This appears to be begging the question, by presuming that the exercise of reason is something different than information processing occurring in our brains. — wonderer1

Which question, exactly? It starts with the presumption that we can arrive at true beliefs through reasoned inference, and then asks what must be the case in order for this to be so.

The general problem in the argument is framing things as True or Not True in relation to phenomenon instead of understanding it as an abstract game that helps guide us through ‘reality’ rather than something that is directly applicable to ‘reality’. — I like sushi

This really makes no sense. Again the argument is about the means by which reasoned inference may result in true beliefs. And any argument which has to place reality in scare quotes ought to be looked at askance.

Good post Wayfarer, the time and detail that went into this is appreciated.

I'm ok with point 1 at the moment, so lets go into the proposed contradiction.

As a matter of definition physicalists claim that all events must have physical causes, and that therefore human thoughts can ultimately be explained in terms of material causes or physical events (such as neurochemical events in the brain) that are nonrational. In Lewis' terms, this would entail that our beliefs are a result of a physical chain of causes, not held as a result of insight into a ground-consequence relationship. — Wayfarer

A process of reasoning (P therefore Q) is rational only if the reasoner sees that Q follows from P, and accepts Q on that basis. Thus, reasoning is veridical only if it involves a specific kind of causality, namely, rational insight. — Wayfarer

If this is the case, how is it not rational to conclude that the physical brain causes the mind? Its not an irrational argument. In simple terms, if brain state = X, then mind state = Y is the claim right? If this can be confirmed through testing, then I would say this is a completely rational argument. If you lacked rational insight, then yes, you would not see it as rational. But you have rational insight. How is this not rational then?

Are you saying that underlying physical process don't process the term rationality like we do in our mind? Because that's not what naturalism is stating. Its perfectly rational to observe that gravity pulls something down at a steady acceleration. Are we to say that gravity is irrational because it doesn't realize or think that it should accelerate at a steady pace? Of course not. That's not a counter of naturalism, that's just a misapplication of the term "rational".

Which question, exactly? It starts with the presumption that we can arrive at true beliefs through reasoned inference, and then asks what must be the case in order for this to be so. — Wayfarer

I meant beg the question in the sense discussed here, assuming that would be the usage most common on the forum. In any case, what I meant by beg the question was assume the conclusion. I interpreted you saying, "...if such theories were true, our thoughts, and so also our reasoning, would be determined on the molecular level by neurochemistry, leaving no role for the free exercise of reason.", as suggesting that exercise of reason is assumed to be incompatible with the determinism of physics, when that is what your argument seeks to show.

Having looked at that sentence from your opening paragraph again, I'll also point out that my theory is that neurons supervene on the molecular level, but it is at the level of networks of neurons that our reasoning is determined in the most interesting regards. That's simplistic of course, since among other things, various organs dumping hormones into our bloodstreams and intake of a variety of substances also plays a deterministic role in how we reason. (Speaking of which... [reaches for a gummie]) However, I think consideration of the role of networks of neurons, and disregarding the molecular details on which the neurons supervene, is an appropriate level of looking at things for the purpose of this discussion. That's the level at which intentionality seems to emerge.

why wouldn't our ability to reason be advantageous for survival?...So the underlying issue here from Wayfarer perspective is that naturalism presupposes intentionality; our capacity for thoughts to be about stuff. How can physical things give rise to such thought? But isn't intentionality essentially about memory - our ability to observe things and recall them? — Tom Storm

I think viewing reason through that criterion of whether it 'helps us survive' is reductionist. What is advantageous to survival is an essential consideration in evolutionary theory. But classifying reason along with other traits - tentacles, claws, physical speed or strength - undermines the sovereignty, thus the credibility, of reason. Surely if reason is to have meaning, it has to be able to stand on it's own feet, so to speak. If it appeals to the court of 'what helps survival', then reason becomes subordinated to other purposes. (Both Donald Hoffman and Alvin Plantinga make use of this line of argument, for different purposes. It's also discussed in Nagel's Evolutionary Naturalism essay which I've previously referred to.)

My view: evolutionary biology certainly provides the account of how h. sapiens physically evolved. But thanks to the rapid evolution of the massive sapient fore-brain, h. sapiens has developed powers of perception which are almost entirely absent in other creatures, chief amongst them reason (hence 'the rational animal'). That faculty, along with language, tool-making, story-telling, and the capacity for self-transcendence, enables us to 'transcend our biology' so to speak. An intuition of that, I contend, is what is behind the various forms of philosophical dualism, such as the rational soul in the physical body. These need not be literally true in order to be metaphorically accurate, to tell us something vital about human nature.

