From that SEP article, the reference to Quine " Rather, there is simply no such thing as that to which our words refer."

Is pretty much my own encapsulation of why "Bachelor' is so problematic as a referent. As @Janus pointed out, just exactly "what" is marriage? The convention is imprecise really. Is it the ceremony? Is it the signing of a document? Is it the belief of others that the person is married? Is it what the people who are getting married believe? And on and on.

I think Kripke tries to sidestep this problem with his "all possible worlds" notion. Clever, but as we are seeing, possibly problematic. Certainly it seems so for "bachelor", but even for his more prototypical example of a Proper Name, it could get a bit dicey as to if the name really holds. I guess Kripke would say something like, "Even if John were completely replaced (Ship of Theseus), because there is no substance but rather, it is causally linked to something, it remains a rigid designator to the reference (read that as something akin to an "open set" that is causally linked to something)."

Kripke also runs into the problem that in order for his "modal logic" to work, he needs the concept of causality to be necessary and not contingent (very Kantian actually). But in all possible worlds, does this have to hold true in reality? I guess to Kripke, this point doesn't matter because the necessity of human understanding itself needs causality for all possible worlds (that is my interpretation at least).

My point being that, the very fact of such mechanisms discounts convention-only theories of language acquisition...Thus, nativists and empiricists are both right. — schopenhauer1

I totally agree. I understand certain primitive concepts as innate, such as the colour red, pain , etc. We then use these primitive concepts to build complex concepts based on our observations of the world, such as governments, mountains, etc.

Without the foundation of primitive concepts, the building of complex concepts would fall down.

I totally agree. I understand certain primitive concepts as innate, such as the colour red, pain , etc. We then use these primitive concepts to build complex concepts based on our observations of the world, such as governments, mountains, etc. — RussellA

:up:

Without the foundation of primitive concepts, the building of complex concepts would fall down. — RussellA

Yes, I just think it goes back to what counts as a "concept". Are primitive concepts concepts, or are they just primitive epistemological tools? I know this sounds a bit pedantic but might have implications for language. That is to say, "recognizing red" and the "concept of red" could be two different things (even as a primitive concept), no? For example, red might need to be embedded with other things like "green (or any other color)", or associated with "red object" for the primitive a priori phenomena to be a concept that "red" has "aboutness" in some tokenized, discrete, "mind-object".

Would the thing that we've named the "Eiffel Tower" be located in the place that we've named "Paris" if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out?
— creativesoul

Yes.

We observe something in the world and then name it "The Eiffel Tower". This something existed before we named it. As this something existed before being named, its existence doesn't depend on being named.

Similarly, we observe somewhere in the world and then name it "Paris". This somewhere existed before we named it. As this somewhere existed before being named, its existence doesn't depend on being named.

As both the something that has been named "The Eiffel Tower" and the somewhere that has been named "Paris" can exist without a name, they can continue to exist even if there was no one around to name them. — RussellA

Okay.

Would "The Eiffel Tower is located in France" be true if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out?

Are primitive concepts concepts, or are they just primitive epistemological tools? — schopenhauer1

I think of concepts more as a metaphor than a literal physical thing.

Metaphor? Can you explain? Do you mean simply that it is an ambiguous concept (ironically) :smile:?

Yeah, it is tricky defining concepts. One can argue as you seem to that qualia and forms (like roundness) are indeed concepts. But someone else might argue that these are proto-concepts. They are materials with which the concepts are created. Concepts are one step beyond, whereby there is a recognition of an object. The primitive might be something like, "Our brains perceive roundness". That THIS object is round, seems to be closer to the more "indexed" (or "tokenized") notion of a concept. Or perhaps just the recognition, "All balls are round" too. Abstractions and instantations.

Edit: Just riffing on my own idea.. There is an intermediary now that I think of it.. Ball-round is just an immediate understanding where "this ball" doesn't matter, just the immediate recognition. Thus in a sentence, "This ball is round" it is immediate that this is analytic upon no reflection. It is simply an externalization of the internal.

