An interesting read. Recent discussions on TPF about definitions at the beginnings of philosophical arguments needing to be precise or left in some wobbly state demonstrate the tendency of the discipline to subside into the babbling of an academic brook.

We seem to be more concerned right now about whether we’re living in a virtual reality than whether we’re living in a text.

Speculations in science - even science fantasy - become a more attractive if not reasonable intellectual adventure than parsing sentences.

I was disappointed that it didn't actually describe any “post-linguistic turn,” didn't elaborate on the statement in the subheading that “new questions have arisen”--except to very briefly mention environmental issues and virtual reality--and didn't say anything about the basis on which the linguistic turn is being overcome. I was hoping it would go into the return of metaphysics in both analytic and continental philosophy.

Also, note that it ignores phenomenology, existentialism, and critical theory, which were concerned much more with experience, life, and society than with language. On the other hand, I guess maybe that by 1967, post-structuralism had become dominant, and represented a rejection of those philosophies.

Also, note that it ignores phenomenology, existentialism, and critical theory, which were concerned much more with life and society than with language. On the other hand, I guess maybe that by 1967, post-... — Jamal

The 'original' Husserlian phenomenology in fact was much concerned with language. Husserl's Logical Investigations was mostly about the difference between signification and intuition i.e. meanings or expressions vs. intuitive-perceptual comprehension or 'fulfillment' of the sense. Derrida's grammatological semiology or general 'graphology' is a critique of these thoughts (combined with the critique of modern linguistics and its 'phonocentrism'). Derrida in fact criticized structuralist semiology for which everything was analogical to the language as the modern linguistics saw it?

The 'original' Husserlian phenomenology in fact w a s concerned with language. Husserl's Logical Investigations was mostly about the difference between signification and intuition i.e. meanings or expressions vs. intuitive-perceptual comprehension or 'fulfillment' of the sense. — waarala

Good point, although in the same book he does say that he wants to get away from “mere words” and “back to the things themselves.” That’s not to say that getting away from “mere words” is to get away from language as such, or that the things themselves are necessarily pre-linguistic, but maybe it does show that his concerns were wider than just language.

Yes, somewhere Husserl speaks about 'parallelity' of these. He is obviously striving for a true identity. Adequate relation between meanings and object or thing itself (Gegendstand). He is conscious of all the problems and challenges involved here though. 'Mere meanings' are at least an existing fact. And the n o n-attainment of the fulfillment of the sense is a 'normal case' too.

.” That’s not to say that getting away from “mere words” — Jamal

An interesting development is the ability of AI to learn new languages, very quickly.

There is the example of AI, 'trained,' via all available fmri (Functional magnetic resonance imaging) scans done on human brains.
If an fmri scan is done on hungry humans, then the exact same bits of the brain 'light up' in every human to indicate that they are hungry.
Recent AI testing has been done, whereby, a human looks at say a photo of a giraffe and an fmri of their brain is taken. The fmri scan is then fed into the AI system, which then tries to reproduce the image, by analysing the fmri scan, based on it's stored knowledge base. The results have been quite spectacular.

So if such an AI system was fitted with a technology, that could scan all the brains in a room of humans, it could reproduce quite a lot of their thoughts.
In time, AI will be able to read your mind, is the projected capability. I just find it fascinating that fmri scans, could be turned into a new language.

If we have some future version of Elon Musk's neuralink type tech/physical input port, connected to our brains, could we store a future AI system on it that can scan other peoples minds, and tell us what they are thinking.
A possible future route to human telepathy? :gasp:
According to the Tristan Harris and Asa Raskin video I posted in one of my own recent threads, the ability of AI to reproduce a good representation of a photo, a human is looking at, via an fmri scan of their brain state at the time, is currently a viable system. The system can also produce a textual or even simulated verbal description of the photo the human is looking at, without the AI 'seeing' the photo directly.

Impressive.

Most impressive! But let's not go all Star Wars again, or my next words HAVE to be

'but you are not a Jedi yet!' :zip:

Recent AI testing has been done...


Even more recent...

https://www.eedesignit.com/oh-no-ai-now-reads-minds/

An interesting article thanks! I wonder how long protections such as:

The researchers addressed questions about the potential misuse of the technology. Decoding worked only with cooperative participants who had participated willingly in training the decoder. If the decoder had not been trained, results were unintelligible, and if participants on whom the decoder had been trained later resisted or thought other thoughts, results were also unusable.

will last!

