In the cause of physical brains, the brain state will be the configuration required to instantiate non-physical mental content. — Mark Nyquist
.. informed by modern information / computational theory. I stand by my earlier dismissal of Aristotle's cosmological argument as a pedantic aside by you, MU, that misses Fooloso4's conceptually salient forest for your anachronistic trees. — 180 Proof
Back on the topic of monism - I'm convinced that the original monist systems were derived from 'the unitive vision' in, for example, Plotinus. — Wayfarer
The argument against it is that it somehow has to posit that these neuological states are at once physical and semantic, i.e. meaning-encoding. — Wayfarer
One line of argument against that is a variation of what is known as 'the argument from reason'. This says that, whatever we understand 'brain states' to be, if we are arguing that they are physical in nature, then they're incommensurable with propositional content (incommensurable meaning not able to be judged by the same standards; having no common standard of measurement.) Why? Because propositional content is wholly dependent on the relationship of ideas and if-then statements - if this is the case, then that is so. Any arguments relying on rational inference or logical syllogisms make use of something like this, and are instances of logical necessity - that is [x] is the case, then it must also be that [y]. But physical causation is of a different order to logical necessity. — Wayfarer
In the cause of physical brains, the brain state will be the configuration required to instantiate non-physical mental content. — Mark Nyquist
But the challenge is, how can any kind of 'either/or' thinking or logical argument, in general, be explained in terms of the kinds of physical causation that characterises brain states? — Wayfarer
In the cause of physical brains, the brain state will be the configuration required to instantiate non-physical mental content.
— Mark Nyquist
So, how to validate that statement is what is at issue. How do you think you could ascertain the empirical fact of that statement, on the basis of neuroscience. — Wayfarer
:up: :up:Another point is that even though causality and propositionality (or causes and reasons) might seem incommensurable to us that can be, as Spinoza says, on account of looking at the one thing from two different incommensurable perspectives and may not reflect on the nature of physical processes, but rather on our naive understanding of them, or our dualistic "either/ or" kind of thinking. — Janus
Well, they don't cash counterfeit idealism at my local bank. :smirk:Promissory materialism, then. — Wayfarer
People adopt them on account of what seems most plausible to them, but as I keep saying, that will depend on what one's own set of unargued premises or presuppositions are. — Janus
Monism is the belief that the variety of things in the world can be traced back to a single Origin or Substance or Cause. That is exactly what the Enformationism thesis attempts to do. The First Cause in that case is, not a person, place, or thing, but the creative power to enform. Presumably, it is empowered to create both material forms, such as stars, planets & rocks; and immaterial forms, such as rational minds --- from the same original source : Unrealized Potential. Since UP is not something that we experience in the real world, we can only conjecture about it. That's what Plato & Aristotle did with their First Cause (creator) and Prime Mover (causal energy) theories. It's something to think about, but being un-real, any such Monistic Origin cannot be scientifically-proven to exist, only philosophically shown to be plausible.Since Monism, as it exists on this forum, has failed to provide any coherent theory of information, a test of functionality should by applied.
Something like the ability to derive pi could be used. — Mark Nyquist
One definition of Monism is "a theory or doctrine that denies the existence of a distinction or duality in some sphere, such as that between matter and mind, or God and the world". If there is no ultimate distinction between Matter & Mind, then the duality we conceive must be missing some essence that is the same in both aspects of the world. In the Enformationism thesis, that ultimate essence is the power to create from scratch : to Enform (to give Actual form to formless Potential). We get glimpses of that creative power in : a> information as Energy ; DNA information ; Quantum information ; and Shannon information*3. All are capable of transforming one thing into another : Energy into Mass ; DNA into proteins ; Quantum fields of potential into actual particles of matter ; and meaningless Shannon information (data) into meaningful concepts (ideas) in human minds.This actually makes things easier for the Monism model to deal with. No longer do you have multiple definitions of information but only one.
At this point, Monism only has the single problem of how brains do it. — Mark Nyquist
Apparently, you are talking about material Form (substance) that is visible to the eye, while I am referring to immaterial Form (meaning). The philosophical First Cause, that I talk about, existed prior to all contingent causes, such as the Big Bang*1. So, there was nothing (no material things, no physical forms, no brains) to see at that point in pre-time*2. Your skepticism seems to be due to a common communication barrier on the forum : when one is talking about Physics and the other about Philosophy. :smile:We deal with the formless but not without our physical brains.
I have to be sceptical of your idea that the formless could be a first cause because the only way we see it at work is in our brains. So how could the formless exist pre DNA, pre biological brains? DNA is a special case of something that controls it's own environment but not anything close to information as it exists in our brains. — Mark Nyquist
From a Materialist perspective, the concept of "Potential"*1 is not just counterintuitive, but unreal : either a thing is real, or it's not. But Plato was an Idealist, so the notion of something-from-nothing could make sense, if that "field" of nothingness*2 had the hypothetical power of Potential. To non-idealists that sounds like Mysticism. But quantum pioneers were faced with making physical sense of squirrely subatomic systems that wouldn't commit to a meaningful position or momentum until measured by an outside agency. The Copenhagen Interpretation of that non-sense was a compromise between theory & practice. Although the Superposition principle*3 --- described by a statistical wave-function --- seems to be super-natural, in practice repeated experiments confirmed the mathematical existence of that strange state of formless (statistical, mathematical, potential, immaterial) quasi-being.I try to follow your arguments the best I can. I still don't see how nothing can become the physical universe based on formless potential. — Mark Nyquist
Yes. What's logically missing from the Big Bang theory is a pre-existing Causal Agency of some kind. Most BB theorists just assume as an axiom (without evidence) that Causal Energy & Natural Laws existed prior to the beginning of space-time, as we know it. I agree. But, for my own philosophical purposes, I refer to that combination of Causation & Organization as EnFormAction.I try to follow your arguments the best I can. I still don't see how nothing can become the physical universe based on formless potential.
I don't have an answer to that.
Nothing...big bang...physical universe, seems something is logically missing in that simple model.
Can you give reasons formless potential in the non-physical could lead to physical matter? — Mark Nyquist
Yes. The concept of "something from nothing" is radically counter-intuitive. But scientists, such as Gleiser seem to be using the word "nothing" with tongue in cheek. However, a mathematical Quantum Field is as close-to-nothing as you can get for an empirical scientist. Some physicists still insist that a Quantum Field is made-up of particles. But then they offer a paradoxical label --- Virtual (almost real) particles --- for those supposed bits of matter*3. Yet, Gleiser clarifies that his "Nothing in the Void" is not actual tangible Matter, but intangible mathematical "Vacuum Energy" (which we perceive only in its effects). So, I'll let you ponder the puzzle of the somethingness of Energy : is it a qualia or a quanta?.I read your references and I still have trouble even having an opinion. All I see is problems when we propose materialism or monism especially when it comes to a first cause. Your reference mentioned the void might not really be nothing. I'm still considering that — Mark Nyquist
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