Would "The Eiffel Tower is located in France" be true if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out? — creativesoul

Is "ya mnara lipo nchi" true if there is no one who knows what it means. If no one knows its meaning, then it isn't a language, it's an object like a pebble, and as a pebble cannot be true or false.

Similarly, "the Eiffel Tower is located in France" would no longer be a language, it would become an object, and just like a pebble, cannot be considered as either true or false.

Metaphor? Can you explain? — schopenhauer1

It could be argued that any understanding we have is metaphorical. Some theorists have suggested that metaphors are not merely stylistic, but that they are cognitively important as well. In Metaphors We Live By, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argue that metaphors are pervasive in everyday life, not just in language, but also in thought and action. Cognitive linguists emphasize that metaphors serve to facilitate the understanding of one's conceptual domain, typically an abstraction such as "life", "theories" or "ideas" through expressions that relate to another, more familiar conceptual domain, typically more concrete, such as "journey", "buildings" or "food".

For example, metaphors are commonly used in science, such as: evolution by natural selection, F = ma, the wave theory of light, DNA is the code of life, the genome is the book of life, gravity, dendritic branches, Maxwell's Demon, Schrödinger’s cat, Einstein’s twins, greenhouse gas, the battle against cancer, faith in a hypothesis, the miracle of consciousness, the gift of understanding, the laws of physics, the language of mathematics, deserving an effective mathematics, etc.

For example, within your own post one could say that the following are more metaphorical than literal: tricky, one can argue, created, one step beyond, primitive, indexed, tokenized, notion, abstractions, instantiations, riffing, idea, intermediary, analytic, reflection, externalization of the internal.

I observe something in the world that is round, but the Nominalist and Conceptualist would argue that roundness doesn't exist in the world, only in the mind. They would say that what I actually observe is one particular instantiation of roundness. In fact, nothing in the world can be exactly round, the most would be an approximation of roundness.

It is still the case, however, that I observe something round, even though no round thing can exist in the world. Therefore, the roundness that I am observing can only exist in the mind as an abstraction, as a concept. Merriam Webster lists abstraction as a synonym for concept.

I can name my concept of roundness as "round" and make the statement "I see a round ball", knowing that what I am referring to doesn't actually exist in the world but only in my mind.

Yes, I am somewhat familiar in passing with Lakoff's idea of metaphor. Something to think about for sure! I'd have to look to see how deep the studies are on it though. However, aren't some of the metaphors pretty complex in and of itself? Are the metaphors supposed to reduce to very primitive ones?

I observe something in the world that is round, but the Nominalist and Conceptualist would argue that roundness doesn't exist in the world, only in the mind. They would say that what I actually observe is one particular instantiation of roundness. In fact, nothing in the world can be exactly round, the most would be an approximation of roundness. — RussellA

Indeed, I'd agree with this mainly. How could it be that judgements such as "round" exist outside an interpretation of such? The thing just "is". How can properties be said to be instantiated in the object and not the mind? The ball has the potential to be actualized as round I guess. Properties need some sort of interpretant, so it seems that (only theoretically) a ball exists (as an event of some sort in space/time), and that (only in potentiality) it can have properties.

I will throw this out there, Speculative Realist, Graham Harman had an interesting idea of "vicarious properties" and "withdrawness". That is to say, humans really do "see" a small portion of the essence of an object, but that the object is always withdrawn or "hidden" besides the vicarious properties of objects it interacts with. This goes for human-object or object-object interactions. However, the idea of "vicarious properties" (properties that objects can share or relate to other objects with) seems a bit ad hoc. I don't know his theory well enough though. If there are any Speculative Realists in the house, please provide some more details.

My argument that "bachelor is an unmarried man" is analytic because:

1) Before it can be decided whether "a bachelor is an unmarried man" is analytic or synthetic, the meaning of the words in the statement must be known.

2) We know that the set of words "unmarried" and "man" have been named "bachelor".

3) So knowing that the set "unmarried" and "men" has been named "bachelor", we know just by virtue of the meaning of the words alone that "bachelors are unmarried men" is an analytic statement.

