Almost nobody reads anybody's posts charitably and thoroughly as far as I have been able to tell judging by the bulk of replies. For what it's worth, I think you are one of the more charitable and thorough readers of others' posts, as well as being one of the more reasonable and thoughtful posters. I often find myself admiring and envying your patience. I'm far too prone to impatience. — Janus

Thank you :smile:

Try reading my post again you pillock. — Jamal

I suggest that we don’t know that other people are conscious, insofar as it is simply part of what it means to be a person. Maybe you could describe it as an animal certainty, but it seems a stretch to describe it as a knowing. — Jamal

Your comment does not stand, because it takes me to be saying something I’m not saying, something I did not say in the post you responded to. You projected a position onto me that I do not hold. — Jamal

Ok then, I guess the subtlety of your argument confused me. We don't know people are conscious because... I think we're about to get into another discussion of what it means to know, which I'd rather not.

I think I can almost accept that I wasn’t clear enough. My criticism of the use of “I know that x” in cases of indubitable certainty is just a repeat of what Wittgenstein says in On Certainty, and I shouldn’t assume people are familiar with that. — Jamal

That rings a bell. I think I read it 53 years ago in one of the two philosophy classes I took in college. Maybe I'll even agree if that will put an end to the p-zombie bullshit.

Maybe I'll even agree — T Clark

Woah, steady on! No need to go that far.

But aye, I did think my post would be in sympathy with your pragmatic conception of knowledge.

then he just declares that they are the same thing. Which they're not. Integrated information is integrated information. — bert1

He's no more 'declaring them to be the same thing' than I'm declaring light to be the same thing as switches. I'm explaining how/why the light comes on in terms of flicking switches.

You yourself understood this when it cam e to symphonies, yet to choose not to when it comes to consciousness. Symphonies are not orchestras, nor are they notes, nor are they sound waves. these are all component parts which, together, explain symphonies (together with other factors, I'm not claiming to have listed them all).

Explaining how/why a phenomena occurs does not require that the components someone 'are' the thing. Ironically, that's the flaw in reductionist thinking (the one type of thinking the 'hard-problem'ers usually rail against). If I explain the components of the human body, I haven't explained humanity, but there's not some element missing, it's just that the assumption that the sum is entirely subsumed by the component parts is flawed.

You're looking for an explanation of your feelings in terms of physics, but physics cannot explain your feelings in terms that would make any sense to you (or me or anyone) because physics and feelings don't share the same language.

It's like me mentally accepting, on faith, that there's a direct physical explanation of why it's raining in terms of energy levels in fundamental particles, but there isn't a hope in hell of anyone ever proving that. there's more interactions in the human brain than could be calculated by the world's fastest supercomputer even if it had all the time in the known universe to run the calculation, and even if it could, and could write one bit of information on each proton, there's not enough matter in the known universe to write the answer.

That's why reductionism fails. But we don't, observing that failure, start introducing some additional 'thing'. The problem of reductionism is not solved by inventing new entities and forces which are even less amenable to investigation that the ones we assume make up the holistic entities we're studying.

Consciousness is fiendishly complicated, and as a phenomena of human culture and language - the thing we talk about - it's not something that can be physically reconstructed from the component parts. Not because it's made of something else, or because there's some woo involved, but because the task is impossible, like predicting the rain from the position of the molecules two days ago. It physically cannot be done, but that doesn't mean we need invoke any other reason why rain fails than that of moving molecules, and it doesn't mean we have to invoke any other reason (or mystery where a reason should be) why phenomenal consciousness results from the interaction of billions of neurons. We've thoroughly investigated the links, and it definitely does.

Have you read it? Is it worth it? — T Clark

Yes, yes. But to understand it you'll need to have done a lot of preliminary reading on Free Energy principles and understand a little of basic neuroscience and Bayesian probability. Nothing super in-depth, but the arguments simply won't be persuasive without that grounding.

As I've tried to point out. Neuroscience, cognitive science, is - like any other science - fiendishly complicated. I find it truly bizarre that otherwise intelligent people could think it remotely meaningful that they pick up a few papers (plucked out of decades of accumulated research) and after glancing at them decide "there's been no coherent theory put forward" as if their failure to immediately understand the arguments made has any bearing on the matter at all. It's weird. Or, to quote your good self...

Albert Einstein couldn't conceive of the leading theories of quantum physics. As you said, that doesn't mean they are wrong. — T Clark

@Jamal @Janus

Yeah, figs are pretty great. Especially in porridge.

