What is bigger comes from what is smaller. — Fooloso4

That's not what the Cyclic Argument is saying.

'argument from imperfection' anticipates Kant's Transcendental Arguments. — Wayfarer

Sure reads that way.

Physical things.

The word "physical" is in the dialogues?

But the suggestion is not that we arrive at the idea of equality by seeing empirical objects of equal size, because empirical objects are not absolute, which the idea of equality is. — Wayfarer

Right. But as I said, I don't find the argument persuasive. The question is whether we would see things as equal if we did not have the idea (eidos, Form) of equality. According to the Divided Line mathematical knowledge of geometric figures comes from making images of them. These imperfect images give us adequate if imperfect knowledge of what a circle or square is. The point is made that they do not have knowledge of the circle itself and the square itself. It is eikasia and dianoia, images and reason, from which mathematical knowledge is derived.

... take all animals and all plants into account, and, in short, for all things which come to be, let us see whether they come to be in this way, that is, from their opposites ... Let us examine whether those that have an opposite must necessarily come to be from their opposite and from nowhere else, as for example when something comes to be larger it must necessarily becomelarger from having been smaller before. [emphasis added] (70e)

I'll tell you how I've always done it. — frank

Your turn

Your turn — Fooloso4

I don't know what you're asking. You said the Cyclic Argument is about physical things, but since it's about the Soul, that would mean you think Plato's Soul is a physical thing.

I don't think we have any common ground from which to proceed, so vaya con dios!

I don't know what you're asking. — frank

You told me you would tell me how you have always done it:

Yes. And then there's my all time favorite Platonic argument: the Cyclic Argument, which shows that there can be no "bigger" without the preceding "smaller".

So tell me how you resolve this, and I'll tell you how I've always done it. — frank

I was saying that we should exchange views on what the dependent nature of oppositions says about the theory of forms. I'm no longer interested in doing that, though.

Peace out. :smile:

since it's about the Soul, — frank

As quoted above, the argument is about "all things which come to be". If the soul comes to be then the soul perishes. If all things that come to be come from their opposite then what is the opposite of soul that it comes to be from?

I don't think we have any common ground from which to proceed, so vaya con dios! — frank

The common ground is Plato's texts. Something you have avoided citing. The real problem seems not to be that there is no common ground but that the dialogues do not give you grounds to support your claims.

I don't find the argument persuasive. — Fooloso4

I find it more than persuasive, I'm compelled by it. And why? Because, in the broadest sense, as soon as you appeal to reason then you're already relying on something very like the knowledge of the forms.

Lloyd Gerson in his seminal paper Platonism vs Naturalism, put it like this:

...in thinking*, [says Aristotle] the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a Form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

*I take this to mean 'thinking' in the sense of discursive reason, not simply idle mental contents.

Another Aristotelian says:

For Empiricism there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in the real as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real). — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism

Examples could be multiplied indefinitely but these suffice to make my point.

(It's also significant that the arguments all go back to anamnesis, the doctrine of recollection. There is, of course, the suggestion of what the soul knew, prior to 'falling' into this life. But a naturalistic account might be provided by, for example, Chomsky's 'universal grammar', although that's a topic for another thread.)

'argument from imperfection' anticipates Kant's Transcendental Arguments.
— Wayfarer

Sure reads that way. — Mww

I'm beginning to see the connection. Still working on it.

What are the advantages of doing that? It seems absurd at face value. — frank

The advantage is versatility. This versatility is what allows things to be "equal in one respect and unequal in another", as Socrates points out in Wayfarer's quoted passage. Two things can be equal in weight, or height, or width, or type, or duration, whatever you want.

The perfect, ideal equality, which Socrates refers to as "abstract equality", gets reformulated by Aristotle as the law of identity, which is indicated by .

As Socrates argues in the Phaedo, no two things, being different by the very fact that they are two things, can obtain ideal equality. Therefore, as you argue, we as human beings have an idea of perfect equality which no two things can possibly display to us. So Aristotle looks at this idea of perfect equality, and determines that it can only describe something real if it describes the relationship which a thing has with itself. This is the law of identity, a thing is the same as it itself.

This provides us with the difference between "equal" and "same" (when we adhere to a strict definition of "same"). "Equal" is a relation between two distinct things. "Same" is proposed as the relation between an object and itself. It is important to notice that "same" is artificial, a human designation derived from the a priori, and it is not proper to say that an object establishes a relation with itself, as if it were two distinct objects. This is the problem with using "relation" to speak of identity, it implies two objects, when the law of identity is meant to strictly enforce the ideal identity, the separate and independent One.

What we can see, or at least what I think we can learn from this, is that Plato (Socrates) segregated the ideal, abstract "equality" from all the actual instances of usage of "equal". it's a perfection, or ideal, which falls outside the scale of usage. In a way it marks the limit to the scale of perfection, but it also leaves the scale unlimited because nothing which is measured by that scale can obtain that perfection, but anything can be measured. This is similar to the traditional us of "infinite" as an ideal. Then Aristotle takes this ideal, which doesn't appear to refer to anything real by Socrates' argument, only a phantom intuition in the mind coming from God knows where, and he assigns something very real to it, the particular, as expressing perfect equality by being "the same" as itself. Now the particular, an individual, independent object, as a unity, can be apprehended as the real ideal, One.

In this way the existence of such ideals, which neither Plato nor Socrates could explain, as appearing to come from somewhere within (through recollection), are validated as having a real and true referent. Aristotle does the same thing with the ideal "infinite". He shows how the sense of "infinite" employed by mathematicians lacks in perfection, being a potentiality rather than an actuality. This is similar to the way that the mathematician's use of "equal" lacks in perfection as shown by Socrates. Each use of "infinite" is derived from a failure to meet the true ideal infinite, which is "eternal". Then he separate "eternal" as the ideal, from "infinite" as the imperfect representation occurring in common usage, and shows how the "eternal" is real and actual as implying what is outside of time.

Still working on it. — Wayfarer

Looking at 74b, we can see the inkling of something new and different just beggin’ to be exposed. Socrates says stuff like…when we think……but leaves it at that. Kant steps in with a new notion of what is actually happening when we think, and the transcendental arguments are the necessary conditions that justify those speculative notions. It’s Aristotle’s logic in spades: if this is the case, which the LNC says it is, and that follows necessarily from this case, which the Law of Identity says it does, then the entire systemic procedure is only possible if this certain something is antecedent to all of it.

By delving deeper into the human cognitive system, examining it from a transcendental point of view, claimed to be the only way to determine that antecedent something, Kant both sustains and refutes arguments from imperfection. Refutes insofar as purely logical systems can be perfectly formed and thereby perfectly concluded, hence can be absolutely certain in themselves; sustained insofar as being metaphysical, there are no possible empirical proofs for those transcendental points of view, which a proper science must have, hence is imperfect.

The former, being perfect, allows trust in knowledge in general; the latter, being imperfect, allows amendments to particular knowledge without jeopardizing the system by which it is furnished. And that combination ends Hume’s radical skepticism forever.
(Until the next new thing comes along, and ends Kant’s transcendental philosophy forever)

We end up with, again in 74b, we don’t “think” as Plato says. We tacitly understand, and that purely a priori, herein a euphemism for subconsciously, re: behind the curtain of mere phenomena, those conceptions Socrates says we are born with, have knowledge of, and of which we think, none of which are the case in the pure a priori use of reason.

…..I’m still working on it.

I am hesitant to discuss Aristotle for two reasons. First, I simply do not understand him. Aristotle Hides (see section on Aristotle in the link) and I have not done enough work to adequately sort things out. Second, although both Plato and Aristotle use the term eidos or Form there are significant differences. There is for Aristotle no "equal itself" existing by itself timeless and unchanging.

But, as I have argued elsewhere, Plato's Timaeus points to the inadequacy of a world of static Forms.

This rather poorly composed post was meant to make several points: irony is a phenomenon of indirect reality; irony is the form of forms: the complete formulation of the indirect reality of physical simulacra of divine ideas and the struggle of the soul to remember; that irony is doctored in the modern period as a literary device, therefore subverting the soul's apprehension of the ironic form exemplifying the struggle of the soul in indirect reality; and, to also raise the question of a possible reconceptualization of irony in the modern conception of indirect realism, if not a struggle of the soul, a struggle of the individual against oppressive rationality such as objectivity?

I find it more than persuasive; I'm compelled by it. And why? Because, in the broadest sense, as soon as you appeal to reason then you're already relying on something very like the knowledge of the forms. — Wayfarer

It is interesting to read Theaetetus concerning this point. That dialogue shows the need for an intelligible world not possible through the relativity of Protagoras or Heraclitus. It is done without recourse to Anamnesis and the separate realm of Forms.

Instead of the model of remembering what was forgotten, the dialogue uses the process of giving birth to concepts as the image of what it is like to learn. The role of the philosopher is to assist in the process and see if the concept is worth trying to keep alive. A mid-wife rather than a source of knowledge.

The Anamnesis model also emphasizes how knowledge is not given from one to another but is the awakening of a potential in the soul of the learner. Much commentary has issued forth over why this model was not used in Theaetetus. How the matter is approached reflects very different ways of listening to Plato. Consider the reasoning of F.M Cornford:

Now the Theaetetus will later have much to say about memory. Why is there no mention of that peculiar impersonal memory of knowledge before birth? There is no ground for supposing that Plato ever abandoned the theory of Anamnesis. It cannot be mentioned in the Theaetetus because it presupposes that we know the answer to the question here to be raise afresh: What is the nature of knowledge and of its objects? For the same reason all mention of the forms is excluded. The dialogue is concerned only with the lower kinds of cognition, our awareness of the sense-world and judgments involving the perception of sensible objects. Common sense might maintain that, if this is not all the 'knowledge' we possess, whatever else can be called knowledge is somehow extracted from such experience. The purpose of the dialogue is to examine and reject this claim of the sense-world to furnish anything that Plato will call 'knowledge'. The Forms are excluded in order that we may see how we can get on without them; and the negative conclusion of the whole discussion means that, as Plato had taught ever since the discovery of the Forms, without them there is no knowledge at all. — F.M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, page 28

There are many ways to respond to this as a species of circular reasoning but I will confine myself to a few observations.

The discussion in Theaetetus advanced well beyond where Cornford placed it.

Cornford saying that it ended as a kind of tethered goat swallowed by aporia ignores the role of Theaetetus and how much or not he was able to learn. For Cornford, Plato is an organized set of doctrines that are given through the guise of dialogue. Once one starts listening to the differences between dialogues as necessary for their own purposes, this top-down hierarchy of meaning stops helping.

The Anamnesis model points to the need for assuming a preexisting condition of the soul to be able to know but it is also a victim of its own success. It is ass backwards from the pedagogy needed to actually learn. The language in the Phaedo underlines this. The soul without death is said to come from death and leave the same way. The anamnesis involved does not address the life in between.

Compare that to the world of Theaetetus where people and thoughts are born from living people stuck with other living people.

There is for Aristotle no "equal itself" existing by itself timeless and unchanging. — Fooloso4

I’m very aware the ‘problem of reification’ when this discussion comes up. I know that Aristotle is said to have ‘immanetized the Forms’ but I don’t believe that by so doing he denied their reality. But I will do some more reading on it. I think I will also create a new thread on Gerson's essay Platonism vs Naturalism, for which there is a video of his reading of it.

FIrst rate. I have encountered the Comford book before and will re-visit it. (I love the image of the tethered goat although of course Jurassic Park comes to mind which is wildly anachronistic.) But much to chew over there, I will return to those points.

I'm posting irregularly at the moment due to work commitments. Appreciate the feedback

The discussion in Theaetetus advanced well beyond where Cornford placed it. — Paine

What is exposed in Theaetetus is that all the conventional ideas about knowledge, and what knowledge is, are faulty. When they look for something which fits the various descriptions of "knowledge" by common belief, (such as JTB), nothing can actually fit, or fulfill the criteria of the proposed descriptions. So they conclude that they must have the wrong idea about what knowledge really is. Cornford sees this as an indication that we need to turn toward understanding "Forms" to produce a true understanding of the nature of knowledge.

That is Cornford's thesis. And it was going great except for the part about JTB (if that means true belief with an added account). Cornford says:

The dialogue is concerned only with the lower kinds of cognition, our awareness of the sense-world and judgments involving the perception of sensible objects. — F.M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, page 28

Socrates said that if we know enough to give an adequate account, that shows us knowing stuff. Including that as proving we could know stuff as a possibility was dismissed on the basis of circular reasoning, not because thinking it was absurd or ignorant.

That issue has nothing to do with Cornford's assertion.

Socrates was the Greek Wittgenstein or, inversely, Wittgenstein was the German Socrates. The meat and potatoes of the dialectical method is to demonstrate the nonexistence of Platonic Forms (essences). What is justice? Nobody knows.

I'm not seeing your point. Socrates surely deals with JTB in the Theaetetus. The bulk of the problems confronted within in this dialogue concern the requirement for truth in knowledge, i.e. the requirement that the possibility of falsity be ruled out. The common notion of "knowledge" is that knowledge must contain only truth, and contain no falsity. But the members of the dialogue find no way that anything which is commonly called "knowledge" could have the possibility of falsity ruled out. So at the end of the dialogue it is revealed that this has probably been a mistaken approach.

But the members of the dialogue find no way that anything which is commonly called "knowledge" could have the possibility of falsity ruled out. — Metaphysician Undercover

That description does not match the language in the dialogue. Socrates directly refutes Cornford's statement, "The dialogue is concerned only with the lower kinds of cognition", when he corrects Theaetetus' idea that knowledge is perception:

Soc: Therefore, knowledge is not present in the experiences, but in the process of gathering together what’s involved in them, for in the latter, as it seems, there is a power to come in touch with being and truth, but in the former there is no power. — Plato. Theaetetus, 186d, translated by Joe Sachs

At 187a, Theaetetus takes a second shot and says opinion is knowledge. After Socrates shows that as inadequate, Theaetetus says:

Theae: That true opinion is knowledge. Having a true opinion is surely something safe from error at least, and all the things that come from it are beautiful and good. — ibid, 200e

The matter of an account combined with true opinion was introduced by Theaetetus after Socrates said:

Soc: Then whenever the jurors are justly persuaded about things it’s possible to know only by seeing them and [C] in no other way, at a time when they’re deciding these things from hearing about them and getting hold of a true opinion, haven’t they decided without knowledge, even though, if they judged well, they were persuaded of correct things? — ibid, 201c

The addition of an account does not repair the problem that true opinion is different than knowledge. Socrates statement here does show, however, that true opinion can come from knowledge and good judgement. That is a far cry from not being able to rule out the "possibility of falsity."

It also rules out Cornford's charge that "as Plato had taught ever since the discovery of the Forms, without them there is no knowledge at all"

Looking at 74b, we can see the inkling of something new and different just beggin’ to be exposed. Socrates says stuff like…when we think……but leaves it at that. Kant steps in with a new notion of what is actually happening when we think, and the transcendental arguments are the necessary conditions that justify those speculative notions. It’s Aristotle’s logic in spades: if this is the case, which the LNC says it is, and that follows necessarily from this case, which the Law of Identity says it does, then the entire systemic procedure is only possible if this certain something is antecedent to all of it.

By delving deeper into the human cognitive system, examining it from a transcendental point of view, claimed to be the only way to determine that antecedent something, Kant both sustains and refutes arguments from imperfection. Refutes insofar as purely logical systems can be perfectly formed and thereby perfectly concluded, hence can be absolutely certain in themselves; sustained insofar as being metaphysical, there are no possible empirical proofs for those transcendental points of view, which a proper science must have, hence is imperfect. — Mww

:up: I will only add that I think this is where the synthetic a priori is of great significance. Even if, as you say, the purely a priori gives no meaningful empirical information, through the act of synthesis - through the combination of a priori principles with empirical observation - much new ground has been discovered, possibly including the vast majority of modern physics. I think this what is behind Eugene Wigner's well-known essay on the Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences. Whence the strange concordance between the operations of mathematical reason and the order of things? All of this goes back to these dialogues.

****

I will step back a bit and say something about what interests me about this topic. I came to philosophy forums ten years ago with the conviction that Platonic realism was in some sense true. By that, I simply meant that the natural numbers and such things as laws and principles, are real ('discovered not invented'). The mainstream consensus seems very much the opposite - various forms of conventionalism, fictionalism and so on ('invented not discovered'). The arguments become extremely technical and really only understandable to specialists but the broad drift is that empiricist philosophy generally reject the notion of innate ideas.

I've been researching this particular question through various perspectives. The theme that is beginning to emerge is that this all goes back to the medieval contests between nominalism and metaphysical realism.

Like Macbeth, Western man made an evil decision, which has become the efficient and final cause of other evil decisions. Have we forgotten our encounter with the witches on the heath? It occurred in the late fourteenth century, and what the witches said to the protagonist of this drama was that man could realize himself more fully if he would only abandon his belief in the existence of transcendentals. The powers of darkness were working subtly, as always, and they couched this proposition in the seemingly innocent form of an attack upon universals. The defeat of logical realism in the great medieval debate was the crucial event in the history of Western culture; from this flowed those acts which issue now in modern decadence. — Richard Weaver, Ideas have Consequences

So in my case, I've started to go back and try and understand the origins of this debate, which in my view begins with Parmenides but my knowledge is, and probably will always be, very sketchy.

:clap: Excellent post!

By "equal" is meant 'same'. No two things are exactly the same, but similarities and differences between things are observed. From this evolves the idea of same kinds and different kinds.

If things resemble one another to greater and lesser degrees, then the idea of perfect sameness is naturally extrapolated, just as the imperfect rectangular form of a building, or an allotment of land, or the imperfectly circular form of a wheel or the imperfect straightness of a path or road lead to the conceptual extrapolations of the perfect geometric forms of the rectangle, the circle and the straight line.

I simply meant that the natural numbers and such things as laws and principles, are real….. — Wayfarer

Ok. What makes that form of realism Platonic? I’m sure it must have something to do with forms, but I’m not up on Plato’s theory enough to grant them as real, in the same sense of real as, say, logical or transcendental objects. I don’t think a particular form as such is susceptible to definition, and I don’t see how forms themselves are conditioned by time. But I concede to being stuck in an Enlightenment rut, so……

Invented or discovered….hmmmm, that’s a tough one right there, even though I’d allow those listed, among others of like kind, to be real, insofar as they are certainly both susceptible to definition and conditioned by time. To be discovered is to be presupposed….can’t discover what wasn’t there…..so maybe the invention just is the conception that spontaneously belongs to that which is presupposed.

Dunno. Mind bender, to be sure.

What makes that form of realism Platonic? — Mww

Platonism about mathematics (or mathematical platonism) is the metaphysical view that there are abstract mathematical objects whose existence is independent of us and our language, thought, and practices. Just as electrons and planets exist independently of us, so do numbers and sets. And just as statements about electrons and planets are made true or false by the objects with which they are concerned and these objects’ perfectly objective properties, so are statements about numbers and sets. Mathematical truths are therefore discovered, not invented. ....

Mathematical platonism has considerable philosophical significance. If the view is true, it will put great pressure on the physicalist idea that reality is exhausted by the physical. For platonism entails that reality extends far beyond the physical world and includes objects which aren’t part of the causal and spatiotemporal order studied by the physical sciences. Mathematical platonism, if true, will also put great pressure on many naturalistic theories of knowledge. For there is little doubt that we possess mathematical knowledge. The truth of mathematical platonism would therefore establish that we have knowledge of abstract (and thus causally inefficacious) objects. This would be an important discovery, which many naturalistic theories of knowledge would struggle to accommodate. — SEP

In his seminal 1973 paper, “Mathematical Truth,” Paul Benacerraf presented a problem facing all accounts of mathematical truth and knowledge. Standard readings of mathematical claims entail the existence of mathematical objects. But, our best epistemic theories seem to deny that knowledge of mathematical objects is possible. Thus, the philosopher of mathematics faces a dilemma: either abandon standard readings of mathematical claims or give up our best epistemic theories. Neither option is attractive. ....

Mathematical objects are in many ways unlike ordinary physical objects such as trees and cars. We learn about ordinary objects, at least in part, by using our senses. It is not obvious that we learn about mathematical objects this way. Indeed, it is difficult to see how we could use our senses to learn about mathematical objects. We do not see integers, or hold sets. Even geometric figures are not the kinds of things that we can sense. ...

[Rationalists] claim that we have a special, non-sensory capacity for understanding mathematical truths, a rational insight arising from pure thought. But the rationalist’s claims appear incompatible with an understanding of human beings as physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies. — IEP, Indispensability Argument in Phil. of Math

Some scholars feel very strongly that mathematical truths are “out there,” waiting to be discovered—a position known as Platonism. It takes its name from the ancient Greek thinker Plato, who imagined that mathematical truths inhabit a world of their own—not a physical world, but rather a non-physical realm of unchanging perfection; a realm that exists outside of space and time. Roger Penrose, the renowned British mathematical physicist, is a staunch Platonist. In The Emperor’s New Mind, he wrote that there appears “to be some profound reality about these mathematical concepts, going quite beyond the mental deliberations of any particular mathematician. It is as though human thought is, instead, being guided towards some external truth—a truth which has a reality of its own...” ....

Other scholars—especially those working in other branches of science—view Platonism with skepticism. Scientists tend to be empiricists; they imagine the universe to be made up of things we can touch and taste and so on; things we can learn about through observation and experiment. The idea of something existing “outside of space and time” makes empiricists nervous: It sounds embarrassingly like the way religious believers talk about God, and God was banished from respectable scientific discourse a long time ago.

Platonism, as mathematician Brian Davies has put it, “has more in common with mystical religions than it does with modern science.” The fear is that if mathematicians give Plato an inch, he’ll take a mile. If the truth of mathematical statements can be confirmed just by thinking about them, then why not ethical problems, or even religious questions? Why bother with empiricism at all? — What is Math

Can you see the issue lurking behind these controversies? It is that naturalism/empiricism - 'our best epistemic theories' - don't seem to provide for the kind of innate capacity that mathematical knowledge seems to imply. And this is the tip of a very large iceberg - which is, tacitly, that mathematics and reason are incompatible with naturalist epistemology.

That description does not match the language in the dialogue. Socrates directly refutes Cornford's statement, "The dialogue is concerned only with the lower kinds of cognition", when he corrects Theaetetus' idea that knowledge is perception: — Paine

I agree that Cornford's statement is inaccurate.

At 187a, Theaetetus takes a second shot and says opinion is knowledge. After Socrates shows that as inadequate, Theaetetus says: — Paine

Let me put this in context. Theaetetus claimed that knowledge is perception, and they had discussed the principle of Protagoras, "man is the measure of all things". This lead them to a discussion of the difference between the opinions of Heraclitus and the like, that everything is in motion, and Parmenides with his group, saying all is One, and at rest. This led to a bit of a digression which threatened to derail the whole discussion by dragging it into a bigger problem, so Socrates moved to get back to questioning whether knowledge is perception.

He successfully separated knowledge from perception by associating perception with sensing. Then he discussed how something other than a sense must distinguish colour from sound, and also make judgements about likeness, difference, equality, numbers, also what is and what is not. So Theaetetus agreed that knowledge is something different from perception. Determining what knowledge is not, is said to be at least some progress toward determining what it is (187a)

Next, they turn to "judgement", and there is an issue because judgement might be true or false. True judgement is said to be knowledge. But there is a problem with false judgement, it appears to be impossible because it would involve not knowing what we know (188-190). Then Socrates offers the analogy of a block of wax. Knowledge is imprinted in the wax, and this is related to perceptions in judgements (191-196). Again, it is concluded that false judgement is impossible.

Then it is revealed that the problem with these arguments is that they use "know", and the usage of that term assumes something about knowing which ought not be assumed. So he proceeds to analyze what "having", or "possessing" knowledge means. He presents the analogy of an aviary where a man hunts and collects birds. The soul is like an aviary full of collected birds (pieces of knowledge). There are two types of hunting here, one whereby the man hunts birds (knowledge) in the wild, to bring into the aviary, and the other where the man hunts birds (knowledge already within the aviary. False judgement would be a matter of grabbing the wrong bird from within. But again, this cannot be right because it would mean that the man has no way of distinguishing the correct piece of knowledge which he has already learned. And if we say that some of the birds are pieces of knowledge, and some are pieces of ignorance, then how is it possible that a man with knowledge cannot distinguish knowledge from ignorance? So the issue is not resolved

At 201 it is proposed that knowledge is true judgement with an account. But this proposal ends up circling back on itself because "an account" really adds nothing to "true judgement". Then we still have the same issue with "true judgement", which was already discussed.

The addition of an account does not repair the problem that true opinion is different than knowledge. Socrates statement here does stow, however, that true opinion can come from knowledge and good judgement. That is a far cry from not being able to rule out the "possibility of falsity." — Paine

I suggest you reread the arguments where "false judgement" is shown to be impossible. The problem revealed is that their use of "know" assumes that what is known is true. And this is what supports the arguments against false judgement. It results in the problem of not knowing what is known. So it is this criteria, that 'what is known is true' (knowledge is true judgement), which allows these arguments and leads to this problem.

Therefore it is an inverted type of argument. The argument demonstrates that false judgement is impossible. Simply put, it does this premising that knowledge cannot consist of falsity, and, that every judgement is based in knowledge. Therefore false judgement is impossible. The inversion comes about because we must reject the conclusion as inconsistent with the evidence. False judgement is possible. And so, as Socrates indicates, we have assumed something wrong about knowledge in the first place, and proceeded with an inaccurate presupposition. This must be the idea that knowledge cannot consist of falsity. it is true judgement or opinion..

In other words, insisting that knowledge must consist of truth (i.e. ruling out the possibility of falsity within knowledge), is what makes it impossible for Socrates and Theaetetus to come up with an acceptable definition of "knowledge".

Can you see the issue lurking behind these controversies? — Wayfarer

I recognize a few from my own opinion, as in…..

….abstract objects independent of human thought, is a contradiction;
….mathematical objects exist, that is, are found in the world, iff a suitable intelligence puts them there;
….mathematical relations are “out there”, that is, empirical cause/effect relations describable only by numbers; truths, mathematical or otherwise, belong to that self-same suitable intelligence;
….truths are not confirmed by thinking about them; truths are determined by it, and the thinking is subsequently confirmed by empirical practices;
….“our best epistemic theories seem to deny that knowledge of mathematical objects is possible”, yet we have mathematical knowledge, which indicates the theory denying such objects, is hardly our best theory.

Very big iceberg indeed. Not so much the need to drop empiricism, but that much more needs be ceded to the thinking subject that is currently kept from him. Nothing whatsoever has any meaning without relation to a particular intelligence capable of being affected by it.

We love our empiricism for the simple reason that it is irrational to object to the lawful conditions which ground it. We love empiricism too much, insofar as the very idea of irrationality and even lawful conditions, are not themselves empirical determinations, which justifies the notion that empirical thought is not as great and grand as is pretended for it.