Is there a flaw in my logic ? — RussellA

We know that the meanings of the terms 'bachelor' and 'unmarried' man were considered to be synonymous, when it was perhaps considered unthinkable that a man would live with a woman out of wedlock. Are they still synonymous?
So, a couple of questions: is the statement: "a dog is a mammal" analytic? Can analytic statements be ambiguous?

:up:

Would "The Eiffel Tower is located in France" be true if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out?
— creativesoul

Is "ya mnara lipo nchi" true if there is no one who knows what it means. If no one knows its meaning, then it isn't a language, it's an object like a pebble, and as a pebble cannot be true or false.

Similarly, "the Eiffel Tower is located in France" would no longer be a language, it would become an object, and just like a pebble, cannot be considered as either true or false. — RussellA

So, would "The Eiffel Tower is located in France" still be be meaningful if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out, but it could not be true or false because no one would know it's meaning, or would it no longer be meaningful at all?

So, would "The Eiffel Tower is located in France" still be be meaningful if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out, but it could not be true or false because no one would know it's meaning, or would it no longer be meaningful at all? — creativesoul

Consider "ya mnara lipo nchi". This object has no meaning until some one gives it a meaning. If there is no one to give it a meaning, it cannot have a meaning. As with a pebble, which is neither true not false, if "ya mnara lipo nchi" has no meaning, it cannot be either true or false. Similarly with "The Eiffel Tower is located in France".

Therefore, both will be true. As there would be no one around, i) it could not be true or false because no one would know it's meaning and ii) it would no longer be meaningful.

is the statement: "a dog is a mammal" analytic? — Janus

The meanings of words can change. For example, a dog can mean a domesticated mammal or it can mean a terrible film.

If a dog means a domesticated mammal, then the statement "a dog is a mammal" is analytic, whereas, if a dog means a terrible film, then the statement "a dog is a mammal" is not analytic.

IE, even though the same word may have different meanings, it is still possible for some statements, such as "a dog is a mammal" to be analytic.

Can analytic statements be ambiguous? — Janus

The Merriam Webster defines analytic as "being a proposition (such as "no bachelor is married") whose truth is evident from the meaning of the words it contains". The Cambridge dictionary defines analytic as "(of a statement) true only because of the meanings of the words, without referring to facts or experience"

There is some ambiguity between these definitions of analytic

IE, even though the definition of analytic may be ambiguous, given a particular definition, the analytic expression itself cannot be ambiguous.

Are the metaphors supposed to reduce to very primitive ones? — schopenhauer1

Perhaps the advantage of a metaphor is that it doesn't need to be reduced to more primitive ones, but allows understanding by relating a complex abstract concept to more familiar concrete ones.

For example, I may be perplexed by the concept of gravity, but I feel I have some understanding by observing one snooker ball rotating around a football on a sheet of rubber stretching under their weight.

How can properties be said to be instantiated in the object and not the mind? ..........................That is to say, humans really do "see" a small portion of the essence of an object, but that the object is always withdrawn or "hidden" besides the vicarious properties of objects it interacts with. — schopenhauer1

As I see it, I observe something having the properties round, green and sweet and name it "apple".

When I observe the object apple, I am observing a set of properties, in that if each property was removed one by one, once all the properties had been removed, there would be nothing left.

It is not the case that the properties round, green and sweet are instantiated in the object apple, rather, the object apple is an instantiation of the properties round, green and sweet

It is not the case that an object has an essence hidden behind the properties of the object , rather, the essence of an object is its set of properties, in that if all the properties were removed, neither an essence nor an object would remain .

Bradley questioning the nature of properties. He started with the example of a lump of sugar. He noted that there appears to be such a thing as a lump of sugar and this thing appears to have qualities such as whiteness, sweetness, and hardness. But, asked Bradley, what is this “thing” that bears properties? On the one hand, he thinks it is odd to assume that there is something to the lump of sugar beside its several qualities, thus implying that postulating a property-less bearer of properties is incoherent. On the other hand, he notes that the lump cannot merely be its qualities either, since the latter must somehow be united. For Bradley, the unity properties presupposes relations, which is why he went on to question our concept of relations.

