Neuroscience is of no relevance to the problem of consciousness

bert1

I'm feeling slightly sorry for @Nickolasgaspar (sort of) as he's had a bit of a bashing for evangelising about methodological naturalism and neuroscience and being off topic.

So here's something for him, and anyone else who's interested.

Neuroscience has nothing to say about phenomenal consciousness. It is important to distinguish a few definitions I suppose. Neuroscience has plenty to say about other concepts of consciousness, the difference between being awake and asleep, various arousal levels, identifying neural correlates of particular experiences (although still nothing to explain how a particular function correlates with the smell of a rose instead of the smell of shit), how the brain makes models of the world which we use to make predictions, the difference between being alive and dead, the integration of information (IIT theory), how it generates a global workspace, what behaviour we are going to take as defining a conscious state in medical contexts, and so on.

Not that I'm remotely well educated on this stuff, I've watched a few vids and read a few things, but nowhere do I see any answer to the question "That's all fab, but why can't that happen in the dark? Why does any of this constitute or necessitate subjective awareness. or consciousness, or the capacity to experience?"

The scientific theories of consciousness often seem to be functionalist theories, that is consciousness, or particular experiences, are equated with particular brain functions. One analogy @180 Proof like to use is the analogy with walking. Walking is something legs do. And consciousness (or minding) is something brains do. But the reason this is a poor analogy is that one is a definition and the other is a theory. Walking is just defined as the particular action of legs. That's all we mean by it. But consciousness is not, at least pre-theoretically, defined as such and such brain function. Walking just is legs doing such and such, by definition. 'Consciousness just is such and such brain function' is not true by definition. If it is true it's true by virtue of the way the world is. Sometimes functionalists try to suggest that it is true by definition, that consciousness is something brains do, and that's what we mean. But I don't mean that at all. It's just wrong - it doesn't capture most usage. Some scientists might mean that, but people who use words as observed by lexicographers don't generally mean brain function. Consider this definition from an online dictionary:

"the fact of awareness by the mind of itself and the world."

No mention of brains. It's reasonably theory-neutral. It might be that minds are brains or brain functions, it might not, the definition doesn't specify. So we need more than definition to connect consciousness, in this phenomenal sense, to brain function.

So, why can't brains do all their stuff without consciousness?
And why isn't a running internal combustion engine conscious?

Manuel

↪bert1

There is some truth to this post, no doubt. Especially when one considers the sheer amount of books on the neurophysiology of consciousness, which tell you... very, very little about it.

But certainly not in principle. Consciousness is a phenomenon of the brain, which needs interaction with the environment to awaken its dispositional knowledge, which, if absent, doesn't lead anywhere.

If we had a much more sophisticated and intelligent cognitive system, we could discover how it is that brains produce experience. But we don't, so we are going to remain puzzled about how this phenomenon could ever arise from such an organ.

Isaac

↪bert1

I'll ask you the same as I ask everyone who asks this question...

Why does any of this constitute or necessitate subjective awareness. or consciousness, or the capacity to experience?" — bert1

... What would an answer look like? Give me an example answer. It's doesn't have to be the right answer, just an example of what sort of thing would satisfy you.

Like if I said "no one has yet answered the question of what is 567,098,098 * 45,998,087" I could clearly tell you what sort of thing I would accept as an answer - I'm expecting some big number - even though I don't know what that number is. Without that framework, I don't see how I could possibly claim that no-one's answered the question yet.

So what's the sort of thing you'd be satisfied with? If I went into my lab tomorrow, had a really good look at some brains, and came back to and said "Brain activity requires consciousness because..." What would you accept?

bert1

If we had a much more sophisticated and intelligent cognitive system, we could discover how it is that brains produce experience. But we don't, so we are going to remain puzzled about how this phenomenon could ever arise from such an organ. — Manuel

Are you sympathetic with Colin McGinn then? Consciousness is in principle comprehensible, but not by us at the moment? Is this because we lack the concepts we need, perhaps? Perhaps we have mental concepts and physical concepts, but we lack a third kind that relate the two?

bert1

What would an answer look like? Give me an example answer. It's doesn't have to be the right answer, just an example of what sort of thing would satisfy you. — Isaac

This is a great question, and I'm sorry to say I can't even give you an example bare-bones answer. Absolutely no idea.

