What a dictator of Russia says and does isn't an opinion. — ssu

I've not denied anything Russia has been shown to say or do. I've denied your interpretation of what those actions indicate about intent.

more than 800 Russian soldiers, many of them witless consripts dragooned into the killing machine, being killed every day. — Wayfarer

Don't pretend to care about innocent soldiers' lives. You've been baying as loudly as anyone that Russia must be completely defeated at whatever cost.

Well. This is the cost.

If you don't like it, perhaps consider a little less flag-waiving for war and a little more public pressure for peace.

The prospect of peace lies wholly and solely with the Kremlin. They have instigated this entire catastrophe.

That's a pretty extreme position to take, and there are serious indications that it is wrong.

For example, what do you make of academics and intellectuals that put a significant amount of the blame with the U.S. and the West? (Mearsheimer, Sachs, Chomsky, etc.)

And what about former Israeli PM Naftali Bennett going on record saying the U.S. stopped a truce from being made a few weeks into the conflict, even though both Russia and Ukraine were prepared for serious compromises?

Are they fools? Kremlin stooges? Pathological liars?

What about the (atleast) 15 year build up to this conflict? Irrelevant?

You need to ignore quite a bit of the information that is out there to take your position and I'm wondering about your justification for that.

The prospect of peace lies wholly and solely with the Kremlin. They have instigated this entire catastrophe. — Wayfarer

So the Ukrainian military action, the US weapons supply, the social media campaigns, the aid... None of that is helping to secure peace?

What is it helping to secure then?

Oh, and you know there's a reply function?

This passive-agressive "I'm not replying to you, but this is the reply anyway..." that you and @SophistiCat have lately adopted is more suited to a school playground that a serious discussion forum. Grow up.

My view is the same as the governments of Australia, US, Britain - the invasion of Ukraine is an unjustified act of aggression resulting in the deaths and displacement of millions. I’ll post links to news items here from time to time but I’m not arguing the case.

I’m not arguing the case. — Wayfarer

Bollocks. You just don't want to defend your position and its pathetic. This is seriously how you see a discussion platform like this one as best used? To post articles promoting a single government agenda and then neither discuss nor defend those positions?

This is not your personal blog. This is not a newspaper. This is not your scrap book.

It's a discussion forum. If you've no interest in actually discussing anything I can't see why you're even here, let alone a mod. Is this the direction you want the site to head in, a series of news clippings in nothing but an echo-chamber of agreement?

My view is the same as the governments of Australia, US, Britain — Wayfarer

The "Anglosphere" for short.

It might be interesting for you to research the geopolitics surrounding the Anglosphere, their role as "island nations" and the implications that has for their relation with the Eurasian continent.

Perhaps that might help you perceive these nations less as honest brokers of truth, and more like independent political agents, with interests and agendas other than the benefit of all mankind.

I've not denied anything Russia has been shown to say or do. I've denied your interpretation of what those actions indicate about intent. — Isaac

Which is hilarious.

Yes, Putin has mentioned also NATO, but the reasons which he has given for the "special military operation" and the actions of annexation are quite clear and obvious. The intent is crystal clear. You simply cannot deny it.

From speculation:


To reality:


The simple problem you have is that you cannot accept that Russia has imperialist aspirations towards Ukraine and it's territories, be it neutral or whatever, and that Russia doesn't like the enlargement of NATO (which you think is the sole reason for this war). It should be obvious that these two motivations can coincide and fit perfectly to each other: an imperialist nation doesn't want any other Great Powers (or a Superpower) near them. Yet if left alone, it will try to dominate what it can.

But be then the apologist to Russia and deny the existence of the imperialist agenda and go with the line that Russia would had left Ukraine in peace if the latter hadn't tried to approached NATO, or rather that the US hadn't pushed Ukraine into NATO (as obviously Ukrainians don't have a say in their own matters), hence everything is the fault of the US and the West.

The intent is crystal clear. You simply cannot deny it. — ssu

So you place your feeling of certainty above actual experts in the field. As I said, your ego really has reached an unexpected peak.

I have no interest in your assessment of the various expert views because you are not qualified to make such an assessment, and I can't think why anyone else would be either.

I am interested in your reasons for preferring one interpretation over another, but if they're "because it seems obvious to me and I never question my own sense of righteousness", then I think I've gathered about as much data on that as there is to gather.

Thanks for being so forthcoming, I guess.

I think that "opinion" is quite well shown from the actions and the reasons given to those actions by the leaders of Russia. Putin's article Article by Vladimir Putin ”On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians“ shows perfectly what he thought of the Ukrainian state. Among the multitude of other obvious examples. — ssu

Yep, and evidence/arguments have been posted throughout the thread already.

Yep, and evidence/arguments have been posted throughout the thread already. — jorndoe

So? Is that your threshold for considering a theory to be such that "you cannot deny it"?

That inexpert laymen have posted what they consider to be evidence on an internet forum.

