Nietzsche had his own theories how the world functions. I think his extremely cynical views represent biologism. Or that the world becomes "fatally" ordered or disordered through the battle of strong and weak ones. — waarala

Deleuze, Foucault and Heidegger were profoundly sly influenced by Nietzsche’s ideas. None of them would label his views biologism. Instead, in their readinga he offers an overturning of Platonic metaphysics by placing difference as prior to identity.

No, I was talking about how things seem to us as opposed to how they might really be. When we talk about order, it is based on our models of what order appears to be to us. — Tom Storm

Sounds like you are being evasive. Barring divine revelation, how else would we know anything about the world, except as they "seem to us" : via our senses & inferences? And how they seem is what our mental models tell us. Is your seemly model/map of the world orderly enough for us to understand it and discuss it, or disorderly enough to keep us forever in the dark about ultimate philosophical questions? As the OP inquired : do we humans possess " the ability to either genuinely apprehend truth, or to be rationally justified in making truth claims". It's not a trick question : do you find the world orderly enough for you to find your way around the local terrain, and to draw inferences about its wider patterns of Geology*1? :smile:

*1. Geology : "the science that deals with the earth's physical structure and substance, its history, and the processes that act on it".

My point is simple. How would we know? We seem to have discovered some regularities in our little patch. We can claim no such knowledge about the whole universe. I'm not even certain physics works the same across the universe - what's to say it isn't largely a function/invention of human cognition? — Tom Storm

Are you claiming complete ignorance about the world, or just "profound skepticism"? Is mathematics simply a child's game of counting fish? Or a science that allows us to guess about what happens next, and what happened before. Kant was skeptical about our ability to know what's what, but despite that handicap, he wrote thousands of words to instruct us about the positive & negative aspects of Epistemology.

On this forum, few of us claim to speak from absolute authority. We just share personal opinions/models, and that's how we expand & refine our "little patch" of reliable knowledge. By comparing our worldviews, we may learn what ideas are imaginary "inventions", and which are realistic enough to be reliable "knowledge". :nerd:

Epistemological rationalism :
Humans will always find things arranged in certain patterns because it is they who have unwittingly so arranged them. Kant held, however, that these certainties were bought at a heavy price. Just because a priori insights are a reflection of the mind, they cannot be trusted as a reflection of the world outside the mind. Whether the rational order in which sensation is arranged—the order, for example, of time, space, and causality—represents an order holding among things-in-themselves (German Dinge-an-sich) cannot be known. Kant’s rationalism was thus the counterpart of a profound skepticism.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/rationalism/Epistemological-rationalism-in-modern-philosophies#ref561225

But maybe you're right and there will be a breakthrough soon. Then you can resurrect this and laugh at me, but I don't think that's going to happen. — RogueAI

No, I wouldn't laugh at you RogueAI. Just want to clarify this isn't a ego thing or jeering in any way. Please continue to have a fascination for alternatives than the status quo!

On this forum, few of us claim to speak from absolute authority. We just share personal opinions/models, and that's how we expand & refine our "little patch" of reliable knowledge. — Gnomon

Kant was skeptical about our ability to know what's what, but despite that handicap, he wrote thousands of words to instruct us about the positive & negative aspects of Epistemology. — Gnomon

I connect these two quotes because no one here is Kant or seems to have his prodigious capacities.

I am not being evasive, simply mildly incredulous at the claims we sometimes make about 'reality'. This is a legitimate view some philosophers arrive at. And yes, I am a skeptic.

There is no God’s Eye point of view that we can know or usefully imagine; there are
only the various points of view of actual persons reflecting various interests and
purposes that their descriptions and theories subserve.

- Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History,

↪wonderer1
Do animals have intentionality? They seem to from my perspective. What does this add to the discussion? — Tom Storm

What did you mean (intend) by that question? :joke:

Courts of Law often spend thousands of attorney hours in trying to prove or deny Intention --- after the fact. But during an action, the intent is fairly obvious to the human mind. We seem to have a talent for interpreting intentions, such as stalking behavior. For example, if we see a cheetah approaching an antelope, crouching slowly, hairs raised, ears forward & eyes fixed, it could be just playing, or it could be intent on murder. Likewise, Nature --- as a whole system --- seems to display intentional patterns of behavior, that can be rationalized into a purposive, meaningful, goal oriented, worldview. But proving it, after the fact, is arduous.

What does that ability to interpret behavior add to a discussion about Rationality? For humans the innate ability to recognize patterns can be enhanced by the addition of Rational analysis of the situation, as in the courtroom example. Reason allows humans to make fine distinctions that may not be apparent to an animal. If you point a gun at an antelope, it may not interpret your intentions as murderous. Artificial/cultural elements of the modern world require reason to enhance instinct. That may be why some exhausted thinkers idealize a return to a "state of nature" where arduous & fallible reasoning & argumentation is not required for survival.

The intention of the OP, seems to argue that rational humans are not mere instinctive animals. Hence more than just aggregations of atoms & tangles of neurons. It's that little extra immaterial essence --- je nais se quoi --- that distinguishes human nature from animal nature. :smile:

WHAT ARE THE ANIMAL'S INTENTIONS?

Assuming you are using "intentionality" as discussed in the SEP... — wonderer1

Which states that:

In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. To say of an individual’s mental states that they have intentionality is to say that they are mental representations or that they have contents.

So I can't see how your proposed definition:

I think that only physical systems with outputs, that are about some aspect of their inputs have intentionality. — wonderer1

squares with what is given in the SEP article. You've already suggested a couple of times that ChatGPT might possess intentionality, which in both cases, ChatGPT itself has rejected. Besides, when you mention neural networks or artificial intelligence, you do so precisely because of what they represent: you are saying that they represent the way in which physical systems are able to embody intentionality. So again your argument is recursive - you are imputing intentionality to those systems on the basis of your rational ability to draw reasoned conclusions, which is the very faculty that is in question.

The intention of the OP, seems to argue that rational humans are not mere instinctive animals. Hence more than just aggregations of atoms & tangles of neurons. It's that little extra immaterial essence --- je nais se quoi --- that distinguishes human nature from animal nature. — Gnomon

As noted, C S Lewis was arguing as a believer. My motivation is different - whilst I'm not atheistic, I also have no intention of evangalising for belief in God. My view is that the commonly-held materialism of secular culture is something like a popular mythology, an aggregation of views that 'everyone knows' must be true (science says so!) But that many of the elements of that worldview can be called into question by philosophical analysis.

In regards the question of the nature of 'intention', the following is glossed from the essay by Victor Reppert, where he defines what exactly is being called into question by the argument.

Basic assumptions of materialism

First the materialist worldview presumes a mechanistic base level. This doesn't mean necessarily deterministic - there can be chance at the basic level of reality in a mechanistic worldview (e.g. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and the 'quantum leap'.) However at the level of basic physics, nature is free of purpose, free of meaning or intentionality, free of normativity, and absent of any and all forms of subjectivity. If one is operating within a materialistic framework, then one cannot attribute purpose to what happens at the basic level. Talk of purpose may be appropriate for macrosystems, such as animals and humans, but that is a purpose that is ultimately the product of a purposeless basic physics. This is the level at which the role of intentionality in nature is to be debated.

Furthermore, 'what something means' cannot be an element of reality at the basic level. Meaning is only ever imputed by subjects, and subjects don't exist on that level - so the Universe, absent subjects, is also devoid of meaning.

There is nothing normative in basic physics. We can never say that some particle of matter is doing what it is doing because it ought to be doing that. Rocks in a landslide do not go where they go because it would be a good idea to go there. To quote Wittgenstein, 'in the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value—and if there were, it would be of no value. If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside all happening and being-so. For all happening and being-so is accidental.' (TLP 6.41)

Basic physics is lacking in subjectivity. The basic elements of the universe have no 'points of view,' and no subjective experience (this is the point which is disputed by panpsychism). Consciousness, if it exists, must be a 'macro' feature of basic elements massed together. This is presumed to be where evolutionary biology enters the picture - by providing the mechanism through which simple elements are combined so as to give rise to the emergence of consciousness.

