In what world is the U.S. not the primary suspect after such a statement has been made? — Tzeentch

Yeah.

Is the US capable of such an operation? Undoubtedly, yes.

Have the US carried out such operations before? Undoubtedly, yes.

Would the US benefit from such an operation? From their own admission, yes.

It's amazing the world we now live in where suggesting the US has done something it's capable of, benefits from, and has done before becomes a 'conspiracy theory'.

On a different topic, Ukraine's frontline is starting to look severely compromised, with pockets closing around Vuhledar, Bakhmut and Krasna Hora, and several cities being at risk of ending up in a similar situation, like Bilohorivka, Avdiivka and the urban area south of Bakhmut.

There are also rumours of a Russian offensive being expected within the month.

Under these circumstances I expect a serious simplification of the Ukrainian lines in the coming week, because this situation seems to be unmanagable. If large portions of defenders are cut off from supply lines this might turn into a disaster, because I am not getting the impression the Ukrainian forces can afford to lose many more troops.

It also makes me wonder why the Ukrainians haven't started a tactical withdrawal yet. It seems to me that the longer they wait, the harder it will be.

Now let's hear from random conspiracy nuts!

Now let's hear from random conspiracy nuts! — SophistiCat

Just calling everyone you disagree with a 'conspiracy nut' is not a response you'd want to advertise. It's embarrassing.

I was not familiar with Hersh or his writing until it came up here. So Hersh might have a history of being anti US military so just asking others what his political orientation might be.

Can we notice any kind of trend here?

Seymour Hersh - multi-award-winning journalist, famous for breaking the CIA internal spying stories, the Abu Graib stories.. Now, apparently a conspiracy nut.

Glen Greenwald - another award-winning investigative journalist, famous for breaking the Snowden story... Now apparently also a conspiracy nut.

Robert Shreer - won eight awards for outstanding journalism. Now also a conspiracy nut.

Chris Hedges - received the Amnesty International Global Award for Human Rights Journalism in 2002. Now also apparently a conspiracy nut.

Paul Thacker - received the 2021 British Journalism Award for Specialist Journalism for a series of articles in The BMJ investigating undisclosed financial interests among medical experts advising the US and UK governments on vaccines. Dismissed by Facebook as 'misinformation'.

Jeffrey Sachs - named one of the 100 Most Influential People in the World by Time. He was also named one of the "500 Most Influential People in the Field of Foreign Policy" by the World Affairs Councils of America. Adviser to the UN. Winner of too many awards to list here. Now apparently a conspiracy nut too.

It's surprising the number of journalists and commentators who suddenly become 'conspiracy theorists' despite award-winning respected careers, almost immediately after criticising mainstream pro-US narratives... There must be some kind of epidemic, poor things.

Forget it, the gig is up - too many superb sources being called ideologues or whatever. And what, they think the New York Times or whatever establishment media (who never see a war they don't salivate for) are more trustworthy?

Not worth it, it isn't serious.

Why get personal instead of answering his question?

It's essentially a replay of the covid pandemic.

This is the denial phase. The phase is prior to the last one, quiet shame.

It makes you wonder how many this circus has to be repeated before people wisen up.

And that list isn't even exhaustive. I could have added another dozen at least - good, well respected journalists, experts, political commentators...

It's such a lazy, anti-intellectual trope to just lob these labels at dissent. I thought we'd done with that after McCarthy, but here it is again, this time promoted by liberals as much as anyone.

It's essentially a replay of the covid pandemic. — Tzeentch

Yep, I slipped Paul Thacker into my list there too. I could have added Pete Doshi, John Ioannidis,... Some of the most respected minds in public health research and journalism victim to the crackdown on dissent.

I think much of what we see happening over Ukraine discourse comes out of Covid-era policies.

This is the denial phase. The phase is prior to the last one, quiet shame. — Tzeentch

Some shame at least would be something. I suppose restitution is too much to ask.

Hersh was once a respected journalist - Pulitzer winner and all that. But he went off the rails a while ago. His wiki page mentions some of that, and you can find more info if you look for it. This type of explosive "investigation" based on a single anonymous source (who may or may not exist, for all we know) has become his modus operandi.

Of course, none of it matters to the useful idiots who will swallow any yarn if it's too good not to be true.