On another note, would it be accurate to say that Iran is in a proxy war with Ukraine?
_{(Sep 17, Oct 13, Nov 1, Nov 5, Nov 5, Nov 6, Nov 10, Nov 18, Nov 24, Nov 25, Nov 27, Nov 28, Dec 7, Dec 12, Jan 2, Jan 9, Jan 26)} — Jan 29, 2023

Iran smuggled drones into Russia using boats and state airline, sources reveal
^{— Martin Chulov, Dan Sabbagh, Nechirvan Mando · The Guardian · Feb 12, 2023}
Iran used boats, state airline to smuggle drones to Russia
^{— The Jerusalem Post · Feb 13, 2023}

Arguably, Iran is technically in a proxy war against Ukraine, yet saying so is kind of misleading (incidentally, analogous to some comments hereabouts). Iran has seen a bit of commotion lately. Could surely use some "friends". Sort of odd, but perhaps not surprising.

jorndoe mentioning Iran reminded me of the Shaw of Iran being deposed and the Iran hostage crisis.

I was in a college dorm at the time and about 6 Iranian students were moved in mid year. When we asked why they moved they said they couldn't talk about it but had the help of the US government and if they returned they would be killed. I think it was a relocation program for entire families.

Reading the history now, I'm not sure which side they were on as the CIA was playing both sides.

I am interested in your reasons for preferring one interpretation over another — Isaac

Lol.

What other interpretation?

So Russia has annexed territories from Ukraine starting from Crimea onwards. So tell me, how is this just an interpretation???



Love to hear your interpretation that an annexation isn't an annexation. :razz:

Yep, and evidence/arguments have been posted throughout the thread already. — jorndoe

Extensively, again and again.

So? Is that your threshold for considering a theory to be such that "you cannot deny it"? — Isaac

I think the annexations, all the ceremonies, the fake referendums and the actions of Russians in the occupied territories are quite real, reported by a multitude of observers and thus seems that you really can say "you cannot deny it".

That inexpert laymen have posted what they consider to be evidence on an internet forum. — Isaac

Comes to mind one inexpert laymen here that started arguing that the agreed definition of imperialism (in the dictionaries like Merriam-Webster) is wrong. :snicker:

Arguably, Iran is technically in a proxy war against Ukraine, yet saying so is kind of misleading (incidentally, analogous to some comments hereabouts). — jorndoe

Exactly. Just selling arms to a participant in a war doesn't make the seller of these arms to have a proxy war against the other side in the conflict.

With that faulty reasoning I guess the Soviet Union / Russia, France and the US has had a lot of proxy wars... and many times both sides have been proxies.

The original claim...

Russia wanted... — ssu

No one is denying what Russia did. So you can stop wasting everyone's time pretending that was the claim.

Which is even more confusing as you don't make sense.

Putin wrote that article far before the special military operation, the "artificiality" of Ukraine as a state and the "illegality" of giving Crimea to Ukraine during the Soviet Union was rhetoric that the Kremlin used far longer. The intent to take territories from Ukraine and to dominate Ukraine is obvious there to see.

The intent to take territories from Ukraine and to dominate Ukraine is obvious there to see. — ssu

As I said before, if the limit if your tolerance for alternative perspectives stops at what 'seems obvious to you' then I think that explains a lot.

I've been through this already. The recent catastrophic erosion of our ability to deal with disagreement is exemplified in your posts.

The fact that you're unyielding even with it directly brought to your attention is a new low, but not entirely unexpected.

The Budapest Memorandum, the hearings entitled “Debate about NATO enlargement”. Mersheimer’s article "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent” (1993). Russia starting a territorial dispute over Crimea practically immediately after recognising Ukrainian independence. — neomac

A-ha. So NATO enlargement was all about Ukraine, then? Interesting theory. — Tzeentch

This is a random objection. The hearings entitled “Debate about NATO enlargement” concerns NATO enlargement about Central and Eastern Europe including the Baltic States. The article that I linked in the part you opportunistically chopped out was again about Poland and Baltic states (https://www.politico.eu/article/western-europe-listen-to-the-baltic-countries-that-know-russia-best-ukraine-poland/).
To clarify once more my views, my general argument is not that Americans supported NATO enlargement due to a current military threat posed by Russia to Europe or the US. But that the US did so driven by the need to shape a global order ensuring the American hegemony in a post-Cold War era in the longer term (e.g. by controlling international legal and economic institutions like EU and global market) wrt the evolving security challenges posed by main hegemonic competitors (e.g. China in Asia and Russia in Europe), and pretty aware of all the implied risks (including e.g. overstretch, militarisation, provocation). On the other side, in the post-Cold War era the European interest of preserving/enlarging NATO was to let NATO deal with regional and global security concerns (for historical reasons France and the UK were more worried about Germany, while central-eastern europeans were likely worried about Russia), and to focus on economic development and integration, while being pretty aware of the implied risks (demilitarisation, conflict of interests especially between East and West Europe wrt Russia, provocation, etc.). I tried to roughly summarise the American carrot&stick strategy (economic globalisation vs NATO expansion or US interventionism) elsewhere in these terms:

The geopolitical gamble the US took with the globalisation: the implicit bargain the US offered to the Rest of the world was roughly something like the European countries proposed to the US, namely “let’s form a global market for everybody’s prosperity in exchange for global security assurance”. After ~30 years of trying to make this work the US concluded that some ambitious regional powers (e.g. China, Russia, Iran) instead of improving standard of life and regime of rights for their people with the resources available thanks to the globalisation (peaceful and convergent with western progressive views), they were growing more authoritarian, more sympathetic toward anti-western propaganda (if they weren't already, and exporting it also into western countries), more assertive (in economic-military terms) outside their borders and naturally converging into a front hostile to the West. And that's the opposite of security assurance. So Ukraine turned out to be willingly or unwillingly the plausible key test for the US to revise their security strategy both in Europe and on a global scale and address the threats coming from powerful authoritarian anti-Western regimes before it was too late. — neomac