@apokrisis suggested a switcheroo, which was quite interesting, basically saying that the burden of proof not on the neuroscientist to say why some or their function of the brain is consciousness, but on the neuro-skeptic to say why it isn't.

Michael

So what's the sort of thing you'd be satisfied with? If I went into my lab tomorrow, had a really good look at some brains, and came back to and said "Brain activity requires consciousness because..." What would you accept? — Isaac

The potential problem here is that if there is such a thing as first person consciousness, and if first person consciousness is essentially private, then by necessity there can’t be any sort of public, scientific evidence of or explanation for it.

Manuel

↪bert1

Very much so.

Him and Chomsky, whom McGinn got the idea from.

Fooloso4

↪bert1

If we are to make headway on the problem of consciousness where do you think it might come from if not cognitive science?

Gnomon

So, why can't brains do all their stuff without consciousness?
And why isn't a running internal combustion engine conscious? — bert1

I won't attempt to give a scientific answer to what is essentially a metaphysical question. But I do think the form of an answer will necessarily have something to do with Function. The purpose of a thing is not inherent in the thing, but is assigned to it by a user or observer. For example the function of an automobile is relative to the driver. The driver wants to move from here to there, and makes use of a mechanism, horse powered or ICE powered, to serve his need for conveyance. For the driver, the source of motive power -- and the details of its internal mechanism, organic or inorganic -- is irrelevant to the transportation function. The horse may be conscious, but its own needs are subordinate to the driver's.

Likewise, the function of a human brain is to collect incoming sensory data, then convert it into concepts & meanings that will serve the needs of the body, for survival and for thrival. According to Don Hoffman, the neural system of the brain processes incoming physical information, and transforms it (by magic?) into the metaphysical meanings that some call "consciousness" and others label "illusions". Those mental models are not real. but ideal. However, the serve the purposes of the Self by creating maps of reality for us to navigate by. A tangle of neurons will not serve as a map of the world. Even though the meta-physical map is not the territory, it serves the function of navigation*1 through the real world.

Service of needs & desires is also the Function of Consciousness : to make meanings that serve the intentions of the meta-physical Self (a mental model of the body/mind system). Therefore, like an engine on the garage floor, a brain in a vat, serves no transportation purpose, and being disconnected from the Self-system, is not functionally conscious. The neurons may continue to do "their stuff", but not the intentional stuff of the Self. :smile:

*1. Navigation : the process or activity of accurately ascertaining one's position and planning and following a route.

fdrake

This is a great question, and I'm sorry to say I can't even give you an example bare-bones answer. Absolutely no idea. — bert1

It is arrogant of me to suggest this. But I think self relation, or self modelling, is a good candidate for what would count as an answer. I'm not saying it's correct. I think it counts as an answer because it explains a few things:

( 1 ) It has an answer for where the "first person" aspect comes from; modelling of "internal state" variables. This is like proprioception ("this body is mine and here in space").

( 2 ) Prediction using previous projections ("what body's modelling expects a given action to do") gives a sense of progression and history in experience, rooting the experience of time and coupling it with the specificity of your actions. This counts as "mine" because your

*

(as a reference to you, without reference to a subjectivity)

retrojections inform your predictions.

( 3 ) The role of intentions - they're explainable as a continuity between your past (as a model), your current needs (as internal states), and what you're going to do to satisfy them (as predictions of environmental effects of actions).

( 4 ) Memory and narrative - memory as informational summary of previous states. Narrative as the sequence of those informational summaries. Like I may remember "the time I saw a parasite crawl out of a slug", but I won't remember everything I experienced at the time, just a memory.

( 5 ) Reflexivity - model update procedures (current state -> new summary -> new summary as past state -> past state as informer of new predictions -> predictions -> new current state) act as a nexus of memory, narrative, time, intention, and render them perspectival to you.