The whole p-zombie thing has always driven me crazy. Of course other people have internal lives that are like mine, i.e. phenomenal consciousness, experience, what it's like to be them. Doubting that is the same as Descartes doubting everything but his own existence. What possible value is there in doubting it. By the way the argument is phrased, it is impossible to tell by any objective means. It's like the multiverse - metaphysics at best, meaningless otherwise. — T Clark

A good reason to imagine p-zombies is that they illustrate differences between philosophical theories of consciousness very well, and are an intuitive way to think about the issue. Whether p-zombies exist is a sexy way to phrase the issue of whether functional/physical properties are vital for an account of phenomenal consciousness. They don't have to exist to be useful.

I don't like them personally. But I'm trying to put on my charitable hat for this thread.

Saying that the brain and mind are different things is not the same as saying the brain has nothing to do with the mind or that neuroscience has nothing to do with human consciousness — T Clark

I see what you mean. But when I say that Neuroscience has nothing to do with human consciousness, I mean that Neuroscience does not deal with the human mind and consciousness. It deals with the nervous system. Hence, Neuroscience.
Anyway, you can stay with @bert1's "Neuroscience has nothing to say about phenomenal consciousness", if you like.

Yes, yes. But to understand it you'll need to have done a lot of preliminary reading on Free Energy principles and understand a little of basic neuroscience and Bayesian probability. Nothing super in-depth, but the arguments simply won't be persuasive without that grounding. — Isaac

Thanks, I'll take a look. Most of the non-fiction I read these days mostly just makes me realize how much I don't know. I tend to just plow ahead and then go back and try to fill in the blanks.

A good reason to imagine p-zombies is that they illustrate differences between philosophical theories of consciousness very well, and are an intuitive way to think about the issue. — fdrake

In my experience, p-zombies are just more pointless, unrealistic thought experiments like the trolley problem. They seem to be made up by people with too much time on their hands.

I don't like them personally. But I'm trying to put on my charitable hat for this thread. — fdrake

You can be the good cop and I'll be the bad cop.

you can stay with bert1's "Neuroscience has nothing to say about phenomenal consciousness", if you like. — Alkis Piskas

Except that, to me, it clearly does.

Thanks, I'll take a look. — T Clark

It will reward you, I think.

I tend to just plow ahead and then go back and try to fill in the blanks. — T Clark

Good policy. Remarkable how far that can can get one in life...

He's no more 'declaring them to be the same thing' than I'm declaring light to be the same thing as switches. — Isaac

Yes he is, actually. He says consciousness is integrated information. But don't let simple facts get in the way.

"The integrated information theory (IIT) starts from phenomenology and makes use of thought experiments to claim that consciousness is integrated information."

It's the opening sentence.

Check yourself. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.2307/25470707

Yes he is, actually. He says consciousness is integrated information. — bert1

I said he's no more declaring them...

Saying one thing is another does not deny meanings in the way you're implying. If I say a hat is my favourite item of clothing, I'm not thereby saying it's not also an item of headwear, or a fan to enliven a sluggish campfire, or a cover for creeping baldness...

The claim that consciousness is integrated information does not entail that it isn't phenomenological.

But don't let simple logic get in the way.

I said he's no more declaring them... — Isaac

Yes and you're wrong. You are saying light isn't the same thing as switches. I, and Tononi, no doubt, would agree with you. He is declaring more than that with consciousness. He isn't saying that integrated information causes consciousness, or produces it, or gives rise to it, or wanks it, or cunts it off, or fugglwucks it, or frottages it, or switches it on, he says it is it.

he says it is it. — bert1

Yes. I addressed that. Are you having trouble understanding what I've written?

Yes. I addressed that. Are you having trouble understanding what I've written? — Isaac

Oh yes.

He's no more 'declaring them to be the same thing' than I'm declaring light to be the same thing as switches. — Isaac

This is just wrong.

Can anyone understand what this means in a way that doesn't entail a simple denial of the facts of Tononi's position?

It seems to be the main issue here is an old one … arguing for dualism is a peculiar approach in this day and age. But who knows! Maybe there is some ‘real’ woo woo going in :D

Neuroscience has nothing to say about phenomenal consciousness. — bert1

I would like to confirm you by quoting the German neuroscientist Gerhard Roth, who said: "As about consciousness, it is a great mystery even for neuroscientists."