Realism is the lens through which I understand the why and how. A moral framework is what I use to judge how I feel about that. — Tzeentch

What do you mean by "Russia is not a moral actor"? Is the US a moral actor? — neomac
Individuals are moral actors.. — Tzeentch

If you ground your expectations on your realist geopolitical views and at the same time you hold moral beliefs fundamentally incompatible with those expectations, then there is a cognitive dissonance. Such cognitive dissonance may also lead to conceptual confusions: e.g. you claim that “Neither of those (moral or legal) are particularly useful lenses to view the current situation through”, yet you keep talking about “the United States jealously guarding its position at the top” and “U.S. hubris” which seem to me bearing a moral connotation (even though neither Russia nor the US are moral actors).

During this period the Russians were committed to playing nice with the West. Since there wasn't any indication that NATO or the EU were making serious attempts at incorporating Ukraine or that such a thing was even feasible, why would they have answered any different? It seems to me they went to great lengths not to give the impression of being aggressive, even when it touched on vital security concerns. Even when it finally did become a real worry to them, they gave warnings for 15 years. — Tzeentch

Well, signals from Putin were pretty mixed. Despite his conciliatory dispositions in public speeches targeting Western audience, Putin’s deepest attitude was pro-actively adverse toward Westernization of Russia and its neighborhood even before 2008. Here for more details: https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Report_The%20Kremlin%27s%20Worldview_March%202019.pdf

Crimea is about more than just access to the Mediterranean. It's about control over the Black Sea, the Kerch Strait, the Sea of Azov (highly important in connecting the Russian heartland to trade), Odessa, etc. — Tzeentch

You were talking of “vital interests” and, since often people when talking about Crimea overlook that Russia owns also the Port of Novorossiysk in the Black Sea, it is still matter of debate to what extent the Port of Sevastopol is really “vital” to the Russian interests in the Black Sea.

Prior to 2008, there was a clear commitment from Russia to maintain good relations with the West, and the West was mostly receptive to that.
It is when the U.S. realized Russia was not going to subjugate itself to the U.S. that it started to pursue its policies in Ukraine.
I see no evidence for real security competition between the West and Russia prior to 2008. If there was any, it was one-sidedly coming from the West. — Tzeentch

“One-sided” in what sense? Take the example of the Orange Revolution. This was an example of competition between West and Russia prior to 2008, because Putin publicly campaigned for Yanukovych in Ukraine and Russia, while Western pro-democracy organisations were supporting Yushchenko. In other words in Ukraine there were 2 foreign powers taking sides wrt domestic political competitors. 2 foreign powers are 2 sides, not one.

My perspective presupposes peaceful coexistence is (or "should be") the goal of nations. Sadly, many nations and certainly the U.S. are not driven by that goal. They are driven by hegemonic ambitions like the ones you consider risky to appease.. — Tzeentch

That’s the cognitive dissonance I was talking about. On one side, “peaceful coexistence” should be “the goal of nations” (at any price?), on the other, many nations pursue hegemonic ambitions at the expense of peaceful coexistence. How can any non-hegemonic geopolitical actor ensure that all other hegemonic or non-hegemonic geopolitical actors will give up on pursuing hegemonic ambitions?

Security concerns were taken seriously, that’s the reason why Ukraine felt safer under NATO. What is implicitly suggested by that claim is that Ukraine should have surrendered to Russian demands... — neomac

That's presupposing that Ukraine sought to join NATO for security reasons. It also sought to join the EU, and join the "western world" at large - the U.S. sphere of influence. There were plenty of other benefits that could have guided their decisions.
What was stubbornly ignored were 15 years worth of the Russians voicing their security concerns. A recipe for disaster, anyone could have told you 15 years ago, and that is what we got.
What I'm explicitly suggesting that whoever drove Ukraine to try and join NATO was either A) extremely foolish, or B) not acting in pursuit of Ukrainian interests. (I'm still entertaining the hypothesis that this whole ordeal is largely U.S.-orchestrated).. — Tzeentch

You yourself keep overlooking the fact that for 15 years Russian security concerns led France and Germany to oppose Ukraine inside NATO. Plus, with pro-Russian governments, like Yanukovych’s, the Ukrainian cooperation with NATO wasn’t an issue for Putin, also because it didn’t exclude a strategic partnership with Russia at all. I understand that Putin got more worried when Yanukovych was ousted , however the popular opinion in Ukraine still wasn’t favourable to joining NATO until Putin aggressed Ukraine in 2014 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93NATO_relations#Popular_opinion_in_Ukraine). As if it wasn’t enough, his “special military operation” is eroding also the support Putin got from the Western Europeans.
In other words, if somebody drove the Ukrainians to try and join NATO, Putin must be put on top of the list of suspects. I’ll let you decide if Putin falls under case A, B or both.
Besides, since I don’t discount the Ukrainian agency and no Western support is enough to explain the historical aversion the Ukrainian widely feel toward the Russians, especially when it’s matter of their independency, and now reinforced due to the war, we can plausibly assume that Ukraine didn’t look for a peaceful coexistence with Russia at any price.