I think the nature of reason is tied up with the ability to abstract and to generalise, which is the basis of both language and logic. And I think the Greek philosophers realised this - you can see the origins of it in Parmenides and Plato and the discussions of forms and universals. That's a digression, but it's also part of the background of this argument.

The question we're faced with: is it impossible that conscious processes could evolve from natural causes? — Tom Storm

Everyone assumes that 'mind is organised matter' and that the processes understood by the natural sciences will one day illustrate the fine detail of how this happened through what is called a-biogenesis (life from non-life). But, I refer again to the first four paragraphs of The Core of MInd and Cosmos, which discusses the sense in which 'the subject' was deliberately omitted or excluded at the formation of the modern natural sciences of Galileo, Descartes and Newton, with many concommitant philosophical implications. One could argue that the perspective of the subject (subject-hood, as distinct from subjectivity) is being re-introduced through phenomenology and embodied cognition (although It's still not considered in the kind of physicalism which this argument is addressing.)

I am contemplating the idea that right from the very first life-forms, life *is* the earliest manifestation of intentionality. As the complexity of organisms evolves over the aeons, so too their intelligence, apparently arriving at h. sapiens, through which the whole process has become critically self-aware.

//we arrive at the ability to understand abstract truths and the like. They're not simply 'a product' of the human mind, although having such a mind, we can produce, e.g. imaginary number systems and the like. But I maintain the furniture of reason such as logical laws, are discovered not invented, and certainly are not the products of a biological process.//

Do the outputs of ChatGPT have intentionality? Why or why not? — wonderer1

Well, taking it from the horses' mouth:

Question: In philosophy, 'intentionality' is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. Do AI systems such as ChatGPT possess this power?


ChatGPT: AI systems, including ChatGPT, do not possess intentionality in the same way that humans do. Intentionality is typically associated with consciousness and subjective experience, which are currently not attributes of AI systems.

While AI systems like ChatGPT can process and generate information about things, properties, and states of affairs, they do not possess a genuine understanding or subjective experience of the concepts they deal with. Their ability to represent and respond to information is based on statistical patterns learned from vast amounts of training data.

AI systems operate through algorithms and statistical models that enable them to process and generate text based on patterns in the data they were trained on. They don't possess personal goals, beliefs, desires, or subjective experiences. Their responses are determined by the patterns in the input they receive and the way they were trained, rather than by any internal mental states or subjective understanding.

While AI systems can be sophisticated in generating responses that appear intentional or meaningful, these responses are ultimately the result of complex computational processes rather than true intentionality.

Verbatim!

In simple terms, if brain state = X, then mind state = Y is the claim right? If this can be confirmed through testing, then I would say this is a completely rational argument. — Philosophim

So I'm saying, you can't get to such simple terms in neuroscience. What you're arguing here is 'brain-mind identity theory'. To respond in terms of the argument from reason, I would say that the brain-mind identity theory collapses or blurs the distinction between logical necessity and physical causation. If mental states are said to be identical to specific brain states or processes, this suggest that there is a direct correspondence between logical propositions and specific physical configurations.

In the brain-mind identity theory, the identity statement between a mental state and a brain state is typically understood as a necessary identity. This means that if a specific mental state is instantiated, it is necessarily identical to a specific brain state. The logical necessity is derived from the supposed one-to-one correspondence between mental and brain states. By collapsing the distinction between logical necessity and physical causation, the brain-mind identity theory implies that the truth of a logical proposition is causally determined by the physical state of the brain. In this view, the brain state corresponding to a particular mental state is thought to be both the cause and the logical ground for the associated mental experience or thought.

But while there may be correlations between mental states and brain states, this doesn't necessarily imply a strict identity between them. Logical propositions and their truth values are abstract entities that exist independently of any specific physical realization, such as brain states. 'If X >Y and A>X, then it must be the case that A>Y'. This is a logical proposition, but note that its validity is not dependent on any configuration of physical symbols. I could choose to represent it (and any number of different propositions) in different symbolic form and in different media, all whilst still preserving the meaning of the proposition. Hence the distinction between logical necessity and physical causation is preserved, and you can't show that 'brain-states' are causal, in respect of propositional content.

I interpreted this as suggesting that exercise of reason is assumed to be incompatible with the determinism of physics, when that is what your argument seeks to show. — wonderer1

And I think the argument does show that. It distinguishes between insight based on reasoned inference (knowing that X must be so on account of Y) and observation of a cause-and-effect relationship. No question is being begged, a case is being made.

