To Kant, though, is reserved the claim that there is, e.g., some thing which I call a chair and sit on all the time, which although it is in all respects a chair as I understand a chair to be and I use it as such, cannot be known. — Ciceronianus

We all have the concept of a chair in our minds, and we only know what a chair is because in our minds is the concept of a chair.

It is true that you can point to something in the world that corresponds with your concept of a chair, but you cannot point to something in the world that is your concept of a chair. IE, concepts exist in the mind, not in a world outside the mind.

Kant is not saying that we have no concept of chair in our minds, but he is saying, as would an Indirect Realist, that concepts only exist in the mind and not in a world outside the mind.

To my understanding Kant became a dualist because of the arguments by Hume that physical "laws" cant be known and that the world is a-mechnical. Kant thought this was a strong position if the world is just as we experience. But if there is phenomena between the thing-in-itself and us, then laws do apply to everything we do. Now someone can argue against him and ask "why shouldn't phenomena be capable of any change? Why can't a monkey suddenly appear next to you if its all mental." The concept of laws, physical laws, mean that instantaneous change in that sense is not possible. It seems to me Kant was protecting his sanity by he insistance on a noumena.

Also i'd like to say that if a positivist says he is not an idealist, why won't he just call himself a materialist then?

this adventure in the preposterous — Ciceronianus

the remarkably silly task — Ciceronianus

which although it is in all respects a chair as I understand a chair to be and I use it as such, cannot be known — Ciceronianus

This is a little off topic, but I’m always curious about positions like this. Let’s say, for the sake of argument, that your position is true, i.e., Kant and Descartes were engaged in a preposterous, silly task involving, among other things, denying that a chair could really be known as such. In your opinion, then, what accounts for the fact that thousands of first-rate philosophers have taken D & K seriously, devoted enormous scholarship and brainpower to investigating the pluses and minuses of the Cartesian/Kantian tradition, built upon this tradition to explore many modern philosophical questions, etc.?

You see what I’m getting at. If D & K are not merely wrong – as they may be – but preposterous and silly, how can you explain so many other philosophers’ inability to grasp this, which ought to be very obvious, as most preposterous things are?

I’m not being snarky. I’d really like to know what the truth of this position would entail about the history of philosophy, and the intelligence of philosophers. You’re not the first philosopher I’ve put this question to, and have garnered some remarkable answers over the years! (My favorite is, "The only good philosophers are the ones that agree with me!") What’s yours?

e all have the concept of a chair in our minds, and we only know what a chair is because in our minds is the concept of a chair. — RussellA

I would say there is no "thing" called a concept floating about in a thing called a "mind." Concepts and minds all exist in the same world as chairs. What we call "concepts" are a consequence of our interaction with the world of which we're a part. We'd have no concept of a chair but for the fact that, as living organisms of a particular kind in an environment, we found it useful and desirable to sit on something different from the ground or a natural object, and we call what results from that a "chair."

We'd have no concept of a chair but for the fact that, as living organisms of a particular kind in an environment, we found it useful and desirable to sit on something different from the ground or a natural object, and we call what results from that a "chair." — Ciceronianus

I tend to think this is the right frame. Hence we can well ask the question -

Is it "metaphysics" or just the lazy habit of reifying abstractions? — 180 Proof

:up:

In your opinion, then, what accounts for the fact that thousands of first-rate philosophers have taken D & K seriously, devoted enormous scholarship and brainpower to investigating the pluses and minuses of the Cartesian/Kantian tradition, built upon this tradition to explore many modern philosophical questions, etc.? — J

It's astonishing, I know. I don't know if it can be attributed to only one or even a few causes. I think we find some of the answers in the Analytic and Ordinary Language philosophy that developed in the 20th century--that is to say, the fact that the intelligence of philosophers was bewitched by means of language, as Wittgenstein said. That bewitchment may result from reification of concepts, for example. Another factor may be an adherence to a correspondence or spectator view of reality, criticized by Dewey and others, or the dualism resulting from the claimed mind-body distinction. There may have been a tendency to distinguish "ordinary" or "common sense" knowledge from "pure" or "absolute" knowledge, a kind of aristocratic view, drawing a distinction between practical knowledge (requiring consideration of probabilities and exercise of judgment) and knowledge of unchanging truth, available only to the wise.

Is your goal here to see how well you understand transcendental idealism as generally presented or how well transcendental idealism holds up to scrutiny?

