I believe that the cause of the conclusion, judgement, comes from something other than the act of considering the possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

……exactly what I said, with which you were quick to disagree.
————

The act of relating two conception together, will cause a relation between them, in the mind. But it does not necessarily cause a judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Never said it did. Just as relating is not relation, so too is the cause of a relation not the judgement of it.

So, I believe that the cause of the conclusion, judgement, comes from something other than the act of considering the possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the mini-treatise preceding this conclusion, and following from your argument just above it, there is not much with which to take exception. Pretty much conforms to what I’ve been saying. I might counter-argue that conclusions can follow immediately from the considering. The only way for there not to be a judgement at all, neither in affirmation nor negation of the considering, is if that which was under consideration wasn’t even imaginable in the first place. Hence the principle…that of which the imagination is impossible the object cannot be conceived. Or, if you prefer, the conception of the unimaginable is empty.
————

Your use of "necessary" and "necessarily" here indicate that you are determinist, and this is either the result of, or the cause of your refusal to separate reasoning from judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Dunno about determinist, but my use of those terms certainly label me as holding with the laws of logical thought, insofar as the term “necessary” is a condition of any law, merely indicating the invocation of its negation, amounts to at least a contradiction and at most an impossibility.

Let me take a look at your proposition here. A collection of conceptions is necessary for cognition, and it is what results from cognition. You ought to recognize that this is a vicious circle of causation. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is patently obvious, so why did you think it was anywhere part of my proposition?

If a collection of cognitions is the effect of cognition….. — Metaphysician Undercover

It isn’t….

……then how could the initial collection of conceptions come into existence….. — Metaphysician Undercover

Theoretically, by the effect of being imagined…..

Suppose we have existing separate conceptions, not yet related so as to form a collection. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fine. Those are presupposed, insofar as a collection of them is impossible without its constitutive parts.

And let's say that there is an act required to "synthesize" these conceptions to make them a collection, a whole. You'd be inclined to say that this is cognition. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I would not.

So we need another name for the act which causes the synthesis. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, and I’ve already stated the name of that other act.

We need an act which supports, or causes the existence of the parts, and another distinct type of act, which supports or causes the unification of the parts as a whole. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we do. What we have not yet addressed, is the act which causes the existence of the parts. But we have considered the part that unifies, or, as was stated, synthesizes, re: imagination.

You notice that at the base level of cognition there is needed a different type of act, intuition. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I do notice, but only in relation to cognition of objects. We are not authorized by that, to say this is base level of cognition in general.

I am arguing that at the highest level of cognition, judgement, there is also the need for a different type of act. — Metaphysician Undercover

To which I adamantly object: the highest level of cognition is not judgement. The source of all human cognitive error, insofar as such error is in fact error in the relation of conceptions to each other, judgement, cannot be the highest level to which cognition can attain, from which follows the possibility of error far outweighs the possibility of correct thinking.

The highest level of cognition, is reason. Reason here the faculty, not the condition by which rational intelligences are distinguished from that which does not possess it. Reason the faculty subjects judgement, and thereby the cognitions given from them, to principles, by which the immediate judgement is regarded as conflicting or sustaining their antecedents. It is here phrases like, “I knew that” and “Now I know that”, hold as, or become, truths.

So it is that understanding is the faculty of rules, reason the faculty of principles, which are the necessary ground for laws.
————

Are you talking about changing my mind because I recognize that I made a mistaken judgement? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but not just you. Me and everybody else as well.

Did I misunderstand your question? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. I was thinking you might substitute your arguments into my parentheticals. In other words, the words I write that you perceive are my (some perceived object) for you, which, because you disagree, can’t be what you think for yourself, my “___” (a cognized known object) for you, and you disagree because the object common to both of us…the words….is missing some property you would give the words, a determinant of relative intentionality, or has properties I gave to them you think don’t belong, a determinant of relative meaning.

If more confusing than purposeful…just forget it. Sometimes I get ahead of myself, and indeed, sometimes beyond. (Sigh)
—————

It is you who is playing a silly language game here. — Metaphysician Undercover

HA!!!! Yeah….everybody that speaks involves himself in language games. I let my abject abhorrence of analytic philosophy impinge on my transcendental nature; I only meant to try making it clear when we say stuff like we do this or that, the manifested doing has no personal pronouns connected to it. If, as you say, we think in images….kudos on that, by the way…..it is absurd to then demand that images themselves invoke personal pronouns. Recognition of this removes the Cartesian theater from being a mere oversimplication, as you claim, but eliminates it altogether.

Yes, this was the dialogue I was taking about. Thanks for bringing this :up: (up)!
However, regarding Socrates, I'm not so much interested in his --and Plato's-- views about the immortality of the soul, or about Forms and Ideas, as much as his critical thinking, Q&A (maieutic) method, positive way of justifying ideas and resourcefulness in general.
Yet, I have not studied Plato's works after my first initiation in them--actually, as part of the my courses in Ancient Greek, not even philosophy!-- at school. But I'm very glad to see people that have done so, like yourself, who seems to know a lot about Plato/Socrates. (Maybe from your studies in College/University?)

I'm not so much interested in his --and Plato's-- views about the immortality of the soul, or about Forms and Ideas, as much as his critical thinking, Q&A (maieutic) method, positive way of justifying ideas and resourcefulness in general. — Alkis Piskas

One issue that I find interesting is the relationship between reason and rhetoric. Socrates accuses the sophists of "making the weaker argument stronger". The ambiguity in this is that if the stronger argument is the most persuasive argument then the most reasonable argument can become the weaker argument. In other words, Socrates too makes sophistic arguments. The difference has to do with motivation. While the sophist seeks to profit, Socrates attempts to persuade his interlocutors of such things as it is better to be just.

Maybe from your studies in College/University? — Alkis Piskas

First as a student and then as a teacher before retiring.

The ambiguity in this is that if the stronger argument is the most persuasive argument then the most reasonable argument can become the weaker argument. In other words, Socrates too makes sophistic arguments. The difference has to do with motivation. While the sophist seeks to profit, Socrates attempts to persuade his interlocutors of such things as it is better to be just. — Fooloso4

Thanks for this. I have sometimes wondered about this and I guess I arrived at the idea that the difference between Socrates and the sophists is good faith - a desire to uncover truth - via judgement, balance, the accumulation of wisdom.

As an aside, I haven't been following this discussion closely, but do you have any 'go to' arguments you use as a rebuttal of idealism or platonic forms? I struggle to see how concepts exist independently from human language. Would you take any cues from Plato's own act of self-criticism in the Parmenides? Or do you think that contemporary phislophy can do better with this subject?

I think the ratio you apply between knowledge and action is incorrect. — Paine

:up: Thanks, helpful explanation. I might have been making a connection where there wasn't one.

I arrived at the idea that the difference between Socrates and the sophists is good faith - a desire to uncover truth - via judgement, balance, the accumulation of wisdom. — Tom Storm

I think that this is on the right track. Although sophist became a term of condemnation, the term is derived from a cognate of sophia, that is, wisdom. The distinction between the philosopher and the sophist is not so clear cut. There are three connected Platonic dialogues Statesman, Sophist, and Theaetetus. Given the subject matter we might expect the third to be titled Philosopher. Why is there no dialogue Philosopher? Is the philosopher a sophist or a statesman or something else? If something else then what? The question is left open.

... do you have any 'go to' arguments you use as a rebuttal of idealism or platonic forms? — Tom Storm

I do not regard Plato as an idealist. The term is anachronistic. The Forms are said to be seen with the mind but are not the product of or dependent on the mind. Earlier in this thread I discussed why the Forms are hypothetical and why rather than being the reputed originals of which other things are said to be images they are themselves images. Forms

A more thorough rebuttal requires a detailed examination of the dialogues. I have provided links to my threads where I do this here.

In simplest terms Socrates calls them hypothetical because he has no knowledge of them. We only know what is said about them, the images we are given.

Is the philosopher a sophist or a statesman or something else? If something else then what? The question is left open. — Fooloso4

Thank you. How interesting.

I do not regard Plato as an idealist. The term is anachronistic. — Fooloso4

Is there a debate about whether Plato is an idealist or not?

I recently discussed why the Forms are hypothetical and why rather than being the reputed originals of which other things are said to be images they are themselves images. — Fooloso4

It becomes a carnival hall of mirrors to me.

Thank you.

Is there a debate about whether Plato is an idealist or not? — Tom Storm

Probably, but I don't know if it is still at issue.

It becomes a carnival hall of mirrors to me. — Tom Storm

A play of images. How deep it goes and how pervasive it is is too often not recognized.

In the mini-treatise preceding this conclusion, and following from your argument just above it, there is not much with which to take exception. Pretty much conforms to what I’ve been saying. I might counter-argue that conclusions can follow immediately from the considering. The only way for there not to be a judgement at all, neither in affirmation nor negation of the considering, is if that which was under consideration wasn’t even imaginable in the first place. Hence the principle…that of which the imagination is impossible the object cannot be conceived. Or, if you prefer, the conception of the unimaginable is empty. — Mww

Yes, it's turning out that we're not really very far apart in our opinions. Nor were we really, at the beginning of this exchange, it was just a matter of fact that we use slightly different terminology, and there was a need to hammer out some details.

But there are still some significant points of disagreement. Why do you think that the only way in which there is no judgement, is if what was being considered was unimaginable? What about my example of relating possibilities, and leaving judgement until later? Suppose I am considering my course of action for tomorrow, and I would like to go to place A, place B, place C, and place D. I have a number of possibilities for ordering these events A,B,C,D, or A,C,B,D, etc.. I decide to keep an open mind on this decision, between now and tomorrow morning, in case new, relevant information comes up. Clearly, what I am considering is imaginable, and also I haven't yet made the required judgement.

Do you understand this situation differently than I do? Or is there a matter of terminology which I am missing?

To which I adamantly object: the highest level of cognition is not judgement. The source of all human cognitive error, insofar as such error is in fact error in the relation of conceptions to each other, judgement, cannot be the highest level to which cognition can attain, from which follows the possibility of error far outweighs the possibility of correct thinking. — Mww

Wait a minute, this conclusion is not valid at all. You proceed from the fact that error is possible, to the conclusion that it is more likely than not, without the required premises. Just because there is an aspect of cognition (judgement) which provides for the possibility of error, doesn't mean that error is more likely than not when this faculty is being used.

It is my belief, that this aspect of cognition, judgement, is the highest level of cognition, for that very reason, that it provides for the possibility of error. It allows for the possibility of choice, and this same freedom of choice is what allows for the possibility of error, as an unavoidable byproduct. It is the highest level of cognition because it provides us with the greatest capacity for the largest variety of activities. So it also provides for the greatest possibility of a good life, due to the nature of ongoing risks and dangers which need to be avoided in order to have a good life.

Reason the faculty subjects judgement, and thereby the cognitions given from them, to principles, by which the immediate judgement is regarded as conflicting or sustaining their antecedents. It is here phrases like, “I knew that” and “Now I know that”, hold as, or become, truths. — Mww

This is where take the determinist perspective which I adamantly object to. Reason does not subject judgement, and this is the crux of our disagreement. That reason does not subject judgement is evident from Socrates' argument, and what in the dialogue is called "being overcome by pleasure".

The issue is not a matter of "I know that", or "I knew that", It is a matter of "I know that I ought not do this, but I am doing it anyway". Reason tells the person "I ought not do that", but judgement has the person do it anyway. In this case we cannot say that reason subjects judgement.

HA!!!! Yeah….everybody that speaks involves himself in language games. I let my abject abhorrence of analytic philosophy impinge on my transcendental nature; I only meant to try making it clear when we say stuff like we do this or that, the manifested doing has no personal pronouns connected to it. If, as you say, we think in images….kudos on that, by the way…..it is absurd to then demand that images themselves invoke personal pronouns. Recognition of this removes the Cartesian theater from being a mere oversimplication, as you claim, but eliminates it altogether. — Mww

Doesn't it make sense to you if I say "I walk to work each day", or "I go to bed each night", as these are activities which I do? Would you recommend removing the "I" from these statements? Thinking is an activity as well. So why doesn't it make sense to you to say "I think", "I relate concepts to each other", and "I decide"? Why does this conjure up an idea for you of an homunculus, which you for some reason think is a wrong idea? It makes no sense to me, to remove the subject, the "I", and propose that thinking is something which just happens, judgement just happens, decisions just happen, intentional actions just happen. What does "effort" mean to you? Is effort something that just happens as well?

Socrates accuses the sophists of "making the weaker argument stronger". The ambiguity in this is that if the stronger argument is the most persuasive argument then the most reasonable argument can become the weaker argument. — Fooloso4

Good point. And if Socrates actually said exactly that --I'm not always sure about the validity and/or exactness of his sayings as they have survived to our days, e.g. his "knowing nothing" is a myth-- then his statement indeed fails rationallly-wise, as you pointed out.
But from what I know about sophists is that they were deliberately using persuasive but false statements (fallacies) to mislead (rich) people to get paid for teaching them rhetoric.
So,these sophisms-fallacies do not make for strong arguments. Rather the opposite. And Socrates was no fool --he was not a "Foolosopher"! :grin:-- and it is difficult to believe that he believed they were actually strong ...

In Plato's Second Letter he says that the Socrates in his dialogues is "a Socrates made young and beautiful". In other words,Plato does not give us a historical account of what Socrates said and did.

In the Apology what he denies is having knowledge of anything "πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ", very much or great and good or beautiful. (21d)

So,these sophisms-fallacies do not make for strong arguments. — Alkis Piskas

You are right. This is why I said the phrase is ambiguous. Stronger in what sense? By refuting them Socrates shows that although the arguments they make are weak, they make the argument seem stronger than it actually is.

There is a serious problem here that must be addressed. I may be persuaded by an argument because I think it is the stronger argument, but am I persuaded because it is stronger or do I think it stronger because I am persuaded? Someone skilled at making arguments may make an argument that is stronger than someone who is less skillful at arguing, but this does not mean they are right.

Suppose I am considering my course of action for tomorrow….. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh my. A priori speculative metaphysics to a posteriori physical activity.

It (judgement) allows for the possibility of choice, and this same freedom of choice is what allows for the possibility of error — Metaphysician Undercover

And here we’ve switched from cognition of things, to that which can only be moral constructions.

Remind me….didn’t we agree feelings are not cognitions? And didn’t we agree the judgement of cognitions is discursive in the relation of empirical conceptions, but the judgement of feelings is aesthetic in the condition of the subject himself?

Why are they being intermingled, when each is of its own domain, and have no business interfering with each other? Allowing the one to cross over to the other weakens the human condition of intrinsic duality, the prelude to a blatant contradiction.

And don’t bother with the power of freedom in the domain of the beautiful or the sublime, insofar as these are nonetheless subjective conditions in themselves, and while certainly hinged on aesthetic judgements, cannot be concerned with errors in general, those being empirically right/wrong with respect to knowledge, or transcendentally good/bad with respect to morality.

I grant moral philosophy is more important than knowledge philosophy, insofar as in the former the subject is his own fundamental causality, which implies some relative control, whereas in the latter, Mother is the fundamental causality, which makes explicit the subject has no control whatsoever. Still, best to keep them separate in philosophical dialectic practices.

Plato does not give us a historical account of what Socrates said and did. — Fooloso4

This looks like a shady photo! Do we live in semi-darkness regarding ancient history?

In the Apology what he denies is having knowledge of anything "πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ", very much or great and good or beautiful. — Fooloso4

Maybe "having knowledge of everything"? Which is very plausible?

This is why I said the phrase is ambiguous. Stronger in what sense? — Fooloso4

Yeah. This too is a reasonable question.

By refuting them Socrates shows that although the arguments they make are weak, they make the argument seem stronger than it actually is. — Fooloso4

Right. They seem strong to a weak mind and weak to a strong mind! :grin:

am I persuaded because it is stronger or do I think it stronger because I am persuaded? — Fooloso4

Ha! The "chicken or the egg" dilemma!
But for me it isn't so: I am persuaded because my logic says so. Or the other way around. See, there's no room for logic and sentiment (being impressed, feeling omething is strong/weak etc.) in the same place. This is known even in Marketing (which I have studied): onsumers buy based either on reasoning or on emotion. (Of course, you can hear also talking about "emotional reasoning" and "reasonable emotion"! Id est, crap.)

Someone skilled at making arguments may make an argument that is stronger than someone who is less skillful at arguing, but this does not mean they are right. — Fooloso4

Right. (See my coment before last.)

Do we live in semi-darkness regarding ancient history? — Alkis Piskas

At one time there was an attempt to construct an accurate picture of the historical Socrates. I don't know if anyone today is still at it.

I am persuaded because my logic says so. — Alkis Piskas

The problem of misologic is addressed in Phaedo. Misologic is the hatred of logical argument. It arises, Socrates says, out of a love of logical argument, out of excess expectations for its ability to provide answers. The main question of the Phaedo is what happens when we die. This is one of those big questions that Socrates admits he does not know the answer to. In the Phaedo, when he is about to die, he chides his friends for their "childish fear of death". He presents several arguments that some today still find persuasive, but when looked at carefully all prove to be weak. Since logic cannot provide a clear answer logic cannot in this case be persuasive. So what is preferable, to accept a comforting answer or, as Socrates did, admit ignorance? The danger of the latter is nihilism.

out of a love of logical argument, out of excess expectations for its ability to provide answers. — Fooloso4

I think I suffer from this kind of illness! Not Misologism (hatred of logic). The opposite: Philologism (love of logic) :grin:

The main question of the Phaedo is what happens when we die. This is one of those big questions that Socrates admits he does not know the answer to. — Fooloso4

I'm a member of the same club. I admit I don't actually know.

Since logic cannot provide a clear answer logic cannot in this case be persuasive. — Fooloso4

This is only ... logical. How can I persuade you if what I say makes no sense to you?

So what is preferable, to accept a comforting answer or, as Socrates did, admit ignorance? The danger of the latter is nihilism. — Fooloso4

Maybe the saying "There is only one thing I know and that is I know nothing" refers to that or something similar? Who knows? See, this is the problem with these sayings: they are used out of their context. Sometimes we are able to find that context and all looks fine. E.g. Descartes' "I think, therefore I am". The reason he said that and how he came to that idea are known (although people don't care about that and prefer to interpret it as they wish). Other times, we have the context but still we cannot me sure about the meaning of a saying. E.g. Juvenal's "mens sana in corpore sano" (healthy mind in a healthy body), which is equivocal. If you try to undestand the pasage of the poem it features in, you might not be sure if he meant that a healthy body makes for a healthy mind or the opposite is or maybe both! :smile:

And here we’ve switched from cognition of things, to that which can only be moral constructions. — Mww

I never made a switch. You said a long time ago that cognition does not involve things. I've been talking about considering possibilities, and making judgements. Moral principles very often enter into these considerations, that's unavoidable.

Maybe we've been misunderstanding each other all along, and that's why we can't work out our differences.

Remind me….didn’t we agree feelings are not cognitions? And didn’t we agree the judgement of cognitions is discursive in the relation of empirical conceptions, but the judgement of feelings is aesthetic in the condition of the subject himself? — Mww

You've unduly restricted "judgement" here, to either feelings or empirical conceptions. And I never agreed to this restriction. I agreed to leave feelings aside, as not entering cognition (though I still believe that feelings influence cognition).

Since abandoning feelings, I've been talking about judging possibilities. I think that all forms of judgement are reducible to a matter of judging possibilities. In other words, judgement requires possibility. To judge is to make a decision, and "decision" implies "choice", which implies "possibility".

Why are they being intermingled, when each is of its own domain, and have no business interfering with each other? Allowing the one to cross over to the other weakens the human condition of intrinsic duality, the prelude to a blatant contradiction. — Mww

It is not a matter of allowing one to cross over, and intermingle with the other, it is a matter of what is natural to the human condition. Such intermingling is a natural part of the human condition, which we cannot rid ourselves of. This is why feelings influence cognition. When I am upset, for example, I can't think straight. I cannot prevent the feeling from influencing the thinking, so I have to wait unit the feeling subsides. This situation is not describable as preventing the feeling from intermingling, which I cannot do, it is describable as suppressing the thinking until the feeling which has a bad influence on the thinking, subsides. Getting rid of the feeling requires a diversion, meditation, or some other calming practise. If they both occur at the same time, the feeling and the thinking, they automatically intermingle.

Still, best to keep them separate in philosophical dialectic practices. — Mww

I don't thinks so Mwww. The separation you propose is not real, therefore in dialectical practises which are directed toward the understanding of reality, it's best not to accept that proposed separation. This is why Plato placed "the good" at the top of all knowledge. In the end, right/wrong is inseparable from good/ bad, and they are both meant to be based in a true understanding of reality.

The different examples of context you present are interesting.

One element in that regard is how Plato reported objections to the 'Q and A" technique (you referred to earlier) employed by Socrates in order to shape conversations, The dialogues have many instances of central characters complaining about this practice.

That clear expression of authorial intent makes it different from establishing the historical circumstances Descartes wrote within, for example.

The dialogues have many instances of central characters complaining about this practice. — Paine

Interesting. I didn't know (or remember) that. I personally found (at that time) and I still find this method (Q & A) very interesting and productive. Way better of course than any teaching that does not involve the students' participation, and esp. any authoritarian or donnish kind of teaching. I can well read books instead, at my own pace and convenience. In fact, this is much better, because I can look up terms that I don't know or I am not sure about in a dictionary, which will make my understanding of the content better.

That clear expression of authorial intent makes it different from establishing the historical circumstances Descartes wrote within, for example. — Paine

Certainly.

…..philosophical dialectic practices.
— Mww

…..dialectical practises which are directed toward the understanding of reality — Metaphysician Undercover

Two different, unrelated things.
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You said a long time ago that cognition does not involve things — Metaphysician Undercover

Starting five days ago, I said exactly the opposite.
—————

In the end, right/wrong is inseparable from good/ bad, and they are both meant to be based in a true understanding of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, well….my true understanding of reality demands they be separated. Guess I just haven’t reached the end yet.

But this exchange is getting pretty close, what with the conversational inconsistencies, and the Platonic and the transcendental being fundamentally incompatible.

Starting five days ago, I said exactly the opposite. — Mww

I thought you said cognition doesn't involve things, it's only a matter of relating conceptions. I'm going to go back and reread that post.

That’s not all we’re doing. Relating conceptions IS the judging. And we don’t make a judgement about a thing; we cognize a thing, from the relation of conceptions thought as belonging to it. And, need I remind you, we’re talking about things here, real spacetime objects….you know, the things not in our heads (sigh)…..represented as phenomena, which in the thinking process, requires something else from understanding not yet considered. — Mww

OK, I see now, you said judging is relating concepts, and we do not make a judgement about a thing. However, you say we cognize a thing. So I'm confused now, what does "cognize a thing" mean? I see here, an act of relating conceptions, which you insist, is the act of judgement. But then there is also an act of cognizing a thing, described here, which is the act of thinking that the conceptions belong to a thing. Isn't this itself a judgement? And isn't it a judgement about a thing? It seems to be an instance of relating the conceptions to an assumed thing, rather than to other conceptions, and this is a judgement about a thing.

Now, I really do not understand the nature of this "thing" you were talking about back then, five days ago. Maybe if I took the time to question you properly back then, we wouldn't have spent five days getting nowhere. How is it that there are things which a person cognizes, but a person doesn't make a judgement about a thing, only thinks that certain conceptions are related to that thing?

Then you go on to make a short statement about what a thing is, but it doesn't really make sense to me. So it probably went right past me.

That which enters the mind as phenomena is that physical thing which represents how that feeling is to be understood. — Mww

Are you saying that the physical thing actually enters the mind as phenomena? Is this, in your belief, how we cognize a thing? The thing enters the mind as phenomena, and when the mind relates conceptions to it, this is cognizing a thing? If this is the case, then why do you not say that this is a form of judgement?

To me, I think that this is what I've been describing as the highest level of cognition, judging possibilities. But you seem to place it at the lowest level, not even obtaining the status of judgement. Deciding which conceptions are related to the thing, which appears as phenomena, is a matter of judging possibilities. Under Aristotelian conceptions, matter is potential, so the material thing is the substance of possibility. Judging possibilities, which is fundamentally judging things, is what I would say is the highest form of judgement. Furthermore, this type of judging often consists of moral judgements, because the things which enter our minds as phenomena, appearing to us in the form of possibilities, are often other human beings.

Yeah, well….my true understanding of reality demands they be separated. Guess I just haven’t reached the end yet.

But this exchange is getting pretty close, what with the conversational inconsistencies, and the Platonic and the transcendental being fundamentally incompatible. — Mww

I really don't believe that the Platonic and the transcendental are fundamentally incompatible. I think there is a medium between the two, which is the Aristotelian. And I think that the transcendental is in many ways, a rejection of Aristotelian terminology. The Aristotelian terminology is based in a Platonic relating of concepts, and this is what creates the appearance of incompatibility. So what I see is a rejection of the Aristotelian interpretation of Plato, but this does not prove to be fundamentally incompatible with Plato, as Plato can be interpreted in numerous different ways. It's difficult for a philosopher to be fundamentally incompatible with Plato, even if one tried, because Plato offered so many different ways of looking at everything.

Maybe we've been misunderstanding each other all along, and that's why we can't work out our differences. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think it more the case we’ve been jumping around all over the place, initially talking about judgement in and of itself, whether it is false or dismissible, then bringing in “things”, then adding in will with its moral implications or not, whether judgement is this kind for this or that kind for that…..on and on and on.

Partly, too, is our posts are so long and involved, important stuff gets laid waste. I know I go back, and notice I should have commented on something.

Another is the speculative nature of metaphysics and human intelligence itself. Nobody knows what’s going on between the ears, which is license to theorize any way we wish, as long as it makes some kind of sense to somebody. As much as I spout this shit, I’d never declare with absolute certainty this method is the true rendition of it, and therefore he who denies it is missing the boat.

Anyway. Once more, into the breach…..
————

You said a long time ago that cognition does not involve things
— Metaphysician Undercover

Starting five days ago, I said exactly the opposite. — Mww

I thought you said cognition doesn't involve things, it's only a matter of relating conceptions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Cognition is only of things, thus things, re: real spacetime objects, are always involved, albeit indirectly, as representations in the form of phenomena. Thing is…imagination, which is the matter of relating conceptions, and judgement, which is the relation of conceptions**, do not require things that are immediately sensed; as parts of understanding, these work on mediate things, re: prior experience, or, without any thing of sense whatsoever, re: fantoms, magic, or just possible experience.

**the adding of numbers, in the way kids are taught in school, put one number above another, draw a line under both, the implicit operation in the arithmetic above the line is analogous to the mental operation in understanding, called imagination, whereby numbers are exchanged for conceptions, regarding mere thought of things without the immediate presence of them, or even without any real sensed thing at all. This method is all a priori, and no experience is forthcoming from it.

Regarding things of sense, real spacetime objects, on the other hand, in the perception of them, one of the numbers in the arithmetic operation will be a conception, and the other number will be an intuition, in which case imagination is synthesizing a conception with a representation of the thing being perceived, which is a phenomenon. This method is a posteriori, from which is experience.

That which is below the line, regardless of which combination is above it, after the analogous arithmetic operation as sum, is the mental operation of judgement. And this for just a single perception, or a single thought. There are gazillions of them both but only one at a time, some of which we are conscious some of which we are not; reason is how they all relate to each other, how they are kept organized…..how we are not in a constant state of utter confusion yet still sometimes in a minor state. How we know things or not; how we remember things or don’t.

Just as all the number operations of different forms grouped together is mathematics, so too the entirety of the mental operation, is understanding, and thereby is it deemed the faculty of rules. It should be easy to see, that just as adding two numbers is exactly the same as adding a whole series of numbers, each stacked on top of the other in arithmetic form, two conceptions synthesized to each other is a simple, problematical, judgement, many conceptions synthesized all together, is a hypothetical judgement.
(Pointy ears may give the cognition of a dog, but pointy ears in conjunction with a bushy tail gives a more certain kind of dog. Pointy ears, bushy tail and brown spots yet a more certain kind. And so on. Sooner or later, the synthesis of sufficiently many conceptions whether from appearance or mannerisms, may very well end being the cognition of one single dog, YOUR dog, an apodeitic judgement.)
————

Relating conceptions IS the judging. Mww

OK, I see now, you said judging is relating concepts, and we do not make a judgement about a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

I made a mistake there, for which I beg forgiveness. We were at the beginning of this conversation, not yet having delved deeply enough to arrive at the subtleties. So saying, relating conceptions is imagination; the relation is judgement, perhaps clarified with the above. Sorry about that.

As for making judgement on things, I would hold with the notion we only make judgements on representations of things, whether those be phenomena regarding experience, or conceptions regarding mere thought of possible experience, or thought for which no experience is ever possible. These latter two is where reason performs its best, exerts its greatest authority, in that it will inform, given prior judgements, that current judgement just won’t work, if it contradicts either experience in the case of real objects, or logic in the case of the possibility of experience.

So it is from this, that reason is the faculty of principles. Understanding regulates conceptions according to rules; reason legislates understanding according to principles. From which follows, because judgement in part of understanding, and because rules have far less power than principles, insofar as rules presuppose their principles, judgement is the source of error in the human reasoning process.
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Now, I really do not understand the nature of this "thing" you were talking about back then, five days ago. — Metaphysician Undercover

I might take some fault here as well. You said….

…if we say that the mind reasons, i.e. thinks about things…. — Metaphysician Undercover

….to which I meant to offer…..“reasons, i.e., thinks about things”….. just doesn’t say enough. I went on to distinguish what a thing is, such that thinking as a whole does not necessary include them. In other words, reason concerns itself with everything we think, whether of real tangible things of perception, necessarily conditioned by space and time, or abstract intangible conceptual objects which understanding thinks for itself, conditioned only by time.
————-

Are you saying that the physical thing actually enters the mind as phenomena? — Metaphysician Undercover

Now we’re in the domain of sensibility, where we before in the domain of understanding. Human dualism, donchaknow.

What does it even mean to “enter the mind”?

To be continued?

Cognition is only of things, thus things, re: real spacetime objects, are always involved, albeit indirectly, as representations in the form of phenomena. Thing is…imagination, which is the matter of relating conceptions, and judgement, which is the relation of conceptions**, do not require things that are immediately sensed; as parts of understanding, these work on mediate things, re: prior experience, or, without any thing of sense whatsoever, re: fantoms, magic, or just possible experience. — Mww

OK, so this is how you lost me. "Cognition" for you, does not include imagination, judgement, or relating concepts. But isn't "cognition" generally used to refer to all forms of mental activity, thinking, and understanding? And I was earlier talking about logical processes being an activity of relating conceptions. Do you exclude logic from cognition then?

**the adding of numbers, in the way kids are taught in school, put one number above another, draw a line under both, the implicit operation in the arithmetic above the line is analogous to the mental operation in understanding, called imagination, whereby numbers are exchanged for conceptions, regarding mere thought of things without the immediate presence of them, or even without any real sensed thing at all. This method is all a priori, and no experience is forthcoming from it. — Mww

And this I do not understand either. How can you say that learning to do mathematics does not provide one with "experience"? I think that's exactly what practising things like that does, gives one experience.

That which is below the line, regardless of which combination is above it, after the analogous arithmetic operation as sum, is the mental operation of judgement. And this for just a single perception, or a single thought. There are gazillions of them both but only one at a time, some of which we are conscious some of which we are not; reason is how they all relate to each other, how they are kept organized…..how we are not in a constant state of utter confusion yet still sometimes in a minor state. How we know things or not; how we remember things or don’t. — Mww

This gives me something to talk about. The kid puts two numbers, and draws a line underneath. Let's say each number has multiple digits, so the student has to employ a method, understanding how to carry over from one column to the next for example. If the student is to be successful, the method must have already been learned. The student was taught by a teacher, or read how to in a book, but at that time, when the student learned, this is the time when understanding occurred. Now the student relies on this understanding, which has already occurred, to practise what is already understood.

Through the practise of what is already understood, the student makes judgements about what digits to write below the line. The digits written are a representation of those judgements. And the judgements come from employing the method which has been learned earlier through experience. There may be some underlying a priori principles involved in the learning process, but the method itself, which is what is employed in the judgements is learned through experience. Do you agree?