I think consideration of the role of networks of neurons, and disregarding the molecular details on which the neurons supervene, is an appropriate level of looking at things for the purpose of this discussion — wonderer1

It might be, were this a computer science or neuroscience forum.

But classifying reason along with other traits - tentacles, claws, physical speed or strength - undermines the sovereignty, thus the credibility, of reason. Surely if reason is to have meaning, it has to be able to stand on it's own feet, so to speak. — Wayfarer

I don't think I share this view but it interests me. I don't see how reason needs to have transcendent meaning. But I'm open to considering this further.

I think the nature of reason is tied up with the ability to abstract and to generalise, which is the basis of both language and logic. And I think the Greek philosophers realised this - you can see the origins of it in Parmenides and Plato and the discussions of forms and universals. That's a digression, but it's also part of the background of this argument. — Wayfarer

I get this but I am not sure where this leads us.

One could argue that the perspective of the subject (subject-hood, as distinct from subjectivity) is being re-introduced through phenomenology and embodied cognition (although It's still not considered in the kind of physicalism which this argument is addressing.) — Wayfarer

Yes, and this is a rich, fascinating (and largely incomprehensible area to me).

I am contemplating the idea that right from the very first life-forms, life *is* the earliest manifestation of intentionality. As the complexity of organisms evolves over the aeons, so too their intelligence, apparently arriving at h. sapiens, through which the whole process has become critically self-aware.

//we arrive at the ability to understand abstract truths and the like. They're not simply 'a product' of the human mind, although having such a mind, we can produce, e.g. imaginary number systems and the like. But I maintain the furniture of reason such as logical laws, are discovered not invented, and certainly are not the products of a biological process.// — Wayfarer

I guess your project is a form of Platonism, a story about reality which you are more or less convinced of. I just don't think we (and certainly not I) know enough to go there. But it's interesting material. I don't think we can rule out naturalism at this point.

Thanks

To respond in terms of the argument from reason, I would say that the brain-mind identity theory collapses or blurs the distinction between logical necessity and physical causation. — Wayfarer

Logical necessity never holds between one belief state and another; it only holds between the contents of one belief state and the contents of another.

That's why you need an actual argument showing that if brain state A, with contents P, causes brain state B, with contents Q, that a causal relation between A and B is incompatible with a logical relation between P and Q.

The argument from reason challenges the proposition that everything that exists, and in particular thought and reason, can be explained solely in terms of natural or physical processes. It is, therefore, an argument against materialist philosophy of mind. According to the argument, if such theories were true, our thoughts, and so also our reasoning, would be determined on the molecular level by neurochemistry, leaving no role for the free exercise of reason. — Wayfarer

On the TPF forum, this a no-win argument. Both Physicalists and Metaphysicalists typically agree on the details of physics, neuro-chemistry, and cosmology all the way back to the rationally-inferred Big Bang, but disagree on the metaphysical question of direction vs randomness.

So, the argument eventually boils down to A> a rational intentional Creation ( temporal Cosmos) vs B> accidental random Causation (timeless Chaos), dating back to the beginning of our little pocket of space-time. Each party, exercising Reason & Inference, can find evidence to support his conclusion, based on that original Axiomatic assumption. But they arrive at different rational conclusions : a world that makes sense to the rational mind vs a world that makes sense for the sensory body*1.

Ontological question : Is the universe a self-organizing self-learning Program*2, or a random sequence of accidents that over eons has stumbled upon a formula to cause a few constellations of atoms to imagine that they exist, simply because they can think. What do you think? :smile:


*1. Is the World Rational? :
Our preliminary hypothesis asserts that the world has a certain property owing to which it can be successfully investigated by us. We call it the hypothesis of the rationality of the world (or simply the rationality of the world).
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-77626-0_5

*2. The Conservation of Information :
I'd be surprised if materialist/physicalist/deterministic scientists would think in terms of "learning" in a law-limited "deterministic" system*1. However computer scientists, and Information theorists, do sometimes use such anthro-morphic terminology metaphorically*2. So, if the "laws of nature" are imagined as a computer program, the universe could conceivably learn, in the same sense that Artificial Intelligence does*3, by means of "non-deterministic algorithms"*4.