The alternative is that the apple supervenes on its properties, in that the apple has an essence which is more than the sum of its properties. But how this is possible needs to be justified.

If the property of roundness was instantiated in the object in the world rather than existed in the mind as a concept, as nothing in the world can be exactly round, how can roundness be instantiated in the world if no instantiation of roundness is possible in the world.

So it could be reworded to show that the statement in this case is about the word rather than about bachelors: “‘bachelor’ means ‘unmarried man’”. This is synthetic (as I’m supposing all definitions are) and it follows from it that “all bachelors are unmarried men” is analytically true. — Jamal

Is there a difference between saying that "bachelor" means "unmarried man" and saying that a bachelor is an unmarried man?

Formally yes--one is about "bachelor", the other is about bachelors--but practically I'm supposing that the latter, if it's ever said, usually just functions to tell people what the word means, which is why it's fair to reword it to refer to the word instead of the thing.

I think the most sensical approach so far is simple concepts?

But I'd still prefer to just use English rather than simple concepts -- it seems like English is expressive enough to make sense of simple concepts and complex concepts. Maybe there's some I-language in there somewhere, but does it have anything to do with analyticity? Is "Red is a color" an analytic statement? Why is "color" considered simple, or "line" considered simple, when these are more like rarified bits of experience which require reflection and interpretation? Are necessity and contingency simples? How do we make non-arbitrary choices on basic concepts?


This is neat:

@RussellA would both eat the cake that all sentences are true by convention while keeping the cake that some sentences are true by the meaning of their terms. — Banno

If we accept that analytic statements are analytic on the basis of convention then we accept that they are, at the same time, not going to have anything philosophically interesting about them. That "A is A" isn't a truth for logicians, but a feature of a particular way of arranging language logic-wise.

As regards the statement "bachelors are unmarried men", it is not possible to know whether it is analytic or synthetic until first knowing the meanings of the words used, in the same way that it is not possible to know whether the statement "moja ndio si ndoa mwanadamu" is analytic or synthetic until knowing the meanings of the words used.

Therefore, the first task is to know what the words mean. — RussellA

We must know the meaning, of course. But do we build a meaning from the individual words? What are the tokens of meaning? Why not sentences? Why not gestures?

To know if P is analytic we must know not just P, not just the meanings of the words (think of bi-lingual dictionaries and how little they tell you) -- but we must know the language those words are in. Language allows us to interpret symbols, which is how we come to know meaning. And no sentence stands outside of context, even the ones we're using here. (It is a philosophical context, but still)

Let's just grant the I-language of simple concepts and what-have-you. Somehow this allows us to use an E-language. The examples of analytic statements aren't in terms of simple concepts, though -- they're in E-language. And it seems you agree there's an element of convention in the E-language.

Isn't analyticity on the side of E-language, rather than I-language?

If we accept that analytic statements are analytic on the basis of convention then we accept that they are, at the same time, not going to have anything philosophically interesting about them. — Moliere

As the meaning of every word in language derives from convention, in what other way can a statement be analytic if not by convention.

Let's just grant the I-language of simple concepts and what-have-you. Somehow this allows us to use an E-language. The examples of analytic statements aren't in terms of simple concepts, though -- they're in E-language. And it seems you agree there's an element of convention in the E-language. Isn't analyticity on the side of E-language, rather than I-language? — Moliere

When driving through a busy city, I don't have time to put all my thoughts into words taken from my E-language. Yet, I couldn't successfully navigate the streets and other traffic without being aware of complex concepts existing within my I-language,

Chomsky in New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind seemed to argue that not only are there complex concepts in the I-language but that they are also innate. I can understand primitive concepts being innate and complex concepts learnt but would agree that both are within our I-language.

If analyticity requires complex concepts, and complex concepts exist within the I-language, then analyticity can also exist within the I-language.

As the meaning of every word in language derives from convention, in what other way can a statement be analytic if not by convention. — RussellA

So far I've thought convention, as in stipulation, is the only way -- so it's trivial.

