And yet isn't it fundamentally an experiential question? Is studying the nature of consciousness equivalent to actually charting the boundaries of consciousness? Or is it just a lot of talking about consciousness? Personally, I believe the boundaries have to be studied with severe existential commitment, otherwise, it is mostly just words. — Pantagruel

I think what we call phenomenal consciousness, experience, what it's like to be... is a mental process much like other mental processes. Everyone makes such a big deal about it, but I see it as an interesting subject to try to understand. I also think looking at experience from the inside is interesting. Are they the same thing? No. One is biology, neurology. The other is psychology, self-awareness. We use different terms to describe them, but then we use different terms to describe chemistry and biology too.

I think artificial intelligence will prove or at least threaten to be a mirror for us. — plaque flag

I see artificial intelligence; along with other advancements such as genetics, nuclear power and weapons, particle physics, nanotechnology, and longevity research; as the first times humanity has stepped beyond itself and its world to take on the power to change the basis of our reality in a practical way. I think maybe this is where it all breaks down. Maybe this is why no aliens will ever have to worry about humans coming along and invading. I worry for my children.

I'm saying I've never heard of any cogent explanation for how matter can give rise to consciousness. I'm not claiming there are none. — Janus

See "The Feeling of What Happens" by Damasio. I'm not saying it will be convince you, but it is a serious scientific attempt at a preliminary explanation.

I suggest that we don’t know that other people are conscious, insofar as it is simply part of what it means to be a person. Maybe you could describe it as an animal certainty, but it seems a stretch to describe it as a knowing. — Jamal

In what plausible universe would I be the only one who has this characteristic, even though everything physical about me and other humans is the same; even though my biology and neurology and that of other people is the same; even though my behavior and that of other humans is the same; even though what I report as my experience and what other humans report is the same. It's an argument looking for a issue to argue about when there's none there. What value is there in having this argument? What do we learn from it beyond the fact that humans will argue about anything.

Do you not find the argument from analogy completely compelling? I know some don't, but I struggle to understand why not. — bert1

I agree. I don't get it either.

But if you think it would be easier with an example, we could use https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10057681/1/Friston_Paper.pdf — Isaac

Have you read it? Is it worth it?

I can't conceive of any of the leading theories in quantum physics. — Isaac

Albert Einstein couldn't conceive of the leading theories of quantum physics. As you said, that doesn't mean they are wrong.

I fully agree. In fact, I will make this statement a little stronger: Neuroscience has nothing to do with human consciousness. (At the level of the mind, of course.)

One must also recognize that there are prominent neuroscientists today who admit that and differentiate mind from brain. But this doesn't change the nature of Neuroscience. — Alkis Piskas

Saying that the brain and mind are different things is not the same as saying the brain has nothing to do with the mind or that neuroscience has nothing to do with human consciousness.

In what plausible universe would I be the only one who has this characteristic, even though everything physical about me and other humans is the same; even though my biology and neurology and that of other people is the same; even though my behavior and that of other humans is the same; even though what I report as my experience and what other humans report is the same. It's an argument looking for a issue to argue about when there's none there. What value is there in having this argument? What do we learn from it beyond the fact that humans will argue about anything. — T Clark

Try reading my post again you pillock.

Since I started posting philosophy on TPF again recently it’s become disturbingly apparent to me that almost nobody reads my posts, even those who reply to them. I don’t think this is a problem with my posts, but if it is then please let me know.

We're not here to read your genius posts. We want you to read ours.

And I want to read yours Frank. You’ve got it in you, I can tell.

You’ve got it in you, I can tell. — Jamal

Oh good grief.

Try reading my post again you pillock. — Jamal

I read it the first time. I read it again just now. My comment stands.

And don't call me Willcox.

My point was that the consciousness of others is impossible to doubt, and yet you seemed to take me to be arguing that other people except for me might not be conscious.

Your comment does not stand, because it takes me to be saying something I’m not saying, something I did not say in the post you responded to. You projected a position onto me that I do not hold.

I suggest that we don’t know that other people are conscious, insofar as it is simply part of what it means to be a person. Maybe you could describe it as an animal certainty, but it seems a stretch to describe it as a knowing.

But then, how do we know people are persons? Again, what is significant here isn't knowing or judging that they are persons but relating, communicating, giving and asking for reasons, and so on.

It follows that we don’t use standards to make that judgement, because there is no judgement--unless the question comes up. And now that the question has come up, we find it difficult to judge. This I suppose is why it's also a difficult philosophical question. — Jamal

I read your post, and I've just read it again! But I wasn't very clear in my first response. I get that you think other people are conscious and that this isn't the result of a judgement. Nor, presumably, do we have to be convinced by the argument from analogy before we think of other people as conscious. It just comes naturally. I wonder if it is possible to make arguments instinctively? Or is there's something else going on completely? Probably the latter, no doubt.

I think something like the latter, yes.