Of course, none of it matters to the useful idiots who will swallow any yarn if it's too good not to be true. — SophistiCat

For example the yarn that anyone critical of US foreign policy has "gone off the rails".

Of perhaps it would be easier to simply list all the hard hitting investigative journalists strongly opposed to US foreign policy who are still treated with respect...

There's... um...

This type of explosive "investigation" based on a single anonymous source (who may or may not exist, for all we know) has become his modus operandi. — SophistiCat

Yeah, imagine investigative journalists being allowed to use a single anonymous source to break open an explosive story...

https://www.washingtonpost.com/watergate-50th-anniversary/?clsrd

Where would that leave the poor government?

If you want some background on Seymour Hersh that isn't just @SophistiCat's apologist smearing, there's a good summary in the London Review of Books when his biography came out.

Here... https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v40/n18/jackson-lears/i-figured-what-the-heck

Without his indefatigable reporting, we would know even less than we do about the crimes committed by the US national security state over the last fifty years. While most of his peers in the press have been faithfully transcribing what are effectively official lies, Hersh has repeatedly challenged them, revealing scandalous government conduct that would otherwise have been kept secret

...but of course, now he's officially a conspiracy nut we have to pretend that he's suffered some kind of weird mental breakdown coincident with all the other prizewinning journalists who've recently had similar mental issues...

The week it happened, I was thinking the US did it.

I don't see why anyone in his place would take such a huge risk for a minor (proportionally) financial gain. — SophistiCat

Minor? Weaning Europe of Russian gas in favour of North American gas is not minor in my book. It's tens of billions of dollars in value per year.

After the Cold War, NATO became something different from a military alliance that pursued deterrence and mutual defense, since there was no enemy to defend against. What happened after the Cold War is that the Americans collected their prize. It became a different name for the European part of the American sphere of influence, and a soft power tool to control Europe, even if it's original nature was a hard power deterrent towards Russia. That change in character is well-documented and part of the reason why NATO went through several identity crises post-Cold War. This isn't misleading language, this is simply understanding the purpose of NATO post-Cold War from the American perspective. — Tzeentch

The repurposing of NATO post-Cold War from the American perspective doesn’t exclude the fact that Russia, along with Germany (especially after the reunion), were still perceived as potential threats by other Western and Eastern European countries. The fear of nationalist revanchism in Europe (at the origin of 2 bloody world wars) remerged after the Cold War (as in the case of Yugoslavia). This is also to say that it’s not just that US wanted to extend its sphere of influence (say for economic reasons), but for keeping safe and stable a dangerously unstable Europe by their own request too.

Right, so it was never about actual threat perception. It was about pre-emptively protecting U.S. hegemony. That's basically what I've been saying all along. — Tzeentch

You are clearly playing dumb. First you were talking about threats in terms of deltas in “military capability”, but that’s a very poor understanding of what constitute “threat perception” for geopolitical agents. Indeed, what was the military capacity of Ukraine wrt Russia prior to this war?! Secondly, if threat perception were elicited only by an actual military buildup on the border and/or ultimatum, it would be useless, because then it might be already too late to prepare a response. Take the case of Ukraine, even its joining NATO defensive alliance wasn’t an actual threat to Russia. Even more so if such event wasn’t imminent at all. And most certainly so if Germany/France were stubbornly against it. And yet Putin perceived such possibility as an intolerable threat and decided to react preventively as timely as he could.

Ask the people of Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lybia, and all the other nations the United States invaded and cast into the fires (a long list it be) what they thought of that "Pax Americana". :vomit: — Tzeentch

Even Pax Romana and Pax Britannica weren’t exactly Disneyland.

This is also to say that it’s not just that US wanted to extend its sphere of influence (say for economic reasons), but for keeping safe and stable a dangerously unstable Europe by their own request too. — neomac

There was no "dangerously unstable Europe" after the Cold War. First off, Yugoslavia hardly represents all of Europe. Second, the U.S. played a major role in destabilizing Yugoslavia, because Yugoslavia insisted on neutrality instead of joining the U.S. bloc.

You are clearly playing dumb. — neomac

You are clearly clutching at straws.

First you were talking about threats in terms of deltas in “military capability”, ... — neomac

And when asked for a metric that you would find more acceptable you presented nothing.

Indeed, what was the military capacity of Ukraine wrt Russia prior to this war?! — neomac

Ukraine is not NATO.

