But your approach would also fit ↪Wayfarer's love-hate relationship with analytic approaches. — Banno
My critique is of Sartwell, not of you. — Banno
Sure, there are various positions. The issue here is that Sartwell would have us think that antirealism is a consensus in analytic philosophy. It isn't; quite the opposite. — Banno
An intermediate sort of lightweight realism has also developed, holding that while there are
objective answers to ontological questions, these answers are somehow shallow or trivial, perhaps reflecting conceptual truths rather than the furniture of the world. Deflationary views of this sort have been developed by Hirsch (1993; this volume), Thomasson (this volume), Wright and Hale (2001; this volume), and others. These views contrast with what we might call the heavyweight realism of Fine, Sider, van Inwagen, and others, according to which answers to ontological questions are highly nontrivial, and reflect the ultimate furniture of the world
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