Fair enough. As the saying goes " you can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make it drink", but I also acknowledge that it might not be water at all, but a mirage.

I think it is nowadays pretty useless, and becoming increasingly so in a world so polemically divided which faces so many much more pressing issues. — Janus

I think I'm in agreement with you. I can only speak for myself, but this type of metaphysical construction is of almost no use to me personally and has absolutely no utility in my life. This of course doesn't speak to the truth of it, just how much I care.

Although, as a matter of curiosity I do care; I have long wondered what it actually means to be a Kantian. I marvel at his ongoing influence or the ghosts of Kant.

And Kant's system gave the foundation for Husserl's Phenomenology, which is a very prevalent and influential system today. So, old metaphysics is not totally useless or bad.  For me, it is great study and reading material — Corvus

Sure. I understand this. What use do you make of it in life? Is it just of academic interest, or something more?

I find phenomenology - the littIe I understand of it - intriguing. I simply don't have time or the disposition to make a proper study of it.

I find phenomenology - the littIe I understand of it - intriguing. I simply don't have time or the disposition to make a proper study of it. — Tom Storm

I don't understand phenomenology to be metaphysics except in the sense that metaphysical speculation shows us what we are capable of imagining. Husserl methodologically bracketed the metaphysical question as to the mind-independent existence of an external world.

Similarly, I think science has no need of metaphysical realism or materialism, and also can safely bracket the question of the role of the subject in constructing phenomena; it can simply take things as they appear and imagine explanatory hypotheses, unpack what such hypotheses should lead us to expect to observe and then proceed from there to further experiment and observation.

So, I remain unconvinced and unconcerned about purported "blind spots" in science; I just find that critique to be inappropriate.

I don't understand phenomenology to be metaphysics except in the sense that metaphysical speculation shows us what we are capable of imagining. — Janus

That's probably right. Phenomenology seems to examine how we experience reality as opposed to identifying what reality is. But it seems to me that in the unpacking of our experience, phenomenology may well show us that much of what take to be reality in the first place is a construction of culture, emotion and perception, with brains busily at work, sense making. Or something like that.

Similarly, I think science has no need of metaphysical realism or materialism, and also can safely bracket the question of the role of the subject in constructing phenomena; — Janus

Sure. I think most people would agree. But many might say this approach is a mistake.

So, I remain unconvinced and unconcerned about purported "blind spots" in science; I just find that critique to be inappropriate. — Janus

I guess this is fair but we can dissolve most metaphysical problems by simply pronouncing that we'll bracket them off. Is that fair?

Cool. You are the first one who laughed at my joke :D

Sure. I understand this. What use do you make of it in life? Is it just of academic interest, or something more? — Tom Storm

I am sure there are some aspects that is useful for strengthening the Scientific principles for the Scientists from theoretic stance. For me personally it is purely for love of the knowledge and learning.

I would say there is no "thing" called a concept floating about in a thing called a "mind." — Ciceronianus

We both have the concept of a "thing" in our minds. If our concept of "thing" doesn't exist in our minds, then where does it exist?

Concepts and minds all exist in the same world as chairs — Ciceronianus

It seems that your position is that of Idealism.

First, you have inferred that the chair can be known:
To Kant, though, is reserved the claim that there is, e.g., some thing which I call a chair and sit on all the time, which although it is in all respects a chair as I understand a chair to be and I use it as such, cannot be known

Also, you have said that minds exist in the same world as chairs:
Concepts and minds all exist in the same world as chairs.

Kant was a philosophical Realist. From the Wikipedia article Philosophical Realism
Philosophical realism – usually not treated as a position of its own but as a stance towards other subject matters – is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder

From the Wikipedia article on Idealism
Idealism in philosophy, also known as philosophical idealism or metaphysical idealism, is the set of metaphysical perspectives asserting that, most fundamentally, reality is equivalent to mind, spirit, or consciousness; that reality is entirely a mental construct; or that ideas are the highest form of reality or have the greatest claim to being considered "real"

To my understanding Kant became a dualist because of the arguments by Hume that physical "laws" cant be known — Gregory

Yes, empirical knowledge is insufficient by itself for understanding. In today's terms, Innatism is also needed.

