just can't see any conceivable way of doing it. Am I missing something? — Janus

I’ve noticed that physics, as an example, and up to a point, deliberately excludes the context of an observation or experiment, by concentrating exclusively on the aspects of phenomena which can be accounted for in completely quantitative and observer-independent terms. Whereas biology has had to begin to pay more and more attention to context, which appears in the form of ‘the environment’, as it has become clear that organisms can’t be completely understood except for in that context. Also because epigenetics and many features of genetic adaptation are activated by environmental factors. And quantum physics too has had to grapple with the questions of context and environment, specifically in respect of the observer or measurement issue. The realisation of the limits of objectivity is like the boundary between the ‘modern’ (period between Newton-Einstein) and the ‘post-modern’ (after quantum physics).

That touches on what I was driving at in the mind-created world argument. Objectivity assumes a very specific context, namely, one in which there is clear separation of observer and object. With the advent of physics as paradigmatic for science generally, this separation becomes kind of an unwritten assumption within philosophy also - the ego/subject in a domain of objects driven by supposedly impersonal or objective laws (the paradigm of modernity). But that is just what is called into question by transcendental idealism which points out that the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’ is never itself amongst the objects of scientific scrutiny but which is the ground of rational analysis. That dovetails with ‘the unknown knower’ analysis which is found both in non-dualist philosophy and later phenomenology (an eloquent commentary on which is provided by Michel Bitbol.)

Plenty of scientific work can proceed without paying any attention to that. Where it shows up is in questions about what it means.

...rather than just being a physical existent — Janus

Call me credulous, but when I have the tea in my hand, that's what I mean by talk of 'physically existent".

This ordinary language is where we all start, even Kant. Doubt is learned.

Edit: about the image. Lots of folk get as far as "question everything". It has a huge pop status, a mark of rebellion, sticking it to the man, talking truth to power, and so on. "Why?" goes a step further, asking what grounds our skepticism, when we should doubt and when we are obliged to certainty. Does the one spraying graffiti question the paint can? The wall? What must be taken as granted in order to engage in doubt? — Banno

I want to acknowledge that there could be things about the cup which are just not perceptible at all. — Janus

Well, it's atomic structure is not something I'd call perceptible. Yet I am sure there are folk who know about such things. You want something more than that, I suppose, an acknowledgement not that we don't know everything, but that there are things we cannot know even in principle? Here you are bumping up against paradox: if there are things beyond knowledge, then what can you claim to know about them?

I'll admit the possibility and then choose silence. Many a philosopher will wax prosaically at length on this topic. That seems muddled.

I guess I also find myself wondering, if accurate. so what? Does it make any difference to how one lives? How is this way of thinking of use? — Tom Storm

I'm of no use here, Bob, apologies. There wasn't an argument. It was simply the fact that for practical purposes idealism makes no difference to my day-to-day experience. So it just faded as I got on with life. Additionally, I'm not all that concerned if the nature of reality remains forever elusive to humans. Since we conduct ourselves in a realm which appears to be material (whatever it may be in itself), that's all I need to make effective use of the life I have. — Tom Storm

Looking through comments, you caught my eye. Just a comment or so. I would guess (guess, not know) that you haven't come to see the course of thought that lies through and beyond Kant. Something Kant did not see, for he was a rationalist, rigidly so, and therefore was unable to draw certain conclusions about where inquiry ultimately goes in philosophy. But when he affirmed that one had to go through epistemology to get to ontology, that is, that claims about what is real are entirely contingent on what one can know, he made it clear that it was impossible to disentangle the former from the latter. But he was such a dyed in the wool rationalist, he couldn't make the Kierkegaardian "qualitative move", something that rings throughout subsequent phenomenology: This cup on the table is bound to my mental grasp of it being a cup, and this latter defines the extent the understanding can know the cup. But what about the irrational feels and fleshy tonalities (Michel Henry talks like this) and the bare presence of this thing?

There is, of course, a lot written about this, but the point would go like this: when we turn our attention to this conscious grasp of its object, and we turn explicitly away from its contextual and logical placings, which is to say we shut up about it and thereby allow (Heidegger borrows the term 'gelassenheit' to talk about this yield to the world as opposed to applying familiar categories) the world to speak, so to speak, the presence of the object steps forth. This is an existential move, not a logical inference, away from all that makes the cup the usual familiar cup.

Why bother to do this? Because the reality of the world rests with familiarity, not with some sublime connectivity between science and reality. When Kastrup talks about the brain, he simply assumes what Kantians, or neoKantians, take up in analysis. But Kant gets lost in his own tendency reduce things to form and structure, and it never occurred to him that he was making assumptions in his "objective" thesis that were themselves grounded on a profound and pervasive indeterminacy. Or, he did know this, but could make the move to affirm it, because he didn't see what Kierkegaard saw: that a concept, on the one hand, and this bare givenness of things on the other, had absolutely no continuity between the two. They are qualitatively radically "other" than one another, and this is made profoundly clear in extreme phenomenal affairs, like having your tooth pulled without anesthetic: clearly on is not witnessing reason at work; nor is a simple phenomenological grasp of the color yellow reason at work IN the yellow color.