What you're doing is using the present situation to retroactively justify NATO expansion in a period that was marked by cooperation, not hostility, between the West and Russia.

When after 2008 it was becoming clear Ukraine might be the stage for a new geopolitcal rivalry, Ukraine was right to fear a Russian invasion.

But who started that conflict? NATO, at the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, and through its continued efforts to make good on the promises that it made back then.

So any notions that NATO did what it did in response to a Russian threat is utter nonsense.

Take the case of Ukraine, even its joining NATO defensive alliance wasn’t an actual threat to Russia. — neomac

I'm not sure what to make of the fact you're still referring to NATO as a defensive alliance. I don't know if you've been paying attention, but NATO has invaded several countries post-Cold War, and left ruin in its wake.

Today it is not a defensive alliance by any stretch.

Even more so if such event wasn’t imminent at all. And most certainly so if Germany/France were stubbornly against it. — neomac

There's no point in regurgitating points that have already been discussed at length.

NATO membership for Ukraine mattered because of the role the United States would take in its security. The situation that developed in Ukraine is that the US took that role without NATO membership, causing de facto the same situation. NATO membership, and thus the German and French opinions, became of secondary importance, if of any importance at all.

Even Pax Romana and Pax Britannica weren’t exactly Disneyland. — neomac

Then don't come with bullshit like this:

While you (like many here) keep focusing on arguable failures of the American interventionism in middle-east (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, etc.) and whine over the drawbacks of American imperialism (as if any avg dude on the internet could plausibly offer a better and realistic alternative), you close an eye over the part of the world that abundantly profited from the Pax Americana (or, if you prefer, the neoconservative liberal democratic capitalist Blob military-industrial-complex satanist American foreign policy). This intellectually dishonest attitude reminds me of a famous Napolitan maxim: “chiagne e fotte”, it roughly means “whine (over injustice of the system) and keep screwing them (the system) over”. — neomac

Minor? Weaning Europe of Russian gas in favour of North American gas is not minor in my book. It's tens of billions of dollars in value per year. — Benkei

I don't believe it's a huge risk, either.

Previous US interventions on foreign assets have included drone strikes, overt threats, seizure, and actual invasion of sovereign territory. None of which so much as dented their hegemony. The barest shred of plausible deniability is all that's required. Much, much worse has been done with impunity in the past.

But more to the point, either Russia are a threat which oughtn't be provoked or they're not. Either both the suspicion of sabotage and anti-Russian intervention in Ukraine are a huge risk, or neither is. I can't see the argument for one being huge and the other not. It's not like Putin is a gentleman who'll only be offended by legitimate grievances. So it's about his capacity to retaliate in both cases.

With Ukraine it's "Biden needn't worry about provoking Russia, they'll never dare attack NATO".

With the pipeline it's "Biden would never provoke Russia, it's too risky"

Some more serious analysis...

Hilarious, sad and scary at the same time.

There was no "dangerously unstable Europe" after the Cold War. First off, Yugoslavia hardly represents all of Europe. Second, the U.S. played a major role in destabilizing Yugoslavia, because Yugoslavia insisted on neutrality instead of joining the U.S. bloc. — Tzeentch

You keep dodging my objections. Notice I never claimed, nor implied, nor suggested that NATO expansion wasn’t in the interest of the US, or to extend its sphere of influence, or that the US didn’t take initiatives, nor that Yugoslavia represents all of Europe.
The point I’m making is that fears of European instabilities due to historical legacies from 2 WWs and the Cold War (from ethnic nationalisms like in Yugoslavia to imperialistic ambitions like from Germany and Russia), were shaping the risk perception of European countries and the US. That’s why Western European (like France and the UK) and East European (like Poland and the Baltic states) welcomed NATO presence. That’s how you get a British lord, H.L. Ismay, the NATO’s first Secretary General, claim that NATO was created to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” or a debate on NATO enlargement by the American committee on Foreign Relations talking about Russian imperialism.
And the reason why I’m making this point is that you need to divert your attention from these facts to build a narrative in which Russia and the US are the only relevant actors, the US is always the most aggressive, and Russia is just victim of the latter.
But that’s a myopic caricature of what actually happened. Russia and the US were absolutely not the only actors that shaped the evolution of NATO. And all other actors involved, including the US, were driven also by very much serious historical fears. Sphere of influence build on fears (of military clashes) and/or opportunities (economic partnership). And the Americans weren’t perceived always as aggressive and exploitative. Both the US and Europe had their interests to favour the American sphere of influence compared to available alternatives.

And when asked for a metric that you would find more acceptable you presented nothing. — Tzeentch

I presented an argument to explain why your approach is flawed. And if that’s not enough you can read plenty of geopolitical theories (also within a realist tradition like Walt’s “balance of threat theory” or Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism”) that would explain what’s wrong with your single metric. On my side, I’m not committed to any specific theory. I limit myself to take the patterns these theories individuate just as patterns of reasoning over security dilemmas more or less plausible depending on the given circumstances, and more or less empirically supported.

Ukraine is not NATO.

When after 2008 it was becoming clear Ukraine might be the stage for a new geopolitcal rivalry, Ukraine was right to fear a Russian invasion. — Tzeentch

But who started that conflict? NATO, at the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, and through its continued efforts to make good on the promises that it made back then.

So any notions that NATO did what it did in response to a Russian threat is utter nonsense. — Tzeentch

First, you are contradicting your previous argument. If deltas in “military capacity” is enough to identify "real" threats, then the "real" threat for Ukraine was there even before 2008 (most certainly after Ukraine returned 1/3 of soviet nuclear weapons to post-Soviet Russia in 1994).
Second, since now you are reasoning in terms of “threat perception”, then again your claim is very much questionable. The Budapest Memorandum (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum) was proof that Ukraine had legitimate worries from Russia not only for historical reasons but also for the case of Crimea, which became a contested region practically immediately after Ukraine declared its independence.
Third, since the deltas in “military capacity” most certainly increased after the Budapest Memorandum, and the security assurances weren’t binding, the problem was still there (as Mearsheimer’s explicitly suggested) so Ukrainian NATO membership (along with other Baltic states) became more appealing to Ukrainians. Even more so after Putin started an increasingly authoritarian and nationalist internal consolidation of power against rebel peripheries concerning territorial disputes prior to 2008.
But, once again, you rely on your own outlandish “threat perception” assessments indifferent to how all directly affected actors and circumstances actually shaped geopolitical events, because you need to support the narrative that basically the US started aggressing Russia for no other reason than its hubris.

I'm not sure what to make of the fact you're still referring to NATO as a defensive alliance. I don't know if you've been paying attention, but NATO has invaded several countries post-Cold War, and left ruin in its wake.

Today it is not a defensive alliance by any stretch. — Tzeentch

“Collective defence and Article 5” is a binding commitment. There is no equivalent for offensive operations. This suggests that all other military activities allegedly going beyond the commitments of NATO by NATO members may be based on other international relation reasons (e.g. including the UN charter) and still express the cohesion of the West toward perceived threats (e.g. by those authoritarian countries vetoing UN agreements in line with the UN charter).

Even Pax Romana and Pax Britannica weren’t exactly Disneyland. — neomac

Then don't come with bullshit like this:

While you (like many here) keep focusing on arguable failures of the American interventionism in middle-east (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, etc.) and whine over the drawbacks of American imperialism (as if any avg dude on the internet could plausibly offer a better and realistic alternative), you close an eye over the part of the world that abundantly profited from the Pax Americana (or, if you prefer, the neoconservative liberal democratic capitalist Blob military-industrial-complex satanist American foreign policy). This intellectually dishonest attitude reminds me of a famous Napolitan maxim: “chiagne e fotte”, it roughly means “whine (over injustice of the system) and keep screwing them (the system) over”. — neomac — Tzeentch

I get that “then” suggests an inference. “Bullshit” suggests something you find objectionable.
Yet, there is absolutely no contradiction between those claims I made. On the contrary, they support each other! So I find your brachylogy utterly unintelligible.

The point I’m making is that fears of European instabilities due to historical legacies from 2 WWs and the Cold War (from ethnic nationalisms like in Yugoslavia to imperialistic ambitions like from Germany and Russia), were shaping the risk perception of European countries and the US. That’s why Western European (like France and the UK) and East European (like Poland and the Baltic states) welcomed NATO presence. That’s how you get a British lord, H.L. Ismay, the NATO’s first Secretary General, claim that NATO was created to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” or a debate on NATO enlargement by the American committee on Foreign Relations talking about Russian imperialism. — neomac

My argument is that none of this 50-year old argumentation is particularly relevant after the Cold War. It's a completely different situation. There is no threat of European infighting. The Germans didn't need to be "kept down", the Soviet Union no longer existed and the Americans had no military reason to stay in Europe (but of course they had a geopolitical reason to want to be "in"). Russia is severely weakened, the United States is the undisputed hegemon.

