I don't understand why you've being so aggressive — T Clark
The differentiation of Being and things is also explicit in Heidegger:
The formidable task that Heidegger sets himself in Being and Time is to respond to the question ‘What is Being’? This ‘Question of Being’ has a long heritage in the Western philosophical tradition, but for Heidegger, to merely ask what is Being? is problematic, as that emphasis tends to objectify Being as a ‘thing' – that is to say, it separates off ‘Being’ (whatever it is) from the questioner of Being. ” — Heidegger's Ways of Being
Bolds added. I see the effort to equate being with the simply existent as an attempt to short-circuit the whole question of 'the meaning of being'. — Wayfarer
One of things I find interesting in Jung is that some portion of the 'scientific method' has a parent people are uncomfortable talking about. — Paine
The problem is that his use is often not in fact reasonable in context. I've demonstrated this in my posts. You might be interested in reading them.
Aristotle, Aquinas, Heidegger, and many others use the term to mean anything that is, i.e., anything that can be said to be. Nobody has to follow them in this usage, of course, but Wayfarer actually attempts to correct people who use the word in this traditional way, by saying that, actually, only sentient individuals are beings.
Can you see the problem? Can you see that if you say to Aristotle "hey, actually only sentient individuals are beings", you're not making a philosophical point, but just refusing to use Aristotle's terminology and expressing your refusal in a misleadingly substantive statement? — Jamal
The interest Jung took in Alchemy would be close to dark magic from that perspective. — Paine
To repeat my point for anyone interested: a being in pre- and non-analytic philosophy is anything that is—anything that can be said to be. — Jamal
Is that how Kant would have looked at it? That was my question. — Paine
Can you see the problem? Can you see that if you say to Aristotle "hey, actually only sentient individuals are beings", you're not making a philosophical point, but just refusing to use Aristotle's terminology and expressing your refusal in a misleadingly substantive statement? — Jamal
What I'm not certain about is how Jung fits into all of this. He was included in the OP. — T Clark
When I said you were being aggressive, I didn't mean you were being impolite. I tend to be pretty aggressive sometimes. I'm just not used to seeing that from you. You're supposed to be nicer than I am. — T Clark
I don't think I've been aggressive — Jamal
only sentient individuals are beings. — Jamal
You could have correctly said 'the differentiation of existence and existents is also explicit in Heidegger". — Janus
Sure. I accept that. I've never claimed any expertise in Heidegger, but 180 brought it up. I know that he placed humans in a priviledged position regarding Dasein and I think he would differentiate sentient beings from things. (I'm reading up on What Is a Thing but I must admit hesitancy about Heidegger due to his nazism.) — Wayfarer
What I said was that 'beings are subjects of experience'. That, of course, is not the only meaning of 'being' or 'to be', which is not and has never been at issue. You and I and the cat on the mat and the tree and the rock are all existents - we all exist. But the cat and you and I are also subjects of experience, and it's a difference that makes a difference. — Wayfarer
The starting point of this whole debate was years ago, when I opined that the noun 'ontology' ought not to be understood simply as 'the classification of what exists'. That, I said, was properly the domain of the natural sciences, whereas ontology was originally conceived strictly as 'the meaning of "being"', while noting in passing that a source I had found (no longer extant) said that the etymology of the term 'ontology' was derived from the first-person participle of the verb 'to be' - which is 'I am'. I took that to mean that it refers to an exploration of the meaning of being, in terms different to those accepted by the natural sciences, which naturally pursues science along objective criteria. This is what provoked an (one could only say) hysterical denunciation from a former member here. I was then sent the Charles Kahn article The Greek Verb To Be and the Problem of Being, which, as I already showed, clearly demonstrates that 'ontology' as classically understood embraced a wider range of meanings than the modern notion of 'to exist'. And the fact that this is no longer understood by analytical philosophers is no credit to them, simply a reflection of the zeitgeist. — Wayfarer
I've already agreed that being and existence are different concepts. — Jamal
What is your reason for telling [Aristotle] he is wrong? (As you have told people here many times) — Jamal
That is only what I tried to argue in the first place! — Wayfarer
I don't think I've done that, anywhere — Wayfarer
I don't recall telling anyone that they're wrong — Wayfarer
I am not familiar with the Black Notebooks or the "Rector's Address. If Heidegger did, and continued to, identify his project with antisemitism then I would say that was a personal failing that does not detract from his philosophy.Don't know about that. See this. — Wayfarer
you have said to people, for example, that inanimate things are not beings, in conversations about metaphysics, where "beings" standardly refers to anything which can be said to be. — Jamal
I will henceforth agree that anything that exists can be called an existent or an existing thing and that of anything that exists can be said to be. I'll add that as a caveat in all such discussions. Would that help? — Wayfarer
I've already agreed that being and existence are different concepts. — Jamal
the word is being — Jamal
They are different words, obviously. But in common usage the basic concepts to be and to exist seem to be more or less synonymous. 'To exist' does seem to carry the implicit notion of standing out, whereas "to be", perhaps not so much, but this has nothing to do with being, or existing as, a conscious entity, being or existent — Janus
Physicalists and such people reduce the difference between sentient individuals (e.g., humans) and non-sentient individuals (e.g., trees) to a difference in degree, rejecting the idea that they are different in kind. — Jamal
traditionally in philosophy, anything that can be said to be is a being. — Jamal
That is one I will need a citation for. — Wayfarer
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