Though I'm not sure meaning is entirely conventional, either. At least not in the same way that analytic statements are. Here they are conventional because there's no criteria for deciding if a sentence is analytic other than to say "Here is the set of analytic statements"

When driving through a busy city, I don't have time to put all my thoughts into words taken from my E-language. Yet, I couldn't successfully navigate the streets and other traffic without being aware of complex concepts existing within my I-language,

Chomsky in New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind seemed to argue that not only are there complex concepts in the I-language but that they are also innate. I can understand primitive concepts being innate and complex concepts learnt but would agree that both are within our I-language.

If analyticity requires complex concepts, and complex concepts exist within the I-language, then analyticity can also exist within the I-language. — RussellA

How about like this -- if the only way we can express our I-language is through E-language, as we are doing in this thread, then what does "I-language" add?

It seems we're still stuck with E-language in determining analyticity, right?

Maybe another way to put it --

Another meta-lingual category is rhyming. Time and rhyme rhyme, but that they do so is a convention of what rhyming is.

Rhyming focuses on sound synonymy. Analyticity focuses on meaning synonymy.

That some bits of language come out the same on the left and right hand side in terms of meaning is an accident in the same way rhyming is an accident -- it happens, but it's not philosophically interesting.

How about like this -- if the only way we can express our I-language is through E-language, as we are doing in this thread, then what does "I-language" add? — Moliere

If the only way the Empire States Building can remain vertical is because of its foundations, one could also ask, then what do its foundations add ?

:D

Are you so certain of your foundations that you'd put them in analogy to architecture?

Why not riverbed bottoms and hinges at the top?

This, for me at least, is probably why I'd favor the E-language over I-language expression of analyticity. I've been using the E-language for quite some time. The I-language, at least my understanding of it, is built upon my understanding of the E-language and my ability to use it. And, since we're dealing here with one another and not some individual phenomenological situation of problems and equipment and horizon, I'd certainly have to use the E-language in talking about analyticity even if there's some I-language foundationally at work in my use of E-language.

I'm starting to think that the E/I-language is to the side of analyticity, though I started out the other way at the beginning of this thread.

@Banno already asked, but I think @RussellA, @schopenhauer1 and @Janus could ask Chomsky for clarification on these issues.

He usually responds to emails within mere hours, but, given that he is going to devote some of his time to TPF, it would be a shame not to ask for clarifications.

Alternatively, you can wait an see how he replies to Banno, and ask something in relation to his reply.

Very lively discussion. :up:

The I-language, at least my understanding of it, is built upon my understanding of the E-language and my ability to use it — Moliere

E-language is what is written and spoken in our daily lives, and the I-language is the physical mechanism of the brain. E-language is the externalized language and I-language is the internalized grammar.

I agree that we have been using the E-language for quite some time, but no E-language can exist without the brain that has created it, even though the brain can exist without an E-language.

The E-language didn't evolve independently of any brain. Its form, character and nature can only be a function of the physical mechanism of the brain.

It cannot be the case that first there was an E-language existing in the world independent of any user, rather, first was the brain and subsequently there was the E-language.

Chomsky argued that it has been generally assumed that language is thought to be something existent whilst grammar is considered something abstract. So grammar, unlike language, does not exist in the same way as language.

However, Chomsky proposed instead that it is language that is abstract and grammar that is existent. He argued that language is something externalized from our brain whilst grammar is the physical mechanism of our brain. He named language “externalized language (E-language)” and grammar “internalized language (I-language)”.

I find it easier to believe that E-language has been founded on the physical mechanisms of the brain, an I-language, than there is an E-language operating in the world independently of any mind controlling it that is capable of making sense of the I-language.

If we accept that analytic statements are analytic on the basis of convention then we accept that they are, at the same time, not going to have anything philosophically interesting about them. — Moliere

What about maths? We might define the symbols and axioms but the results take time to discover and have practical import.

I find it difficult to think of the brain as operating like a grammatic machine, and expressed as much in saying "Why neurons firing rather than concentrations of proteins of a certain kind or ratios of concentrations of the various chemicals interacting or blood flows ?" -- that what we choose as an I-language, even if we delimit our domain to the brain, will be over-determined by the E-language we already know. We'll only know to focus in on this or that bit of the brain if it happens to have a relationship to the meaning of the language we are investigating, and we'll only focus on the bits of the brain that we happen to be able to discriminate.

