In regard to 'unconditioned' knowledge, Protagoras (as played by Socrates) is not denying we all live in a shared world where one kind of life is better than another. The argument about the status of false opinions takes place during Protagoras' promotion of education by means of Sophists and the condemnation of Socrates' practice of Philosophy:

One does not, however, make someone who’s been having some false opinion afterward have some true opinion, for there is no power to have as opinions either things that are not, or other things besides those one experiences, and the latter are always true. But I suppose that when someone with a burdensome condition holding in his soul has opinions akin to his own condition, a serviceable condition would make him have different opinions, of that sort, which latter appearances some people, from inexperience, call true, but I call the one sort better than the other, but not at all truer. — Plato, Theaetetus, 167a, translated by Joe Sachs,

The benefits of the education are more real than the distinctions Socrates tries to make. They are not confined to an individual in some solipsistic fashion but include the City as a central condition of the individual:

Seeing as how whatever sorts of things seem just and beautiful to a city are those things for it so long as it considers them so, it’s the wise man who, in place of each sort of things that are burdensome for them, induces serviceable things to be and seem so. — ibid,167c

This likening of the individual to the City perfectly mirrors The Republic. In that dialogue, the desire to understand justice leads to thinking about changing the City. There is a measure of the good used to say what is better or worse for both Socrates and Protagoras. Protagoras is saying that Philosophy is unhealthy:

Now if you do this, those who spend their time with you will hold themselves responsible for their own confusion and helplessness, and not you, and they’ll pursue you and love you, but hate themselves and run away from themselves to philosophy, in order to become different people and be set free from what they were before. But if you do the opposite of these things, as most people do, the opposite result will follow for you, and you’ll make your associates show themselves as haters of this business instead of philosophers when they become older. — ibid, 168a

This is the charge that was brought against Socrates in his trial. Socrates' first reply to it is:

Soc: Well then, Protagoras, we’re also stating opinions of a human being, or rather of all human beings, and claiming that no one at all does not consider himself wiser than others in some respects and other people wiser than himself in other respects, and in the greatest dangers at least, when people are in distress in military campaigns or diseases or at sea, they have the same relation to those who rule them in each situation as to gods, expecting them to be their saviors, even though they are no different from themselves by any other thing than by knowing; and all human things are filled with people seeking teachers and rulers for themselves and for the other animals, as well as for their jobs, and in turn with people who suppose themselves to be competent to teach and competent to rule. And in all these situations, what else are we going to say but that human beings themselves consider there to be wisdom and lack of understanding among them? — ibid, 170b

This has the obvious purpose of supporting the argument that false opinions exist but it also speaks to the charge against him of causing harm by seeking them out. He is preparing to show it is the Sophist who is disrupting the beneficial order and those traditions that preserve it. It is good to remember the other dialogues concerning the trial when Socrates says:

Soc: Those who’ve bounced around in courts and such places from their youth run the risk, compared with those who’ve been reared in philosophy and that sort of pastime, of being raised like menial servants as against free men. — ibid, 172c

Ouch. That's going to leave a mark. From here begins the Digression that interrupts the argument about false opinions but does speak directly to the question of who is harming who.

The above is a long way around to saying Protagoras is not a skeptical Hume answered by the idealism of Kant. In this case, it is Socrates who is skeptical of what Protagoras has no need of confirming.

I think it more correct to say judgement depends on, or follows from, an instance of willing, but one is not the other. An instance of willing is the immediate determination of an act, therein called a volition, in accordance with a feeling; to judge is to relate the correspondence of the volition to the feeling that caused it. — Mww

But would you class judgement as part of the reasoning process? Suppose reasoning is the feeling which causes a volition. Then, if we say that the mind reasons, i.e. thinks about things, would a conclusion (judgement) come about naturally as part of the reasoning process, or is there a separate act of will required which constitutes the judgement or conclusion ?

This has a bearing on the nature of logic, because we say that logic necessitates the conclusion. But if a separate act of willing is required then one might suspend judgement even in the cases of logical necessity. And I wonder if this is possible. If a person understands, and apprehends the logic, is it still possible that they might reject the conclusion, or at least suspend judgement. On the other hand, if it is impossible for a person who understands the logic, to reject the conclusion, then it would appear like there is no separate act of willing between the reasoning and the judgement.

Ahhhh….possibly the greatest source of abhorrence in metaphysical practices, in which the warrant for a principle which is both entirely sufficient in itself and absolutely necessary as a merely logical terminus, yet completely unavailable to empirical justification, must be given a place in a sub-system of the human condition. It is here your loophole makes its appearance, as the very epitome of abstract rationality. — Mww

Isn't this just the nature of philosophy though, especially metaphysics, to seek an understanding of things which escape empirical justification. It is tied up with wondering "why". Socrates said philosophy is based in wonder. There is a type of empirically observable occurrence which appears to happen for no apparent reason, empirically. This is the act of will. Since there appears to be no material cause we ask "why" it happened, which implies an intentional cause. Once we accept the reality of this type of causation, the non-empirically justifiable cause, of an empirically observable activity, we can much better understand the mindset which posits God as the immaterial cause of the universe.

It’s abhorrent because to be useful it must be accepted as legitimate, and hardly anybody wants to merely accept anything carte blanche. Made worse by the stipulation that the thing requiring mere acceptance is never allowed to pertain to the system granting the acceptance. It’s the same as…conceiving a thing, but prohibiting that conception from acting on or even within the system that conceived it. How absurd is that!!!! Can you walk without moving your foot??? — Mww

It does pertain though. It's related as cause to effect. The actions of human beings are observable with the senses, yet the causes of these actions, will and intention, are not observable through the senses. The abhorrence, I believe derives from the simplistic idea that sense observation is the only cause of knowledge and knowledge is what leads to human actions. Not wanting to complicate things, people deny the causal role of intention and rational thought in the production of knowledge, so the suggestion that these things which are not observable through the senses, have real causal effect in the world, seems abhorrent to them. To put it simply, the attitude is that dualism is too complex, and monism provides me with as much as I need to know about causation; so don't try to pass your dualist ideas on me because I have no use for them.

The purpose of a will is to cause an end. It is the end itself that is judged, the willing of it be what it may. The secondary question would then be….what end does the will purpose itself toward, but the primary question must remain…how is the agent in possession of such a will informed as to does or does not the end he wills satisfy the need he feels. And TA-DAAAA!!!, there’s where your preference to….. — Mww

I think I have to disagree with this characterization of "will". I think that what is caused by the will is the means to the end, not the end itself. This puts the acts which are caused by the will into the domain of observable by the senses (material), while the end itself, as the desire or want, stays within the unobservable realm (immaterial).

So for example, you talk about feelings as what leads to an act of volition. Let's say that I have a sort of feeling within myself, which is thirst. I don't automatically go for a drink of water, as if the thirst causes the volition, I first use my mind to recognize the feeling as a need for water. Then I can produce the end , which is the goal of a glass of water. Or perhaps, my mind is habitualized so as to go straight from the feeling, to the end, which is to have the goal of getting a drink. Whatever the precise process is, the point is that the mind produces the end, then I believe it is the will which initiates my act of going to get a drink, and that is the means. I believe it is this separation between the end and the means, or I can express it as the separation between the intentions or goals, and the actions which are taken to bring about the goals, which allows for long term goals, and delay between judgement and acting. I think it's important to represent the real possibility of delay between setting a goal, and acting to fulfill it.