Also i'd like to say that if a positivist says he is not an idealist, why won't he just call himself a materialist then? — Gregory

If Positivism is the philosophical theory that holds that the only true knowledge is scientific knowledge, based on data and experience, then Kant was not a Positivist.

Here's a small chance, a chink in the wall of Kant*. What if talk of the cup perceived and of the cup's ding an sich are talk of the very same thing? Perhaps there is just one cup? — Banno

Given your position as a Direct Realist, and assuming Direct Realism, when we look at an object and perceive the colour red, science may tell us that the object has emitted a wavelength of 700nm

How can the Direct Realist justify that a perception of red in the mind and a wavelength of 700nm in the world are the very same thing?

Kant specifically denies knowledge of the things-in-themselves: so how could he possibly claim that things do or do not exist outside of minds? — Bob Ross

Kant does in fact claim things do exist outside minds, and that necessarily so. In fact, there are two arguments in affirmation of it, concluding from either subjective a priori** or objective a posteriori*** major premises.

So, what……you think the warrant for those claims was unjustified, or, you think he had no warrant at all?

**the gigantic footnote to Bxxxix
***Bxx: “…. and that things in themselves, while possessing a real existence….”

Hello Corvus,

Thank you for your reply, and explanation. I am not sure if thing-in-itself is an entity that you are forced to formulate yourself conceptually. When you say, it is something that you formulate conceptually, it gives the impression that you know what thing-in-itself is.   That is what conceptually formatting implies

I don’t think it does. I can know X is not Y without knowing anything about the properties of Y. I know that the limits of my knowledge is that of bananas and never cucumbers; so a cucumber could be just like a banana, but I can only know about bananas.

But I think Kant never said that. Thing-in-itself is something that you cannot conceptually formulate.  If you can, then it wouldn't be  thing-in-itself. Would you not agree?

It depends on what you mean by “conceptually formulate”: it can be formulated in so far as it is however the ‘thing’ exists independently of what was sensed of it.

This statement seems to say that you have sensibility, representations, intuition and cognition in order to perceive an external object.

A representation is the production of senses [of a thing-in-itself or multiple] being intuited (in space and time), and intuitions being judged and cognized (with the understanding).

And you suddenly have a sensibility of the cup, a representation of the cup, an intuition of the cup, and then a cognition of the cup,

There is a ‘cup-in-itself’ or something-in-itself that excited my sensibility. I get sensations of it. That gets intuited (into space and time). That gets judged and cognized. The aftermath of which is a representation.

Anticipated by whom? Not by Kant, I think, or whatever Kant-in-himself may have been.

Perhaps I misunderstood you: I was under the impression that you were just noting that things-in-themselves, if this theory is correct, are completely from our grasp and, thusly, are practically meaningless. Is that not what you were saying?

For my part, I blame Descartes for this adventure in the preposterous, and much else for that matter. He started the ball rolling, and doomed otherwise fine minds to the remarkably silly task of determining whether they and all they regularly and continually interact with every moment really exist and are what they are shown to be while we interact with them. To Kant, though, is reserved the claim that there is, e.g., some thing which I call a chair and sit on all the time, which although it is in all respects a chair as I understand a chair to be and I use it as such, cannot be known

Why is this a silly task? Would you rather blindly trust some of your perceptions? I don’t see any other options here.

I have long wondered what it actually means to be a Kantian….. — Tom Storm

“…. We shall thus spare ourselves much severe and fruitless labour, by not expecting from reason what is beyond its power, or rather by subjecting it to discipline, and teaching it to moderate its vehement desires for the extension of the sphere of cognition….”
(Think carefully about what you don’t know)

“…. To maintain a simply negative position in relation to propositions which rest on an insecure foundation, well befits the moderation of a true philosopher; but to uphold the objections urged against an opponent as proofs of the opposite statement is a proceeding just as unwarrantable and arrogant as it is to attack the position of a philosopher who advances affirmative propositions regarding such a subject….”
(Speak even more carefully about what you don’t know)

It is talk of the same ontological thing. I am not saying there are ontologically two worlds: I am saying epistemically there must be two, ontologically one.

@Janus

I think @Banno is confusing the ontological with the epistemic consideration of the cup (in their hypothetical situation they posited): just because epistemically we must treat the ontological object as two (viz., the thing-in-itself and the thing) does not entail in any manner that there are actually two objects in reality which we are describing.

Kant does in fact claim things do exist outside minds, and that necessarily so. In fact, there are two arguments in affirmation of it, concluding from either subjective a priori** or objective a posteriori*** major premises.

So, what……you think the warrant for those claims was unjustified, or, you think he had no warrant at all?

The only one I remember off the top of my head is his "refutation of idealism" which only proves that there must be real things outside of me in space for my representative faculties to empirically determine the 'I'; but this doesn't prove that the sensations or intuitions themselves must be non-fabricated. If there is an argument for that, then please let me know.

It's strange to think of the phenomena/noumena distiction in relation to one's own body parts. Is there a nose-in-itself vs the phenomena of it?

It's strange to think of the phenomena/noumena distiction in relation to one's own body parts. Is there a nose-in-itself vs the phenomena of it? — Gregory

After an amputation, some people experience pain in the part of the limb that’s no longer there. This sensation is phantom limb pain. The pain is real. The phantom part refers to the location of the pain: the missing limb or part of the limb (such as fingers or toes) (Leveland Clinic - Phantom Limb Pain)

Moore famously put the point into dramatic relief with his 1939 essay Proof of an External World, in which he gave a common sense argument against scepticism by raising his right hand and saying "here is one hand," and then raising his left and saying "and here is another" (Wikipedia - Here is one hand)

Who is to say that Moore hadn't had both his hands amputated after an accident, and only imagined his hands were still there?

….proves that there must be real things outside of me in space (…) but this doesn't prove that the sensations or intuitions themselves must be non-fabricated. — Bob Ross

All of which was the point. If you already know there is a proof of a claim (things do exist outside the mind), I don’t understand why you would then ask how could he possibly claim that things do or do not exist outside of minds.

And what's any of that got to do with fabrication? How are you assigning this condition, what do you mean by it?

What contentions do you have? — Bob Ross

You are on the right path, by my thinking. But you need to take the next step, and this is a very big step: Kant found noumena in some impossible beyond, but this entails that all that stands before us in intelligible structured existence stands apart from noumena, which makes talk about noumena impossible, rendering the concept worse than a mere necessary postulation: it is no less than nonsense of the order of, say, denying the principle of contradiction. Apodictically impossible, as Kant would put it.

Not only does this make any proposition about noumena nonsense (like Wittgenstein said about "the world" or value), it draws an impossible line, that between noumena and phenomena, as if all that is there in plain sight is of another ontological order entirely. If noumena is supposed to be true, unconditioned and eternal Real, then how is it possible to draw such a line which excludes my occurrent apprehension of this lamp on my desk? Excluded how? To draw such a line, as Wittgenstein reminds us, one has to know both sides to make sense, so how does one make sense of delimiting noumena?

What the Kantian concept fails to see is that noumena is all pervasive. This obviates the nonsense about ontological divisions: there are none. (One odd conclusion of this is that analytic philosophers lean toward the Kantian side of the issue, maintaining that talk about metaphysics is nonsense, while seriously opposing any talk about Kant.) One has to except that this lamp is noumenal, that phenomenal events are noumenal events. The trouble lies not in ontology but epistemology: there is something about this lamp that I am not seeing yet is there always already IN the seeing.

This is the kind of sh** that drives analytic philosophers crazy. Keep in mind that Russell called Wittgenstein a mystic because of his "threshold" claims and there is an entire philosophical tradition called phenomenology that travels right up this alley.

We both have the concept of a "thing" in our minds. — RussellA

Neither you nor I have minds lurking within us, separate from the rest of us. We think as part of our interaction with the rest of the world. Language as well is a result of that interaction, as are the definitions arrived at in the use of language.

It seems that your position is that of Idealism. — RussellA

More that of Deweyian Pragmatism than anything else, I think.

Though I can't help thinking that something so clearly absurd (in this telling of the story) would have been noticed long before Wittgenstein — J

Well, there's the "common sense philosophy" of Thomas Reid and others, in reaction to the balderdash of Hume's skepticism and Berkeley's subjectivism (I tend to exaggerate on this issue, I know).