Not sure what you are referring to. Is any of such trivia on wikipedia? Do you have links? — neomac

I'm referring to the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, during which it was decided that: "... [Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO."
NATO officially reaffirmed its commitment to this promise on several occasions between 2008 and 2014. — Tzeentch

Allied leaders also agreed at Bucharest that Georgia and Ukraine, which were already engaged in Intensified Dialogues with NATO, will one day become members. In December 2008, Allied foreign ministers decided to enhance opportunities for assisting the two countries in efforts to meet membership requirements by making use of the framework of the existing NATO-Ukraine Commission and NATO-Georgia Commission – without prejudice to further decisions which may be taken about their applications to join the MAP. (Source: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm)
MAP is the Membership Action Plan, a programme which helps nations prepare for possible future membership. Participation does not guarantee membership, but is a key preparation mechanism.
As a commitment it’s still pretty vague about timing and in any case conditional on a series of requirements which Ukraine must fulfil prior to submit candidature. Not to mention that to realists like Mearsheimer such international commitments do not deserve much credit.

If you believe puppetization or Russification was Russia's goal you must provide some evidence. I can go along with the idea that Russia, like any nation state, acts in its self-interest. I do not go along with the idea that Russia can only do so by acting in hostile ways, and therefore must always have sinister intentions even if we can't see them.. — Tzeentch

You are no geopolitical agent, nor a state neighbouring Russia, nor - I guess - equipped with memories/education of Russia oppression against your people, so to me your beliefs are pertinent to the extant they express your understanding of the geopolitical context.
Yanukhovic was widely considered a Russian puppet by Ukrainians. Putin practically and publicly ran his political campaign, and supported him against fierce Ukrainian opposition. Besides Yanukhovic’s policies concerning national security although pursuing formal neutrality were arguably pro-Russian (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13518046.2012.730372)
Russification is a leitmotif of Russian history. Both Donbas and Crimea were subject to Russification until practically these days. And the readiness of Putin to solve territorial and political disputes through war was evident in Georgia and Chechnya. So whatever doubt about Russification/puppetization one might have had prior 2014 is now even more hardly sustainable given that, besides the Crimean annexation and the civil war started in Donbas, the “special military operation” was declaredly pursuing “denazification” which implied forcefully installing a pro-Russian regime supporting Russian cultural and ethnical homologation (as we see in the occupied areas).

Brzezinski was a National Security Advisor and participated to the official “the debate on NATO enlargement” (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46832/pdf/CHRG-105shrg46832.pdf). Mearsheimer has always been just an academic. — neomac

I think it's crazy that you would dismiss academics in such a way, but whoever you base your views on is your business. If practical knowledge is required in order not to be considered by you a "armchair academic" then why are you referring to someone whose practical experience is nearly half a century old? Anyway. Have you ever considered the difference between the words of an "armchair academic" and a politician? — Tzeentch

I generally don’t dismiss armchair academics, especially prominent ones like Mearsheimer. I myself rely on his insights as far as I find them plausible. However, a part from my doubts on the merits of his geopolitical analysis, I find methodologically very limiting to rely exclusively on the insights of academics if we are talking geopolitics. Indeed, NATO enlargement can’t be realistically understood without considering the reasoning of the decision makers and their background understanding of the American national interest wrt the geopolitical environment and its interplay between domestic/foreign factors.
Armchair academics in the domain of geopolitical analysis have more likely an a-posteriori, partial and abstract understanding of the epistemic and decisional constraints of politicians, and are dispensed from those political power struggles and moral dilemmas that politicians have to endure to do their job effectively whatever their goal is. Both factors may significantly bias their analysis (e.g. ignoring the agency of all involved parties, or underestimate the role of ethnic lobbies, etc.).

If you are so quick to suspect intellectual dishonesty when someone disagrees with you, defer to phoney psychoanalysis and believe everybody here to only be "avg dudes", it begs the question what you are doing here. — Tzeentch

Being quick at detecting intellectual dishonesty sounds more as a compliment if detection is reliable. Besides you seem even quicker to detect “craziness” when I disagree with you no matter how plausible my arguments are. Concerning your question imbued with “little personal animosity”, I take my participation in this forum as a form of personal intellectual entertainment, like a chess game.

To clarify once more my views, my general argument is not that Americans supported NATO enlargement due to a current military threat posed by Russia to Europe or the US. But that the US did so driven by the need to shape a global order ensuring the American hegemony in a post-Cold War era in the longer term (e.g. by controlling international legal and economic institutions like EU and global market) wrt the evolving security challenges posed by main hegemonic competitors (e.g. China in Asia and Russia in Europe), and pretty aware of all the implied risks (including e.g. overstretch, militarisation, provocation). On the other side, in the post-Cold War era the European interest of preserving/enlarging NATO was to let NATO deal with regional and global security concerns (for historical reasons France and the UK were more worried about Germany, while central-eastern europeans were likely worried about Russia), and to focus on economic development and integration, while being pretty aware of the implied risks (demilitarisation, conflict of interests especially between East and West Europe wrt Russia, provocation, etc.). I tried to roughly summarise the American carrot&stick strategy (economic globalisation vs NATO expansion or US interventionism) elsewhere in these terms: — neomac

:up:

If you ground your expectations on your realist geopolitical views and at the same time you hold moral beliefs fundamentally incompatible with those expectations, then there is a cognitive dissonance. — neomac

Nonsense. I suggest you debate me on arguments rather than attempting to make things personal.