Didn't realize I had written so much. At any rate, the value of this line of thinking lies not in some propositional statement. It is existential, like an awakening, because one realizes for the first time in this discovery that one actually exists. This is the existential foundation of religion. Of course, this take practice and study, but this is the brass ring of philosophy.

Whereas biology has had to begin to pay more and more attention to context, which appears in the form of ‘the environment’, as it’s become clear that organisms can’t be completely understood except for in that context. — Wayfarer

I agree with this, but this a case of realizing that no organism is isolated or can be properly understood without taking into account its interactions with other organism and also the inorganic environment.

The so-called observer problem in QM is the closest context I can think of to bringing the perceiving subject into the picture. But even there what constitutes an observer is controversial. For the doing of science considerations of the perceiving subject seem to generally be bracketed, but of course I agree it should be philosophically acknowledged that science deals with what appears to us, and not anything beyond that ambit.

Well, it's atomic structure is not something I'd call perceptible. Yet I am sure there are folk who know about such things. You want something more than that, I suppose, an acknowledgement not that we don't know everything, but that there are things we cannot know even in principle? Here you are bumping up against paradox: if there are things beyond knowledge, then what can you claim to know about them?

I'll admit the possibility and then choose silence. Many a philosopher will wax prosaically at length on this topic. That seems muddled. — Banno

Atomic structure is still no more than an appearance, and a mathematically based theory, albeit made possible by perception augmenting technologies. We cannot have more than that, so that leaves open the possibility that there may be real things, as opposed to imagined possibilities, which we cannot know even in principle; we don't even know if there are such things or not, so we really cannot claim anything at all about them. But we can exercise our imaginations, and I see that as a valuable creative exercise in itself, and that's why I say the distinction between 'for us' and 'in itself' is important for human life.

I agree with you that from the perspective of propositional knowledge such "waxing" is "muddled", but I don't think that matters, I don't think that negates its value.

I'll admit the possibility and then choose silence. Many a philosopher will wax prosaically at length on this topic. That seems muddled. — Banno

Consider what it is that is silenced: it is the ordinary sense of the world that usually and immediately makes the claim on the moment. This is suspended. Where those who takes this kind of thing seriously differ is what this "nothing" reveals, but to even grasp at all what is at issue, one has have the prior exposure to the philosophy that opens inquiry into this.
What philosopher that seems muddled are you talking about? What is the source of the muddle? This is the question is begged here.

It was Arthur Eddington who talked about the ‘two tables’ - the one you sit at, and the one atomic science describes, comprising mostly space strung together with forces. I don’t see that as at issue in many of these debates. The point of ‘mugs’ and ‘tables’ and ‘chairs’ is they are used as stand-ins for objects generally, in analysis of the philosophy of cognition and knowing. The naive realist hardly sees the point in any such questions, but it begs the question, why pursue philosophy at all?

What philosopher that seems muddled are you talking about? — Astrophel

Here? Following on from the OP.

It was Arthur Eddington who talked about the ‘two tables’ - the one you sit at, and the one atomic science describes, comprising mostly space strung together with forces. — Wayfarer

Yep. It's a question of preference, of what "parlance" one chooses, but I'll go with there being one table, described in two ways, participating in two language games, and hence that the table one sits at is the space mostly strung together with forces.

Why pursue philosophy? If you have a choice, perhaps best not.

Why pursue philosophy? If you have a choice, perhaps best not. — Banno

Do you mean to say that we shouldn't bother to pursue philosophy unless we want to? I would take that as read, because the alternative would be that we ought to pursue philosophy even if we don't want to which seems absurd.

What a thoughtful and interesting response. Thanks. But I fear it is lost on me.

It is existential, like an awakening, because one realizes for the first time in this discovery that one actually exists. This is the existential foundation of religion — Astrophel

Not sure I can use this and I have, of course, heard such things expressed for much of my life. I spent my early life with Theosophists, followers of various forms of Buddhism, Hinduism, Gnosticism and mysticism. What is the discovery that one actually exists mean?

the reality of the world rests with familiarity, not with some sublime connectivity between science and reality. — Astrophel

I don't disagree, but how far to take it? I think of science as a tool for acquiring tentative models that are useful in certain contexts. Is the gap between science and reality or the gap between anything and reality worth filling with speculations? For me it isn't. An issue for me is that reality itself is a gap. It's an abstract idea, we fill with our values and anticipations.