But that doesn't mean that I'm saying we aren't using our brains. It's just this the category of I-languages that's being disputed -- one may just want to say that things like logic and grammar are a part of the language we're all familiar with and have been using all along rather than some un-definite imagined possible brain architecture or pattern. In addition, I don't think I'd forgo grammar. Grammar and language are as real as beans and brains, in my view. (it's the theories about grammar and language that end up in the land of abstractions)




Math is always weird. Depends on how we set up analyticity probably?

The first thing to mention is that mathematics will be useful to us regardless of how we interpret it with respect to analyticity. So, on my view of analyticity, mathematics could count but I suppose the question is -- is there a non-trivial way to set up analyticity with respect to math?

It'd depend on how we want to dub a particular mathematical sentence to serve as an analytic example in comparison to our synthetic sentences. So we might want to say "For any constant A: "A = A" is analytic, and any instantiation of said sentence is synthetic, i.e. "1 = 1"" as a means to differentiating between individual mathematical sentences and sentences that are tautologously true within a mathematical system -- setting up a notion of "constant" to fulfill the same role as "Bachelor" and "unmarried man" in the bachelor example of analyticity.

If the property of roundness was instantiated in the object in the world rather than existed in the mind as a concept, as nothing in the world can be exactly round, how can roundness be instantiated in the world if no instantiation of roundness is possible in the world. — RussellA

Wouldn’t degrees of roundness suffice? Whatever relations that interact with that object will interact with it in relation to the round-like feature of that property. So if it is round like, properties of rolling are in play for example. Round like things will roll on some other objects with certain properties such as grade.

...simple concepts? — Moliere

This is one of the more important criticisms of the ideas of the Tractatus, made early on in the Investigations - up to about §60, but see especially §47 - 48. And there is the following, that anticipates Gavagi:

What is going on when one means the words “That is blue” at one time as a statement about the object one is pointing at a at another as an explanation of the word “blue”? Well, in the sec- ond case, one really means “That is called ‘blue’”. a Then can one at one time mean the word “is” as “is called” and the word “blue” as “‘blue’”, and another time mean “is” really as “is”?
It can also happen that from what was meant as a piece of infor- mation, someone derives an explanation of a word. [Here lurks a superstition of great consequence.]

Can I say “bububu” and mean “If it doesn’t rain, I shall go for a walk”? It is only in a language that I can mean something by something. This shows clearly that the grammar of “to mean” does not resemble that of the expression “to imagine” and the like. |p. 18 n.| — Investigations, p. 22e

Compare with

Consider "ya mnara lipo nchi". — RussellA

What does i-langage do that is not captured by "cognition"?

If a dog means a domesticated mammal, then the statement "a dog is a mammal" is analytic, whereas, if a dog means a terrible film, then the statement "a dog is a mammal" is not analytic. — RussellA

What if, however unlikely it might seem, dogs turned out, on further investigation, not to be mammals? A better example might be the related understandings (which you would presumably say are analytic) "reptiles are cold-blooded" and "dinosaurs are reptiles"; what if dinosaurs were warm-blooded (as some paleontologists theorize)?

The Merriam Webster defines analytic as "being a proposition (such as "no bachelor is married") whose truth is evident from the meaning of the words it contains". The Cambridge dictionary defines analytic as "(of a statement) true only because of the meanings of the words, without referring to facts or experience"

There is some ambiguity between these definitions of analytic

IE, even though the definition of analytic may be ambiguous, given a particular definition, the analytic expression itself cannot be ambiguous. — RussellA

Both of those definitions seem to state that a proposition is analytic on account of its truth being given purely in the meanings of the words. So then, what if the meanings of the words are ambiguous? Would that make the truth of such an expression undecidable and hence no longer analytic?

Or else, if we were to stipulate that 'bachelor' means 'unmarried man' whatever 'unmarried man' might be taken to mean, or even if we cannot precisely determine its meaning, would that not be trivial?

:up: