Exactly. NATO enlargement had nothing to do with a threat from Russia, but the United States jealously guarding its position at the top. — Tzeentch

I think for the East European countries and the Baltic States wanting to join NATO had the membership everything to do with the threat of Russia. Which now also Sweden and Finland have seen, thanks to February 24th 2022.

Typical for those obsessed about the US: forgetting totally the motivation and agenda of the European countries themselves.

What I see is the people in power play a zero sum game but they need to control the means of production of their own populations or base. So if we are the producers we should hold our governments to account to not exploit their populations unnecessarily. Seems like a lot of bungled wars on the US side in recent history.

Also we should be aware that weaponized central banking can be a driver in leading to wars.

This means that the United States will remain the primary supplier of LNG to Europe for at least 2023. This will likely generate even greater revenue for U.S exporters after a record 2022, which totaled $35 billion through September, compared to $8.3 billion over the same period in 2021, U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) data shows. — Reuters

forgetting disagreeing totally [about] the motivation and agenda of the European countries themselves. — ssu

Fixed that for you.



So can you explain for us why the US pushed to the point of diplomatic crisis against Nordstream2, if they had so little to gain?

A bit of fun? A sudden passion for the well-being of Qatar?

Well, it has changed. Eu statistics from 2020:

In 2020, almost three quarters of the extra-EU crude oil imports came from Russia (29 %), the United States (9 %), Norway (8 %), Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom (both 7 %) as well as Kazakhstan and Nigeria (both 6 %). A similar analysis shows that over three quarters of the EU's imports of natural gas came from Russia (43 %), Norway (21 %), Algeria (8 %) and Qatar (5 %), while more than half of solid fossil fuel (mostly coal) imports originated from Russia (54 %), followed by the United States (16 %) and Australia (14 %).

So finally they've gotten those terminals built.

forgetting disagreeing totally [about] the motivation and agenda of the European countries themselves.
— ssu

Fixed that for you. — Isaac

Yeah sure, you know better what Finns and Swedes think. :roll:

So can you explain for us why the US pushed to the point of diplomatic crisis against Nordstream2, if they had so little to gain? — Isaac

Yes, it was Trump that was against this.

Of course in your logic you forget what and why that changed, just like why Sweden left it's foreign policy stance that had been the same since Napoleons times.

With no February 24th, Nordstream lines would be open and Sweden and Finland not trying to join NATO.

Yeah sure, you know better what Finns and Swedes think. :roll: — ssu

No. Do you need me to get the diagrams out again?

1 + 1 is 2 definitionally, so people who think it's 3 are wrong.

The earth can be empirically shown to be spherical by methods performatively agreed upon by everyone. People who think it's flat are wrong.

Physical laws of electromagnetism are agreed on by virtually all experts in the field. People who disagree are wrong.

The internal motives and beliefs of the entire population of Sweden and Finland is neither empirically demonstrable, nor agreed upon by all experts in the field. People who have a different opinion to you are not wrong. They disagree.

Of course in your logic you forget what and why that changed, just like why Sweden left it's foreign policy stance that had been the same since Napoleons times. — ssu

Go on. "Some time has elapsed therefore everything's changed" is not much of an argument.

Now this is interesting. WoPo article says that Ukraine’s rocket campaign reliant on U.S. precision targeting, officials say. What's more, while Ukrainians identify and select their targets for precision rocket strikes on their own, their NATO partners basically have a veto power.

What's more, while Ukrainians identify and select their targets for precision rocket strikes on their own, their NATO partners basically have a veto power. — SophistiCat

So NATO is monitoring their targeting systems and won't allow them to strike the Russian interior?

@SophistiCat @ssu https://www.welt.de/regionales/mecklenburg-vorpommern/article243596071/Frank-Keine-Belege-fuer-russische-Sabotage-an-Pipelines.html

Peter Frank is one of German's highest ranking prosecutors. And he's no friend of Russia as he's also the guy that communicated they found 100s of pieces of evidence of war crimes by Russia in Ukraine and called for their prosecution.

Of course, no evidence yet doesn't mean there isn't any but I think, once again, we really don't know who's done it and we need to wait it out. I do think the hypothesis the US did it needs to be considered and investigated. If they didn't do it and give full cooperation then disculpatory evidence should be relatively easy to find.

Another theory, but one further down the likelihood road, is that it was corporate sabotage. Certainly players that could pay for it but who would they hire?