I think this is a question only if we assume that we or our "minds" are separate from (outside) of the world. That's not an assumption I think we should make. We are a part of the world, not outside it. The chair is a part of the world as well. The chair isn't part of us. We aren't a part of the chair. We are a part of the world. The world isn't inside us, as we're a part of it. We have certain characteristics as human beings. We interact with the world as human beings do. We see as human beings do, hear as they do, etc. There's nothing surprising about this, and it doesn't establish in itself that we can't know what it is we encounter or interact with. — Ciceronianus

As an Indirect Realist, I agree with your paragraph, as would a Direct Realist, but this does not address the topic of the thread "A Case for Transcendental Idealism". In other words, "A case for Indirect Realism".

Both an Indirect and Direct Realist would agree that both us and the chair are part of the same world, but they would disagree as to the nature of this world

You inferred before your support for Direct Realism as opposed to Indirect Realism
To Kant, though, is reserved the claim that there is, e.g., some thing which I call a chair and sit on all the time, which although it is in all respects a chair as I understand a chair to be and I use it as such, cannot be known.

I am persuaded by Bertrand Russell's support for Indirect Realism as he sets it out in the beginning of his book "The Problems of Philosophy"

My question is, how does the Direct Realist answer Indirect Realism's objections to Direct Realism?

. And, if we can't know what "things in themselves" really are, what possible difference would it make? — Ciceronianus

This morning, when making a cup of tea, it didn't pass my mind whether the cup was an appearance or a thing-in-itself. But this is a Philosophy Forum, where such considerations are of interest.

I don't think Kant must have thought there were two cups when he was making a coffee for himself, and took out a cup from the cupboard.

There is a cup on his worktop, and that is it.  But there is a cup-in-itself according to his TI. So you might say Kant says that there are two cups?  That is absurd.

But this is where Kant's Transcendental Logic kicks in.  TL will say, no this is the only cup in the worktop, and that is it.  TL is supposed to correct when your reason goes astray, and have illusions or broken thinking on the perceptions.

With TL operational, you know that you have only one cup on the worktop, and there is no confusion in that. In Kant, Logic is not just A -> B, B -> C, therefore A -> C, like some other folks seem to believe.

Logic is the engine of how rationality, intuition, perception, understanding and judgement works.

For the idealist, the contents of what they visualise, believe, remember, imagine and think in their minds are also significant, as the object they see in real world. I think we must allow that, because it is the foundation and source of all arts and creativity in human nature.

Of course the realists only allow what they see in the real world as the only existence, disregarding the mental contents. But that is what the realists are.

But when we talk about the cup, the pot, the cupboard, we are not talking about our private perception-of-cupboard, or the pot in itself, or one's mental image of a cupboard, but about the cup, cupboard and pot. — Banno

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist see a red cup, take it out of the cupboard, boil the kettle and make themselves a cup of tea.

However, the Indirect Realist takes into account the fact that science has told us that the cup we perceive as red is actually emitting a wavelength of 700nm. This causes them to question whether what they perceive as a red object is actually red. They then begin to question the relation between the appearance of an object and the object as a thing-in-itself.

However, Direct Realism turns a blind eye to scientific discoveries and continues to insist that when we perceive an object to be red it is actually red.

The Direct Realist refuses to address Kant's concerns about the ontological nature of objects in the world, and limit themselves to Wittgensteinian Linguistic Idealism, whereby language games are founded on hinge propositions, such as "I see a red cup". Such hinge propositions remain true regardless of the ontological reality of the world .

Part of the problem is that whilst the Direct Realist wilfully ignores Kantian concerns with the ontological nature of reality in favour of Linguistic Idealism, the Indirect Realist is willing to take into account not only Kant's ontological concerns but also Wittgenstein's Linguistic Idealism, acknowledging that language is needed to talk about the non-linguistic.

So you might say Kant says that there are two cups?  That is absurd...............Logic is the engine of how rationality, intuition, perception, understanding and judgement works. — Corvus

When I look at a cup, in my mind is a two-dimensional appearance, but science tells me that what I am actually looking at is a set of atoms in a three-dimensional space.

In one sense there are two cups, the cup as it exists as a two-dimensional appearance in my mind and the cup as it exists as a three-dimensional set of atoms, both of which are very different. But in another sense, there is only one cup, the cup as a thing-in-itself in the world as the cause of the cup as an appearance in my mind.

What is crucial is a logical connection between the thing-in-itself in the world and the appearance in the mind, and this connection is what Kant understands as the Category of Cause. Kant's Category of Cause is what ensures that there is only one cup, even though the cup may exist in different forms, first as a set of atoms in three dimensional space in the world and then as a two-dimensional appearance in the mind.

Kant's Category of Cause is crucial to the viability of his Transcendental Idealism.

Yeah sounds reasonable. :cool: :up:

but science tells me that what I am actually looking at is a set of atoms in a three-dimensional space. — RussellA

Not sure, if science has to be consulted for that assurance. Wouldn't common sense or intuition do?

And we don't really care about a set of atoms unless for some peculiar reason. To me atoms are just an abstract concept, that doesn't exist in the real world. Or if it did, it has nothing to do with me, or daily life.