If the latter, I would have a few contentions.

1. There is experience, therefore something exists.
2. That something, or a part of it, must be producing experience.
3. The unified parts of that something which are producing it is the ‘I’.
4. The ‘I’ can only produce experience through (data) input (i.e., sensibility).
5. The production of experience via sensibility (and whatever may afterwards interpret such sensibility) entails that one’s experience is a representation.

1. Ok.
2. Why must something "produce" experience? Why can't experience just exist? It seems you are assuming causality here. But from whence cause and why invoke it here if you're "starting from nothing" ala the cogito?

What causes the thing that "produces experience" to exist and why should we find it more likely that "something that produces experience must exist" than simply that "experience exists?"

3. Seems to hinge on justifying #2.

4. This just seems to beg the question. I can see 1, but then we jump to "something must produce experience," and now to "it must produce that experience due to causes external to itself (inputs)."

5. Sure, if you assume something like: "data input ----> processing ----> output." But why not assume something more basic, like light passing through a window. Something like: "Experience exists. Experience flows, changes." - seems to require fewer presuppositions.

Personally, I think the attempt to build up a foundation for knowledge from something like 1 is just the wrong way to go about things. Epistemology seems to inevitably be circular and fallibilist to me. But, if you're going to do it that way, then it seems like presuppositions need to be limited (else it is just assuming what you set out to prove).

Thusly, science (and the like) are pragmatic for paradigmatic and not ontological purposes.

Why must we have "absolute certainty" when it comes to "ontological purposes?" History seems to show that we're bound to be wrong either way. Building up one's system from a "firm foundation," doesn't seem to make it any less likely to crumble. That being the case, it seems like the methods of science are good enough to inform ontological questions (where relevant obviously).

Could it be said that all systems of philosophy try to be as exact as mathematics, but fail?

the intelligence of philosophers was bewitched by means of language, as Wittgenstein said — Ciceronianus

Interesting answer, thanks. Though I can't help thinking that something so clearly absurd (in this telling of the story) would have been noticed long before Wittgenstein . . . Pretty strong enchantment! Also, now that LW has unbewitched us, wouldn't that kind of put an end to serious metaphysics? Yet all the phil. journals I read still haven't got the memo, apparently. Or does the anti-spell only work for some philosophers? What do you suppose makes the difference?

...nuances... — J

One man's nuance is another's sophistry, perhaps.

You can substitute "noumena" for my Capitalized Phrase if that helps. — J

I can't make much sense of "noumena", either, for reasons already given.

My purpose is of course to try to restore metaphysics' reputation to a certain extent. — Leontiskos

I don't think it was under threat, at least not from me. Metaphysics is inevitable. But I lack your forbearance.

Realism doesn’t entail there is one cup in the sense that you outlined. If we sense objects, then it is meaningful and correct to say that there is a cup-in-itself and a cup-that-we-perceive because there is a gap between them. — Bob Ross

Here's a small chance, a chink in the wall of Kant*. What if talk of the cup perceived and of the cup's ding an sich are talk of the very same thing? Perhaps there is just one cup?

* Yes, that's a Kant/cant joke.

I think it is unfair to Kant to claim that we would think there are two cups. He was an empirical realist, and I believe he would have said there is only one cup, and that we can think about it in different ways: namely as it appears to us, and as it is in itself. I see this as being perfectly compatible with realism, since the cup as it appears is just as real as the cup is as it is in itself. The curly bit comes with the realization that the cup as it is in itself cannot be real for us but is ideal (meaning it is merely an idea). The cup that appears and the cup that exists in itself unperceived are not two different things.

* Yes, that's a Kant/cant joke. — Banno

I heard that someone once said to Kant after he had introduced himself "Oh, I'm an automatic cunt".

I would say there is no "thing" called a concept floating about in a thing called a "mind." Concepts and minds all exist in the same world as chairs. What we call "concepts" are a consequence of our interaction with the world of which we're a part. We'd have no concept of a chair but for the fact that, as living organisms of a particular kind in an environment, we found it useful and desirable to sit on something different from the ground or a natural object, and we call what results from that a "chair." — Ciceronianus

:100: :fire:

I don't think it was under threat, at least not from me. Metaphysics is inevitable. But I lack your forbearance. — Banno

Science is impossible without Metaphysics. Causality, gravity, relativity, atoms, ... they are all metaphysical concepts. In the external world, there are only the objects, motions and energies. Without the metaphysical concepts, Science have no way to establish theories and scientific laws. I have been telling that to Bob until the face got blue in his last thread "Metaphysics as illegitimate source of knowledge for science". :roll:

You are quite correct "Metaphysics is inevitable."