Of course, no evidence yet doesn't mean there isn't any but I think, once again, we really don't know who's done it and we need to wait it out. I do think the hypothesis the US did it needs to be considered and investigated. If they didn't do it and give full cooperation then disculpatory evidence should be relatively easy to find. — Benkei

As obviously things are kept out of public, it naturally begs the question who did it? Hence the US is totally one candidate in this.

Wouldn't actually be anything new for the US. During the Cold War Sweden got humiliated after a Russian sub moving on the surface got stuck on a rock on Swedish waters very close to their main naval base. Afterwards the Swedes were eagerly hunting for submarines (and mini-submarines) on their waters. Later it seems that at least some of these incidents were done by NATO submarines and if so, as the incidents were blamed on the Soviet Union, it was quite a successful covert operation. See here.

(A humiliating incident for both Sweden and the Soviet Union during the Cold War:)


The reason why would Russia blow up it's own gas pipeline is beyond me. Hence I think that the US behind this is totally possible. Luckily the US is system is so prone to leaks at least in the historical perspective, decades from now as people write their memoirs, is that we'll know this in future history books.

The internal motives and beliefs of the entire population of Sweden and Finland is neither empirically demonstrable, nor agreed upon by all experts in the field. — Isaac

But the reasons, arguments and agenda of the politicians and the military are.

And simply sidelining them here is simply wrong. It's you who is counting 1+1=1, when you argue that everything evolves around the US and the security issues of European countries don't matter in the equation when they have applied to NATO.

And simply sidelining them here is simply wrong. It's you who is counting 1+1=1, when you argue that everything evolves around the US and the security issues of European countries don't matter in the equation when they have applied to NATO. — ssu

My position is clear.

The U.S. and Russia, and to a lesser extent Ukraine are the big players in this conflict, and all the other countries involved (primarily in NATO) play no role of significance. That's not to say they play no role at all, but their influence isn't big enough to warrant paying much attention to.

Maybe you should provide some argumentation why you believe that approach is wrong. Why these smaller countries are worth paying attention to.

Your point seems to be we cannot sideline their agendas and interests. My question would be, why not?

Exactly. NATO enlargement had nothing to do with a threat from Russia, but the United States jealously guarding its position at the top. — Tzeentch

You can not say that NATO enlargement doesn’t have to do with threat from Russia, because I brought you evidence that that’s the case. You would also contradict yourself, in claiming otherwise.
The best you can argue is that Russia wasn’t a direct threat to the US as it was for the Baltic States or Ukraine because it’s very much unlikely that Russia was prepared or determined to aggress the US after the collapse of Soviet Union. However the accusation about “the United States jealously guarding its position at the top” sounds like a moral judgement which presupposes your moral assumptions (which I might not share). One may wonder why is the US so jealous, though? Realist views like Mearsheimer’s are not concerned with moral assessments but with how security dilemmas by geopolitical agents are expected to be addressed. And what are “offensive realism” expectations about how the US (or any possible geopolitical actor at its place) would act wrt Russia (or any other possible geopolitical competitor at its place)? Here is the answer [1]. Indeed there are evidences in support of the fact that American decision makers would reason like that [2]. So American “jealousy for being on the top” seems perfectly in line with what Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism” predicts.
One can still wonder at individual level or state level: if that’s the typical hegemonic behaviour and the alternative to the US is China or Russia, which one is more convenient for remaining non-hegemonic states to bandwagon with?

This is further supported by the fact NATO enlargement received a great deal of criticism over the years, precisely because there was no Russian threat - in the end, NATO enlargement turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. — Tzeentch

The criticisms were out of fear of Russian reaction in case of NATO enlargement. But why would a superpower like the US fear Russia for NATO enlargement? Russia is no threat to the US right? And why would Russia react to NATO enlargement to the point of threatening European security? NATO enlargement wasn’t an invasion of Russian territory, was it? Maybe it’s because NATO was interfering with the Russian sphere of influence (euphemistically called “Russia’s backyard”)? Why should the US (or neighbouring countries or Ukraine for that matter) care for Russia to have a sphere of influence at their expense exactly? Does Russia have a moral or legal right to have a sphere of influence? Or is it convenient to the US, neighbouring countries or Ukraine for that matter to let Russia have a sphere of influence at their expense? How so?

This conflict was initiated by the U.S. when it sought to change Ukrainian neutrality, which was obviously a prerequisite for a robust peace. — Tzeentch

Or maybe the “conflict was initiated” by Russia when it sought to forcefully preserve the “alleged” Ukrainian neutrality?
BTW, neutrality could be an obvious precondition for robust peace as much as for repressing independents movements (Chechnya), military engaging over territorial disputes (Georgia), puppetization (Belarus) and economic exploitation/depression (the whole of Russia federation, except major Russian urban areas like Moscow and St. Petersbourg) and Russification (Ukraine). What if Ukraine didn’t want any of that?

Further, Brzezinski is a terrible source to quote in favor of your position, since he basically laid out how U.S. domination of the globe works and how to maintain it, and it fits perfectly into the picture of U.S. hubris. — Tzeentch

On the contrary, it’s precisely because Brzezinski contributed to the decision process that led America to NATO expansion, that is absolutely worth to have a good grasp of his reasoning over American security dilemmas. On the other side Mearsheimer is an armchair academic who most certainly didn’t benefit from the informational network, the internal understanding, and related responsibilities in foreign policy decision making as Brzezinski (not surprisingly, Brzezinski analysis are richer in terms of Russian political, social, historical insights than Mearsheimer’s).
For the notion “hubris” holds the same I said for “jealousy”. They are polemical notions which do not improve our understanding of geopolitical agents’ behaviour. At best, they can appease some avg dude’s sense of moral entitlement which anonymously, on the internet, is very cheap and verges on virtue signalling, right?



[1]
To be more specific, the international system has three defining characteristics.
First, the main actors are states that operate in anarchy, which simply means that there is no higher authority above them.
Second, all great powers have some offensive military capability, which means they have the wherewithal to hurt each other.
Third, no state can know the intentions of other states with certainty, especially their future intentions.
[…]
In a world where other states might have malign intentions as well as significant offensive capabilities, states tend to fear each other.
[…]
Therefore, states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it.

(Source: https://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931)


”Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.
"There are three additional aspects to this objective: First the U.S must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.”

(source: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html)

the reasons, arguments and agenda of the politicians and the military are. — ssu

No, they very clearly aren't. The arguments and agenda of the politicians and the military are empirically demonstrable. The reasons are private and a matter on which you and I may equally speculate.

You can not say that NATO enlargement doesn’t have to do with threat from Russia, because I brought you evidence that that’s the case. — neomac

And what evidence would that be? The Budapest Memorandum?

However the accusation about “the United States jealously guarding its position at the top” sounds like a moral judgement which presupposes your moral assumptions (which I might not share). — neomac

Certainly. This is a philosophy forum after all, and realism is one lens through which I might view current events - not the only one.

So American “jealousy for being on the top” seems perfectly in line with what Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism” predicts. — neomac

Indeed. Which is why I've been making the argument that that is the core of why things in Ukraine happened the way they did.

The criticisms were out of fear of Russian reaction in case of NATO enlargement. But why would a superpower like the US fear Russia for NATO enlargement? Russia is no threat to the US right? — neomac

That answer should be obvious: just because the U.S. is/was the hegemon, does not mean they can force anyone to do their bidding, or enter war with anyone they like and come out the victor. That much should be painfully evident from the failings in the Middle-East.

As I said earlier, to the U.S. independence is a threat, resistance is aggression.

We can use such hubristical notions to understand U.S. behavior, but to consider them rational would be an entirely different subject. Moreover, we see now how U.S. hegemony is slowly crumbling as a result of this hubris, so even the realist may start to question the nature of these actions.

Maybe it’s because NATO was interfering with the Russian sphere of influence (euphemistically called “Russia’s backyard”)? — neomac

Let's be frank. Russia accepted most of NATO's enlargement. Ukraine was simply a bridge too far. That has more to do with the way Russia views Ukraine with regards to its vital interests, and less with its sphere of influence, though it would stand to reason Russia would prefer to have Ukraine in its sphere of influence for this reason.

For such a position as yours to make sense, you would have to provide some evidence that Russia viewed the ex-Soviet republics in Eastern Europe as part of its ("rightful") sphere of influence. I don't think you'll find much of the sort.

Why should the US (or neighbouring countries or Ukraine for that matter) care for Russia to have a sphere of influence at their expense exactly? — neomac

I don't think "sphere of influence" is the right description, as I said earlier, but it's in U.S. interest to understand the vital interests of other big players on the global stage, to avoid getting into conflicts it cannot or is not willing to win. That's what we see now, and in my view it is bringing the end of U.S. hegemony one step closer since it now has to juggle its attention between Europe and South-East Asia.

Does Russia have a moral or legal right to have a sphere of influence? — neomac

Neither of those (moral or legal) are particularly useful lenses to view the current situation through. International law is entirely ignored, and Russia is not a moral actor.

From a perspective of how nations can best coexist peacefully and war can be avoided, it is of vital importance that countries' security concerns are taken into consideration.

Or is it convenient to the US, neighbouring countries or Ukraine for that matter to let Russia have a sphere of influence at their expense? How so? — neomac

It certainly would have been convenient for the Ukrainians had Russian security concerns been taken more seriously. If they had been, many would not have lost their lives and homes.

Or maybe the “conflict was initiated” by Russia when it sought to forcefully preserve the “alleged” Ukrainian neutrality? — neomac

I view this conflict as having started in 2008, with war becoming extremely likely after the U.S. backed coup, and practically unavoidable after the 2014 invasion of Crimea.

What if Ukraine didn’t want any of that? — neomac

What the Russians demanded was Ukrainian neutrality, not puppetization or Russification.

If they were willing to have their country wrecked as a consequence of not wanting to meet the Russian concerns in any way, fair enough.

If having their country wrecked was unexpected, I think their political elite should have thought a little harder about their actions.

At best, they can appease some avg dude’s sense of moral entitlement which on the internet is very cheap and verges on virtue signalling, right? — neomac

I think you're letting a little personal animosity bleed into your realism yourself. :nerd:

On the other side Mearsheimer is an armchair academic... — neomac

Said what I assume is also "some avg dude on the internet"?

A bit of self-awareness would suit you well, I think.

Of course, no evidence yet doesn't mean there isn't any but I think, once again, we really don't know who's done it and we need to wait it out. — Benkei

I agree, and I never said otherwise. There are arguments in favor of the Russia-did-it theory (e.g. this), and I could buy some of them, but not with real money.

One thing though that makes it easier to buy the Russia theory is that the risk threshold is much lower for Russia than for any other plausible actor. They have little to lose, since their relationships with Europe are at their lowest point since the Bolshevik revolution. Worse comes to worst, they will just deny everything, like they always do, not caring at all whether they are believed.

So NATO is monitoring their targeting systems and won't allow them to strike the Russian interior? — frank

I doubt it. They know full well that Americans would not agree to that. And those systems don't have the range to strike deep in the interior anyway. More likely the Americans are second-guessing the Ukrainians, trying to conserve their expensive munitions.

One thing though that makes it easier to buy the Russia theory is that the risk threshold is much lower for Russia than for any other plausible actor — SophistiCat

So...

They have little to lose, since their relationships with Europe are at their lowest point since the Bolshevik revolution cold war. — SophistiCat

European diplomats privately admit transatlantic relations are at their lowest point since the end of the Cold War, including during the 2003 Iraq War — https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/06/trump-has-irrevocably-changed-american-relations-with-europe-and-biden-probably-can-t-fix-it-pub-81739

And..

they will just deny everything, like they always do, not caring at all whether they are believed. — SophistiCat

the scope and the scale of such operations have been enormous — https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/pitfalls-us-covert-operations#

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3093

doubt it. They know full well that Americans would not agree to that. And those systems don't have the range to strike deep in the interior anyway. More likely the Americans are second-guessing the Ukrainians, trying to conserve their expensive munitions. — SophistiCat

I figured the Ukrainians are consulting with American strategists though. The run toward Kharkiv was supposedly a strategy the US military has used before.

You can not say that NATO enlargement doesn’t have to do with threat from Russia, because I brought you evidence that that’s the case. — neomac

And what evidence would that be? The Budapest Memorandum? — Tzeentch

The Budapest Memorandum, the hearings entitled “Debate about NATO enlargement”. Mersheimer’s article "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent” (1993). Russia starting a territorial dispute over Crimea practically immediately after recognising Ukrainian independence.
Some more input also in the article: https://www.politico.eu/article/western-europe-listen-to-the-baltic-countries-that-know-russia-best-ukraine-poland/.
You yourself were talking of "plenty of historical grievance to build it on”, did you already forget?
And I could go on discussing about the rise of the Russian far-right nationalist (even nazi) movements before and during Putin (see “managed nationalism”) etc.

However the accusation about “the United States jealously guarding its position at the top” sounds like a moral judgement which presupposes your moral assumptions (which I might not share). — neomac

Certainly. This is a philosophy forum after all, and realism is one lens through which I might view current events - not the only one.

So American “jealousy for being on the top” seems perfectly in line with what Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism” predicts. — neomac

Indeed. Which is why I've been making the argument that that is the core of why things in Ukraine happened the way they did. — Tzeentch

That’s also why you are trapped in a cognitive dissonance, because you seem to hold realist expectations in geopolitics that systematically frustrate your idealistic moral standards or your relatable desire for peace.

Let's be frank. Russia accepted most of NATO's enlargement. Ukraine was simply a bridge too far. That has more to do with the way Russia views Ukraine with regards to its vital interests, and less with its sphere of influence, though it would stand to reason Russia would prefer to have Ukraine in its sphere of influence for this reason. — Tzeentch

First, that Ukraine was “a bridge too far” wasn’t always so obvious as you seem to believe. Here is an interview with Sergej Lavrov by the German business newspaper Handelsblatt (02.01.2005):
Question: Does the right to sovereignty also mean for Georgia and Ukraine, for example, that Russia would have nothing against their accession to the EU and NATO?
Lavrov: That is their choice. We respect the right of every state - including our neighbors - to choose its own partners, to decide for itself which organization to join. We assume that they will consider for themselves how they develop their politics and economy and which partners and allies they rely on
(Source: https://amp2.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/handelsblatt-interview-mit-aussenminister-lawrow-russland-oeffnet-ukraine-den-weg-in-die-nato/2460820.html)
Although that conciliatory response by Lavrov was questioned by Putin himself, especially in the case of Ukraine, a few months later: https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x88b9ii
Second, what would be the difference between vital interests and sphere of influence in the case of Ukraine? I see the latter as a desirable condition to ensure the former. And even if one wants to consider the worst scenario for Russia, namely Russia losing the port of Sevastopol (but I wouldn’t exclude a possible compromise convenient to Russia), Russia could still keep its access to the Mediterranean through the Port of Novorossiysk.

For such a position as yours to make sense, you would have to provide some evidence that Russia viewed the ex-Soviet republics in Eastern Europe as part of its ("rightful") sphere of influence. I don't think you'll find much of the sort. — Tzeentch

The evidence I need is what I already provided. Threat perception is in the eye of the perciever (as NATO enlargement for Russia). Surely one can question how reasonable they are but historical legacies can sediment in blood and bones for generations. Besides it’s also up to Russia’s signalling good intentions by acts and words, especially if aware that the ex-Soviet Republics might have been particularly suspicious about any innuendo to Russian hegemonic pride and historical revisionism. Unfortunately Russia (especially under Putin) didn’t send the right signals most of the time. E.g. Russia has almost always complained about NATO enlargement (aside from East Germany), Putin has vowed to protect the rights of Russian minorities (like in Ukraine and Georgia, and the problem is that there are Russian minorities also in all ex-Soviet Republics, including Baltic states and Moldova), Putin questioned the legitimacy of modern Ukraine and Ukrainian nationalism (BTW Putin complaining about Ukrainian nazism is not new, even against the Baltic states he raised the same accusations https://www.dw.com/en/putin-accuses-europe-of-ignoring-nazism-in-the-baltics/a-2817872).

Neither of those (moral or legal) are particularly useful lenses to view the current situation through. International law is entirely ignored, and Russia is not a moral actor — Tzeentch

.

What do you mean by "Russia is not a moral actor"? Is the US a moral actor?

From a perspective of how nations can best coexist peacefully and war can be avoided, it is of vital importance that countries' security concerns are taken into consideration — Tzeentch

.

I see at least 2 issues: 1. How can democratic countries best deal with security concerns of non-democratic countries, especially if driven by hegemonic ambitions (imagine a Nazi regime, Isis, Soviet Union, etc.)? Appeasement might be a very risky game 2. Your idea would sound more plausible if every geopolitical agent had a full understanding about the security concerns of its peers, yet any defensive move can be perceived as hostile (NATO enlargement was defensive for the ex-Soviet Republic but perceived as hostile by Russia, but also Russian perceiving NATO enlargement as hostile was perceived as hostile by ex-Soviet Republic, etc.).

Or is it convenient to the US, neighbouring countries or Ukraine for that matter to let Russia have a sphere of influence at their expense? How so? — neomac

It certainly would have been convenient for the Ukrainians had Russian security concerns been taken more seriously. If they had been, many would not have lost their lives and homes. — Tzeentch

Security concerns were taken seriously, that’s the reason why Ukraine felt safer under NATO. What is implicitly suggested by that claim is that Ukraine should have surrendered to Russian demands (which for Ukraine means losing its independence to the historical most dangerous country/people to the Ukrainians, let’s not forget that to Ukrainians Hitler’s Germany wasn’t perceived as dangerous as Soviet Union). And the West should have played along, which Germany and France could have done and likely kept doing so until Russia invaded Ukraine.

I view this conflict as having started in 2008, with war becoming extremely likely after the U.S. backed coup — Tzeentch

.

Not sure what you are referring to. Is any of such trivia on wikipedia? Do you have links?

What the Russians demanded was Ukrainian neutrality, not puppetization or Russification.
If they were willing to have their country wrecked as a consequence of not wanting to meet the Russian concerns in any way, fair enough. — Tzeentch

It’s a bit naive to think that Russia would have explicitly demanded the puppetization or Russification of Ukraine in these terms (e.g. “denazification” is Putin’s ersatz for puppetization and Russification). There are implied risks though. Ukrainians seem willing to sacrifice and resist now to be free later.
Just imagine how shitty must feel to be under the Russians to them.

I think you're letting a little personal animosity bleed into your realism yourself.

Sir, it’s just that I’m more pugnacious when I suspect intellectual dishonesty. Said that, “homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto”.

On the other side Mearsheimer is an armchair academic... — neomac

Said what I assume is also "some avg dude on the internet"?
A bit of self-awareness would suit you well, I think. — Tzeentch

And correctly said so, because that’s a fact. Check on wikipedia. Brzezinski was a National Security Advisor and participated to the official “the debate on NATO enlargement” (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46832/pdf/CHRG-105shrg46832.pdf). Mearsheimer has always been just an academic.

Concerning my “bit of self-awareness”, is the following enough?

I’m an avg dude (not en expert), we are reasoning under uncertainties of many relevant facts, and exchange in a philosophy forum from our armchair during leisure time. Didn’t we explicitly factor in all that in our claims many times already? Yet I care about the clarity/logic of my arguments and the evidences available to me to assess them (including the input from all sorts of news/stats/reports/experts of course). Since I take such arguments and evidence assessment to be affordable also by other avg dudes in a philosophy forum post format, I expect such avg dudes to reciprocate in intellectually honest and challenging ways — neomac

as an avg dude, I’m far from assuming to know better or enough how to play the game to “propose” or “recommend” anything to anybody about geopolitical issues, or to have any significant impact on this war directly or indirectly through my posts here — neomac

nobody and certainly not avg dudes like me and you can figure out a reliable plan to grant an optimal military victory — neomac

As an avg dude, I would rely more on geopolitical speculation and historical analogies for guidance. — neomac

I agree, and I never said otherwise. There are arguments in favor of the Russia-did-it theory (e.g. this), and I could buy some of them, but not with real money. — SophistiCat

Oh good, didn't mean to suggest you did. Interesting article. With regard to his Nord Stream speculation, I think the first is bullshit. If things normalise, the West isn't weaned of Russian gas: it will buy whatever is cheapest and if that's Russian gas, we will buy Russian gas.

The second point, though, is indeed a good argument to suspect the Russians.

Personally, I don't think the Russians are sophisticated enough to not have any evidence pointing their way after 3 months of research.

The Budapest Memorandum, the hearings entitled “Debate about NATO enlargement”. Mersheimer’s article "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent” (1993). Russia starting a territorial dispute over Crimea practically immediately after recognising Ukrainian independence. — neomac

A-ha.

So NATO enlargement was all about Ukraine, then?

Interesting theory.

That’s also why you are trapped in a cognitive dissonance, because you seem to hold realist expectations in geopolitics that systematically frustrate your idealistic moral standards or your relatable desire for peace. — neomac

Has the time already come for psychoanalzying?

Realism is the lens through which I understand the why and how. A moral framework is what I use to judge how I feel about that.

First, that Ukraine was “a bridge too far” wasn’t always so obvious as you seem to believe. Here is an interview with Sergej Lavrov by the German business newspaper Handelsblatt (02.01.2005):
Question: Does the right to sovereignty also mean for Georgia and Ukraine, for example, that Russia would have nothing against their accession to the EU and NATO?
Lavrov: That is their choice. We respect the right of every state - including our neighbors - to choose its own partners, to decide for itself which organization to join. We assume that they will consider for themselves how they develop their politics and economy and which partners and allies they rely on
(Source: https://amp2.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/handelsblatt-interview-mit-aussenminister-lawrow-russland-oeffnet-ukraine-den-weg-in-die-nato/2460820.html)
Although that conciliatory response by Lavrov was questioned by Putin himself, especially in the case of Ukraine, a few months later: https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x88b9ii — neomac

During this period the Russians were committed to playing nice with the West.