Just as all the number operations of different forms grouped together is mathematics, so too the entirety of the mental operation, is understanding, and thereby is it deemed the faculty of rules. It should be easy to see, that just as adding two numbers is exactly the same as adding a whole series of numbers, each stacked on top of the other in arithmetic form, two conceptions synthesized to each other is a simple, problematical, judgement, many conceptions synthesized all together, is a hypothetical judgement.
(Pointy ears may give the cognition of a dog, but pointy ears in conjunction with a bushy tail gives a more certain kind of dog. Pointy ears, bushy tail and brown spots yet a more certain kind. And so on. Sooner or later, the synthesis of sufficiently many conceptions whether from appearance or mannerisms, may very well end being the cognition of one single dog, YOUR dog, an apodeitic judgement.) — Mww

But where is cognition in relation to all of this synthesis? You separated cognition off, at the beginning, to be only about things, and not about relating conceptions, and judgements. But aren't these mental operations you describe really about things? The numerals which the student works with have a real physical presence on the paper. Likewise, "pointy ears", "bushy tail", and "dog" are real physical symbols in front of me. And if I think by mulling them over in my mind, I am using a representation of the physical symbol. This is phenomena isn't it? I cannot form those conceptions of those dogs without using those words. And the words in my mind are representations of physical words. So why isn't such conceptualizing, cognition, as working with things?

….to which I meant to offer…..“reasons, i.e., thinks about things”….. just doesn’t say enough. I went on to distinguish what a thing is, such that thinking as a whole does not necessary include them. In other words, reason concerns itself with everything we think, whether of real tangible things of perception, necessarily conditioned by space and time, or abstract intangible conceptual objects which understanding thinks for itself, conditioned only by time. — Mww

You have set up two parallel forms of thinking. one concerning real tangible things, the other concerning abstract intangible concepts. But I do not see that this separation is warranted, or even sustainable in application. The real tangible thing itself does not enter into the thinking itself, only the representations of it. But by the time the representation gets into the conscious mind, it's already tied up with so may abstract conceptions, judgements already made (prejudice), that I do not see the advantage of trying to separate the thing (as phenomenon) from the concepts. I think this just gives an unreal representation which may mislead.

“Cognition" for you, does not include imagination, judgement, or relating concepts. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the sense that “house” includes glass, wood, metals, it does, yes. One cannot cognize without these antecedents, but one can have those antecedents without being cognizant. This is partially why cognition regards perception alone, insofar as to say we are cognizant of our thinking, is quite superfluous.

But isn't "cognition" generally used to refer to all forms of mental activity, thinking, and understanding? — Metaphysician Undercover

Generally, perhaps. Critically, I would think not. Humans are a naturally inquisition lot, which reduces inevitably to the capacity to ask themselves questions for which there is no readily apparent answer. As soon as that happens, the quest for why not requires examination of that by which we do get answers to our questions, in order to find both, what the demarcation is, and, why there is one.

And I was earlier talking about logical processes being an activity of relating conceptions. Do you exclude logic from cognition then? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, given the fact cognitions are of things, from which follows we are not conscious of the relating of conceptions, nor are we conscious of the judgement itself. We are conscious only of the relation of one cognition to another, which is reason. On the other hand, in aesthetic judgements having to do with conceptions alone, we are conscious of these as to how they make us feel, but we cognize nothing by them. It is easy to see that how we feel has no predication on logic, in that it is true we do in fact sometimes feel very differently than the judgement warrants. Like….the guy who fell off a ladder should have caused consternation, but you laugh because it looked so funny when he landed.
———-

How can you say that learning to do mathematics does not provide one with "experience"? I think that's exactly what practising things like that does, gives one experience. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m ok with that. Except that my example is concerned with form, but yours is concerned with content. I’m saying the kid stacks numbers, gets a result, you’re saying the kid stacks 5 over 9 and gets 14. I’m saying the kid will necessarily get a result from any stack whatsoever, you’re saying the kid will only get a certain number contingent on the numbers he stacks. I’m constructing the math, which is not itself an experience, you’re using the constructs, which is.

There may be some underlying a priori principles involved in the learning process, but the method itself, which is what is employed in the judgements is learned through experience. Do you agree? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, as long as the stipulation of being taught applies, because there are two distinct methods involved. In such case as being taught, the things being learned about are given to him, the method is presupposed, re: addition, also taught to him, which eliminates him having to exercise his pure a priori conceptions for the construction of them, an entirely different method. In other words, he needs not think what a two is, or how it came to be a two, nor does he need to understand the cause/effect of succession, but only that he should conform to an expectation.

A question of….why is it, that which is known by rote practice makes far less impression than that known from self-determination. Stands to reason it is because the mental effort of the former is far less stringent than the latter. If far less, which effort is not used, as opposed to when it is.
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And the words in my mind are representations of physical words. So why isn't such conceptualizing, cognition, as working with things? — Metaphysician Undercover

The phenomena in your mind are representations of physical words, just as in any perception. In the sense that you already know a language, you don’t need to conceptualize the words, you’ve already done it when you learned the words that constitute the language. All you need now is to judge the relation of the word you’ve learned, to the word you perceive. If you cognize a sufficient correlation, you understand what’s been said. In some cases, though, if you cognize a necessary correlation, you know what’s been said is true.
(Guy says…I just went to Home Depot. Ok, fine, you understand how that could be the case. Guy shows you a garden rake, says…I just went to Home Depot and bought this rake. Now you understand he more than likely actually did go to Home Depot. Guy says….I just went to Home Depot and bought this gallon of ice cream. Now, you understand he might have gone to Home Depot, but he more than likely didn’t buy the ice cream there, because yo have no experience of any Home Depot ever selling ice cream. Guy says…I just went to the bank and got a cashier’s check. Now you understand he had to have gone to a bank, because you know for certain there is no where else to get a cashier’s check.)
————

I do not see the advantage of trying to separate the thing (as phenomenon) from the concepts — Metaphysician Undercover

In the words of The Right Honorable Professor Old Guy…..understanding does not intuit, intuition does not think. Regarding things…intuition without conception is empty, conceptions without intuition is blind.

Sustainable in application? Dunno, but it is necessary in speculative metaphysics, which is itself always in consideration of whether it is sustainable in application or not.

In the sense that “house” includes glass, wood, metals, it does, yes. One cannot cognize without these antecedents, but one can have those antecedents without being cognizant. This is partially why cognition regards perception alone, insofar as to say we are cognizant of our thinking, is quite superfluous. — Mww

I don't quite understand this, so let me put an example to you. Suppose I look around me. What I perceive with my eyes is a bunch of different colours around, and I also somehow see a separation between some of them, as a difference in distance. Because they appear separated, I think of them as distinct things, and I have a name for many of them, "house", "car", etc.. The latter part is all conceptual, me seeing them as things, and as specific things. And the former part is supposed to be perceptual, seeing the differences.