I think (but don't read enough to know) that modern efforts in metaphysics benefit from the therapeutic philosophy of Wittgenstein, Austin, Ryle and others, and may be of more worth as a result.

It's strange to think of the phenomena/noumena distiction in relation to one's own body parts. Is there a nose-in-itself vs the phenomena of it? — Gregory

Well, this doesn't make the essential move, which begins with the logical structure of the statement about a nose bleed. Kant is doing an analysis of knowledge relationships, so there you are observing such a thing, the nose bleeding, and within an everyday sense of things, it is routinely familiar, something everyone knows about, like grass growing. But what is the knowledge relationship? This is what Kant wants to analyze. And epistemological determinations dictate ontological ones.

This is really a pretty familiar method. After all, your nose bleed has a number of analytical perspectives. What would a particle physicist say it "is"? Or an immunobiologist? Kant is a transcendental idealist. Look at the matter from his perspective. Alas, you have to read the Critiuqe of Pure Reason to do this.

Yes... but I guess it still leaves us with open questions about which metaphysical models we may be willing to engage with, or accept as worth our time. — Tom Storm

Good point! A Physical thing, like a chair, is real, specific & tangible, requiring little thought to perceive. But metaphysical models are ideal, general & abstract, so they require a greater investment of time & thought to conceive.

Historically, artists, philosophers & scientists were the ones who were willing to put-in the effort to look beneath the surface, and "see" the universal essence of chairness : In German --- der stuhl-en-sich. Physically, a specific chair is an aggregation of invisible atoms, which take-on a functional form. Philosophically, a chair is an instance of non-specific "sitting support", which includes such tangible objects as an Eames Chair, and intangible concepts as The Holy See in Rome. :smile:

Chairness ;
if the term “chair” is to have definite meaning, there must be something in common to all chairs. This is what an artisan must have knowledge of if s/he is to fabricate a chair. This thing that is common to all chairs – that all particular chairs “participate in”, is called “the form of the chair”, or “chairness”.
http://guweb2.gonzaga.edu/faculty/mcreynolds/phil301/forms.htm


Ceci n'est pas une chaise
This is not a chair, it's a representation of a chair ; which is an instance of chairness

It's strange to think of the phenomena/noumena distiction in relation to one's own body parts. Is there a nose-in-itself vs the phenomena of it? — Gregory

If I interpret thing-in-itself as some sort of copy or separate entity of an object, it sounds absurd to me. Therefore I look at it this way.  Thing-in-itself is the part that is not caught by my sensation.  When I look at an object, I cannot catch the whole part in my perception from one angle from where I am and my perspective. 

I am looking at this clock on the desk.  All I see is the front face of the clock.  It is a real clock.  But the back of the clock is not visible to me because it is facing away from me, so the back is hidden.  That part of the clock which is hidden from the view is the clock-in-itself in noumena.  The front face of the clock which I am seeing in real time and space, so I can read the time, is the clock in phenomena.

Just like that, you see your nose protruding out from your face when you look at it with your eyes slightly downward focusing on the nose. You see the top of the nose ok, and it is the nose that is caught by your visual sense, but the rest of the nose hidden from your sight. The hidden from the sight part of the nose is the nose-in-itself in noumena. The part of the nose that your see is sensible nose in phenomena.

Some objects never appear in our senses, although we have abstract concepts such as God, afterlife, causality etc.  They are thing-in-itself without any possible sensation or perception.  This is my interpretation, and would be definitely way off the mark from the proper academic interpretations. I am just a hobbyist reader.  This interpretation of thing-in-itself as an unobserved part of objects sounds not too absurd, and actually quite reasonable and agreeable to me. But you may find it totally absurd and disagreeable on the idea, so feel free to agree to disagree, and forward your thoughts and ideas. :)

Neither you nor I have minds lurking within us, separate from the rest of us. We think as part of our interaction with the rest of the world. Language as well is a result of that interaction, as are the definitions arrived at in the use of language. — Ciceronianus

I believe in Enactivism, the philosophy of mind that emphasizes the interactions between mind, body, and the environment (Wikipedia - Enactivism). I agree with Dewey's cultural naturalism, where philosophy should be seen as an activity undertaken by inter-dependent organisms-in-environments (SEP - John Dewey)

We agree that we as humans interact with the rest of the world, but the central question remains unanswered, where exactly is this world that we interact with?