Since there wasn't any indication that NATO or the EU were making serious attempts at incorporating Ukraine or that such a thing was even feasible, why would they have answered any different?

It seems to me they went to great lengths not to give the impression of being aggressive, even when it touched on vital security concerns. Even when it finally did become a real worry to them, they gave warnings for 15 years.

Second, what would be the difference between vital interests and sphere of influence in the case of Ukraine? I see the letter as a desirable condition to ensure the former. — neomac

Russian vital interests were protected with a neutral Ukraine. There'd be little to gain and much to lose for them to change that status quo, so incorporating it into their sphere of influence would not have been desirable at all.

... Russia could still keep its access to the Mediterranean through the Port of Novorossiysk. — neomac

Crimea is about more than just access to the Mediterranean. It's about control over the Black Sea, the Kerch Strait, the Sea of Azov (highly important in connecting the Russian heartland to trade), Odessa, etc.

Besides it’s also up to Russia’s signalling good intentions by acts and words, [...] Unfortunately Russia (especially under Putin) didn’t send the right signals most of the time. — neomac

Prior to 2008, there was a clear commitment from Russia to maintain good relations with the West, and the West was mostly receptive to that.

It is when the U.S. realized Russia was not going to subjugate itself to the U.S. that it started to pursue its policies in Ukraine.

I see no evidence for real security competition between the West and Russia prior to 2008. If there was any, it was one-sidedly coming from the West.

What do you mean by "Russia is not a moral actor"? Is the US a moral actor? — neomac

Individuals are moral actors.

I see at least 2 issues: 1. How can democratic countries best deal with security concerns of non-democratic countries, especially if driven by hegemonic ambitions (imagine a nazi regime, isis, soviet union, etc.)? Appeasement might be a very risky game 2. Your idea would sound more plausible if every geopolitical agent had a full understanding about the security concerns of its peers, yet any defensive move can be perceived as hostile (NATO enlargement was defensive for the ex-Soviet Republic but perceived as hostile by Russia, but also Russian perceiving NATO enlargement as hostile was perceived as hostile by ex-Soviet Republic, etc.). — neomac

Fair points, and the nature of the security dilemma does not need elaboration.

I shared my perspective in response to your question whether nations have a moral right to a sphere of influence. My perspective presupposes peaceful coexistence is (or "should be") the goal of nations. Sadly, many nations and certainly the U.S. are not driven by that goal. They are driven by hegemonic ambitions like the ones you consider risky to appease.

Security concerns were taken seriously, that’s the reason why Ukraine felt safer under NATO. What is implicitly suggested by that claim is that Ukraine should have surrendered to Russian demands... — neomac

That's presupposing that Ukraine sought to join NATO for security reasons. It also sought to join the EU, and join the "western world" at large - the U.S. sphere of influence. There were plenty of other benefits that could have guided their decisions.

What was stubbornly ignored were 15 years worth of the Russians voicing their security concerns. A recipe for disaster, anyone could have told you 15 years ago, and that is what we got.

What I'm explicitly suggesting is that whoever drove Ukraine to try and join NATO was either A) extremely foolish, or B) not acting in pursuit of Ukrainian interests. (I'm still entertaining the hypothesis that this whole ordeal is largely U.S.-orchestrated).

Not sure what you are referring to. Is any of such trivia on wikipedia? Do you have links? — neomac

I'm referring to the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, during which it was decided that:

"... [Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO."

NATO officially reaffirmed its commitment to this promise on several occasions between 2008 and 2014.

It’s a bit naive to think that Russia would have explicitly demanded the puppetization or Russification of Ukraine in these terms (e.g. “denazification” is Putin’s ersatz for puppetization and Russification). — neomac

If you believe puppetization or Russification was Russia's goal you must provide some evidence.

I can go along with the idea that Russia, like any nation state, acts in its self-interest. I do not go along with the idea that Russia can only do so by acting in hostile ways, and therefore must always have sinister intentions even if we can't see them.

Brzezinski was a National Security Advisor and participated to the official “the debate on NATO enlargement” (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46832/pdf/CHRG-105shrg46832.pdf). Mearsheimer has always been just an academic. — neomac

I think it's crazy that you would dismiss academics in such a way, but whoever you base your views on is your business.

If practical knowledge is required in order not to be considered by you a "armchair academic" then why are you referring to someone whose practical experience is nearly half a century old?