There was no threat of war in Europe after the Cold War. You're just making it up.

I presented an argument to explain why your approach is flawed. — neomac

You did none of the sort. You avoided giving me a metric, probably because you're fully aware that they all point towards the same thing - that Russia was weak after the Cold War, and not a threat to NATO.

First, you are contradicting your previous argument. If deltas in “military capacity” is enough to identify "real" threats, then the "real" threat for Ukraine was there even before 2008 (most certainly after Ukraine returned 1/3 of soviet nuclear weapons to post-Soviet Russia in 1994). — neomac

I never argued as much. I gave Russia's military capacity in relation to the West as a measure to support the idea that Russia did not pose a threat after the Cold War.

Second, since now you are reasoning in terms of “threat perception”, then again your claim is very much questionable. The Budapest Memorandum (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum) was proof that Ukraine had legitimate worries from Russia not only for historical reasons but also for the case of Crimea, which became a contested region practically immediately after Ukraine declared its independence. — neomac

How can you interpret this in any other way than a solid commitment to peace and cooperation?

Note that the United States and the United Kingdom also signed this treaty, vowing to respect the sovereignty of its signatories.

... because you need to support the narrative that basically the US started aggressing Russia for no other reason than its hubris. — neomac

Yes, and there are plenty of experts that make this point for me. Mearsheimer explicitly makes the point that the U.S. pushed NATO expansion all the way into Ukraine because it felt Russia was weak and it could get away with it.

“Collective defence and Article 5” is a binding commitment. There is no equivalent for offensive operations. — neomac

Nice words on a piece of paper mean nothing when NATO goes around the world invading countries wherever it pleases. To make the argument that NATO is a defensive alliance in view of its appaling record of expansion and aggression after the Cold War is just detached.

My argument is that none of this 50-year old argumentation is particularly relevant after the Cold War. It's a completely different situation. There is no threat of European infighting. The Germans didn't need to be "kept down", the Soviet Union no longer existed and the Americans had no military reason to stay in Europe (but of course they had a geopolitical reason to want to be "in"). Russia is severely weakened, the United States is the undisputed hegemon.

There was no threat of war in Europe after the Cold War. You're just making it up. — Tzeentch

See how you are dodging again: there was no "threat" (which you who are not a geopolitical agent measure on a single metric) or there was no "perceived threat" in Europe after the Cold War (which contradicts your claim that NATO expansion was based on "plenty of historical grievance to build it on.")?

You did none of the sort. You avoided giving me a metric, probably because you're fully aware that they all point towards the same thing - that Russia was weak after the Cold War, and not a threat to NATO. — Tzeentch

Of course I did [1]. And I re-iterated on analogous points over several posts in my past exchanges.
Besides there is no geopolitical theory I'm aware of that uses such single metric to assess threat perception by geopolitical agents (not even Walt's or Mearsheimer's). Not surprisingly NATO enlargements as expression of the US hegemony fits very well Mearsheimer's "offensive realism" theory ("states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals").

How can you interpret this in any other way than a solid commitment to peace and cooperation?

Note that the United States and the United Kingdom also signed this treaty, vowing to respect the sovereignty of its signatories. — Tzeentch

That Russia violated by invading Ukraine which is why the United States and the UK felt compelled to react. And let's not forget the returning of 1/3 of soviet nuclear weapons to post-Soviet Russia with the support of the very much "aggressive" and "Russophobic" US/UK.

Yes, and there are plenty of experts that make this point for me. Mearsheimer explicitly makes the point that the U.S. pushed NATO expansion all the way into Ukraine because it felt Russia was weak and it could get away with it. — Tzeentch

I know about Mearsheimer's views. But I'm not impressed by them for several reasons: it contradicts Mearsheimer's own "offensive realism" assumptions (which is even more unmitigated if alliance commitments shouldn't be taken seriously just because they are written on paper). Secondly, it questions the explanatory power of Mearsheimer's theory (I won't reiterate on my old arguments about this, you can find precious inputs also from Robert Jervis "Liberalism, the Blob, and American Foreign Policy: Evidence and Methodology"). Thirdly, Mearsheimer's completely bypasses the historical arguments I made which owe also to Brzezinski's insights (Brzezinski wasn't just a armchair academic like Mearsheimer, but someone who contributed to shape American foreign policy after post-Cold War), and which Mearsheimer didn't question (he too predicted the tensions between Ukraine and Russia would likely increase).