The problem I have, is that to talk of them as "colours" and "separations", or "distance", is also conceptual. Now I have to keep reducing the type of differences I am sensing, to a most basic concept, "differences", which is still conceptual, but as close as possible that I can get to making a separation between the perceptual (of the senses) and the conceptual (of the mind). But when I do this, I deny myself the capacity to even distinguish between what is being perceived by one sense, and what is being perceived by another sense, because "colour" and "sound" are conceptual separations. All the senses are just demonstrating "differences" in general, and they are completely uncategorized because categorizing them is conceptual.

Since this distinction, between sound, coulour, taste, etc., appears to me to be done at a level prior to any form of conceptualization as I would understand "conceptualization", it doesn't look right to me. It appears to me like there is some form of relating sensations inherent within the act of perception, which already categorizes them prior to even relating them to any conceptions. So I think that your proposed division between 'of the thing' (cognition) and 'of the conception' (reason) doesn't make any sense to me because the two seem to contaminate each other right from the most basic levels and one cannot be said to be prior to the other. So sense perception has inherent within it a fundamental relating of percepts and classification, because I naturally distinguish between colour and sound. Likewise, the objects of reasoning always seem to have a sense aspect, as they seem to always be representations of something sensed, like words, symbols or images. I am incapable of reasoning without employing some sense images.

Yes, given the fact cognitions are of things, from which follows we are not conscious of the relating of conceptions, nor are we conscious of the judgement itself. We are conscious only of the relation of one cognition to another, which is reason. On the other hand, in aesthetic judgements having to do with conceptions alone, we are conscious of these as to how they make us feel, but we cognize nothing by them. It is easy to see that how we feel has no predication on logic, in that it is true we do in fact sometimes feel very differently than the judgement warrants. Like….the guy who fell off a ladder should have caused consternation, but you laugh because it looked so funny when he landed. — Mww

Here is where the problem I had above, manifests into a bigger problem. You say there are cognitions of "things" which is at a sub-conscious level. I assume these "things" would be the differences I referred to above, as I explained "differences" to be the fundamental object of the senses. So when you say "cognitions are of things", you mean cognitions are of differences according to the description I provided above. "Things" is reducible to "differences". Also, within the act of "cognition", there is some sort of relating of differences to each other, and a basic classification going on, and this is the "judgement" you speak of, which we are not consciously aware of.

Now, there are what you would call "cognitions". And reason relates cognitions one to another. However, and here's where the problem lies, you now have another separation, within the conscious level of reasoning, and this appears to be between aesthetic judgements, involving the relations of cognitions, and logical judgements, involving purely abstract conceptions. So the problem is, where do these purely abstract conceptions employed in logic come from? You provide a big description (which I find to have problems) of how a cognition can come to a reasoning mind, being 'of things', but no description of how purely abstract conceptions come to a reasoning mind. And, I explained how each of these, cognitions, and purely abstract concepts, are both fundamentally contaminated by each other, so this renders that whole division as ineffectual. In reality, it appears like both cognitions and abstract concepts are produced in the same way within the sub-conscious, so that when they come to the reasoning mind, they simply come as different categories similar to how colours and sounds come as different categories, but they are actually created in much the same way.

I’m ok with that. Except that my example is concerned with form, but yours is concerned with content. I’m saying the kid stacks numbers, gets a result, you’re saying the kid stacks 5 over 9 and gets 14. I’m saying the kid will necessarily get a result from any stack whatsoever, you’re saying the kid will only get a certain number contingent on the numbers he stacks. I’m constructing the math, which is not itself an experience, you’re using the constructs, which is. — Mww

I was emphasizing the process, which must be learned. So yes, the kid stacks 5 over 9, and gets 14, but more than this, the kid puts 4 below the 5 and 9, and carries the 1 to the next column. So what I am saying is that what you call "the math" is just a learned process without any necessity to it. The kid does not have to write down the 4 and carry the 1, if it's a simple case, it might be all kept in the mind. Then there would be some other way to remember the digits, rather than writing them down. So your determination of necessity is completely meaningless. It's like saying, put some numbers in front of the kid, and the kid will necessarily do something, but you can't make any statement of necessity as to what the kid will actually do. What point is such an assertion of necessity? It's like saying something will necessarily happen, but it could be absolutely anything.

Yes, as long as the stipulation of being taught applies, because there are two distinct methods involved. In such case as being taught, the things being learned about are given to him, the method is presupposed, re: addition, also taught to him, which eliminates him having to exercise his pure a priori conceptions for the construction of them, an entirely different method. In other words, he needs not think what a two is, or how it came to be a two, nor does he need to understand the cause/effect of succession, but only that he should conform to an expectation.

A question of….why is it, that which is known by rote practice makes far less impression than that known from self-determination. Stands to reason it is because the mental effort of the former is far less stringent than the latter. If far less, which effort is not used, as opposed to when it is. — Mww

This conclusion you make here, ought to serve to demonstrate to you the problem with your division between cognition and reason which I explained above. What you describe is the two different ways of learning a rule, explained by Wittgenstein. You can be taught the rule, or you can observe activity and learn the rule simply from observation. As you describe, the two produce a fundamentally different understanding of what is here called "the rule". Both means of acquiring "the rule" are sense based. In one case you acquire the instructions through language, as a prescriptive rule, and in the other instance you observe, and make a descriptive rule.

The problem is that the two are fundamentally different. The rule that you learn from being taught will not be the same as the rule that you learn from observation, as you say, the latter involves a deeper understanding. But does it really? In reality, the other way, being taught the rule, involves a whole lot of purpose, meaning, which the observational way does not reveal. So prior to even being able to understand the rule in language, a whole lot of other education is required, and this is implied already when one is taught the rule, so there is a whole package of understanding purpose, and meaning, inherent within learning the rule through language. So really we cannot say that one is a better understanding than the other because they are both completely different, and understand completely different aspects. To have a complete understanding requires both.

How this bears on the division you proposed, between cognition and reason, is that both these ways of understanding "the rule", prescriptive and descriptive, are based in cognition, recognition of things. However, they involve completely different ways of looking at things. In the descriptive way you look at the activity of "things", people in this case, and notice that their activity is patterned and intelligible, and you thereby make some conclusions about those patterns, allowing you personally to replicate them. In the prescriptive way, you look at "things" as carriers of inherent meaning, like words and symbols, and you learn some understanding about what these things are supposed to represent.