I would like to confirm you by quoting the German neuroscientist Gerhard Roth, who said: "As about consciousness, it is a great mystery even for neuroscientists." — Jacques

Yeah, thanks. I hadn't heard that one particularly, but I've come across a number of neuroscientists saying similar things over the years. I don't really like invoking scientific authorities in this case, as my post, trollish title notwithstanding, isn't really about the science but the concepts. From what I understand there is a great deal of interesting science around identifying the neural correlates of particular experiences, which is great, but that doesn't say much about how consciousness comes about in the first place.

... there is a great deal of interesting science around identifying the neural correlates of particular experiences, which is great, but that doesn't say much about how consciousness comes about in the first place. — bert1

More precisely, until now they are unable to say anything at all about how consciousness comes about.

More precisely, until now they are unable to say anything at all about how consciousness comes about. — Jacques

There have been some attempts, but they fail conceptually I think. Tononi's IIT model is really interesting and ingenious, but ultimately it's just another kind of functionalism and is vulnerable to the same conceptual critiques.

More precisely, until now they are unable to say anything at all about how consciousness comes about. — Jacques

Maybe someday.

Maybe someday. — frank

Maybe. Discoveries do lead to new concepts. I'm very doubtful but I'm not against people trying.

Maybe. Discoveries do lead to new concepts. I'm very doubtful but I'm not against people trying. — bert1

Maybe it will be like the science of human origins. It draws from a variety of sciences to answer one question.

Maybe it will be like the science of human origins. It draws from a variety of sciences to answer one question. — frank

A variety of sciences? I thought it was just biology alone.

I thought it was just biology alone. — Jacques

At one time it was mostly archeology. Genetics became a biggy later on.

A good reason to imagine p-zombies is that they illustrate differences between philosophical theories of consciousness very well, and are an intuitive way to think about the issue. Whether p-zombies exist is a sexy way to phrase the issue of whether functional/physical properties are vital for an account of phenomenal consciousness. They don't have to exist to be useful. — fdrake

Yeah, it's a more evocative way of specifying what the debate over the hard problem is about. But I'd rephrase it as whether functional/physical properties are all there is to account for consciousness. And if phenomenal consciousness doesn't fit, as Dennett and Frankish will admit, then we are the p-zombies, deluded into thinking phenomenal consciousness is real.

I want to be clear about that. As far as I can tell, Daniel Dennett and Keith Frankish do not think phenomenal consciousness exists. And they do recognize that it would pose a serious philosophical problem for physicalism/functionalism/objectivity if it did. I'm pretty sure the Churchlands also fall into this category. There are physicalists who do think phenomenal consciousness can either be reductively explained by the functional/physical properties, or strongly emerges from the functional/physical. But not Dennett or Frankish. For them, we are conscious only in a functional and behavioral sense.

Since I don't think we are deluded p-zombies, then I think physicalism has a conceptual problem. And why not? It's an abstraction, and it' s a metaphysical proposition.

In my experience, p-zombies are just more pointless, unrealistic thought experiments like the trolley problem. They seem to be made up by people with too much time on their hands. — T Clark

It clarifies the conceptual problem for physicalism. If you think we have phenomenal consciousness, then how do you square that with physicalism? If you don't, then you need to explain why we think we have phenomenal consciousness, and admit we live in Chalmers p-zombie universe. Frankish calls it a magic trick of the brain, and Dennett endorses that as a plausible solution for why we're deluded, although he may prefer a Wittgestenien language on holiday kind of answer.

And if you if you think you can make physicalism work with phenomenal consciousness, then good luck with that. Personally, I think Nagel's argument about the view from nowhere gets to the heart of the objectivity/subjectivity split, and we don't even need to talk about Mary or p-zombies.

But I don't know how to justify someone else having "narrow" content since everything observable seems to be "wide" content, when you take others' self reports as a form of behaviour anyway. Like p-zombies can say "I see the traffic light has red, green and yellow lights" or "Ouch" without, allegedly, the qualia. A p-zombie can behave as a qualia-haver in any way, AFAIK that's part of the point. — fdrake

You can prompt LLMs like ChatGPT to do that. Some people have been playing with hooking the OpenAI api to robots and prompt ChatGPT to control the robot. So you could have a robot with sensors claiming it sees colors, feels the cold, is hungry for more power and what not.

Wouldn't convince me it was conscious, though. Not in the phenomenal sense. LLMs are linguistic p-zombies. We can ask what it would mean or look like for a model to have phenomenal consciousness. I'm guessing we couldn't tell from the weights or architecture. We'd be in the same position as we are with neurons, except that we built the models.

But if neurons are carrying out something like gradient descent, then what makes that different? Or for any functions the brain might be said to perform?