[...] you keep talking about “the United States jealously guarding its position at the top” and “U.S. hubris” which seem to me bearing a moral connotation (even though neither Russia nor the US are moral actors). — neomac

I'd say it's a fairly accurate description of how the United States acts. I could have used more objective terms.

Here for more details: https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Report_The%20Kremlin%27s%20Worldview_March%202019.pdf — neomac

I might read this later, but I don't consider these kinds of reports very valuable. In 2019 the inevitability of conflict was already well-understood among political elites, and they were probably already busy "shaping the battlefield".

The writer of that report for example served under the post-Maidan Ukrainian government.

Take the example of the Orange Revolution. — neomac

There's no question that the West and Russia sought to influence Ukraine prior to 2008, but I explicitly used the term "security competition".

On one side, “peaceful coexistence” should be “the goal of nations” (at any price?), on the other, many nations pursue hegemonic ambitions at the expense of peaceful coexistence. How can any non-hegemonic geopolitical actor ensure that all other hegemonic or non-hegemonic geopolitical actors will give up on pursuing hegemonic ambitions? — neomac

They can't, which is part of the reason why I consider myself a realist. But that doesn't change the fact that any reasonable human being desires peace.

Geopolitical actors simply aren't very reasonable when it comes to that. They are only reasonable when it comes to maximizing their power.

I have no illusions that geopolitical actors will ever pursue policies that are compatible with my moral views.

You can stop spinning your cognitive dissonance yarn now. Didn't I recall you saying something about intellectual dishonesty?

You yourself keep overlooking the fact that for 15 years Russian security concerns led France and Germany to oppose Ukraine inside NATO. Plus, with pro-Russian governments, like Yanukovych’s, the Ukrainian cooperation with NATO wasn’t an issue for Putin, also because it didn’t exclude a strategic partnership with Russia at all. I understand that Putin got more worried when Yanukovych was ousted , however the popular opinion in Ukraine still wasn’t favourable to joining NATO until Putin aggressed Ukraine in 2014 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93NATO_relations#Popular_opinion_in_Ukraine). As if it wasn’t enough, his “special military operation” is eroding also the support Putin got from the Western Europeans. — neomac

As I have said earlier in this thread, I don't believe what the French or the Germans wanted, or even to a large extent what the Ukrainians themselves wanted, was very relevant to Russia's perception of the threat of Ukraine joining NATO.

And I would agree with that Russian assessment.

If the United States wanted Ukraine into NATO, it was going to pursue that policy whether the French, Germans or Ukrainians wanted it or not, and it would likely have succeeded also.

Allied leaders also agreed at Bucharest that Georgia and Ukraine, which were already engaged in Intensified Dialogues with NATO, will one day become members. In December 2008, Allied foreign ministers decided to enhance opportunities for assisting the two countries in efforts to meet membership requirements by making use of the framework of the existing NATO-Ukraine Commission and NATO-Georgia Commission – without prejudice to further decisions which may be taken about their applications to join the MAP. (Source: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm)
MAP is the Membership Action Plan, a programme which helps nations prepare for possible future membership. Participation does not guarantee membership, but is a key preparation mechanism.
As a commitment it’s still pretty vague about timing and in any case conditional on a series of requirements which Ukraine must fulfil prior to submit candidature. Not to mention that to realists like Mearsheimer such international commitments do not deserve much credit. — neomac

The official statement was that "[Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO."

There's nothing ambiguous about that.

Don't come at me with 2022 interpretations of what that sentence meant.

Moreover, NATO explicitly reaffirmed their commitment to the Bucharest declarations on several occasions. And the U.S. took away all doubt, if any remained, when it supported the 2014 coup d'etat.

Yanukhovic was widely considered a Russian puppet by Ukrainians. Putin practically and publicly ran his political campaign, and supported him against fierce Ukrainian opposition. Besides Yanukhovic’s policies concerning national security although pursuing formal neutrality were arguably pro-Russian — neomac

All very regrettable, of course. Sometimes Ukrainian leaders were in the pocket of the West, sometimes in the pocket of the East. It was a delicate balance that they had to protect.

Hard to see this as evidence of "puppetization".

So whatever doubt about Russification/puppetization one might have had prior 2014... — neomac

After 2014 war was essentially inevitable, because from the Russian point of view, Crimea being cut off from Russia without a land bridge was unsustainable for the same reason Ukraine in NATO was unsustainable.

We must see everything after 2014 as the opening moves of war, and not as representative of policies prior, which is what you and many others here are trying to do.

you keep talking about “the United States jealously guarding its position at the top” and “U.S. hubris” which seem to me bearing a moral connotation (even though neither Russia nor the US are moral actors). — neomac

I'd say it's a fairly accurate description of how the United States acts. I could have used more objective terms. — Tzeentch

How would you rephrase those expressions in more objective terms?