The level of basic physics must be causally closed. That is, if a physical event has a cause at time t, then it has a physical cause at time t. Even that cause is not a determining cause; there cannot be something nonphysical that plays a role in producing a physical event. If you knew everything about the physical level (the laws and the facts) before an event occurred, you could add nothing to your ability to predict where the particles will be in the future by knowing anything about anything outside of basic physics.

Finally whatever is not physical, at least if it is in space and time, must supervene on the physical. Given the physical, everything else is a necessary consequence, including minds and purposive behaviour.

In summary, the world is at bottom a mindless system of events at the level of fundamental particles and fields, behaving in the manner described by physical laws, and everything else that exists must exist consequentially to what is going on at that basic level. This understanding of a broadly materialist worldview is not a tendentiously defined form of reductionism; it is what most people who would regard themselves as being in the broadly materialist camp would agree with, a sort of “minimal materialism.” Reppert also maintains that any worldview that could reasonably be called “naturalistic” is going to have these features, and the difficulties that the 'argument from reason' presents against a “broadly materialist” worldview thus defined will be typical of naturalism insofar as it maintains these materialist tenets.

Incidentally, for anyone who is up for rather a long (i.e. >10,000 word) read, I've found an excellent essay by non-reductionist biologist Stephen Talbott, From Physical Causes to Organisms of Meaning, which discusses in depth and details how to get from the 'blind, non-purposive' causes of physics to the plainly purposive behaviours which animate the entire organic domain.

:up:

In summary, the world is at bottom a mindless system of events at the level of fundamental particles and fields, behaving in the manner described by physical laws, and everything else that exists must exist consequentially to what is going on at that basic level. — Wayfarer

This is pretty straightforward, but even this will get bogged down quickly when someone asks, "What, exactly, is a particle?" The materialist/physicalist ontology is very...fluid.

I'm not convinced we know what is random versus that which is not random. We detect patterns, as far as human cognition allows and we ascribe characteristics to those patterns - again in human terms. But words like 'random' or 'accidental' seem to have emotional connotations and function as tips of icebergs. — Tom Storm

I'd say it takes some effort to find something in the world that looks like it might be truly random.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_random_number_generator

You are correct that "random" has emotional connotations for many. In the Christian environment of my childhood, with the belief that there was a God that was going to make everything right, and the feeling of security that comes with that - it can be unnerving to consider the possibility that there is a random aspect of some sort, to the world. I, being very much a science nerd, realized fairly early on that it looks an awful lot like there is a random aspect to reality. It's a somewhat controversial topic in physics. The Multi Worlds Interpretation of QM is considered a deterministic interpretation. I'm kind of partial to the MWI, but not because I have anywhere near the expertise needed to judge between interpretations. I find it relatively easy to 'picture' an MWI world, as compared to the worlds of other interpretations of QM, and that undoubtedly biases my view.

Anyway, after that longer than intended digression, I was curious as to whether you found the following excerpt from that link to be emotional?

In computing, a hardware random number generator (HRNG) or true random number generator (TRNG) is a device that generates random numbers from a physical process, rather than by means of an algorithm. Such devices are often based on microscopic phenomena that generate low-level, statistically random "noise" signals, such as thermal noise, the photoelectric effect, involving a beam splitter, and other quantum phenomena. These stochastic processes are, in theory, completely unpredictable for as long as an equation governing such phenomena is unknown or uncomputable. This is in contrast to the paradigm of pseudo-random number generation commonly implemented in computer programs.