.meets its authority, but…..

I think will ought to be separated from judgement.
— Metaphysician Undercover

….is contestable on theoretical grounds, insofar as will remains connected to judgement of a certain kind, itself removed from the intellect as well. — Mww

I believe the will must be separated from judgement in theory, to account for the reality of the separation between judging and acting. As mentioned above, this is necessary to allow for the reality of long term goals and delayed actions. So perhaps we have the relation between judgement and will backward. If the will is active, continuously, all the time, then judgement is what prevents certain actions (this lead to the concept of will power) to allow for others. Then the human body is a continuous hive of activity, and the will is preventing all sorts of possible activities and this is allowing other activities to proceed smoothly. Then the whole idea that the human will initiates specific actions is sort of backward backward. If I want to get up off the couch, for example, I block a whole lot of internal energy flow, to allow this energy to flow smoothly toward moving my legs. What I think of as willing a particular action, and having it proceed from that act of will, would really proceed by way of block a whole lot of other internal actions, which induces that one to go ahead.

It is somewhat off topic, but we are within the theme of dualism, and discussing indirectly, the problem which Plato brought up in the Protagoras, the problem of "being overcome by pleasure". This is when a person acts in a way which is contrary to one's own judgement. You say here, that this action which is contrary to one's rational judgement would still involve a sort of judgement, but the judgement is removed from the intellect. I would characterize such actions as a lack of judgement. So I used the concept of "inertia" above. The person just continues moving in a way which requires the least effort, or will power, allowing oneself to go with the flow. So the person knows at the time that the action is bad, and the person does not want to do it, but they do not have the will power to prevent it from happening.

Thanks for that very painstaking response to my question about 'akrasia'. Again, my inner voice can only say - 'do more reading'. :sad:

The soul itself is the fundamental principle of actuality of the living body. But I ask now, how can that fundamental actuality (what we're calling the will here) direct itself as to which potentials to actualize, to create activity? Acting as a force, from within a body, with some sort of choice as to which parts of the body it acts on and when, means that it must be itself, not behaving according to the law of inertia. This is why we can understand the soul, or the will, as immaterial, it is a cause which does not act according to the laws which apply to material bodies. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have just viewed an interview with the philosopher Richard Swinburne about this very point. See here.

...the problem of "being overcome by pleasure"... — Metaphysician Undercover

Isn't this something to do with the parable of the three horses, being the various appetites? That the appetitive part of the soul overwhelms the rational part? Would seem like 'plato 101' to me, but then what do I know....

I'm not familiar with Richard Swinburne, but I will check your reference.

Isn't this something to do with the parable of the three horses, being the various appetites? That the appetitive part of the soul overwhelms the rational part? Would seem like 'plato 101' to me, but then what do I know.... — Wayfarer

Neither am I familiar with "the three horses", and I'm a bit thrown off by your use of "appetites" (plural) here. Aristotle had an "appetitive part", referring to bodily desires, and the source of action toward such desires. But "appetites" is more proper to Aquinas. He proposed two principal types of appetites, sensitive and rational and made further divisions beyond this. Each appetite is directed towards a "good". Notice that even bodily desires are directed towards "a good". This was to maintain consistency with Aristotle's separation between apparent good (sense appetite) and real good (rational appetite). The sensitive appetites would remain unintelligible if not directed towards a good, so that good is designated as apparent, and not necessarily real.

From Aquinas' perspective, the entirety of the living being, body and mind, has appetitive motivations. Appetite is the source of movement, in general. The problem which Plato inherited from the pre-Socratic idealists, was that the whole realm of intelligible objects, therefore the intelligible realm in general, was portrayed as passive, inactive, eternal objects, which could have no causal efficacy. This is often referred to by modern monists as producing the problem of interaction. Plato showed this problem to inhere within the theory of participation. So he introduced "the good" as the source of motivation, activity, and therefore causal efficacy in the intelligible realm. This made a clear division between bodily appetite and intelligible good.

Prior to this, causal motivation of human beings, 'appetite', had to come from the world of sense objects, therefore manifesting as bodily desires. This was the only source for active causation in the human being. But Plato recognized that the intellect itself had to have within it causal motive power, and this he proposed as "the good". Now he had a clear division between bodily motivation represented as sensual desire (appetite), and intellectual motivation represented as the good. From the latter developed the concept of "will", which became Aquinas' rational appetite. But Plato proposed a medium between these two sources of active causation, as passion or spirit. Passion could ally with the body to overwhelm the mind, or it could ally with the mind to subdue the body. In any case, passion is the medium between body and mind, which along with "the good" or Aristotle's "final cause" as the source of activity within the intelligible realm, resolved the problem of interaction.

Notice that following Aristotle all sources of motivation are represented under "good", whether real or apparent. This provides consistency throughout the entirety of the human being, so that there is no conflict between body and mind, as Plato represented the body and mind within a sort of conflict. This allows the intellect to smoothly rule over the body by making the bodily desires intelligible as "goods", and as Aquinas proposed, the intelligible goods of the will are equally "appetites".

But would you class judgement as part of the reasoning process? Suppose reasoning is the feeling which causes a volition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I wouldn’t accept that reason is a causal feeling. At bottom, thinking is the reasoning process, and we do not think our feelings. While thinking is an innate human ability, the constituent objects of which aggregate over time to reflect the condition of the intellect, feeling is an innate human quality reflecting on the condition of the subject itself, the constituent objects of which subsist in themselves as wholes. The former reduces to experience, the latter reduces to conscience.

…..if we say that the mind reasons, i.e. thinks about things, would a conclusion (judgement) come about naturally as part of the reasoning process… — Metaphysician Undercover

I take things here to mean represented by phenomena. Real spacetime objects. A conclusion with respect to a thought about things would come about naturally, but it wouldn’t be a judgement. All judgement does in thought of things, is relate concepts to each other, this being the discursive kind as opposed to the aesthetic, the relation itself called a cognition. Reason concludes whether the immediate judgement conflicts with antecedent judgements, hence determines the truth of the relation.

If one wishes to assign a feeling to this empirical system of things, he would use statements like…this does or doesn’t feel right, which represents a conflict in logic. In the case of aesthetic judgements, in a rational system of feelings, he would use statements like, this does or doesn’t feel good, which represents a conflict in subjective, re: personal, principles.

……or is there a separate act of will required which constitutes the judgement or conclusion? — Metaphysician Undercover

There is not a separate act of will in the thinking about things, no, insofar as the will does not concern itself with phenomena. Nevertheless, in the act of willing, the mind does reason to conclusions, does employ judgement, the major distinction being, the objects upon which it is concerned regarding such willing, are of its own creation, as opposed to objects of Nature’s creation. This is an entirely separate philosophy, though, and has no business being mingled with worldly considerations.

But if a separate act of willing is required then one might suspend judgement even in the cases of logical necessity. And I wonder if this is possible — Metaphysician Undercover

I submit it is impossible to suspend any judgement, it being a necessary constituent of any logical system. If it is merely a premise in a logical system, to suspend a premise is to destroy the system, which contradicts the employment of it for the suspension.

With respect to cognitions in an empirically grounded logical system employed by the understanding, to suspend judgement reduces to denying the very knowledge phenomena provide, which reduces to not knowing what is known, which is absurd, the efforts to do so is called stupidity.

With respect to volitions in a rationally grounded logical system employed by the will, to suspend judgement is not to deny the volition, which would lead to the same absurdity, but to deny the rationality of it, which is certainly possible, and even occasionally observable, but herein the efforts to do so, is called immorality.

The guy exhibiting stupidity elicits pity; he who exhibits immorality, elicits disgust. Ya know what’s ironic here? It is actually impossible to accuse ourselves of being stupid, in the pathological as opposed to the incidental sense, then proving it, but we can very easily accuse ourselves of being immoral and very easily prove it. Why? Because it is impossible to know why I might be stupid…..if I knew why I couldn’t be stupid….but it is easy to will the proper moral volition, then completely and utterly disregard it. In addition, with respect to the subject himself, there is no feeling per se in being stupid, but there is always a feeling necessarily conjoined with being moral with its complementary feeling in being immoral.
————

account for the reality of the separation between judging and acting. — Metaphysician Undercover

These are already separated; it is the separation between will and judgement I contest. Besides, we don’t act on a judgement, we act on a volition, which is what the will determines and judgement directs. Still, we do judge the act itself, post hoc, that is, after its manifestation in the world, but in such case, the judgement has been transposed into a discursive judgement insofar as we then understand hence cognize, some certain effect we ourselves have caused. Pretty simple really: we judge in one way for the throwing or the not throwing of the switch, we judge in a completely different way when we witness the results of the switch having been thrown or not thrown.
————

the thing requiring mere acceptance is never allowed to pertain to the system granting the acceptance.
— Mww

It does pertain though. It's related as cause to effect. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh absolutely related to cause and effect. But….how? What is it and from whence does it arise? Your aforementioned loophole.
————

The purpose of a will is to cause an end.
— Mww

I think I have to disagree with this characterization of "will". I think that what is caused by the will is the means to the end, not the end itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ehhhh….depends at which point one is examining the system. If he thinks an end is the act, then will could be the means, insofar as will does not cause an act. If he thinks an end is the determination of how to act, but not the act itself, then will can be said to cause such determination. The former causality of will as means is a volition, the latter causality of will as cause proper, is an imperative.

Havin’ fun yet?

I believe you are referring to the parable concerning the soul of a lover in Phaedrus, composed of a charioteer and two horses of opposite dispositions.

Do you agree that it's a mistake to project our own mental/physical division on the dialogs? That distinction, so embedded in our own worldview, didn't exist around 2400 years ago. If they thought of the realm of the gods or Hades, they thought of concrete places. Likewise, the forms weren't thought of as vaporous categories. They're actually part of the makeup of the world around us.

Exactly right, I completely mangled it. :yikes:

I wouldn’t accept that reason is a causal feeling. At bottom, thinking is the reasoning process, and we do not think our feelings. While thinking is an innate human ability, the constituent objects of which aggregate over time to reflect the condition of the intellect, feeling is an innate human quality reflecting on the condition of the subject itself, the constituent objects of which subsist in themselves as wholes. The former reduces to experience, the latter reduces to conscience. — Mww

If I understand you, you are saying that feeling is a property of the whole subject, while thinking is a property of a part, the intellect. So thinking is a capacity of that part, the intellect, and it is what the intellect does. Feeling, as a quality of the subject, is a property of the human subject, and therefore not an activity which could be assigned to a specific part.

I take things here to mean represented by phenomena. Real spacetime objects. A conclusion with respect to a thought about things would come about naturally, but it wouldn’t be a judgement. All judgement does in thought of things, is relate concepts to each other, this being the discursive kind as opposed to the aesthetic, the relation itself called a cognition. Reason concludes whether the immediate judgement conflicts with antecedent judgements, hence determines the truth of the relation. — Mww

Well, I think this is just an avoidance of the question. We don't have "real spacetime objects" within our minds when we're thinking, we think with concepts, or at least with images. So you can't dismiss judgements about things, as not being judgements, because judgements only relate concepts to each other. When we think about things, that's what we're doing, relating concepts to each other, and from this we may make a judgement about the thing.

Or do you mean to separate images from concepts, so that thinking about a thing is a matter of relating concepts to an image? So would you say that the image is not properly a part of the intellect, not a part of the thinking, but more like a feeling? How would the phenomena, or image, relate to the intellect, so that the person could be thinking about it, if it wasn't in the mind, and part of the thinking?

With respect to cognitions in an empirically grounded logical system employed by the understanding, to suspend judgement reduces to denying the very knowledge phenomena provide, which reduces to not knowing what is known, which is absurd, the efforts to do so is called stupidity. — Mww

This is exactly the problem Plato uncovered in that part of Theaetetus. Positing "false judgement" resulted in not knowing what is known. But what was exposed was a misconception of "knowing". Here, you are saying that phenomena provides knowledge in an empirically grounded system, and suspending judgement would be to deny that knowledge, i.e. not knowing what is known. The problem is that this is a misconception of "knowledge". Phenomena does not provide knowledge, it provides a material condition, or a condition necessary for the possibility of knowledge, which is not in itself knowledge. So when "knowledge" is conceived in the way I propose, suspending judgement reduces to preventing the production of knowledge, not to not knowing what is known.

With respect to volitions in a rationally grounded logical system employed by the will, to suspend judgement is not to deny the volition, which would lead to the same absurdity, but to deny the rationality of it, which is certainly possible, and even occasionally observable, but herein the efforts to do so, is called immorality. — Mww

So, I do not see how you can separate a rationally grounded system from an empirically grounded system, in the way that you do. If you separate the phenomena, images, or whatever you want to call it, from the intellect, to provide an outside grounding, making the phenomena necessarily known, then it cannot get into the mind in the first place. If it's in the mind, then it's just part of a rationally grounded system.

It appears to me, like you want to have your cake and eat it too, forcing a separation between thoughts and feelings, but then allowing the feelings into the mind as phenomena, which might ground the knowing in some kind of necessity. Is that what's going on here?

The guy exhibiting stupidity elicits pity; he who exhibits immorality, elicits disgust. Ya know what’s ironic here? It is actually impossible to accuse ourselves of being stupid, in the pathological as opposed to the incidental sense, then proving it, but we can very easily accuse ourselves of being immoral and very easily prove it. Why? Because it is impossible to know why I might be stupid…..if I knew why I couldn’t be stupid….but it is easy to will the proper moral volition, then completely and utterly disregard it. In addition, with respect to the subject himself, there is no feeling per se in being stupid, but there is always a feeling necessarily conjoined with being moral with its complementary feeling in being immoral. — Mww

This is the inversion of not knowing what is known, it's the problem of knowing what is not known. When we allow that knowing is a form of becoming, we allow an intermediary condition, between knowing and not knowing, between being and not being. This is how Socrates approached that sophistry. So just like there is a feeling associated with being immoral, there is also a feeling associated with being stupid, it's a feeling of ignorance. So this feeling, which motivates the philosopher, is the intermediary between not knowing and knowing, and all feelings are similar. Likewise, phenomena are intermediary between not knowing and knowing.

Ehhhh….depends at which point one is examining the system. If he thinks an end is the act, then will could be the means, insofar as will does not cause an act. If he thinks an end is the determination of how to act, but not the act itself, then will can be said to cause such determination. The former causality of will as means is a volition, the latter causality of will as cause proper, is an imperative.

Havin’ fun yet? — Mww

I don't know. Fun is a feeling. And I can suspend judgement, can't I?

Do you agree that it's a mistake to project our own mental/physical division on the dialogs? That distinction, so embedded in our own worldview, didn't exist around 2400 years ago. If they thought of the realm of the gods or Hades, they thought of concrete places. Likewise, the forms weren't thought of as vaporous categories. They're actually part of the makeup of the world around us. — frank

No, I do not see that as a mistake. This is because truths are timeless, eternal as some say, and comprehensible to all subjects. So, what was relevant 2400 years ago is relevant today. That's what really impressed me when I first picked up Plato years ago, because I had to for school. I thought, what's the relevance of this ancient stuff, until I read it. And it blew me away because it all seemed so relevant.

No, I do not see that as a mistake. This is because truths are timeless, eternal as some say, and comprehensible to all subjects. So, what was relevant 2400 years ago is relevant today. That's what really impressed me when I first picked up Plato years ago, because I had to for school. I thought, what's the relevance of this ancient stuff, until I read it. And it blew me away because it all seemed so relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you found it relevant because to some extent, you created it. There's nothing wrong with that, though. I did the same thing until I studied the history of the time in which it was written.

"History" is the faulty perspective in looking at ancient ideas. So you only replaced the better perspective with the worse, when you allowed history to taint your view.. "History" is created from the perspective of the intentions of the modern day person, looking backward in time with specific goals. And "intention" guides and shapes our understanding, as explained by Plato's conception of "the good". So the understanding of ancient ideas, which is given from the perspective of "history" is necessarily flawed, by understanding those ancient ideas through the lens of an historian's intention rather than directly pursuing the intention (meaning) of the ancient person who produced those ideas. This is why Plato objected to narrative as an inaccurate source of knowledge. It is twice removed from the actual ideas which are represented. Instead of looking directly at the expression of the ideas, therefore once removed, to look at the narrative is to look at a representation of the expression, therefore twice removed. It's the difference between primary source and secondary source. But when the secondary source is an historian, there is not even the intent to understand the true meaning of the expression, only the intent to put into the context of an overall narrative created by the historian.

Plato gives us a very good glimpse into how ideas are passed down through time. In the earlier times there was no writing, and stories were passed by word of mouth, accompanied with chanting and song to aid in memory. But this was very defective because each generation would produce changes, interpretations guided by the intentions of the interpreters. So a person living at one time, looking back hundreds of years toward the source, trying to understand the true meaning of the myth, would have to make an attempt to account for all the intermediate changes. This would require determining the cultural conditions of that intermediary time which influenced the interpretations. For Plato this was to determine how the myth was transported from its origins to its current position.

However, written material provides far more stability, allowing us to look directly at the expressions from ancient times. But there is still the difficulty which Plato outlines, we interpret according to our intention which we have now. And this includes translations. So when we look back at ancient material we still have to take into consideration intermediary intentions, translations, and cultural influences on one's own intentions.

The perspective of "history" does none of this, looking only at material artifacts, to make some general conclusions about people and cultures. So it provides a very much inferior way of looking at the ideas of ancient people. Interpreting the words of the ancient people, though there may be layers of intention between the interpreter and the original speaker, provides the only real course toward understanding the ideas of the ancients. Looking at the ancient ideas through the intent of an historian, to put the writer's ideas into the context of the historian's own narrative, provides no real approach to the intent (meaning of the writer.

If I understand you….. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here you do, well enough.

I think this is just an avoidance of the question…. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here you do not.

So when "knowledge" is conceived in the way I propose, suspending judgement reduces to preventing the production of knowledge, not to not knowing what is known. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed, but you’re in a different systemic time. In the time I used, re: “with respect to cognitions…”, which makes explicit the conceptions have already been related to each other, which means judging has already been accomplished, satisfying the conditions necessary for knowledge. I’m saying it is stupid to grant the possibility of suspending a judgement that’s already happened, which implies the possibility that something has become known.

By saying phenomena do not provide knowledge limits your claim to the faculty of sensibility, insofar as all your talking about is phenomena, and in this regard you are correct. I, on the other hand, have progressed methodologically far downstream from sensibility, from which follows that phenomena have already been addressed in the methodological timeframe. Cognitions, of course, belonging to understanding, along with the business of relating conceptions to each other.

When we think about things, that's what we're doing, relating concepts to each other, and from this we may make a judgement about the thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

That’s not all we’re doing. Relating conceptions IS the judging. And we don’t make a judgement about a thing; we cognize a thing, from the relation of conceptions thought as belonging to it. And, need I remind you, we’re talking about things here, real spacetime objects….you know, the things not in our heads (sigh)…..represented as phenomena, which in the thinking process, requires something else from understanding not yet considered.
————

It appears to me (you’re) forcing a separation between thoughts and feelings, but then allowing the feelings into the mind as phenomena, which might ground the knowing in some kind of necessity. Is that what's going on here? — Metaphysician Undercover

Separation, yes. Allowing….no. That which enters the mind as phenomena is that physical thing which represents how that feeling is to be understood. I’d hoped to make it clear feelings per se are not cognitions, and that being the case, combined with the necessity of cognitions for knowledge, it should follow that there is no knowledge in feelings as such. We can certainly say we know we are are affected in some way by them, which informs us of their occasion, this actually being more a change in our subjective condition than predication for knowledge as such. The knowledge as such, then, reserved for the cause of the feeling rather than the feeling itself.
————-

With respect to volitions in a rationally grounded logical system employed by the will….
— Mww

I do not see how you can separate a rationally grounded system from an empirically grounded system, in the way that you do. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you don’t see the distinction in empirically grounded and rationally grounded systems as I promote it, you must favor some other antagonistic dichotomous system, or, see the same dichotomy but promote it in a different way. Which would be……what?

If you separate the phenomena, images, or whatever you want to call it, from the intellect….. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps you don’t see the way of my separation because I separate as you stated right there, but, of course, that’s not at all my way. All I ever separated from the intellect is aesthetic judgement, and the will as autonomous causality.

……to provide an outside grounding, making the phenomena necessarily known, then it cannot get into the mind in the first place. — Metaphysician Undercover

You could say “empirically grounded” equates roughly to “outside grounding”, but it does not follow from that, that phenomena are necessarily known. Which is kinda silly in itself, insofar as if phenomena are necessarily known, why invent a complete theoretical knowledge system in humans, of which phenomena are the mere occasion for its instantiation?

If it's in the mind, then it's just part of a rationally grounded system. — Metaphysician Undercover

If it’s in the mind, it is a part of a rationally conditioned system. Again, we’re talking about things….you know, real spacetime objects not in the head (sigh)…..which makes them the ground of the system. That with which the system is immediately concerned and without which the system has nothing immediate to do.

In a rationally grounded system, there are no real spacetime objects under immediate consideration, eliminating the faculty of sensibility, hence phenomena, from the methodological process.

An empirically grounded system, the governance of which is Nature, requires the cooperation of sensibility and reason, the culmination being knowledge a posteriori; a rationally grounded system, the governance of which is logic, requires only reason in cooperation with itself, re: non-contradiction, the culmination being knowledge a priori.

That separation seems pretty straightforward, does it not?
————-

All judgement does in thought of things…
— Mww

So you can't dismiss judgements about things, as judgement, because judgements only relate concepts to each other — Metaphysician Undercover

These two statements do not say the same thing. I certainly can dismiss judgement about things, because judgement isn’t about things. It’s about the relation of conceptions, and conceptions have nothing to do with things, but only with the representations of things as they are thought.

Furthermore, if you recall, I said judgement cannot be dismissed (I actually said suspended) at all, under the assumption they are properly employed in the first place.
———-

Fun is a feeling. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nahhhh, it isn’t. Pleasure is the feeling, fun is merely the relative qualitative measure of it. Would you agree that every quality of feeling is reducible to one or the other of only two of them?

So a person living at one time, looking back hundreds of years toward the source, trying to understand the true meaning of the myth, would have to make an attempt to account for all the intermediate changes. This would require determining the cultural conditions of that intermediary time which influenced the interpretations. For Plato this was to determine how the myth was transported from its origins to its current position. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's exactly what I'm saying. We are the recipients of a worldview in which mental and physical appear to be in different dimensions. This conflict pervades the philosophy of our time. The emotional generator at its heart is a conflict between religion and science. There is no evidence that this conflict existed during the iron age, and there is persuasive evidence from historian Moses Finley that the opposite was the case.

Finley's analysis of the works of Homer indicate that the iron age Greek and eastern mediterranean view would seem to us to be like the psyche turned inside out, with motivations being generated by external forces instead of within individual minds and hearts. So Plato inherited a worldview in which (what we call) ideas were cast about the world around and within us. This is the setting of his works. The fact that he nods in the direction of near eastern thought strengthens this view.

The perspective of "history" does none of this, looking only at material artifacts, to make some general conclusions about people and cultures. So it provides a very much inferior way of looking at the ideas of ancient people — Metaphysician Undercover

The works of Homer are the most important source for understanding the iron age outlook because it was held in such high esteem down through the time of Plato and beyond. We know that copies of Plato's works are extremely rare. Apparently not even a rich, educated person would own a single dialog, but that same rich man would more than likely own the works of Homer. So as opposed to imagining that Plato is talking directly to you (which is easy and enjoyable to do), if we want to understand how it would have been taken at the time, we should imagine Plato speaking to an iron age resident. And that's where Finley comes in. His analysis of Greek thought has become the standard for historians of thought.

A resident of the iron age would not have understood what we mean by "physical." Missing the battle between church and science that shapes our understanding, our meaning wouldn't translate.

We are the recipients of a worldview in which mental and physical appear to be in different dimensions. This conflict pervades the philosophy of our time. The emotional generator at its heart is a conflict between religion and science. There is no evidence that this conflict existed during the iron age — frank

The presocratic philosophers discussed the relationship between phusis (nature, from the root to grow) and nomos (law, custom). [Added: What is by nature vs what is by convention.]

The divided line in the Republic separates the visible from the intelligible realms. This includes the distinction between physical objects seen with the eyes and intelligible objects seen with the mind.

Socrates criticizes those who cite the authority of the poets because they are unable to give an account. Mythos without logos. Since the poets, most notably Homer and Hesiod, are the source of the teachings about the gods, there is seen in Plato a conflict between religion and science. In the Apology, Anaxagoras' claim that the sun is a stone and not a god, is falsely attributed to Socrates and is used as the basis of the charge of atheism against him. It is at its heart a conflict between religion and science.

... the psyche turned inside out, with motivations being generated by external forces instead of within individual minds and hearts. — frank

On the one side we find in Homer human motivations such as rage and shamelessness, and other the other the work of the gods. On both sides individual minds and hearts are influenced by a hierarchical order.

So Plato inherited a worldview in which (what we call) ideas were cast about the world around and within us. — frank

What is entailed by "inherited"? Plato wrote in response to those of his time and those before him, but this response is in no way a simple acceptance or agreement. Rather than simply inheriting a worldview he created one.

So as opposed to imagining that Plato is talking directly to you (which is easy and enjoyable to do), if we want to understand how it would have been taken at the time, we should imagine Plato speaking to an iron age resident. — frank

An alternative is to read the dialogues as if, on the one hand Socrates (or in a few cases Timaeus or a Stranger) is talking to both a particular person and to those present, and on the other, that he is addressing a question or issue. In the latter case the reading audience is also being addressed. I see no reason to assume that he intended for this larger audience to be limited by time and place.

When Socrates says that the image of the cave is:

an image of our nature in its education and want of education (514a)

does "our nature" refer to human nature or the nature of Greeks or Athenians at that time? Are there different human natures? Does human nature change over time? Many today would argue that the is no human nature but even then the question of phusis vs nomos was raised. Clearly, there is no expiration date.

However we might imagine the dialogues were taken at that time, and we should not imagine it being taken in only one way, it would be wrong to assume that any way in which they were taken is the way in which Plato intended for them to be understood. In addition, Socratic philosophy (and Plato was a Socratic philosopher) is dialectical, that is to say, dialogical. The dialogues are not doctrines frozen in time. In the Seventh Letter Plato says:

There is no treatise (suggramma) by me on these subjects, nor will there ever be. (341c)

The presocratic philosophers discussed the relationship between phusis (nature, from the root to grow) and nomos (law, custom). [Added: What is by nature vs what is by convention.] — Fooloso4

This is the Eleatic philosophy.

"Eleaticism, one of the principal schools of ancient pre-Socratic philosophy, so called from its seat in the Greek colony of Elea (or Velia) in southern Italy. This school, which flourished in the 5th century BCE, was distinguished by its radical monism—i.e., its doctrine of the One, according to which all that exists (or is really true) is a static plenum of Being as such, and nothing exists that stands either in contrast or in contradiction to Being. Thus, all differentiation, motion, and change must be illusory. This monism is also reflected in its view that existence, thought, and expression coalesce into one."

Anaxagoras belonged to this school. In identifying mind as the prime motive force in the world, he was in keeping with the a worldview that goes back to the end of the Bronze Age. What's missing from this view to make it what we would think of as science, is the "clockwork" conception of the universe that first starts with Aquinas and progresses to Newton. They wouldn't have understood our distinction between religion and science, and so it's a mistake to project that into what Plato says.

Socrates criticizes those who cite the authority of the poets because they are unable to give an account. Mythos without logos. Since the poets, most notably Homer and Hesiod, are the source of the teachings about the gods, there is seen in Plato a conflict between religion and science. In the Apology, Anaxagoras' claim that the sun is a stone and not a god, is falsely attributed to Socrates and is used as the basis of the charge of atheism against him. It is at its heart a conflict between religion and science. — Fooloso4

You're confusing the Athenian state for a religious authority. It wasn't. The law Socrates broke was created by Solon and was simply an admonishment against failing to show respect for the gods. The grudge the Athenians had against Socrates was not based on a science/religion controversy. It was that they thought his style of teaching produced derangement among the young. There were no religious institutions of the kind we know today. There were only various temples and the Oracle. Opposition to mystery religions can be thought of as an impetus for more rational consideration, but that's far from, again, what we would think of as a war between science and religion.

Does human nature change over time? — Fooloso4

In some ways, yes. But I'm not suggesting that residents of the iron age were from a different species. I'm simply pointing out that the worldview of people 2400 years ago was missing elements critical to a mechanistic outlook which underpins our conception of physicality and science.

They wouldn't have understood our distinction between religion and science, and so it's a mistake to project that into what Plato says. — frank

They would have understood both religion and and science in ways that differ from what someone today might understand. That does not mean the ancients did not make such a distinction. Someone today might understand science differently than someone at the time of Newton.

Anaxagoras belonged to this school. In identifying mind as the prime motive force in the world, he was in keeping with the a worldview that goes back to the end of the Bronze Age. — frank

Newton's mechanistic "natural philosophy" intended to demonstrate the hand of God at work.

What's missing from this view to make it what we would think of as science, is the "clockwork" conception of the universe — frank

What is missing from contemporary science is the "clockwork" conception of the universe.

They wouldn't have understood our distinction between religion and science, and so it's a mistake to project that into what Plato says. — frank

I think you have got it backwards. It is not so much that they would not have understood but that we should not attempt to understand the distinctions that they made in contemporary terms.

You're confusing the Athenian state for a religious authority. — frank

You are making the same mistake that you are warning us about. They did not make the church and state distinction. Atheism was an offense against the city.. The city states were religious states. Athens is the city of the goddess Athena. It is clear that Socrates was charged with impiety. Whether this was the motivating concern of his accusers, is another matter.

In some ways, yes. — frank

You miss the point. The question of human nature is still relevant. It is not a quant ancient idea that was of interest long ago but no longer is.

... a mechanistic outlook which underpins our conception of physicality and science. — frank

See above. If by "our conception" you mean the outlook of contemporary science, this is simply wrong.

the "clockwork" conception of the universe that first starts with Aquinas — frank

I've never read that the mechanistic model of the Universe started with Aquinas. I had thought it started around the time of Descartes, who firmly believed in it.

Anaxagoras belonged to this school. In identifying mind as the prime motive force in the world, he was in keeping with the a worldview that goes back to the end of the Bronze Age. — frank

Anaxagoras did express himself within the structure of Parmenides' injunction against saying 'coming into being' or that 'beings moved'. But the texts we have clearly show a keen interest in the phenomena that we face in our natural world. The SEP article you linked to includes a helpful paragraph:

One way to think of Anaxagoras’ point in B17 is that animals, plants, human beings, the heavenly bodies, and so on, are natural constructs. They are constructs because they depend for their existence and character on the ingredients of which they are constructed (and the pattern or structure that they acquire in the process). Yet they are natural because their construction occurs as one of the processes of nature. Unlike human-made artifacts (which are similarly constructs of ingredients), they are not teleologically determined to fulfill some purpose. This gives Anaxagoras a two-level metaphysics. Things such as earth, water, fire, hot, bitter, dark, bone, flesh, stone, or wood are metaphysically basic and genuinely real (in the required Eleatic sense): they are things-that-are. The objects constituted by these ingredients are not genuinely real, they are temporary mixtures with no autonomous metaphysical status: they are not things-that-are. (The natures of the ingredients, and the question of what is included as an ingredient, are addressed below; see 3.2 “Ingredients and Seeds”). This view, that the ingredients are more real than the objects that they make up, is common in Presocratic philosophy, especially in the theories of those thinkers who were influenced by Parmenides’ arguments against the possibility of what-is-not and so against genuine coming-to-be and passing-away. It can be found in Empedocles, and in the pre-Platonic atomists, as well as, perhaps, in Plato’s middle period Theory of Forms (Denyer, 1983, Frede 1985, W.-R. Mann 2000, Silverman 2002).

This is, of course, a general remark The precise connections between the 'pre-Socratic' philosophers are a matter of much scholarly debate. A.P.D. Mourelatos' writings and reactions to them are a good place to see that.

Without sorting all that out, the article shows a critical element: Rational consideration of phenomena as what we are able to observe and the attempt to find out why events happened predates subsequent methods for doing that.

A resident of the iron age would not have understood what we mean by "physical." — frank

Certainly not the part where we can write: F=MA. But I think you are throwing out the baby with the bathwater:

In the Cratylus, Socrates mentions “the recent doctrine of Anaxagoras that the moon receives ( ἔχει) its light from the sun” (409A11-B1). Here Plato’s testimony on the issue of who was first appears to be clear and unambiguous: as Plato sees it, Anaxagoras was first. Insofar as Graham does not discuss the Cratylus passage, his case for taking Anaxagoras and Empedocles to have regarded Parmenides as an empirically minded scientific reformer is significantly weakened. Further, the Cratylus passage fits well with the traditional view that Anaxagoras (and Empedocles) sought to rescue natural science from Parmenides’ stultifying rationalism. — John E Sisko

It is not self-evident to me how this dialectic "goes back to the end of the Bronze Age."

Without sorting all that out, the article shows a critical element: Rational consideration of phenomena as what we are able to observe and the attempt to find out why events happened predates subsequent methods for doing that. — Paine

And the preceding Greek religion was likewise an attempt to explain why things happen. The first priests were caretakers of all the science that existed at the time. This makes it hard to draw a line between science and religion in these cultures. The battle between these entities that shaped our worldview couldn't have happened then for lack of the social structures necessary to carry it out.

But the texts we have clearly show a keen interest in the phenomena that we face in our natural world. — Paine

This is the basis for Socrates criticism of Anaxagoras in the Phaedo. Anaxagoras said:

it is Mind that directs and is the cause of everything. I was delighted with this cause and it seemed to me good, in a way, that Mind should be the cause of all. I thought that if this were so, the directing Mind would direct everything and arrange each thing in the way that was best. If then one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is best.” (97b-d)

But this is not what Anaxagoras did. He gave explanations in physical terms.It is clear as the dialogue progresses that Socrates is not able to do without physical causes either:

If you should ask me what, coming into a body, makes it hot, my reply would not be that safe and ignorant one, that it is heat, but our present argument provides a more sophisticated answer, namely, fire, and if you ask me what, on coming into a body, makes it sick, I will not say sickness but fever. (105b-c)

Agreed, but you’re in a different systemic time. In the time I used, re: “with respect to cognitions…”, which makes explicit the conceptions have already been related to each other, which means judging has already been accomplished, satisfying the conditions necessary for knowledge. I’m saying it is stupid to grant the possibility of suspending a judgement that’s already happened, which implies the possibility that something has become known. — Mww

Don't we relate conceptions to each other, without necessarily making a judgement, as in the case of considering possibilities? We relate possibilities without necessarily judging, because sometimes the possibilities are not well enough known to support a judgement. So when Socrates talks about comparing possible future pleasures in Protagoras, isn't it possible to suspend judgement in a matter like this? And the problem he referred to is that the ones closer to the present appear bigger than the further away, just like when looking at spatial objects. Socrates said we need to do some sort of scaling. Probability would be an important factor, but once we assign probability we have judged.

Therefore I think it's actually quite common to relate concepts without judgement. If I am trying to figure out the meaning of a philosophical passage for example, I'll consider numerous possible meanings, relating words in different ways, without making a judgement if I'm not convinced that I understand. If, when considering possibilities, one starts to assign probabilities, this implies that judgement is being made.

If, by "cognition", you refer to a process which leads to knowledge, you must admit that there is a time while that process is occurring, which is prior to the knowledge being produced but this is still "cognition". That time period might be a long period or a short period depending on how one suspends judgement. And we can't really assume that there is necessarily pieces of knowledge being used in the cognitive process, or else we'll require prior knowledge for each new piece of knowledge, resulting in an infinite regress implying that knowledge has always existed. So I think it is completely reasonable to assume that we have cognitive activity of relating concepts, thoughts, images, perceptions, whatever, without judgement.

Then Socrates brings up the virtue of courage, which Protagoras has argued is distinct from the other virtues. It is different, because it appears to invert the priority of knowledge. Courage is to proceed into the unknown. This is to make a judgement when it appears like judgement ought not be made. When it appears like judgement ought to be suspended, courage allows us to make the judgement any way.

Nahhhh, it isn’t. Pleasure is the feeling, fun is merely the relative qualitative measure of it. Would you agree that every quality of feeling is reducible to one or the other of only two of them? — Mww

No, I would not agree with that at all. Plato produced a good argument, (I believe in the Gorgias), which demonstrates that feelings cannot be reduced in this way. Socrates' argument was that pleasure is not the opposite of pain. If it was, then all pleasure would be a matter of being relieved from pain. Therefore acquiring pleasure would require a want of that pleasure, which would be the condition, pain. This would be the necessary prior condition to pleasure, being deprived of that pleasure, which would be pain. Then he described how some pleasures do not require the prior pain, therefore these pleasures are not opposed to pain.

From this we can say that pleasure is one general category of description, and pain is another general category of description. But this does not mean that all feelings are one or the other, pleasure and pain might just be different aspects of the same feeling. The reality, I believe is that many feelings are a combination of the two, each type of feeling combining aspects of the two in its own unique way. So the two categories are simply an aid for description, and real feelings don't obey those boundaries. It's better, I believe, to have numerous different categories of feelings, each of which may or may not have aspects describable as pleasure or pain.



Sorry frank, I explained in my last post why we ought not derive ideology from an historian. You haven't shown me anything to make me believe that Moses Finlay is anything other than an historian. I think the idea you presented, that modern dualism is based in a conflict between religion and science is very good evidence of why we ought not derive ideology from historians. When it comes to ideology the historians just make stuff up to add substance to their narrative. The problem being that it is fictional and therefore not substance at all. So I've got nothing further to say.

And the preceding Greek religion was likewise an attempt to explain why things happen. — frank

A myth that gives a vivid narrative for events is different from developing explanations that are pitted against other explanations in the expectation that some are better than others. Some social structures make the latter conversation possible. Others don't.

The question does not come down to deciding between religion and science as we have come to think of it. That would be projecting the way we developed the difference between beliefs and the 'objective' that could stand apart. We were looking for something outside of belief in order to not drown in it.

I take your point that this was not happening in Greece in the 5th and 4th century before the CE. To that extent, it would be presumptuous to say the opposite was happening; That the pursuit of understanding had no resistance from received ideas.

To that extent, it would be presumptuous to say the opposite was happening; That the pursuit of understanding had no resistance from received ideas. — Paine

Sure. I agree.

Don't we relate conceptions to each other, without necessarily making a judgement? — Metaphysician Undercover

That kind of thinking is where the notion of Cartesian theater, or the dreaded homunculus, comes from. The relation of conceptions just IS judgement. WE don’t relate; there just is a systemic process in which that happens. Beware of….and refrain from, at all costs….those abysmally stupid language games.

Note the rela-TION of conceptions is not the relat-ING of them. Relating, which is the subsuming of a manifold of minor conceptions as schema of a greater, technically, a synthesis, is done by imagination; judgement merely signifies the relative belonging of them in the collection, one to another.

So it is that, under the auspices of this particular theory, because no cognition of a thing is at all possible from a singular, stand-alone conception, a synthesis of a collection of conceptions is itself necessary for cognition and all which follows from it, and because the synthesis is necessary, the judgement follows from it necessarily. So, no, there is no relating of conceptions without judgement signifying the relation.

Sidebar: there is a caveat here regarding the cognition of things, but for the sake of simplicity, it shall be overlooked, re: intuition. For the mere thinking of things, the synthesis of conceptions holds by itself, and judgement works the same way for both.

Think about it. Has it ever occurred to you that, say, this thing (a perceived object) can’t be “__” (a cognized known object) because it’s missing some property (a conception) already understood (judged) as belonging to (synthesized with other conceptions) that certain “__”?

No, I would not agree with that at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

Rhetorical question, because that is precisely what you did right there, which would be readily apparent to you, when you examine what and how your disagreement came about.

The idea that my soul can attain divine knowledge that contradicts that of the prevailing formula for realism could possibly result in a mental health diagnosis. — introbert

I think that the idea of having a soul (re: "my soul") contradicts with your nature and alienates you from it, because it creates a relationship between you and the soul, that is, with yourself. And this is what results into a mental problem, which can be from imperceptible to quite severe.

And this is perhaps why you see in Socrates a conflict between rational objectivity and the soul trying to escape a physical world/society of deception. Because what Socrates did with his characteristic method of teaching based on Q & A, was to foster critical thinking to his students so that they discover the truth that resided in themselves. Not only there's no conflit in this but, on the contrary, there is cognition and agreement --and therefore harmony, which is the opposite of conflict.

a relationship between you and the soul — Alkis Piskas

Good point. Socrates addresses this in the Phaedo. The overarching question of the dialogue is what will happen to Socrates. The concern is that the unity that is Socrates will be destroyed. In order to address this Socrates divides his unity into a duality, body and soul.

On the other hand, if body and soul are one then the destruction of the body is the destruction of the soul. Socrates attempts to separate them in order to save the soul, but can only do so by blurring the distinction between the Form Soul and a soul. If Soul is imperishable it does not follow that Socrates’ soul is. The human soul is átopos, literally, without place, unclassifiable,. It is not a Form and not a physical thing. If there is no distinction between Soul and Socrates’ soul, then it would not be Socrates’ soul that is undying. The fate of Socrates in death is not assured by the fate of Soul.

That kind of thinking is where the notion of Cartesian theater, or the dreaded homunculus, comes from. The relation of conceptions just IS judgement. WE don’t relate; there just is a systemic process in which that happens. Beware of….and refrain from, at all costs….those abysmally stupid language games. — Mww

I don't agree with this at all. I see a clear difference between relating concepts to each other, and making judgements. As I explained, when I am planning for action, I consider numerous possibilities (relate these concepts), then I make a judgement as to my best course of action. If relating the concepts, and making the judgement was the same thing, I couldn't relate possibilities without coming to a conclusion, which i often do. If judgement was not separate from reasoning, we could not have free will. If the act of relating possibilities to each other (thinking) necessitated a conclusion, then it would be the possibilities themselves which cause the conclusion, rather than the will of the thinking person. That is how we can say that the will is free, because decision is not causally determined in this way. Are you determinist?

There is nothing inherently wrong with the notion of the Cartesian theatre, and the homunculus, other than that it is an oversimplification. It doesn't properly represent reality because it is an oversimplification, but it is a very useful concept for understanding dualism. In that sense it is no different from fundamental concepts of math, physics, and other sciences. They are over simplifications so they don't accurately represent reality, but they are still very useful. A straight line, being one dimensional doesn't represent anything real, but it is very useful. Inertia doesn't represent anything real, but it is simple and useful.

And the infinite regress commonly cited as a problem with the homunculus is unjustified because the will which causes the act is immaterial, while the person acting is material. Therefore the act of the will is a completely different type of act from the observable act of the human body, and cannot be compared in the way necessary for infinite regress.

Note the rela-TION of conceptions is not the relat-ING of them. Relating, which is the subsuming of a manifold of minor conceptions as schema of a greater, technically, a synthesis, is done by imagination; judgement merely signifies the relative belonging of them in the collection, one to another. — Mww

It is you who is playing a silly language game here. The act of relating two conception together, will cause a relation between them, in the mind. But it does not necessarily cause a judgement. I can relate possibility A to possibility B, thereby causing a relation between them, and still not decide which one to proceed with in my actions. We might say that in establishing this relation, I did make a judgement, the judgement not to act. But if this is the case, then every thought is itself a judgement. Just to think of possibility A is to make a judgement. And even to have any thought enter the mind at all would be to make a judgement. Even to remember something would be to judge. Then there would be no difference between thinking and judging.

The problem now is that we'd have no difference between deliberating and deciding. Clearly there is a difference between deliberating, the thinking activity which leads up to making a choice, and deciding, which is the finality of actually choosing. We must allow for this difference to allow for the fact that some deliberations are quick, while others are slow. Therefore it cannot be just considering the possibilities only which causes the conclusion, or else all conclusions would be immediate after the possibilities were considered. So, I believe that the cause of the conclusion, judgement, comes from something other than the act of considering the possibilities.

So it is that, under the auspices of this particular theory, because no cognition of a thing is at all possible from a singular, stand-alone conception, a synthesis of a collection of conceptions is itself necessary for cognition and all which follows from it, and because the synthesis is necessary, the judgement follows from it necessarily. So, no, there is no relating of conceptions without judgement signifying the relation. — Mww

Your use of "necessary" and "necessarily" here indicate that you are determinist, and this is either the result of, or the cause of your refusal to separate reasoning from judgement.

Let me take a look at your proposition here. A collection of conceptions is necessary for cognition, and it is what results from cognition. You ought to recognize that this is a vicious circle of causation. If a collection of cognitions is the effect of cognition, then how could the initial collection of conceptions come into existence, which would be required for the first act of cognition, which would be required to cause the first collection of cognitions?

Here's another proposal, let's look at what "synthesis" means here. Suppose we have existing separate conceptions, not yet related so as to form a collection. These are the things which will be the parts to a collections the parts of a whole. And let's say that there is an act required to "synthesize" these conceptions to make them a collection, a whole. You'd be inclined to say that this is cognition, the act which relates the parts, synthesizes, and produces the whole. However, cognition is required already, to support the existence of the parts, the concepts which will be united in synthesis, allowing them to exist in a way where synthesis is possible. By that fact, that they exist in a way which will allow for synthesis, it is implied that they have some sort of relations to each other. So we need another name for the act which causes the synthesis.

I think we can see this in all natural situations where there is a whole with parts. We need an act which supports, or causes the existence of the parts, and another distinct type of act, which supports or causes the unification of the parts as a whole. So each level we pass through, where a whole becomes a part of a larger whole, in synthesis, a different type of act is required from the act which made the part a whole in the first place.

Sidebar: there is a caveat here regarding the cognition of things, but for the sake of simplicity, it shall be overlooked, re: intuition. For the mere thinking of things, the synthesis of conceptions holds by itself, and judgement works the same way for both. — Mww

I think we are actually not far from agreement. You notice that at the base level of cognition there is needed a different type of act, intuition. I am arguing that at the highest level of cognition, judgement, there is also the need for a different type of act.

Think about it. Has it ever occurred to you that, say, this thing (a perceived object) can’t be “__” (a cognized known object) because it’s missing some property (a conception) already understood (judged) as belonging to (synthesized with other conceptions) that certain “__”? — Mww

I don't think I understand you here. Are you talking about changing my mind because I recognize that I made a mistaken judgement? If so, that's fairly common. If not, what are you asking?

Rhetorical question, because that is precisely what you did right there, which would be readily apparent to you, when you examine what and how your disagreement came about. — Mww

Again, I don't understand. Did I misunderstand your question?

Very interesting analysis.
I had never digged into the subject of body and soul at the time I was reading about Socrates at school. But it was always clear to me that Socrates --and Plato, of course-- believed that the soul was immortal. More specifically, I remember vaguely one of Platos's dialogues in which Socrates, using his Q&A method, made a student "find" the solution of a math problem --geometric I think-- and then he said that the student actually knew the answer (from a past life, I suppose), and that he had only to remember it. Something like that. :smile:
(I was somehow surprised, but I also I felt very comfortable with it. I don't know though if and what effect that had to other students or people in general.)

But it was always clear to me that Socrates --and Plato, of course-- believed that the soul was immortal. — Alkis Piskas

I have reached the opposite conclusion, but I think that the myths support the immortality of the soul. The arguments also appear to support it as well unless they are followed closely. But of course not everyone agrees. I attempt to show why the arguments fail here: Phaedo

I think this has clear parallels with the argument about 'false judgement'. Just as real knowledge is only possible with respect to what truly is, Socrates denies that it is possible to act against your better judgement. — Wayfarer

The discussion of false opinion was not an acceptance of some principle of individual judgement but a component of Socrates' demonstration of its inadequacy. He dismisses the concept at the end of it:

Soc: Then, my boy, doesn’t the argument give us a beautiful rebuke, and point out that it was not correct for us to look for false opinion before knowledge, leaving that alone? But the former is something one has no power to recognize before one gets a sufficient grasp of what knowledge is. — Plato. Theaetetus, 200d, translated by Joe Sachs

I think the ratio you apply between knowledge and action is incorrect. Genuine knowledge cannot be wrong but our actions can be. By saying we always choose what seems good for us, Plato is framing the circumstances of our ignorance. If we start with the assumption that what is best for us is an essential agent in our constitution, the need emerges to understand what causes all the evils and suffering we experience.

The Timaeus gives a number of narratives to show what looking for those causes could reveal. The circumstances of becoming embodied lead to being strongly affected by our physical constitution. That is why so much emphasis is placed on the health of bodies and regimes throughout the dialogues.