There's no question that the West and Russia sought to influence Ukraine prior to 2008, but I explicitly used the term "security competition”. — Tzeentch

All right, then what were you referring to when you wrote “If there was any, it was one-sidedly coming from the West” in your previous post?

On one side, “peaceful coexistence” should be “the goal of nations” (at any price?), on the other, many nations pursue hegemonic ambitions at the expense of peaceful coexistence. How can any non-hegemonic geopolitical actor ensure that all other hegemonic or non-hegemonic geopolitical actors will give up on pursuing hegemonic ambitions? — neomac

They can't, which is why I consider myself a realist. But that doesn't change the fact that any reasonable human being desires peace. Geopolitical actors simply aren't very reasonable when it comes to that. They are only reasonable when it comes to maximizing their power. — Tzeentch

Again if “any reasonable human being desires peace” is a fact, then is “any reasonable human being desires peace at any cost” also a fact to you? If so, then the latter sounds not only more accurate, but arguably a first step to cope with your cognitive dissonance.

I have no illusions that geopolitical actors will ever pursue policies that are compatible with my moral views. You can stop spinning your cognitive dissonance yarn now. Didn't I recall you saying something about intellectual dishonesty? — Tzeentch

There is a misunderstanding. By “cognitive dissonance” I didn’t mean that you have delusional expectations (I don’t think that’s what the technical notion implies either [1]), but that there is an undesirable clash between incompatible beliefs (normative and factual) both of which you hold.

[1] In the field of psychology, cognitive dissonance is the perception of contradictory information, and the mental toll of it. Relevant items of information include a person's actions, feelings, ideas, beliefs, values, and things in the environment. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_dissonance)

As I have said earlier in this thread, I don't believe what the French or the Germans wanted, or even to a large extent what the Ukrainians themselves wanted, was very relevant to Russia's perception of the threat of Ukraine joining NATO. And I would agree with that Russian assessment. If the United States wanted Ukraine into NATO, it was going to pursue that policy whether the French, Germans or Ukrainians wanted it or not, and it likely succeed also. — Tzeentch

First, if we want to scrutinise threat perception about Russia by Westerners, we should be ready to do the same for threat perception about Ukraine joining NATO by the Russians. So Russia made a preventive move to thwart an uncertain (or most certainly opposable, postponeable, non-imminent) future event that was perceived as a threat, which however is not clear to what extent would have impacted its “vital” security concerns.
Second, maybe the US was going to pursue that policy as it did for 30 years, but it’s not evident that it would have succeeded since Germans and French could still have opposed Ukraine joining NATO (also Turkey could have been in handy for that matter) as they did for 30 years, even more so with Nord Stream 2 up and running. Of course the odds changed after Putin aggressed Ukraine. Yet even in the current conditions Western Europeans are still reluctant to discuss about NATO membership for Ukraine. At the end of last year, Macron was still more concerned about giving security guarantees to Russia than discussing NATO membership for Ukraine.

The official statement was that "[Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO." There's nothing ambiguous about that. Don't come at me with 2022 interpretations of what that sentence meant. Moreover, NATO explicitly reaffirmed their commitment to the Bucharest declarations on several occasions. And the U.S. took away all doubt, if any remained, when it supported the 2014 coup d'etat. — Tzeentch

Nothing of what you are saying questions the fact that there was no defined timeline, nor a guarantee that Ukraine was able to meet NATO standards for another 15 years or more. E.g. I wouldn’t exclude the possibility that Putin was in condition to keep supporting the separatist fight in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea with the revenue from Nord Stream 2 to destabilise Ukraine and so likely compromising the Ukrainian chances to join NATO or EU, without making any “special military operation”.
I’m not sure to understand why you keep talking about “coup d'etat” supported by the US. This doesn’t sound as wikipedia trivia, does it? (BTW “coup d'etat” as I understand it refers to illegal and often brutal overthrow of power by politicians or military, Maidan Revolution was a popular revolution).

Yanukhovic was widely considered a Russian puppet by Ukrainians. Putin practically and publicly ran his political campaign, and supported him against fierce Ukrainian opposition. Besides Yanukhovic’s policies concerning national security although pursuing formal neutrality were arguably pro-Russian — neomac

All very regrettable, of course. Sometimes Ukrainian leaders were in the pocket of the West, sometimes in the pocket of the East. It was a delicate balance that they had to protect.
Hard to see this as evidence of "puppetization”. — Tzeentch

Then tell me what you take as evidence of "puppetization”, possibly with historical examples.

After 2014 war was essentially inevitable, because from the Russian point of view, Crimea being cut off from Russia without a land bridge was unsustainable for the same reason Ukraine in NATO was unsustainable.
We must see everything after 2014 as the opening moves of war, and not as representative of policies prior, which is what you and many others here are trying to do. — Tzeentch

I was talking about puppetization and Russification, the war doesn’t question these trends. It’s just the next stadium: forceful territorial annexation and direct political subordination to a hegemonic authoritarian regime. Anyways, even if Putin’s was preparing for this war after 2014 for whatever reason (why wasn’t the Kerch Bridge enough?), something has been holding his “special military operation” until 2022, so I find your claim of “inevitability” debatable (even more so if one takes into account the infamous Russian intelligence failures at the beginning of this war: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/russia-fsb-intelligence-ukraine-war/).