( 1 ) demands an explanation of perspectivality, that experiences are mine.
( 2 ) demands an explanation for continuity in time, that I am ongoing.
( 3 ) demands an explanation for intentions, that I am an agent capable of recognising and realising goals.
( 4 ) demands an explanation for self narrative, that I am an agent capable of creating my history and future.
( 5 ) demands an explanation for the integration of my processes, that I count as a whole composed of parts which draw from and influence each other and the environments I find myself in.

If you take a less functional perspective, you might need there to be a ( 6 ):

( 6 ) What it feels like to be in a reflexive, ongoing, intentional, historicising, projective, story telling and unitary affective state. What is it like.

I imagine much of the dispute regarding whether neuroscience and its philosophical analysis suffices for an explanation concerns whether ( 6 ) should be included in the list.

bert1

↪fdrake

Thanks fdrake that's really good. Lots there to chew on. I'll respond in detail when I get a mo.

Nickolasgaspar

Not that I'm remotely well educated on this stuff, — bert1

-you don't say.....

-"but nowhere do I see any answer to the question "That's all fab, but why can't that happen in the dark? Why does any of this constitute or necessitate subjective awareness. or consciousness, or the capacity to experience?""
-oh....ok Why questions again....and its science's fault for not being able to answer your fallacious question.
Sure Bert...keep feeling sad for me I guess.lol

Nickolasgaspar

There is some truth to this post, no doubt. Especially when one considers the sheer amount of books on the neurophysiology of consciousness — Manuel

Are you familiar with the the role Ascending Reticular Activating System and Central Lateral Thalamus?

If we had a much more sophisticated and intelligent cognitive system, we could discover how it is that brains produce experience. — Manuel

-Do you really thing that's the main issue? How about the complexity of organ and its functions?
What percentage of books and publications have you studied in order to arrive to that conclusion? Are you sure that we haven't pin point the responsible mechanisms for conscious experiences.
https://neurosciencenews.com/?s=brain+consciousness
There are many papers that beg to differ.

bert1

Why questions again. — Nickolasgaspar

I can get rid of the 'why'. I think this may be a language barrier. 'Why' isn't always meant in a teleological sense, it often, perhaps usually, meant to elicit an explanation of whatever sort. "Why is the engine making that noise?" for example is not about ascribing intentions to the engine.

So, to rephrase:

"How does brain function necessitate consciousness? What is it about brain function that means it can't happen without consciousness also happening?"

plaque flag

.

If you take a less functional perspective, you might need there to be a ( 6 ):

( 6 ) What it feels like to be in a state of reflexive, ongoing, intentional, historicising, projective, story telling and unitary affective states. What is it like. — fdrake

Great post in general. Responding to what we might both see as the crux, this tricky number 6.

As I see it, there's a weird logical blind spot in the hard problem of consciousness singular. There's a covert assumption that there's one way that it feels like to be or tell such a story. But those who believe in something like a 'pure mentality' (and its shadow, the thing-in-itself) tend to take theirs radically private. Why don't they all have their own personal hard problem of consciousness ? I think Wittgenstein has already answered this, but I also think his beetle analogy and other hints are not so easy to grok.

Manuel

↪Nickolasgaspar

The issue is not one of not being able to find neural correlations, or not being able to form theories, whether that of embodied cognition or computational approaches, or whatever else is fashionable.

It's much simpler than that: we don't understand how matter can think. We simply lack an intuition of how the stuff we see in the world, could, in certain combination, lead to experience.

There is no doubt neuroscience is very useful. But I doubt we will understand how matter can think, we only know it is so in our own case.

plaque flag

It's much simpler than that: we don't understand how matter can think. We simply lack an intuition of how the stuff we see in the world, could, in certain combination, lead to experience. — Manuel

We are in a strange situation. I'll give you that. But we do attribute thoughts and sensations to certain animals, and we do tend to agree that their nervous systems make this possible.

I think it's natural to ask whether silicon will work if the proper organization of signals is achieved. But work how ? I don't think we know very well what we mean by 'consciousness' in a metaphysical context. Nor do we know what we mean by 'things as they are independent of human inquiry.' It's as if we are taking a flexibly blurry practical distinction and stretching it into a dualistic metaphysics.

plaque flag

↪fdrake

Have you given Robert Brandom's work much of a look ? He offers the best theory of the self that I can think of.

In short, the self is something like a self-referential system of concepts that is stretched out temporally by its responsibility for the coherence of its claims. This includes things like integrating the implications of one's current beliefs into that system when those implications become obvious (which can take time.) Each self is a like a player in a game of coherent expansion with pruning. A belief that's not 'forbidden' for you might be 'forbidden' to me because it contradictions something else that I have claimed and you have not.

The idea is that the philosophical context is itself made explicit. It's what we have been doing all along, scorekeeping coherence.

Nickolasgaspar

"How does brain function necessitate consciousness? What is it about brain function that means it can't happen without consciousness also happening?" — bert1

Nickolasgaspar

It's much simpler than that: we don't understand how matter can think. We simply lack an intuition of how the stuff we see in the world, could, in certain combination, lead to experience. — Manuel

Actually we understand how matter can think....through specific structures of matter with specific functions.
"intuition"? I don't think we can trust Intuition. What we need is to study and gather more knowledge and construct more detailed models.
We don't fully understand many things in nature i.e. organization,electricity, gravity, light, life, quantum behavior etc etc but that doesn't mean we haven't identify the responsible mechanisms for them and use this knowledge to come up with predictions and applications.
I get what you mean but these type of statements look more like an excuse people give to avoid doing the hard work (studying the actual science of the field). They sound more like a "why "question (why matter can do that) highlighting our surprise for being possible.

Wayfarer

As I see it, there's a weird logical blind spot in the hard problem of consciousness singular — green flag

The blind spot is a great subject of study. It is grounded in the Upaniṣadic philosophy, 'the eye cannot see itself.' Google The Blind Spot, Michel Bitbol.

Well its turns out that being conscious offers survival advantages, — Nickolasgaspar

However, human beings are past the point of doing what every other creature does - the four F's of feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing. Human beings actually stop and ask the question: WHY AM I DOING THIS? And for that matter, what am I? What is this thing that thinks?

Because of the cultural role of science, Darwinism has tended to fill the vacuum caused by the collapse of religion in secular culture. But evolutionary theory may not be up to the task, simply because it was never intended as a philosophy as such, or the basis for an epistemology and metaphysic. And if you try to adapt it to that purpose, it's very hard to avoid something like social darwinism or scientism.

By the way, in return for all the neuroscience articles, I will offer only one, a NY Times review prompted by the replication crisis with a particular eye on fMRI scans, Do You Believe in God, or is That a Software Glitch?

plaque flag

The blind spot is a great subject of study. It is grounded in the Upaniṣadic philosophy, 'the eye cannot see itself.' Google The Blind Spot, Michel Bitbol. — Wayfarer

As I see it, you would talk of blind spots, if you knew what I was getting at.

You say 'the eye cannot see itself.' You assume simultaneously that there is a singular way of seeing which cannot catch itself seeing. Yet, typically at least, this seeing is understood in terms of a radical privacy that should make such ambitious theorizing impossible.

If everyone has a box that no one can look in, that's already saying to much, unless the box has a visible outside. The methodological solipsist violates his method with his first statement about the eye or the mind.

I think this happens to easily to us because thinking is not essentially the function of a single mind but rather of tribal linguistic software that runs on individual brains. We are so wired to communicate that we can't remember to be methodological solipsists for 5 seconds.

plaque flag

What we need is to study and gather more knowledge and construct more detailed models. — Nickolasgaspar

:up:

And discuss concepts !

Nickolasgaspar

However, human beings are past the point of doing what every other creature does - the four F's of feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing — Wayfarer

You will be surprised by the actual number of humans who do just that and don't ask questions. But I agree our Symbolic language does allow us to form complex concepts and questions and even ask things that have no meaningful answers. "

Because of the cultural role of science, Darwinism has tended to fill the vacuum caused by the collapse of religion in secular culture. But evolutionary theory may not be up to the task, simply because it was never intended as a philosophy as such, or the basis for an epistemology and metaphysic. And if you try to adapt it to that purpose, it's very hard to avoid something like social darwinism or scientism. — Wayfarer

- you clearly don't understand Evolution or Science so I will not even try to comment or correct the misconceptions in that paragraph...