Dr. Brzezinski, some critics of NATO enlargement are alarmed by the negative reaction of Russia to this policy. If, as we are led to believe by those critics, Russia has no designs on the territory of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, how does the membership of those countries in NATO impact Russian interests?
Dr. Brzezinski. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that it impacts on Russian interests adversely at all unless Russia is of the view that NATO is an enemy and that the United States is an enemy. If that is the Russian view, then we have a very serious problem, in which case we ought to expand NATO for that reason as well.
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46832/html/CHRG-105shrg46832.htm



[1]

What’s your argument? A comparison of US military capacity and Russian military capacity is enough to make your point? — neomac
Essentially, yes. What would you like me to compare instead? GDP? Think it'll paint a different picture?

There are many factors that shape threat perception in geopolitical agents "military capacity" being one of the most important, but not the only one (and notice that in the case of Russia things are complicated by the fact that Russia is not only the 3rd rank country by military capability but also the country with the largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world, relevant to the defensive/offensive military capacity balance, and that it’s military/offensive capacity can sum up with the Chinese one in case of a anti-American alliance). Military capacity is important because it contributes to shape “security dilemmas” but in this respect, also aggressive intentions count (signalling strategies and ideological convergence may help in mitigating the issue), so geopolitical agents are prone to detect and anticipate potential threats based on other geopolitical agents’ past/current behavior and their dispositions/opportunities for alliance and conflict.
Reactions may be defensive or offensive (pre-emptive): especially, hegemonic powers may certainly not wait for threatening competitors to be strong enough to attack, before reacting against them. As I wrote elsewhere, geopolitical strategies can involve long-term goals covering decades and generations to come (so timing is important too). Any response implies risks, because of uncertainties induced by mistrust, complexity/timing of coordination and unpredictable events (like a pandemic).
Now let’s talk about “threat perception” for the post-ColdWar American hegemonic power (which, not surprisingly, is perfectly in line with “offensive realist” views [1]):
”Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.
"There are three additional aspects to this objective: First the U.S must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.” (source: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html)
Pretty diabolical, isn’t it?! Yet in the last 30 years, Europe got richer and less committed (in terms of security/economy) toward the US, and at the same time Russia and China got much richer (also related avg standard of life improved), more militarised and assertive abroad, in the hope of extending their sphere of influence at the expense of the US. Europeans, Russia and China abundantly exploited the institutions and free-market (the soft-power!) supported by the Pax Americana after the end of Cold-War era. And anti-Americanism (along with American decline calls) grew stronger too. What could possibly go wrong given those “security” premises held by the hegemonic power?

While you (like many here) keep focusing on arguable failures of the American interventionism in middle-east (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, etc.) and whine over the drawbacks of American imperialism (as if any avg dude on the internet could plausibly offer a better and realistic alternative), you close an eye over the part of the world that abundantly profited from the Pax Americana (or, if you prefer, the neoconservative liberal democratic capitalist Blob military-industrial-complex satanist American foreign policy). This intellectually dishonest attitude reminds me of a famous Napolitan maxim: “chiagne e fotte”, it roughly means “whine (over injustice of the system) and keep screwing them (the system) over”.


[1]
My own realist theory of international relations says that the structure of the international system forces countries concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. The ultimate goal of every major state is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. In practical terms, this means that the most powerful states seek to establish hegemony in their region of the world, while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region.
To be more specific, the international system has three defining characteristics. First, the main actors are states that operate in anarchy, which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. Second, all great powers have some offensive military capability, which means they have the wherewithal to hurt each other. Third, no state can know the intentions of other states with certainty, especially their future intentions. It is simply impossible, for example, to know what Germany’s or Japan’s intentions will be toward their neighbors in 2025.
In a world where other states might have malign intentions as well as significant offensive capabilities, states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded by the fact that in an anarchic system there is no night watchman for states to call if trouble comes knocking at their door. Therefore, states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it. No Americans, for example, worry that Canada or Mexico will attack the United States, because neither of those countries is strong enough to contemplate a fight with Uncle Sam.

https://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931 — neomac

I don't see why anyone in his place would take such a huge risk for a minor (proportionally) financial gain. — SophistiCat

Minor? Weaning Europe of Russian gas in favour of North American gas is not minor in my book. It's tens of billions of dollars in value per year. — Benkei

Sure, but that is a hypothetical that has little to do with reality, so I am not sure how this is an objection to what I said.