This TLS accelerator computer card uses a hardware random number generator to generate cryptographic keys to encrypt data sent over computer networks.
A hardware random number generator typically consists of a transducer to convert some aspect of the physical phenomena to an electrical signal, an amplifier and other electronic circuitry to increase the amplitude of the random fluctuations to a measurable level, and some type of analog-to-digital converter to convert the output into a digital number, often a simple binary digit 0 or 1. By repeatedly sampling the randomly varying signal, a series of random numbers is obtained.

This is pretty straightforward, but even this will get bogged down quickly when someone asks, "What, exactly, is a particle?" The materialist/physicalist ontology is very...fluid. — RogueAI

Sure! It is now. That is why a lot of people will say that quantum physics itself has undermined materialism (and I'm one of them). There is a strong idealist school of thought amongst physicists. But materialism in popular culture hasn't caught up with that.

It was all so simple before QM.

I'm kind of partial to the MWI, but not because I have anywhere near the expertise needed to judge between interpretations. I find it relatively easy to 'picture' an MWI world, as compared to the worlds of other interpretations of QM, and that undoubtedly biases my view. — wonderer1

Doesn't MWI violate the old axiom: Entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity? Isn't the following pretty awkward?

"In the Everett version of the cat puzzle, there is a single cat up to the point where the device is triggered. Then the entire Universe splits in two. Similarly, as DeWitt pointed out, an electron in a distant galaxy confronted with a choice of two (or more) quantum paths causes the entire Universe, including ourselves, to split. In the Deutsch–Schrödinger version, there is an infinite variety of universes (a Multiverse) corresponding to all possible solutions to the quantum wave function. As far as the cat experiment is concerned, there are many identical universes in which identical experimenters construct identical diabolical devices. These universes are identical up to the point where the device is triggered. Then, in some universes the cat dies, in some it lives, and the subsequent histories are correspondingly different. But the parallel worlds can never communicate with one another."
https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/the-many-worlds-theory/

Discussion of interpretations of quantum physics is a sure death-knell for any thread. Let's not get dragged into that rabbit-hole.

The topic is 'the argument from reason' and the sense in which rational inference is or is not explicable in naturalistic terms.

Anyway, after that longer than intended digression, I was curious as to whether you found the following excerpt from that link to be emotional? — wonderer1

If boredom is an emotional reaction, then yes. :wink: Sorry - I find any kind of technical writing (or descriptions of methodologies, etc) almost unreadable. I don't have the attention span. It's on me, I know...

As I said, I am biased, because for me MWI is a useful tool for conceiving of aspects of the world. I know that I am not going to study QM to the point of being an expert, so a consequence of that is that I'm likely to remain biased. At least until some breakthrough comes along. OK?

:cool:

So do we blame old Franz for creating all of this confusion? — wonderer1

Blame millennia of folk psychology (e.g. Scholastic psychologism).

Next you'll be telling us qualia is nonsense... — Tom Storm

Not "nonsense", just (adaptive?) phenomenal noise in mammalian cognitive systems.

So how did this entry become written? By mistake? — Wayfarer

It was written – as our exchanges are written, Wayf – by deterministic nonlinear dynamic system-agents which reflexively confabulate ex post facto intentions-of-the-gaps. :sparkle: :eyes:

It was written by deterministic nonlinear dynamic system-agents — 180 Proof

waffle, 180. Pure and simple.

OK

It was written – as our exchanges are written, Wayf – by deterministic nonlinear dynamic system-agents which reflexively confabulate ex post facto intentions-of-the-gaps. :sparkle: :eyes: — 180 Proof

:up:

And yet, besides a disapproving squeak, you cannot point out my error/s. :roll:

Life is short, 180.

So I can't see how your proposed definition:

I think that only physical systems with outputs, that are about some aspect of their inputs have intentionality.
— wonderer1

squares with what is given in the SEP article. — Wayfarer

Yes, I know it would take a paradigm shift for you to get it. You would need to spend some time, studying stuff, that I suspect you would find boring, to reach the point of grasping what I am trying to communicate, about what is involved in understanding oneself.