By the way, in return for all the neuroscience articles, I will offer only one, a NY Times review prompted by the replication crisis with a particular eye on fMRI scans, Do You Believe in God, or is That a Software Glitch? — Wayfarer

Sure studies do go wrong....and this is why meta analyses are far more important.
The important thing with our findings in neuroscience is not to learn people's beliefs but to inform our technical applications (real life evaluation of our findings).

Manuel

↪green flag

Sure. I don't see any a-priori prohibition as to why silicon could not produce consciousness.

But since we don't understand it very well in our own case (human beings), and cannot prove other animals are conscious, to say that an AI has experience can be misleading.

We assume (and I think with good reasons) that other animals are conscious, but since we cannot get inside other species heads (or nervous system), there will remain some doubt about this.

We don't fully understand many things in nature i.e. organization,electricity, gravity, light, life, quantum behavior etc etc but that doesn't mean we haven't identify the responsible mechanisms for them and use this knowledge to come up with predictions and applications.
I get what you mean but these type of statements look more like an excuse people give to avoid doing the hard work (studying the actual science of the field). They sound more like a "why "question (why matter can do that) highlighting our surprise for being possible. — Nickolasgaspar

There is nothing here with which I disagree.

The puzzle, for many people, and I assume even some scientists is the why question. And there should be space for surprise. There seems to be nothing in the "physical stuff" of nature which could lead one to conclude "consciousness comes from that". If there were, then, it wouldn't be surprising.

However, I don't see why this would entail people giving up on neuroscience at all. There is plenty of good research being done in the field with all sorts of practical applications. Some of it can have bearing on practical stuff concerning experience, such as the Libbett experiments, which have to do with will and when we become aware of us making a decision.

Or the work of Stanislas Dehaene, or Thomas Metzinger. Plenty of interesting material.

Wayfarer

- you clearly don't understand Evolution or Science — Nickolasgaspar

So you don't accept that science has a cultural role? That evolutionary theory is often used as a guide to how we should think or what we are? Have you ever studied philosophy of science? Do the names Kuhn, Feyerabend, Polanyi mean anything to you?

Nickolasgaspar

But since we don't understand it very well in our own case (human beings), and cannot prove other animals are conscious, to say that an AI has experience can be misleading — Manuel

Its one thing to not understand the details of how conscious states emerge/are sustained and another to talk about other people/animals ability to be conscious.
Actually we are very good in identifying conscious states of other people or species. Our survival used to depend on that ability.
In my opinion we don't have to "prove" it, because its not a mathematical problem.
Other animals are conscious not just because they behave exactly how conscious agents are expected to act, they also share the same hardware function and patterns with ours.
If we are going to question the ability of animals to be conscious of their environment, needs and urges then I don't know what the word "conscious" means.

The puzzle, for many people, and I assume even some scientists is the why question. And there should be space for surprise. There seems to be nothing in the "physical stuff" of nature which could lead one to conclude "consciousness comes from that". If there were, then, it wouldn't be surprising. — Manuel

The same should be true about Metabolism, constipation, mitosis, memory, photosynthesis, conductivity, liquidity, fluidity, replication, organization, emergence etc. As a scientists we should ignore the "why" questions and try to answer the how and what questions.

However, I don't see why this would entail people giving up on neuroscience at all. There is plenty of good research being done in the field with all sorts of practical applications. Some of it can have bearing on practical stuff concerning experience, such as the Libbett experiments, which have to do with will and when we become aware of us making a decision. — Manuel

Agreed.

Nickolasgaspar

So you don't accept that science has a cultural role? That evolutionary theory is often used as a guide to how we should think or what we are? Have you ever studied philosophy of science? Do the names Kuhn, Feyerabend, Polanyi mean anything to you? — Wayfarer

I accept the cultural role of science. I rejected you paragraph for the nonsensical statement on evolution ("But evolutionary theory may not be up to the task, simply because it was never intended as a philosophy as such, or the basis for an epistemology and metaphysic. And if you try to adapt it to that purpose, it's very hard to avoid something like social darwinism or scientism.").
Evolution IS a theory so by definition its a philosophical narrative (natural philosophy)about observable facts. As a theory Evolution is part of our epistemology and it is used to inform our metaphysics.
The last part is even more weird. ITs not the theory's fault when people use it inappropriately. A theory has a specific place in science....its not for boosting our petty agendas

Yes I know those names but I prefer Hoyningen and Sanders.