For example, this question was never addressed by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations.

There is certainly a world that we interact with, but is this the world of the Direct or Indirect Realist.

Is it the case as the Direct Realist believes that the world as we perceive it exists independently of our perception of it but exactly as we perceive it, or is it the case as the Indirect Realist believes that the world as we perceive it only exists as a representation of something that exists outside our perception of it.

Yes, there is a chair in the world that we interact with, but does this world of chairs exist in our minds or outside our minds?

:up: Nice quotes.

Historically, artists, philosophers & scientists were the ones who were willing to put-in the effort to look beneath the surface, and "see" the universal essence of chairness : — Gnomon

Nicely put. But as someone who is neither an artist, philosopher or scientist, I feel I don't need to concern myself with idealism and such speculative frames. They add nothing to my experience. :wink:

Is your goal here to see how well you understand transcendental idealism as generally presented or how well transcendental idealism holds up to scrutiny?

Both are fine by me!

Why must something "produce" experience? Why can't experience just exist? It seems you are assuming causality here. But from whence cause and why invoke it here if you're "starting from nothing" ala the cogito?

Something must produce experience because the content of experience is within space and/or time, which are but forms of experience. Thusly something permanent must exist outside of those forms which is the content of it. Otherwise, space and time are somehow producing the content (which is impossible) or nothing is (which is equally impossible).

Also, I don’t think the cogito argument works. Just because there are thoughts does not mean that there is a thinker in the reality as it is in-itself.

In terms of causality, I am not presupposing physical causality (necessarily); but perhaps some causality between what was sensed and the process which occurs to produce a representation of it.

This just seems to beg the question. I can see 1, but then we jump to "something must produce experience," and now to "it must produce that experience due to causes external to itself (inputs)."

The content of experience must be supplied from something, even if it is from the same being. “input” is just whatever is being supplied.

ure, if you assume something like: "data input ----> processing ----> output." But why not assume something more basic, like light passing through a window. Something like: "Experience exists. Experience flows, changes." - seems to require fewer presuppositions.

Well, so the processing part comes from the transcendental recognition that we have a priori knowledge; and so it can’t be like a light passing through a window. Even in that case, though, it is worth mentioning that there is input → output—so you seem to be agreeing implicitly with #4 on this part. Also, are you saying that a the window doesn’t provide a representation in the form of output? I would imagine that the light coming into the window doesn’t 1:1 pass-through unscathed (unless this is like a really, really, really clean window or perhaps a special one).

Personally, I think the attempt to build up a foundation for knowledge from something like 1 is just the wrong way to go about things. Epistemology seems to inevitably be circular and fallibilist to me. But, if you're going to do it that way, then it seems like presuppositions need to be limited (else it is just assuming what you set out to prove).

Interesting. I would say that I know 1-5 based off of fallibilist, evidence-based reasoning and not absolute grounds.

Why must we have "absolute certainty" when it comes to "ontological purposes?" History seems to show that we're bound to be wrong either way. Building up one's system from a "firm foundation," doesn't seem to make it any less likely to crumble. That being the case, it seems like the methods of science are good enough to inform ontological questions (where relevant obviously).

It’s not that we need absolute certainty: it is that we are incapable of knowing the things-in-themselves, which limits the outreach of science (and ontology proper).

I guess it depends on what you mean by "exist outside of the mind". For kant, space is a mode of intuition, so all he was saying (as far as I can tell) is that in order for the mind to be represented for experience there must be things outside as indicated by our intuitions which is not our mind. However, this doesn't entail that those intuitions themselves are not completely made up (by our representative faculties, a different faculty, or someone/thing else). By fabrication, I just mean it in the sense of something being simulated and not real. Our intuitions could be simulations of real objects which would have spatially separated things outside of us vs. us all the same. So, for you, why would you say that, as well as things in our intuition indicating things which are separate from the mind, there exists real things that impact our sensibility (and are not just made up)?