Meanwhile, the dreadful attrition rate of men fed into the meat grinder continues [...] — Wayfarer

Russia may have lost an entire elite brigade near a Donetsk coal-mining town
^{— Veronika Melkozerova · POLITICO · Feb 12, 2023}
'This isn't Russian roulette, it's like the suicide of lemmings': Putin's marine brigade of 5,000 men is all but destroyed in one of the most brutal battles since the start of the war
^{— Ian Birrell · Daily Mail · Feb 13, 2023}
‘Like turkeys at a shooting range’: Mauling of Russian forces in Donetsk hotspot may signal problems to come
^{— Tim Lister · CNN · Feb 14, 2023}

The frontlines go this way then that. (↑ gross and disgusting)

Analysis: Kremlin moves to rein in Russian mercenary boss Prigozhin
^{— Andrew Osborn, Alex Richardson · Reuters · Feb 14, 2023}

Well, Prigozhin is a nasty piece of work, maybe even for the Kremlin.

US-backed report says Russia has held at least 6,000 Ukrainian children for 're-education'
^{— Reuters via The Jerusalem Post · Feb 14, 2023}

(in continuation of prior reports)

EU seeks to use frozen Russian funds to rebuild Ukraine
^{— Terje Solsvik, Essi Lehto, Niklas Pollard, Sandra Maler · Reuters · Feb 14, 2023}

There's an idea.

Many Western politicians seem to be prioritizing signalling their political virtue in fighting what is seen as tyranny and promoting Western liberal democracy over realistic assessments of the costs and benefits of their actions.

... if we continue to ignore the idea that other state actors might have legitimate concerns — that are backed up by significant military power — we risk careering toward a global conflict that can only end badly.

... No matter how hard some might wish, Russia’s war in Ukraine is unlikely to lead to any sort of crushing Russian defeat on the battlefield, and sooner or later negotiations will have to take place. If future negotiations are to be meaningful, both sides will have to give ground and make some attempt to see something of the other side’s point of view. — https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/02/14/we-dont-have-to-engage-in-hysterical-crusades-against-russia-and-china/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=we-dont-have-to-engage-in-hysterical-crusades-against-russia-and-china

Not only do these global military contractors arm Ukraine, but they stand to benefit from the re-militarization of Western Europe, Japan, and the new NATO members.

... President Volodymyr Zelensky delivered an emotional wartime appeal to a joint meeting of US Congress pleading for more military assistance from the lawmakers, who were about to approve $45 billion in additional aid. It was necessary for "eventual victory."

Yet, there was a huge disconnect between the triumphant declaration and the realities. Earlier in the month, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had acknowledged Ukraine’s losses in the war amounted to 100,000 soldiers and 20,000 civilians, though her tweet was quickly deleted and a new one was released without the true death count.

... even as international media was touting the mirage of Ukraine’s military triumph, the country’s real GDP declined over 35 percent on an annual basis in the third quarter of 2022; that is, before Russia’s massive infrastructure attack.

Starting on October 10, Russia’s waves of missile and drone attacks opened a new phase of the war. The direct physical damage to infrastructure soared to $127 billion already in September; that’s over 60 percent of Ukraine’s pre-war GDP. The impact on the productive capacity of key sectors, due to damage or occupation, is substantial and long-lasting.

The population share with income below the national poverty line in Ukraine may more than triple reaching nearly 60 percent in 2022. Poverty will increase from 5.5 percent in 2021 to 25 percent in 2022, with major downside risks if the war and energy security situations worsen. As casualties continue to mount, over a third of the population has been displaced and over half of all Ukrainian children have been forced to leave their homes. The nine months of war have caused massive population displacement. As of October 2022, the number of Ukrainian refugees recorded in Europe was over 7.8 million, and the number of internally displaced people was 6.5 million.

Ukraine is "absolutely a weapons lab in every sense because none of this equipment has ever actually been used in a war between two industrially developed nations," said one source familiar with Western intelligence to CNN. "This is real-world battle testing." — https://original.antiwar.com/dan_steinbock/2023/02/14/us-big-defense-the-only-winner-of-the-ukraine-proxy-war/

As historian Geoffrey Roberts has argued, President "Putin went to war to prevent Ukraine from becoming an ever-stronger and threatening NATO bridgehead on Russia’s borders.” The war was not the Ukrainians’ first choice either. When Zelensky, whom Ukrainians elected as a "peace candidate," flirted with the idea of reconciliation with Russia in 2019, Ukraine’s notorious far-right supported by the West, torpedoed it.

Even in April 2022, after a month of hostilities, Russia and Ukraine tentatively agreed to end the war. But that decision was undermined by former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. His Ukraine visit was designed to stop the talks, which were not acceptable to the US and some of its allies. Today, in Pentagon, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin sees the escalation as "a window of opportunity here, between now and the spring."

Only a year ago, Ukraine, under Zelensky’s leadership, was still positioned to embrace neutrality, opt out from military alignments and serve as a bridge between Eastern and Western Europe, due to its position in China’s Bridge and Belt Initiative. Had that future prevailed, Ukraine might today be peaceful. Its GDP would be a third bigger. Young men would alive and well and have good jobs. Ukrainian refugees would be returning for new opportunities at home. Children wouldn’t suffer from traumatic nightmares.