Wayfarer

Evolution IS a theory so by definition its a philosophical narrative (natural philosophy)about observable facts. — Nickolasgaspar

But it doesn't provide criteria for judgement of epistemelogical or existential or metaphysical questions, because that is not the problem it is addressing. It is addressing the issue of 'how species evolve'. And it does so quite successfully, although it is continually being modified to deal with varoius evolutionary facts.

But the bottom line of evolutionary biology has to do with survival, reproduction, mutation and evolution.. When those criteria are applied to the use of reason, then it's reductionist, because it is reducing reason to an adaptation for the purposes of survival (when the vast bulk of evolved species have gotten along perfectly well without it.)

A theory has a specific place in science....its not for boosting our petty agendas — Nickolasgaspar

Indeed - but that's pretty well all you do here. You basically barge into every philosophical discussion with Look! Science! Can't you see, fools! That's exactly how you responded to me.

Manuel

↪Nickolasgaspar

I won't quibble with the comments about animals, it's a matter that won't get us far, since we agree on the practical considerations.

The same should be true about Metabolism, constipation, mitosis, memory, photosynthesis, conductivity, liquidity, fluidity, replication, organization, emergence etc. As a scientists we should ignore the "why" questions and try to answer the how and what questions. — Nickolasgaspar

And it is a very good list, and I agree that all these things are quite baffling, as I think existence should be.

I am surely not going to get in the way of a scientists and suggest them what they should, or should not do. Science has been a spectacular success story since it lifted off in the 17th century and it should continue as far as it can.

Nevertheless, in a philosophy forum, one that features people interested say in Plato, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein and so on in the tradition, it is quite important to deal with these why questions, to differing degrees and with different perspectives in mind. It's built into the fabric of the discipline.

But on the practical dealings of the experiments, and data collection and theories, that's mostly up to the scientists.

Now, if a scientists were to say, that free will is an illusion or that we don't actually perceive colour, we only think we do, then the philosophers can have say, and rightly so, in my opinion.

Nickolasgaspar

But it doesn't provide criteria for judgement of epistemelogical or existential or metaphysical questions, because that is not the problem it is addressing. — Wayfarer

- Well evolutionary principles do provide answers to our hypotheses or questions. So by default the theory has the epistemic power to provide answers to our metaphysical questions (by metaphysical I mean beyond our current knowledge /classical definition) Since evolution deals with the diversity of life, ontology is the main focus of the theory.

And it does so quite successfully, although it is continually being modified to deal with varoius evolutionary facts. — Wayfarer

That is the main characteristic of science. Its call learning.

But the bottom line of evolutionary biology has to do with survival, reproduction, mutation and evolution. — Wayfarer

Or better....changes in allele frequencies over time.

When those criteria are applied to the use of reason, then it's reductionist, because it is reducing reason to an adaptation for the purposes of survival (when the vast bulk of evolved species have gotten along perfectly well without it.) — Wayfarer

No you are wrong. It reduces nothing, and reason was not the mind property in question here.
People tend to confuse different mind properties as if they are one.
Reason, memory , awakeness , awareness, pattern recognition, intelligence etc etc are different properties of the mind.

Indeed - but that's pretty well all you do here. You basically barge into every philosophical discussion with Look! Science! Can't you see, fools! That's exactly how you responded to me. — Wayfarer

You can not do science without philosophy and you can not have philosophy without science...well you can but it would be pseudo philosophy (Epistemically ignorant theoretical models).
Now, you are confusing politics (social Darwinism ), an irrational belief (scientism) with the act of using credible knowledge (science) to produce wise claims about the world (philosophy).
Your claims are all over the place. Revisit your thoughts pls.

Neuroscience is of no relevance to the problem of consciousness

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