1. Europe was already on course to wean itself from Russian gas long before the explosions.
2. Most of the extra purchases necessitated by the shift were not going to the US, for obvious economic and logistical reasons.
3. As I was just saying, before the explosions, only two of the Nord Stream lines were ever in operation, and the explosions left one line intact (one of the Nord Stream 2 lines, which Russia lobbied for and US opposed). The supply was not constrained by this action, because European pipelines were already underutilized, and Nord Stream was not operating at all.

So the hypothetical motivation for the US would not be money, and such an action would not be taken just to earn a bit of extra cash, anyway. It would have to be a political decision. One possible motivation could be to burn the bridges to prevent backsliding, but the timing seems odd, seeing as Europeans were moving away from Russian gas full-steam.

Not surprisingly NATO enlargements as expression of the US hegemony fits very well Mearsheimer's "offensive realism" theory ("states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals"). — neomac

Exactly. NATO enlargement had nothing to do with a threat from Russia, but the United States jealously guarding its position at the top. The United States, for which any semblance of independence is a "threat", resistance is aggression, etc. case and point: Yugoslavia, Lybia, Russia, China, etc.

This is further supported by the fact NATO enlargement received a great deal of criticism over the years, precisely because there was no Russian threat - in the end, NATO enlargement turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

That Russia violated by invading Ukraine which is why the United States and the UK felt compelled to react. — neomac

Yes, and that happened under entirely different circumstances. This conflict was initiated by the U.S. when it sought to change Ukrainian neutrality, which was obviously a prerequisite for a robust peace.


Further, Brzezinski is a terrible source to quote in favor of your position, since he basically laid out how U.S. domination of the globe works and how to maintain it, and it fits perfectly into the picture of U.S. hubris.

Sure.

Now apply exactly the same level of exculpatory analysis to the theory that Russia did it.

1. Europe was already on course to wean itself from Russian gas long before the explosions.
2. None of the extra purchases necessitated by the shift were not going to Russia, for obvious economic and logistical reasons.
3. Only two of the Nord Stream lines were ever in operation, and the explosions left one line intact (one of the Nord Stream 2 lines, which Russia lobbied for and US opposed). The supply was not constrained by this action, because European pipelines were already underutilized, and Nord Stream was not operating at all.

Plus...

4. It's Russia's fucking pipeline and they could have just turned off the supply.
5. Less stable supplies through the Baltic actually favour Ukraine - that being the whole point of the crisis between Germany and the US over the pipeline in the first place.
6. Putin has, unlike Biden, never threatened to "end" the pipeline by unspecified means.

But somehow the exact same analysis doesn't seem to stir the same sycophantic bootlicking when directed against America's competition.

Yes, Isaac, who needs Hersh when you have the logic of your item #4.

Sure, but the important thing here is to remember this is not about us trying to work out who sabotaged the pipeline. We're just not in a position to do that. We have a miniscule portion of the evidence available and are all woefully inexpert regarding the geopolitical analysis required to assess motive here.

The point is entirely about opposing this new fad of trying to present all opposition to US foreign policy as deranged conspiracy theory.

If we can no longer hold power to account we're screwed.

I don't care if there's only a tangential scrap of evidence that the US did it. I will still amplify that narrative above any that exculpate the US so that the government remain as terrified of their populace as possible. They should feel as though they're walking on thin glass, not a red carpet.

Minor? Weaning Europe of Russian gas in favour of North American gas is not minor in my book. It's tens of billions of dollars in value per year. — Benkei

It's basically Gulf States like Qatar and a myriad of providers have replaced Russia.

The problem with US gas (and oil) is that the production hasn't the infrastructure yet to be exported to Europe. Also they have had regulatory obstacles. So a country like Qatar is the real winner of embargoes.