So I would say that the division here is not between cognition (of things), and reason (of concepts), but a difference in the way that we look at things. So each "way" is cognitive in the sense that it deals with things, but in one way the thing is seen as something which you must personal assign meaning to, in your attempt to understand it, and in the other way you see the thing as having meaning already inherent within it, and this is taken for granted.

The phenomena in your mind are representations of physical words, just as in any perception. In the sense that you already know a language, you don’t need to conceptualize the words, you’ve already done it when you learned the words that constitute the language. All you need now is to judge the relation of the word you’ve learned, to the word you perceive. If you cognize a sufficient correlation, you understand what’s been said. In some cases, though, if you cognize a necessary correlation, you know what’s been said is true.
(Guy says…I just went to Home Depot. Ok, fine, you understand how that could be the case. Guy shows you a garden rake, says…I just went to Home Depot and bought this rake. Now you understand he more than likely actually did go to Home Depot. Guy says….I just went to Home Depot and bought this gallon of ice cream. Now, you understand he might have gone to Home Depot, but he more than likely didn’t buy the ice cream there, because yo have no experience of any Home Depot ever selling ice cream. Guy says…I just went to the bank and got a cashier’s check. Now you understand he had to have gone to a bank, because you know for certain there is no where else to get a cashier’s check.)
———— — Mww

This further demonstrates the two different ways of cognizing things. Once we understand that there is meaning inherent within the thing, get a fundamental grasp on this meaning and take it for granted, we can move on toward understanding further meaning which is within the context of the thing. What context is, really, is the assumption of a larger thing ( eg. instead of a word, a sentence) with meaning inherent within that larger thing. But if we cognize a thing without inherent meaning assuming that we must assign meaning to the thing through some act of reasoning, then we allow for the existence of unintelligible "things". That ends up being like the ice cream at Home Depot. If the things cognized, "ice cream" and "Home Depot" in this example have no inherent meaning, then we allow any form of relation. But such a judgement would render everything unintelligible because there would be no inherent rules for relating things.

So we must allow that within cognition, which is the first interaction between mind and thing, there is already assumed by the apprehending mind, that there is meaning already inherent within the percept. So perception presents all things to the reasoning mind as if they are symbols or representations of a concept already. And that's why I do not like the division between cognition and reason, because there would reasoning already inherent within the cognition, because the meaning of the thing cognized has already been understood, just like after we learn to speak, we recognize words as things because we understand the meaning which inheres within.

Outstanding critique. Well-thought, and asks pertinent questions, not all of which have answers.

Before itemizing responses, lemme ask ya, when considering this:

So perception presents all things to the reasoning mind as if they are symbols or representations of a concept already. — Metaphysician Undercover

…..what happens in the very first instance of a perception or an idea in a particular human cognitive system? By first instance I mean the very first observation of something in Nature, or the very first flash of a possibility a priori? The implicit ramification being of course, there is no experience on which to draw, therefore there is nothing in memory, re: consciousness, therefore the representation by already present conceptions is quite impossible.

Combine that scenario with the obviousness that everything whatsoever, is or was a first instance to some human intelligence. There is nothing in general known today that wasn’t first learned by someone, mostly long ago, but true nonetheless, and there is nothing known by an individual that didn’t begin with the not knowing of it.

What are you to do, when perception presents to your reasoning mind something for which it has no conceptual representations already?

What are you to do, when perception presents to your reasoning mind something for which it has no conceptual representations already? — Mww

Indeed. I think this is a similar point @joshs makes in relation to how people assimilate (or fail to) unfamiliar information or fresh worldviews. We seem to need to have a partial appreciation (some conceptual representation) to take any useful step towards comprehension of the new or towards paradigmatic shifts in thought. Is something is truly unfamiliar to us are we blind to it?

Is something is truly unfamiliar to us are we blind to it? — Tom Storm

In keeping with the scenario, in which perception presents to the reasoning mind, it is then contradictory to deny the presentation, so we couldn’t say we’re blind to it.

True story and case in point: So….I’m a stargazer, with all that implies. Local weather guy informs that at a certain time in a certain region of the night sky, I will experience first-hand….all else considered as given….what he has second-handedly represented for me in a mere snapshot, along with a brief strictly appearance-related description.

Next….I didn’t understand the snapshot representation properly, in that to me it looked like a time sequenced composite of a traversing single object, and all the description did was confirm the snapshot.

Now…..at the appointed time, and with the correct spatial orientation, I saw a string of pinpoint lights, musta been a hundred of ‘em, all in perfect linear succession, all at the same velocity, going my right to left, for six minutes.

I mean…can you even imagine the fascination of this experience, it having no antecedent conceptual representation whatsoever? As you say, an occasion of the truly unfamiliar? Pinpoints of light? Seen plenty of ‘em. This particular one here at this time of year, over there at that time of year? Been there, done that. A singular point moving at speed? Yep, first for me being Telstar, if I remember right. Noisey singular pinpoints a speed? Ehhh…big ol’ jet airliner. Big deal. None of which is sufficient to grant me immediate knowledge of what I saw this time. In fact, not only did I not know what I saw, I couldn’t even image something fitting the observation, such that I could guess what I saw. But still, there’s no possibility for being blind to it.

Anyway….I looked it up, updated my knowledge base, none the worse for wear. Damned if it wasn’t Elon Musk’s SpaceLink. Truth be told, I didn’t know there was such a thing in the first place.

One of those guess you had to be there moments? Despite that, hopefully you grasp the relevance.

There's an anecdote I often re-tell, which has been challenged before, so I went and did the research, and it is bona fide. It's in an account of the discovery of Australia by Captain James Cook, concerning the day the Endeavour sailed into Botany Bay and dropped anchor. Joseph Banks noted in his diary that although they were within clear sight of a group of aborigines who were mending nets on the shoreline, not one of them looked up or gave any sign of acknowledging the presence of the Endeavour. It wasn't until some hours later, when a small boat was lowered and rowed towards the shore, that the aborigines looked up and began to gesticulate in the direction of the small boat. He noted that it was if they didn't see the Endeavour. Make of it what you will.

One of those guess you had to be there moments? Despite that, hopefully you grasp the relevance. — Mww

Cool story. I think you need to change your name to Kantian Stargazer.



Thanks, so it was Cook's ship. I was trying to recall the details of this story with someone last week. It's the prefect example of what I was getting at.

One can imagine this kind of thing happening with concepts and frames of reference quite easily.

Kantian Stargazer. — Tom Storm

Useless trivia. Kant authored the precursor to currently accepted nebula dynamics. Theory of the Heavens, 1755.