Anyway.

Have you ever considered the difference between the words of an "armchair academic" and a politician?

it’s just that I’m more pugnacious when I suspect intellectual dishonesty. — neomac

Concerning my “bit of self-awareness”, is the following enough? — neomac

If you are so quick to suspect intellectual dishonesty when someone disagrees with you, defer to phoney psychoanalysis and believe everybody here to only be "avg dudes", it begs the question what you are doing here.

Russian vital interests were protected with a neutral Ukraine. — Tzeentch

You are either forgetting or simply denying (which is likely) that these "vital interests" meant also obtaining territories from Ukraine and Ukraine to be tightly under Russian control... not just being neutral.

But admitting these facts somehow go against the NATO enlargement argument, so you keep denying them.

There'd be little to gain and much to lose for them to change that status quo, so incorporating it into their sphere of influence would not have been desirable at all. — Tzeentch

Seems that you don't know much about post-soviet era history of Russo-Ukrainian relations. Russia wanted to have Ukraine under it's influence, even if it was actually neutral, as actually the country was in the 1990's and the 2000's, before the current war. (Wanting to join NATO, by one Ukrainian president, and getting vague promises of something in the future doesn't make the country a NATO member.)

Seems that you don't know much about post-soviet era history of Russo-Ukrainian relations. Russia wanted to have Ukraine under it's influence, even if it was actually neutral, as actually the country was in the 1990's and the 2000's, before the current war. — ssu

Christ, you're incorrigible aren't you.

What Russia wanted is not a fact of history, it's an opinion. This isn't up for debate, you're just completely wrong. Not a single historian in the world would claim that a nation's intentions are facts of history.

Facts of history are matters like such and such a battle took place on such and such a date, or that some law was passed by some Parliament or other. These are matters which people might forget, or get wrong.

Opinions about intent are not facts. No one is 'forgetting', no one is 'misunderstanding'.

People are disagreeing.

It's a concept which seems to be rapidly in danger of becoming extinct.


I like a quote from Shashi Tharoor, talking about the success of Indian democracy...

In a diverse plural democracy like India, you don't really have to agree on everything all the time, so long as you agree on the ground rules of how you will disagree.

Deciding that everyone who disagrees is a conspiracy nut, an ideologue, in the pay of the opposition, beneath response, mistaken, or fails to understand is not a healthy set of ground rules. It's just quasi-religious dogmatism.

What Russia wanted is not a fact of history, it's an opinion. — Isaac

I think that "opinion" is quite well shown from the actions and the reasons given to those actions by the leaders of Russia. Putin's article Article by Vladimir Putin ”On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians“ shows perfectly what he thought of the Ukrainian state. Among the multitude of other obvious examples.

Hence when the attacker annexes parts of a country, calls it artificial and says it has been all along Russian, it's not just an opinion. What Vladimir Putin has done, has said, has implemented as policy, is far more than just "opinion". But accepting what Putin has done and said breaks with your agenda of saying that everything is the fault of the US. (And note, you don't say US administration)

Not s single historian in the world would claim that a nation's intentions are facts of history. — Isaac

Now for your strawman that we cannot talk about countries and obviously mean their leadership. But somehow you talk about the US having an agenda.

People are disagreeing. — Isaac

People disagree about the World being round shaped. Some say it's flat.

People disagree about the World being round shaped. Some say it's flat. — ssu

Are you seriously suggesting that your preferred theory of Russian geopolitics is on a par with the theory that the earth is round?

Your ego really has reached an unexpected peak.

re you seriously suggesting that your preferred yhriry — Isaac

what is yhiry?

What a dictator of Russia says and does isn't an opinion.

Chilling story on CNN about the brutal treatement of so-called conscripts fighting for the Wagner group.

“We couldn’t retreat without orders because if we don’t comply with the order, we will be killed,” said one of the prisoners.

“One man stayed at a position, he was really scared, it was his first assault. We received an order to run forward. But the man hid under a tree and refused. This was reported to the command and that was it. He was taken 50 meters away from the base. He was digging his own grave and then was shot.”

The other fighter reported a similar situation: “Our commander was told that if anyone gets cold feet, he would have to be eliminated. And if we failed to eliminate him, we would be eliminated for failing to eliminate him.”

Meanwhile, the dreadful attrition rate of men fed into the meat grinder continues with accounts of more than 800 Russian soldiers, many of them witless consripts dragooned into the killing machine, being killed every day.