Today, all those dreams are in ashes. The proxy war is aimed against Russia. The Ukrainians’ role is to die in it. The puppet masters are the primary beneficiaries. — https://worldfinancialreview.com/the-unwarranted-ukraine-proxy-war-a-year-later/

without an overall political and strategic concept, arms deliveries are pure militarism...
We have a militarily operational stalemate, which we cannot solve militarily. Incidentally, this is also the opinion of the American Chief of Staff Mark Milley. He said that Ukraine's military victory is not to be expected and that negotiations are the only possible way. Anything else is a senseless waste of human life. — Erich Vad. From 2006 to 2013 Chancellor Angela Merkel's military policy advisor

Few outlets reported the recent revelations by former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett about the ceasefire negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in Turkey that he helped to mediate in March 2022. Bennett said explicitly that the West "blocked" or "stopped" (depending on the translation) the negotiations.

Bennett confirmed what has been reported by other sources since April 21, 2022, when Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, one of the other mediators, told CNN Turk after a NATO foreign ministers’ meeting, "There are countries within NATO who want the war to continue… They want Russia to become weaker."

Advisers to Prime Minister Zelensky provided the details of Boris Johnson’s April 9 visit to Kyiv that were published in Ukrayinska Pravda on May 5th. They said Johnson delivered two messages. The first was that Putin and Russia "should be pressured, not negotiated with." The second was that, even if Ukraine completed an agreement with Russia, the "collective West," who Johnson claimed to represent, would take no part in it.

The Western corporate media has generally only weighed in on these early negotiations to cast doubt on this story or smear any who repeat it as Putin apologists, despite multiple-source confirmation by Ukrainian officials, Turkish diplomats and now the former Israeli prime minister. — https://original.antiwar.com/mbenjamin/2023/02/13/how-spin-and-lies-fuel-a-bloody-war-of-attrition-in-ukraine/

@SophistiCat @ssu Almost complete silence on Hersh' article in Europe by the way. Nothing in the main newspapers. You'd think the Graun would jump at the opportunity.

So there is to be an iron curtain, after all. It’s simply a question of its precise location now.

How would you rephrase those expressions in more objective terms? — neomac

The U.S. acts self-interestedly to maintain its position of domination (basic realism).

About the term hubris I would change nothing, because that's exactly what it is. The U.S. has been acting with severe disregard for other nations' interests, and that behavior is now undermining its own power.

All right, then what were you referring to when you wrote “If there was any, it was one-sidedly coming from the West” in your previous post? — neomac

NATO expansion.

There is a misunderstanding. — neomac

The only misunderstanding here is that you seem to believe babbling on about cognitive dissonance is going to help your case any.

Second, maybe the US was going to pursue that policy as it did for 30 years, but it’s not evident that it would have succeeded since Germans and French could still have opposed Ukraine joining NATO — neomac

The problem is the one I have described earlier: the U.S. was in the process of turning Ukraine into a U.S. ally on a bilateral basis, completely circumventing NATO.

The Germans and the French had no power to stop that.

Yet even in the current conditions Western Europeans are still reluctant to discuss about NATO membership for Ukraine. — neomac

With the current condition being large-scale war between Russia and what is basically a NATO proxy, their opinions are even more irrelevant than they were in times of peace.

The European powers are a bunch of suckers, piggybacking on the U.S. defense budget and apparently believing that will not completely wipe out their bargaining power.

They're essentially U.S. vassals given the illusion of relevance.

I wouldn’t exclude the possibility that Putin was in condition to keep supporting the separatist fight in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea with the revenue from Nord Stream 2 to destabilise Ukraine ... — neomac

With the amount of bilateral support it was receiving from the U.S., I would pretty much exclude that possibility.

I’m not sure to understand why you keep talking about “coup d'etat” supported by the US. — neomac

We've got U.S. officials admitting to sending Ukraine billions of USD of support prior to 2014, and to being deeply involved in constructing the post-coup government in Ukraine.

Clearly the U.S. was involved, supported the coup and, as I said earlier, I am still entertaining the hypothesis that the U.S. largely orchestrated it. We know the U.S. is capable of such things, and its fingerprints are all over it.

(why wasn’t the Kerch Bridge enough?) — neomac

You can't seriously believe that the Russians would be content to dangle Crimea by a single bridge.

If any real attempt at attacking Crimea were made, that bridge would not last a single day.

If Putin’s was preparing for this war after 2014 for whatever reason [...], something has been holding his “special military operation” until 2022, — neomac

A war of this magntitude requires planning and preparation, obviously. Besides, they did not have the power of hindsight and did seek to exhaust the alternatives. Even late into 2021 the Russians were still trying to pursue a diplomatic solution.

so I find your claim of “inevitability” debatable — neomac

The U.S. started arming Ukraine shortly after the 2014 coup and subsequent invasion of Crimea.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/russia-fsb-intelligence-ukraine-war/ — neomac

Seems like a rather weak article to me, that presupposes the Russian invasion was a complete failure. While that seems to be part of the western narrative, I see little evidence to suggest it is true.

The Russians invaded Ukraine while outnumbered, with a force that was way too small to occupy all of it. This leads me to believe that the territories they occupied in east and southern Ukraine probably roughly coincide with the initial aims of the invasion.

Mearsheimer makes that point in detail.