Metaphysics is inevitable. But I lack your forbearance. — Banno

You are quite correct "Metaphysics is inevitable." — Corvus

Yes... but I guess it still leaves us with open questions about which metaphysical models we may be willing to engage with, or accept as worth our time.

I heard that someone once said to Kant after he had introduced himself "Oh, I'm an automatic cunt". — Janus

Nice. :wink:

Science is impossible without Metaphysics. Causality, gravity, relativity, atoms, ... they are all metaphysical concepts. — Corvus

I'd say those are physical, not metaphysical, concepts. They are concepts which describe/ explain what is observed. Causality, gravity and relativity are not directly observable, but atoms are observable via electron beams just as microbes are observable via microscopes.

Yes... but I guess it still leaves us with open questions about which metaphysical models we may be willing to engage with, or accept as worth our time. — Tom Storm

I don't suppose anyone would take the whole Kant's system as some valid or useful system today.  The world has moved on, and 200+ years is a long time even in Philosophy. But there are definitely interesting bits in the system, and some philosophers extract the useful bits  from Kant, and synthesis with their own system e.g. Wilfrid Sellars.  For Sellars, Thing-in-Itself is a legitimate scientific existence, where the objects and phenomenon are unclear and daunting at first.  With ongoing investigations and observations, Thing-in-Itself can be manifested as the real scientific objects and phenomenon. But P.F. Strawson didn't accept that at all.

And Kant's system gave the foundation for Husserl's Phenomenology, which is a very prevalent and influential system today. So, old metaphysics is not totally useless or bad.  For me, it is great study and reading material. :)

I'd say those are physical, not metaphysical, concepts. They are concepts which describe/ explain what is observed. Causality, gravity and relativity are not directly observable, but atoms are observable via electron beams just as microbes are observable via microscopes. — Janus

I don't agree with that at all.

Well, that's a shame!

It is a shame that you have to resort to the information coming from the popular media, rather than information that you reason, intuit and experienced.

:roll: :rofl:

I would have thought that, where a metaphysics leads you to count two cups where there is otherwise but one, that alone would be grounds for doubt.

There are actually n cups my friend, where n = the number of people experiencing, and thus representing the cup.

From this, we can must conclude that there are at least some 8 billion Moons, many more once you include the moths and other animals. This might be what is causing sea levels to rise. You get that many Moons in one place, and the pull of their combined gravity is sure to increase.

I think it is unfair to Kant to claim that we would think there are two cups — Janus

I really do not much care which account of Kant is the correct one - one world or two. Rather, my point is that, that this is such a bone of contention counts against the utility of the whole Kantian enterprise.

So if poor old @Bob Ross had answered that there were only one cup, I'd have skewer'd him on the other horn of the dilemma, that since there was only one cup there is no difference between observed cups and cups-in-themselves.

There are actually n cups my friend, where n = the number of people experiencing, and thus representing the cup. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Very droll. I approve.

I really do not much care which account of Kant is the correct one - one world or two. Rather, my point is that, that this is such a bone of contention counts against the utility of the whole Kantian enterprise. — Banno

I think the 'dual aspect' as opposed to the 'dual world' interpretation of Kant is the only coherent one, but I do get where you are coming from.

There are actually n cups my friend, where n = the number of people experiencing, and thus representing the cup. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Even if that is rejected on the basis that those are all experience of the cup, and not the cup itself; leaving experience aside altogether it remains trivially true that there are indeed many cups in the world. :smirk:

Cheers. For my money the dual aspect account amounts to admitting the thing-in-itself is irrelevant, extraneous. So we might well just drop it.

I think we basically agree on that, except as I keep saying I think the fact that we can and do make such a distinction has had profound consequences for human life, but yeah beyond those historical, cultural consequences for religious, metaphysical, aesthetic and even ethical thinking, I think it is nowadays pretty useless, and becoming increasingly so in a world so polemically divided which faces so many much more pressing issues.

...that we can and do make such a distinction has had profound consequences for human life — Janus

Not seeing it.