But AI is not natural, and currently requires a natural Programmer to establish the parameters of the system. Would a self-organizing, self-learning world also require the services of a preter-natural Programmer to bootstrap the system?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/816834

Is the universe a self-organizing self-learning Program*1, or a random sequence of accidents that over eons has stumbled upon a formula to cause a few constellations of atoms to imagine that they exist, simply because they can think. What do you think? — Gnomon

I'm not convinced we know what is random versus that which is not random. We detect patterns, as far as human cognition allows and we ascribe characteristics to those patterns - again in human terms. But words like 'random' or 'accidental' seem to have emotional connotations and function as tips of icebergs.

Logical necessity never holds between one belief state and another; it only holds between the contents of one belief state and the contents
of another. — Srap Tasmaner

That's what I'm arguing, it's exactly what I said - 'Logical propositions and their truth values (meaning their content) are abstract entities that exist independently of any specific physical realization'

That's why you need an actual argument showing that.... — Srap Tasmaner

Sorry, but I don't follow this part.

I don't see how reason needs to have transcendent meaning. — Tom Storm

Useful to bear in mind the tricky Kantian distinction between 'transcendent' and 'transcendental'. The former refers to what is beyond experience; the latter to what must be presumed to be the case, in order for such and such a statement to be true. The argument from reason is very much a transcendental argument.

On the TPF forum, this a no-win argument. — Gnomon

I am dissappointed, but never surprised, to observe the routine deprecation of the faculty of reason. I think the classical notion of reason is rather non-PC, for various reasons, chief among them that it distinguishes humans from other species.

I guess your project is a form of Platonism, — Tom Storm

Lloyd Gleeson, who is one of the leading academics in this area, says in his most recent book Platonism vs Naturalism, that Platonism is philosophy, in that it delineates the specific questions and subject matter unique to philosophy as distinct from natural science. I don't expect that will win anyone over, though ;-) (See Edward Feser, Join the Ur-Platonist Alliance!)

Ontological question: Is the universe a self-organizing self-learning Program*2, or a random sequence of accidents that over eons has stumbled upon a formula to cause a few constellations of atoms to imagine that they exist, simply because they can think. What do you think? — Gnomon

Again, take a look at the chapter headings and abstracts (all available online) of Mind and the Cosmic Order, Charles Pinter. He has a compelling answer to at least part of this question.

The argument from reason is very much a transcendental argument. — Wayfarer

Good to know.

Lloyd Gleeson — Wayfarer

Do you mean Lloyd Gerson? I've read some of his papers.

it delineates the specific questions and subject matter unique to philosophy as distinct from natural science. — Wayfarer

Yes, I am aware of this position. I am simply unable to determine whether any of this scholarship is meaningful or not. My job in philosophy to be aware of the key questions and positions. With no expertise in these areas of enquiry, my own commitments are intuitions and of no real importance.

Lloyd Gleeson, who is one of the leading academics in this area, says in his most recent book Platonism vs Naturalism, that Platonism is philosophy, in that it delineates the specific questions and subject matter unique to philosophy as distinct from natural science. I don't expect that will win anyone over, though ;-) (See Edward Feser, Join the Ur-Platonist Alliance!) — Wayfarer

I’m with Deleuze here:

“The whole of Platon­ism is dominated by the idea of drawing a distinction between 'the thing itself' and the simulacra. Difference is not thought in itself but re­lated to a ground, subordinated to the same and subject to mediation in mythic form. Overturning Platonism, then, means denying the primacy of original over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections.” (Difference and Repetition)

Thanks, although I suspect I'd have to read a lot more of that milieu to understand the drift (and must admit, feel little compulsion to do so.)

Do you mean Lloyd Gerson? — Tom Storm

Yeah sorry :yikes: I find him a very difficult read, because so much of his work is addressing other scholars and historical questions of interpretation. So I've only read snippets - come to think of it, that applies to many of my sources - but really got a lot from a lecture of which I also have the hard copy. That lecture conveys the gist of what was to become his latest book. I have this quotation from it in my scrapbook:

Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too. — Lloyd Gerson

which, as it happens, beautifully supports 'the argument from reason'.

but really got a lot from a lecture of which I also have the hard copy. I have this quotation in my scrapbook: — Wayfarer

Yes, that's one I found pretty interesting too. Gerson is the go to guy on this subject as I understand it.

Overturning Platonism, then, means denying the primacy of original over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections.” (Difference and Repetition) — Joshs

That's an interesting call to arms but I guess it's hard for most of us to apprehend how we can do this? Is it an act of will? Pardon my literalism but in glorifying the reign of simulacra, does my Picasso print become equal to the one hanging in the museum?