I think maybe this is where it all breaks down. Maybe this is why no aliens will ever have to worry about humans coming along and invading. I worry for my children. — T Clark

:up:

We are rubbing a magic lamp !

We're not here to read your genius posts. We want you to read ours. — frank

<laughter>

[ See how I heroically deny myself the convenience of emojis. ]

Thanks for reading and understanding my post by the way.

It follows that we don’t use standards to make that judgement, because there is no judgement--unless the question comes up. And now that the question has come up, we find it difficult to judge. — Jamal

:up:

I also think looking at experience from the inside is interesting. — T Clark

Yes. And is this inside look at experience what we are really trying to grasp? Isn't that also the locus of the experience of knowing?

Thanks, I have read that book, but maybe twenty years ago. I think it is still on the shelves somewhere, so I might revisit it. Another example is semiotics that talks about the "epistemic cut": The problem I have is that consciousness, feeling, doesn't seem to be the kind of thing that can be understood mechanically, so unlike with physical processes which can be analyzed down to a set of mechanical causal events which seem to make sense, understanding how something apparently non-physical (in the sense that what it feels like to be conscious is not quantifiable or observable from without) seems to be a lost cause.

Are they the same thing? No. One is biology, neurology. The other is psychology, self-awareness. We use different terms to describe them, but then we use different terms to describe chemistry and biology too. — T Clark

:up:



I suggest that, for humans, norms are primary, as deep as anything else. The self is something that ought to be good, ought to be rational. Our talk of freedom and responsibility and autonomy is foundational. The philosophical situation takes it for granted.

I'd put self-awareness in this normative sphere. We hold ourselves accountable. We learn to be and think of ourselves as selves, as capable of unified (relatively internal and private) monologues.

Saying that the brain and mind are different things is not the same as saying the brain has nothing to do with the mind or that neuroscience has nothing to do with human consciousness. — T Clark

:up:

Since I started posting philosophy on TPF again recently it’s become disturbingly apparent to me that almost nobody reads my posts, even those who reply to them. I don’t think this is a problem with my posts, but if it is then please let me know. — Jamal

Almost nobody reads anybody's posts charitably and thoroughly as far as I have been able to tell judging by the bulk of replies. For what it's worth, I think you are one of the more charitable and thorough readers of others' posts, as well as being one of the more reasonable and thoughtful posters. I often find myself admiring and envying your patience. I'm far too prone to impatience.

I suggest that we don’t know that other people are conscious, insofar as it is simply part of what it means to be a person. Maybe you could describe it as an animal certainty, but it seems a stretch to describe it as a knowing.

But then, how do we know people are persons? Again, what is significant here isn't knowing or judging that they are persons but relating, communicating, giving and asking for reasons, and so on.

It follows that we don’t use standards to make that judgement, because there is no judgement--unless the question comes up. And now that the question has come up, we find it difficult to judge. This I suppose is why it's also a difficult philosophical question. — Jamal

I think you're right on the ball here. Knowing other people are conscious is not a propositional knowing, like knowing it is raining, it is a sense of familiarity, and "animal" knowing as you say.

There is absolutely no reason to doubt that others experience things more or less as I do. Because it is logically possible, because it is not propositionally certain, that others are even conscious, the idea that that constitutes reason to doubt their being conscious is absurd in my view.

I agree with you that no judgement (in the propositional sense at least) is made until the question comes up, and then we find that it is, due to lack of direct observational data, impossible to judge. That said, I don't see it as a philosophical question on account of its analytic undecidability, but as one of the symptoms showing that this kind of "philosophy" has lost its way.

Just on a quick glance, there do seem to be multiple problems being left undressed hereabouts.

Like "How do we tell if someone is conscious?" Basic first aid: they are alert and oriented to place and time. There's an occasional pretence that the "consciousness" being dealt with by philosophers is somehow different to this, extreme examples are trotted out as if they showed that such simple descriptions of consciousness were somehow wrong. The evidence might be, given the listed first three types of decreased consciousness, that many contributors here are victims, unawares.

One hopes that folk do not think those around them are unconscious. is of course correct.

There's also the odd error of mistaking mere awareness for consciousness. I blame talk of qualia for this; as if being aware of red splotches were all that is required. To be considered conscious, it's not enough to just be aware of the stuff around you; you also have to be able to interact with it. The concentration on qualia, with the implicit pseudo-phenomenological narrative, seems to me to be very unhelpful.

And now it's proposed that "Bert is conscious" is not a proposition.

A rough thought experiment: I grow a blob of suitable cells in a petri dish so that a muscle twitches if and only if a red blotch is place over it.

Are you going to claim that the blob is conscious of red?

if not, then there is more to consciousness than "phenomenal consciousness".

if not, then there is more to consciousness than "phenomenal consciousness". — Banno

There's definitely more.

But there is not more to phenomenal consciousness than phenomenal consciousness.