That may be true. But the pertinent point in this thread is that Materialism is presented as a natural fact, while alternative metaphysical notions are rejected as Super-natural fictions. It's like an old western showdown : there ain't no room in this town (Truth) for both tangible Matter and intangible Mind.Materialism is a metaphysical standpoint. Metaphysics is not restricted to "concepts or principles that transcend the physical or empirical realm and are typically associated with supernatural aspects of reality". Also 'metaphysics' is not synonymous with 'supernatural'; the former term, in its "popular" sense may share some associations with 'supernatural', but not so in its philosophical sense. There is no 'philosophy of the supernatural'. — Janus
the pertinent point in this thread is that Materialism is presented as a natural fact, while alternative metaphysical notions are rejected as Super-natural fictions. It's like an old western showdown : there ain't no room in this town (Truth) for both tangible Matter and intangible Mind. — Gnomon
The soul's deeper parts can only be reached through its surface. In this way the eternal forms, that mathematics and philosophy and the other sciences make us acquainted with will by slow percolation gradually reach the very core of one's being, and will come to influence our lives; and this they will do, not because they involve truths of merely vital importance, but because they [are] ideal and eternal verities.
My use of "immaterial" is indeed "tendentious". It's intended to discriminate between tangible objects and intangible feelings. For example, Nagel's question "what is it like to be a bat?" is not inquiring about the stuff we can see or touch, but about the inner being : the sense of self. Even the terms "sense" & "feeling" may be biased (tendentious) toward materialism, in their literal reference to the five senses. That's why I sometimes refer to "Reason" as a sixth sense. It's a way of knowing that is not limited to physical sensations. By that, I don't mean that Reason is Extra Sensory Perception in the mystical meaning of that term. But merely that the brain can produce abstract concepts from concrete experience : by metaphorically removing the material flesh from the immaterial bones. Reason goes beyond the physics of matter (meta-physics). So, Materialism is literally irrational in that it excludes the immaterial function that we call "Reason".↪Gnomon
Mental states, if they are equivalent to brain states, may be material. Abstractions generally are not material (IE they are not objects of the senses) but concepts, not physical, but conceptual. Calling such things "immaterial" is tendentious, in my view. — Janus
Yes. The materialistic Enlightenment era not only categorically rejected all Religious doctrines, it also rejected all philosophical beliefs that "go beyond" actual/factual descriptions of the world based on the five senses (meta-physics). It's such a categorical exclusion that makes calm reasoned discussions almost impossible, for those who wish to discuss anything that exists mentally but not materially : such as Consciousness or Monism.That's pertinent in many a thread. This is why I keep referring to Thomas Nagel's essay, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion, although it is often misconstrued as an apologetic for religion, which it isn't. What Nagel is saying, is that there are certain avenues of thought that are cut off because of their association with religious ideas. And it is very much relevant to the point you're making. — Wayfarer
Maybe the feeling, the seeing and the thinking are just physical processes, but not physical processes that we can understand in the "mechanical" way we understand some other physical processes. Perhaps it is our ability to understand some physical processes in a mechanical way that leads to the prejudice that all physical processes must be mechanical, and that therefore the experience of seeing, feeling and thinking cannot be physical because we cannot understand them in mechanical terms. — Janus
As you said, Abstractions are not material objects. Which is why they can be described as immaterial. I don't mean that mental images are Spiritual, but merely that they are Ideas or Theories or Generalizations that have left behind their material substance, and exist in the Mind as imaginary Concepts, not sensory Percepts. — Gnomon
:up: :up:Digestion is a material process which is not a material object.
Ideas, theories and generalizations only exist insofar as they are physically instantiated. — Janus
The Enlightenment era not only categorically rejected all Religious doctrines, it also rejected all philosophical beliefs that "go beyond" actual/factual descriptions of the world based on the five senses (meta-physics). — Gnomon
The Enlightenment era not only categorically rejected all Religious doctrines, it also rejected all philosophical beliefs that "go beyond" actual/factual descriptions of the world based on the five senses (meta-physics). — Gnomon
Since the prefix "im-" literally means "not", it follows that whatever is "not material" is literally "immaterial"*1. Yet apparently, those not-matter words have an unplatable implication for you. Perhaps, to you "immaterial" is equated with "unreal" or "spiritual", and "material" means "real" or "mundane". If so, your definition of "material" is even more metaphysical*2 than mine. Instead of those spooky notions though, I'm thinking in terms of reductive/pluralistic scientific categories, in which massive Matter is merely a condensed form of ethereal Energy (E=MC^2), or ultimately of elucidating Light.From the fact that abstractions are not material objects it does not follow that they are immaterial. They may be material processes. Digestion is a material process which is not a material object. — Janus
We seem to be in agreement on the material vs non-material question. But not on the emerging concept of Generic Information as the fundamental element of reality. That still emerging "science" grew out of Information theory & Quantum physics since the early 20th century. And due to the subject non-matter, it is still more philosophy than empirical science. So, I'll have to agree with your assessment that it's not "good science"--- meaning productive of hard goods, like Atomic Bombs & Cell Phones.And since you referenced information physics I'll just say I don't think it's good science at all. — Mark Nyquist
To my mind, simply put, material corresponds to instantiated (observable); physical corresponds to material system (configurable); and natural corresponds to physical structure (invariant). — 180 Proof
Since the prefix "im-" literally means "not", it follows that whatever is "not material" is literally "immaterial"*1. Yet apparently, those not-matter words have an unplatable implication for you. Perhaps, to you "immaterial" is equated with "unreal" or "spiritual", and "material" means "real" or "mundane". If so, your definition of "material" is even more metaphysical*2 than mine. Instead of those spooky notions though, I'm thinking in terms of reductive/pluralistic scientific categories, in which massive Matter is merely a condensed form of ethereal Energy (E=MC^2), or ultimately of elucidating Light. — Gnomon
Therein lies something of a problem. :wink: Where do you sit on the notion that maths is Platonic? As you know, some people maintain that logic and maths transcend physical reality. Would mathematical Platonism quality as immaterial? — Tom Storm
It exists only by fiat, as a set of agreements, has no material existence. — Wayfarer
When something is said to be material a common meaning is, as 180 Proof outlined above, that it is observable (or detectable in some way), and when something is said to be immaterial there are two common meanings: either that it doesn't exist or is unimportant, or that it exists in some way other than the material. — Janus
I don't know what it could mean to say that logic and maths transcend physical reality. Would it mean that they would still exist, even if nothing else existed? — Janus
Human babies develop a 'theory of mind' that is strongly correlated to their "publicly confirmable" observations of others' behaviors. As for one's own "consciousness", or subjectivity, I think it is only assumed and not observed (any more than an eye sees itself seeing). My "publicly confirmable" behavior strongly correlates to others' 'theory of mind' as applied to me (and one another) and, on the basis of the persistent circumstantial evidence, I don't have any observational grounds to doubt or disbelieve that I am (at least, occasionally) "conscious". Do you? As far as I'm concerned, 'eliminativism' is only a research paradigm which treats "consciousness" as a counterintuitive "user-illusion" that deconstructs the incorrigible basis – "conscious" – of our folk psychology (i.e. practical woo) in order to publicly investigate (an) objective physical structure of subjective information processing (i.e. experience).On the other hand, if we each know from experience that we are conscious, then it must also be observable in another sense, the difference being that this other kind of observation is not publicly confirmable. — Janus
It would mean that at least some of the primitive terms of both of those would be the same in all possible worlds, that if intelligent life evolved elsewhere, it would still be obliged to recognise the law the excluded middle and the notion of 'equals', for instance. — Wayfarer
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