Question: In philosophy, 'intentionality' is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. Do AI systems such as ChatGPT possess this power?


ChatGPT: AI systems, including ChatGPT, do not possess intentionality in the same way that humans do. Intentionality is typically associated with consciousness and subjective experience, which are currently not attributes of AI systems.

That was funny, but note ChatGPT simply says ChatGPT does not have intentionality "in the same way that humans do." Which of course any well informed materialist would agree with. Then ChatGPT goes on producing output which doesn't directly respond to the question.

Whether ChatGPT has consciousness is not relevant. The point was to consider intentionality at low (subconscious) levels, on which intentionality at conscious levels could supervene.

Also, you didn't ask ChatGPT the question I proposed which was, "Do the outputs of ChatGPT have intentionality?" Since you posted an output of ChatGPT, do you think that output is about something?

Do animals have intentionality? They seem to from my perspective. What does this add to the discussion?

Overturning Platonism, then, means denying the primacy of original over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections.” (Difference and Repetition)
— Joshs

That's an interesting call to arms but I guess it's hard for most of us to apprehend how we can do this? Is it an act of will? Pardon my literalism but in glorifying the reign of simulacra, does my Picasso print become equal to the one hanging in the museum — Tom Storm

It’s not as act of will , it’s an act of insight, understanding that there is no such thing as an original. It’s only as a contrivance, a sleight of hand, an illusion that we refer contingent particulars back to propositional or axiomatic forms, universals, foundations. Ever see Orson Wells’ film ‘F for Fake’?

Which of course any well informed materialist would agree with — wonderer1

OK then, give us a well-informed materialists' account of the significance of intentionality.

As for whether output - written text - has any kind of ‘intentionality’, I would say, clearly not. Written text means nothing without being interpreted.

there is no such thing as an original — Joshs

Now we're on solid po-mo territory. Oh, wait..... :yikes:

Ever see Orson Wells’ film ‘F for Fake’? — Joshs

One of my favorite films. An extraordinary cinematic essay. I understand his argument to be slightly different - a talented forger can fake things and they may pass as real, especially amongst the rich who want them to be real and the 'experts' who pass them off and take a cut. Wells also argues (elsewhere) that Shakespeare is objectively great and that Welles films are original even if flawed. I'm not sure he's our guy for this but I get your point, he loves to evoke and explore the notion of fakery

But forgery and fakery are only possible if there is an original - so how does this all work?

Also, you didn't ask ChatGPT the question I proposed which was, "Do the outputs of ChatGPT have intentionality?" — wonderer1

Let's do that.

Do the outputs of ChatGPT have intentionality?

ChatGPT: No, the outputs of ChatGPT do not have intentionality. ChatGPT is a language model that generates responses based on patterns it has learned from the training data. It does not possess consciousness or subjective experiences, and its responses are not driven by internal goals or intentions. ChatGPT generates text based on statistical patterns and associations in the training data and attempts to provide coherent and relevant responses to the input it receives.

Do animals have intentionality? They seem to from my perspective. What does this add to the discussion? — Tom Storm

In my experience, people have widely varying concepts in mind when using the word "intentionality" so many may disagree with what I am talking about being intentionality, but yes. I'd say animal with enough of a neural network to call a brain, likely have the low level intentionality I've been discussing. That's a different matter though, than having 'a big enough pile' of low level intentionality for consciousness to emerge.

Edit: I forgot to answer your last question. I don't have a clear idea of what you are asking with your question, but what I see it as adding to the discussion, is further consideration and clarification of the paradigm I'm presenting.

But forgery and fakery are only possible if there is an original - so how does this all work? — Tom Storm

Why not forgery and fakery all the way down? As Nietzsche asks:

“Why shouldn't the world that is relevant to us – be a fiction? And if someone asks: “But doesn't fiction belong with an author?” – couldn't we shoot back: “Why? Doesn't this ‘belonging' belong, perhaps, to fiction as well? Aren't we allowed to be a bit ironic with the subject, as we are with the predicate and object? Shouldn't philosophers rise above the belief in grammar? With all due respect to governesses, isn't it about time philosophy renounced governess-beliefs?” – The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not fact but fable and approximation on the basis of a meager sum of observations; it is "in flux," as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: for--there is no "truth" (1901/1967 Will to Power.)

I love the idea but I can’t find a way to fit it in.