Concludes that the linguistic turn might have had its day. :scream: — Wayfarer

He reaches this conclusion only in the last couple paragraphs, with no justification other than that , yes, there is a real material world outside our our discursive schemes.So that ‘s what this superficial piece is about. It caricatures a wealth of recent philosophy as examples of a ‘linguistic turn’ , which it misreads as semiological structuralism, and then sets up this straw man for demolition.

It is just one more addition to the slag heap of reactionary philosophy thinking that it has spied a way ‘beyond’ postmodernism , poststructuralism and any other ism that seems to want to swalllow up the real world within our schemes. We’ve already seen similar claims, first by the New Philosophers in France , and more recently by the New Materialists, Speculative Realists and Object Oriented Ontology. These are not a step forward but a regressive move backward. In order to go beyond a way of thinking, you first have to demonstrate a proper understanding of it.

These are not a step forward but a regressive move backward. In order to go beyond a way of thinking, you first have to demonstrate a proper understanding of it. — Joshs

Do you think there's a serious attempt at understanding and he got it wrong or do you think that other factors may be at play (deliberate misreading, etc)?

In order to go beyond a way of thinking, you first have to demonstrate a proper understanding of it. — Joshs

Fair enough. What I got from the essay was an overview of the origin and significance of the focus on language as constituting a large proportion of philosophy. I hadn’t really been aware of that emphasis when I started posting on forums.

"In order to go beyond a way of thinking, you first have to demonstrate a proper understanding of it."


This seems to me a prima facie false statement. Do you have an argument for it?

Do I need a "proper understanding" of ancient Greek cosmology in order to go beyond it? What does "proper understanding" even mean in such a case? Or to ask it another way, did Einstein need a proper understanding of luminiferous aether to go beyond it?

No offense intended, but your statement strikes me as something a member of a priesthood might say, in an attempt to cow anyone who might suggest it might be reasonable to dismiss the priesthood's theobabble.


"An interesting article thanks! I wonder how long protections such as:

The researchers addressed questions about the potential misuse of the technology. Decoding worked only with cooperative participants who had participated willingly in training the decoder. If the decoder had not been trained, results were unintelligible, and if participants on whom the decoder had been trained later resisted or thought other thoughts, results were also unusable.

will last!"

Speaking as an electrical engineer, with a long time interest in the uniqueness of brains, I'm quite confident that without the AI having been trained on a specific individual's brain, the AI would not be able to decode that individual's linguistic thought.

However, in cases where a more advanced AI:
1) had been trained to decode a specific individual's thoughts
2) had the ability to provide input to the individual (spoken word, images, video, etc.) in an attempt to 'interrogate' the individual's thinking
...I wouldn't be too confident that the individual would be able to thoroughly prevent the AI from learning something that the individual didn't want known.

This seems to me a prima facie false statement. Do you have an argument for it? — wonderer1

Here is the author’s key contention:

“In the new millennium, to take one example of the transformed terrain, environmental issues came to be central in a way that seemed to render linguistic constructionism irrelevant or seemed simply to suggest its falsity. Though discourse has many roles in helping create carbon emissions, for example, it’s the material interactions of particles, whether known or unknown to anyone, narrated or not, that is the heart of the problem. Any philosophy that seemed to undermine the reality of the natural world, or make it a malleable human artefact, has come to feel potentially destructive. Indeed, scholars’ obsession with linguistic interpretation, their notion that everyone has always experienced the world as though reading a book, came to seem at a certain point to be an artefact of privilege, as well as fundamentally implausible.“

The writer’s claim here is not based on empirical fact , from which vantage he could render linguistic constructivism “false”, as he suggests, but a philosophical presupposition. He is wedded to a form of realism and this colors his reading of a variety of authors as ‘undermining reality’. Of course , postmodern authors are also operating out of a set of presuppositions , but at least they don’t fool themselves into believing this dispute is a matter of what is true or false. It is a clash of worldviews.

No offense intended, but your statement strikes me as something a member of a priesthood might say, in an attempt to cow anyone who might suggest it might be reasonable to dismiss the priesthood's theobabble. — wonderer1

No offense taken, I’ve heard this line many times. It’s kind of a standard meme among those hostile to postmodern philosophies. Authors like Derrida , Focault and Deleuze supposedly use a deliberately obscurantist style to create a cult of personalty and a horde of blindly unquestioning devotees.
That does t fly with me. I’ve studied these authors for years. It’s very hard work, but rewarding due to the brilliance and originality of their ideas. Perhaps the babbling you’re hearing is a result of your tone deafness to unfamiliar paths of thinking.

The article assumes a divide between language and the study of what exists which ignores how the problem of language has always been central to the concerns of philosophers.