You are interested in Buddhism, right? Are you familiar with the Zen notion of beginners mind?

Your teacup is full.

Life is short, 180. — Wayfarer

And denial is long.

Yes, I know it would take a paradigm shift for you to get it. — wonderer1

Much simpler than that - the source you provided doesn’t support your meaning of the term ‘intentionality’.

You are interested in Buddhism, right? Are you familiar with the Zen notion of beginners mind? — wonderer1

Owned the first edition. Nothing whatever to do with the point at issue.

...You've already suggested a couple of times that ChatGPT might possess intentionality, which in both cases, ChatGPT itself has rejected. — Wayfarer

Wayfarer, it seems unlikely that I'll be able to keep up with your rate of posting, but I do want to respond to this much for now.

As I've said, there are different ways of understanding intentionality. Furthermore, you haven't been paying close attention. What I asked was (going from memory) "Does the output of ChatGPT have intentionality?" and in response to the way you responded to that, I asked, "Do you interpret the output of ChatGPT as having intentionality?" (As being about something.) Which you haven't answered.

The reason I asked was to get you thinking about the question. I think that you do interpret the output of ChatGPT as being about something, after all, you've said that you have been making use of it a lot lately. Why would you do that, if you didn't think that the output is about something?

Besides, when you mention neural networks or artificial intelligence, you do so precisely because of what they represent: you are saying that they represent the way in which physical systems are able to embody intentionality. So again your argument is recursive - you are imputing intentionality to those systems on the basis of your rational ability to draw reasoned conclusions, which is the very faculty that is in question. — Wayfarer

You misunderstand, I'm not trying to make an argument in talking about neural nets. I am presenting a hypothesis for consideration. It would take effort on your part, that you haven't shown a willingness to make, for you to grasp the hypothesis, which is fine.

Owned the first edition. Nothing whatever to do with the point at issue. — Wayfarer

I didn't asked if you owned the book. I asked, "Are you familiar with the Zen notion of beginners mind?"

(( Unlikely I'll slog through Victor Reppert, but if I do, I'll let you know. Probably will look at the Stephen Talbott. ))

Back to business.

What does human reasoning look like? Let's go back to the Lewis example. He wants to contrast (1) Grandpa sleeping in because he's sick from (2) my inferring that he's sick because he's sleeping in.

(1) asserts a causal relation between two states of affairs: Grandpa is sick causes Grandpa sleeps in; (2) is considerably more complicated. I am said to know or believe a couple things: (a) Grandpa is sleeping in; (b) Grandpa sleeps in if and only if he is sick. From these, I deduce that (c) Grandpa is sick.

Unlike Grandpa, whose sleeping in is caused by his being sick, my state of believing (or knowing) that Grandpa is sick is not caused by my beliefs (a) and (b); it is a free choice (or act?) of mine to believe that (c) on account of (a) and (b). (a) and (b) together entail (c), and I choose to align my beliefs with what is logical, and so hold (c). Nothing forces me to believe (c), and I could (perversely) do otherwise if I choose. As a matter of logic, (c) flows automatically from (a) and (b), but my holding (c) does not flow automatically from my holding (a) and (b).

That's the Lewis account of the basic situation, but that account is actually intended to be embedded into another argument that will include the free act of inference, something like this: if I am caused to believe something, then I have not freely inferred it; if I have not freely inferred my belief, then I cannot consider it rational, for only beliefs arrived at by the use of reason are rational.

Is that a fair account of the argument from reason as you understand it?

Which states that:

In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. To say of an individual’s mental states that they have intentionality is to say that they are mental representations or that they have contents. — Wayfarer

By the way Wayfarer,

The sentence immediately following what you quoted there from the SEP says:

Furthermore, to the extent that a speaker utters words from some natural language or draws pictures or symbols from a formal language for the purpose of conveying to others the contents of her mental states, these artifacts used by a speaker too have contents or intentionality.

Do you agree with that statement?