Let's not dissolve the entire dialogue in the acid bath of post-modern relativism.

people have widely varying concepts in mind when using the word "intentionality" — wonderer1

The SEP entry would be a good starting point https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality

OK then, give us a well-informed materialists' account of the significance of intentionality. — Wayfarer

The sort of low level intentionality I have been discussing provides the subconscious infrastructure for consciousness.

As for whether output - written text - has any kind of ‘intentionality’, I would say, clearly not. Written text means nothing without being interpreted.

And have you interpreted ChatGPT's output as being about something? (Like your conscious mind interpret's the outputs of your subconscious as being about something.)

The SEP entry would be a good starting point https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality — Wayfarer

You know I've already provided that link, right? Is your ego so bruised already that you need to try to put me down in the estimations of the rest of the forum?

We could talk about the evolutionary psychology of that.

Sorry, I rarely get what Nietzsche says. I like him best when he sounds like a truculent Oscar Wilde. The question I always have when I read this kind of hyperbolic provocation is, why?

Sorry @Wayfarer I might start a thread on postmodernism and reason.

You know I've already provided that link, right? — wonderer1

Sorry, I forgot you had mentioned it.

But while there may be correlations between mental states and brain states, this doesn't necessarily imply a strict identity between them. — Wayfarer

You know this is a completely false statement. You can't just claim they are correlations, you have to prove it. To prove a correlation, you need to remove the brain and still have a mind. Does anyone with brain death have a mind? Are the countless neuroscience discoveries, medicine, psychiatrics, etc. all just correlations? Of course not. You're too well versed to make a claim like that.

This is a rationalization. Despite knowing this isn't true, you believe this regardless. Why? What do you gain out of it Wayfarer? That's the only reason why people hold things they know are false to be true. Do you do it because you fear you'll lose something? Maybe I can help you hold onto what you want without you having to hold to this false notion. We're in philosophy. The point is to be razor sharp with are arguments and suppositions as we cut down our rationalizations and false beliefs.

Logical propositions and their truth values are abstract entities that exist independently of any specific physical realization, such as brain states. — Wayfarer

No, they aren't. There always has to be something to process those logical proposition and truth values. It doesn't exist in a vacuum. If there is nothing, there is no logic Wayfarer. We are the brains abstracting these identities. No brains, no abstract identity of logic. Apart from brains, does such logic just float out there? Where is it if it is not in the brains of logically capable thinking beings?

I could choose to represent it and any number of different propositions in different symbolic systems and different media, whilst still preserving the logic. — Wayfarer

And what is doing this thinking? Your brain.

You seem to take the argument like this: "My brain's physical capabilities let me think of abstracts and logic and rationality. Therefore such things exist apart from the physical capabilities that my brain produces. Its a contradiction Wayfarer. Go get drunk and watch logic disappear. Look at a brain damaged individual and see how they process.

I think consideration of the role of networks of neurons, and disregarding the molecular details on which the neurons supervene, is an appropriate level of looking at things for the purpose of this discussion
— wonderer1

It might be, were this a computer science or neuroscience forum. — Wayfarer

Here you are also mistaken. The best philosophers of history were often times mathematicians and scientists as well. Philosophy has to discuss the material that we know of today, or it is an exercise in futility. You cannot discuss the philosophy of mind without neuroscience. That is a person who is in the dark ages and will be left behind. Why isn't neuroscience looking to arguments such as your Wayfarer? Because they offer nothing. They're wrong. Its not that neuroscience is full of itself and can't comprehend what you're saying. They do. And its so off base as to be brushed aside without a second thought.

I've said this before, and I'll say it again. Poor philosophy wonders at what could be. Great philosophy wonders at what is, and attempts to solve it. But we have to address what we know, not ignore it for our ideology.

:up:

Are the countless neuroscience discoveries, medicine, psychiatrics, etc. all just correlations? Of course not. — Philosophim

But they don't entail what you say they entail. Have you ever encountered the book The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, by Hacker and Bennett? Can you say anything about that? Up until I mentioned the term 'brain-mind identity theory' had you ever heard it? Do you know who those philosophers are that I mentioned, and what they say?

From my perspective, everything you write on the forum comprises wholly and solely what Philosophim thinks is obvious, accompanied by a strong sense of indignation that someone else can question what, to you, are obvious facts. This is your response to everything I address to you.

We're in philosophy. — Philosophim

Have you ever written a term paper in philosophy? Ever actually studied it? Because I can see no indication of that. You never mention any philosophers, or philosophical arguments, apart from your belief that everything is matter-energy and the mind is the product of the brain, which, to you, is obvious.