In Plato's Cratylus, there is the conclusion that names are not natural products but the result of a lot of talking. In Phaedrus, the introduction ot text is said to leave out an important dimension of live dialogue. The validity of arguments throughout the dialogues generates more questions than they answer.

Aristotle's development of logic and how it collides with the processes he wants to understand in 'the world of the becoming' is the central task of his Metaphysics. A lot of his style of criticism involves having statements cancel each other out.

Hegel's Logic is, in one sense, a grammar. It is like Aristotle's Metaphysics in the way it specifies the use of words.

I could go on in this vein but want to avoid becoming tiresome.

As a result, I think the 'history of philosophy' view that we are in a place is dubious.

.

The article assumes a divide between language and the study of what exists which ignores how the problem of language has always been central to the concerns of philosophers. — Paine

I didn't post it as an authoritative reference, but as a useful sketch of how 'the linguistic turn' assumed such prominence in 20th century philosophical discourse. I myself feel from my many years of participation in forums that the restriction of the scope of philosophy to what can be clearly stated is often a way of dodging important philosophical concerns.

Concludes that the linguistic turn might have had its day. — Wayfarer

If so, then only because it is by now ubiquitous.

By finishing his account of analytic philosophy on Rorty and Goodman, Sartwell leans overly towards an antirealism that is only a minority view. The notion captured in the opening quote "There is nothing outside the text", is not representative of analytic philosophy.

I did not mean to put words in your mouth. I hear what you are saying about the limits of definitive statements. I am wondering how that activity is specific to a problem we are having now seen side by side with people having the problem at other times.

Even though my knowledge is sketchy, I'm more drawn to European than Anglo philosophy on the whole. I really don't like the Oxbridge types.

I am wondering how that activity is specific to a problem we are having now seen side by side with people having the problem at other times. — Paine

Very interesting question. Other historic epochs had, as it were, very different worlds. Perhaps you could say different 'meaning worlds' - that is, the background understanding was so different that the same words carried very different meanings. Which is something that I think today's realist epistemologies can't accomodate.

I have never understood how exactly words are meant to map onto reality. Is it a map-territory relation issue? People like Rorty, I believe, hold that language is not reality, but it is used by us to construct a reality - truth then is just about language doing something, but never involves a reality outside of this or, by implication, outside of us. Do words even point to reality? All of this is elementary Saussurean structuralism, I guess, but I have no good answer to these matters. You?

Me? No, not particularly. There are elements I've picked up from here and various other forums. I'm interested in the subject of how predication relates to universals, and the ontological status of abstract objects such as number. I'm also interested in biosemiosis since Apokrisis came along. As said, I've never warmed to the 'ordinary language' approach characteristic of analytic philosophy. It's jejune.

Perhaps the babbling you’re hearing is a result of your tone deafness to unfamiliar paths of thinking.


Nope that wouldn't be it. I'm autistic, and a bit savantish, and quite familiar with unfamiliar paths of thinking. Paths of thinking that don't involve words among them. ;-)

and a bit savantish, — wonderer1

Isn't that like being a bit pregnant? Sorry - couldn't help it... :wink:

Isn't that like being a bit pregnant? Sorry - couldn't help it... :wink:
2 minutes ago


Well... There have been many times when it has been a bit like there was something big inside me that I wanted to push out, but the linear structure of language provided a painfully narrow orifice through which to do so. So maybe so. ;)

I know the feeling. :cool:

Then it is a disparity that, on the increasingly rare occasions of your putting together an argument, your predominant method is analytic.

Why thanks, kind of.

If there would be logic to this, wouldn't the "post-post philosophy" simply be the old philosophy again, in some developed form?

And we are no longer a planet awash in newsprint, but a world of imagery and image-text hybrids of sorts not covered in the Tractatus. We seem to be more concerned right now about whether we’re living in a virtual reality than whether we’re living in a text. That all sorts of new questions have arisen, however, demands new reflection, but also makes possible new histories. As Hegel observed, you can’t really tell the story of something until it starts winding down.

This feels a bit shallow. Or the familiar cry of "Our time now is so unique, that old things don't cover it".

But then again I'm not a professional philosopher.

Concludes that the linguistic turn might have had its day.
— Wayfarer

If so, then only because it is by now ubiquitous. — Banno

Well, not entirely so, I fear.

I think the methods of analytic philosophy and OLP are useful and will remain with us as long as efforts are made to speak, write and think carefully and critically in an effort to curb, or perhaps discipline, the results of our efforts to obtain special insight merely by a kind of deep, intuitive consideration of things, ideas and concepts in abstract and without context, i.e. thinking about something really hard (contemplation).

Pretty cool, eh?