Glen, your question is not readily intelligible in the form of words you have used. By "consciousness", do you mean the world of sense-perception, which appears to be something external to (and independent of) ourselves? Or are you referring to mental processes?

They are not the only two options. Some panpsychists (like myself) might say that consciousness is a basic property of matter, like charge, spin or mass. That way it's inside your brain without being a function.

like I think consciousness is fundamental.

If consciousness is the ability to gather and store information and use this as a "self - contained" system of reference for further perception (intake, collection and processing and storage to memory) then it is not limited to brains.

In theory anything that can store memory (any object that can hold information) and can be rearranged and processed has the ability to think and perceive itself as well as other additional information outside its gathered system.

So the low complexity, macroscopic, spread out scattering of matter in the universe could potentially be primordial memories as consciousness evolved out of the big bang and condensed further by evolution (self organisation) of all systems in a hierarchy from "seemingly inanimate" to what we interpret as "animate" - human consciousness (who's quality is inherently biased as its the only type weve really considered rigorously).

So yes this wouldnt cause a mind-body problem as all bodies (physical objects) would have some form of rudimentary mind (the construction/aggregation, storage, modulation, fission/fusion and deconstruction/scattering of information/energy) during time.

There is a claimed mind-body problem, it doesn't mean this claim is true. There are many problems in our understanding of the world and our minds, but a mind-body problem need not be one of them, unless someone likes to discuss terminology instead of ideas.

What we have most confidence in, out of anything there is, is our own experience. This experience, when looking at the best available evidence we have, should conclude that experience arises out of people, realized in brains.

Brains are made of matter, suitably organized. So, experience a product of matter (or physical stuff if you prefer), as is gravity and everything else. That's extremely astonishing - so much so in fact, that to add some other substance or property, does nothing but complicate our understanding, unnecessarily so.

I'm still struggling with the issues involved with consciousness. — GLEN willows

I what way are you "struggling" and why? What is your adversary?

The most pressing for me is how - if consciousness isn't entirely a function of the brain, and is somehow outside the brain - that wouldn't invoke the mind-body problem? — GLEN willows

I believe, yes. that would invoke the mind-body duality. But if you feel you have to struggle with that, it means that you either don't grasp it or you don't accept it. It doesn't make sense to you. It is not real for you. And if, as you say it poses a "problem" for you, well, it is this maybe the adversary you are struggling with. For one reason or the other you resist to it.

I don't think that this can be resolved by just getting involved with concepts and general thinking. An extroverted attitude is needed towards this subject. Posing practical questions help. E.g. "Who is conscious right now, me or my brain?", "Who has thought about and composed this topic, me or my brain?", "If I have a brain can I also be a brain?", "Can a stimulus-response mechanism, such a a brain, observe, be conscious, think, rationalize, solve problems in life, imagine, be creative, play music?" And so on

Brains are made of matter, suitably organized. So, experience a product of matter (or physical stuff if you prefer), as is gravity and everything else. — Manuel

The 'so' suggests an inference, but I can't see a valid one without adding something in. Is it that experience is a product of the brain?

When I contemplate the theories and experiments of embedded and embodied cognition they seem not so much as to invoke the mind-body problem as to blur the boundaries between the concepts and defuse the question.

I'm still struggling with the issues involved with consciousness. The most pressing for me is how - if consciousness isn't entirely a function of the brain, and is somehow outside the brain - that wouldn't invoke the mind-body problem? — GLEN willows

If it helps Glen consider this: take two humans. To human one: their experience of human 2 is part of their experience (the "out there") and vice versa for human 2.

If human one takes the assumption that everyone outside them is "objective reality" this includes human 2 (their behaviour, actions, articulations of beliefs etc).

But as ethics implores, its more prudent to assume the other person has an "I" too - a subjective experience (set of memories, beliefs, emotions and feelings) whether demonstrated or kept private.

How then can human 1 objectify/standardise their environment (which includes other humans and the content of their minds) without accepting the contradictory nature or differing belief systems of human 2 as being "real" (standardised/objectified) to them in their own right.

If they were to do this they would have to believe the other person is incorrect in their subjective experience and doesn't feel "hurt" they just simply aren't listening to our personal logic (objectification/standardisation and thus rationalisation) of our own external environment.

A "philosophical zombie" so it were, with any objections against us being invalid in light of our own superior objective/standardised understanding of the world/what is real.

So in conclusion 1). what is spoken/articulated (language/meaning) does not equal 2). the content of one's mind (consciousness/what is meant) does not equal 3). what is actual (the truth of reality).

This is a sort of "sacred trinity/triad" that permits contradictions between person 1, person 2 and what they observe 3 (the universe/reality as it truly is).

It allows for mutliple personal individual experiences and identities (partial truths) , communication (articulation and interpretation) between those partial truths (navigation/analysis and acceptance and rejection of partial truths - in other words agreement or argument with one another, and what is actual (the whole truth - actual reality), to exist simultaneously as three separate interrelated dynamics.

Yes, I missed putting in that word. But to be more precise, experience is a product of a person, realized in a brain.

that’s the whole issue, isn’t it? Is consciousness an outside process or a mental process that is part of the brain

I understand panpsychism. So do you believe that when you die, you’re consciousness, as in your perceptions abd experiences, will carry on?

interesting. So you don’t feel there’s a question of how thoughts and persecution’s can cause material substances to move?

yes these are all aspects of it. I’m interested in your feelings on the topic.

so you believe we create reality. Do you believe there is any material world, outside of our perceptions? I guess my question is aimed at people here who believe there is matter that is separate from our senses.

interesting. So you don’t feel there’s a question of how thoughts and persecution’s can cause material substances to move? — GLEN willows

I think the fact is that is happening, is a basic feature of the mind-matter system, so isn't really mysterious.

I just want to clarify that everyone here is familiar with Elizabeth of Bohemia and the subsequent argument by many philosophers (ex. Hume) who saw the problem with dualism?

I want to make sure the mind-body problem is understood properly, even if this thread ultimately convinces me it's not a problem. I get a sense that at least a few of the responses here didn't understand the long-standing philosophical argument, and if so, how they would answer/dismiss it.

If it's been dismissed in modern philosophy, I can tell you it's still being taught at the university level, for what it's worth.

If you believe there are no material substances, or you're a panpsychist, there is no problem. But surely not everyone here is an idealist, panpsychist or anti-materialist?

But as ethics implores, its more prudent to assume the other person has an "I" too — Benj96

Thanks for the reply. I'm not sure what ethics has to do with the belief in other minds, but I'm talking about something you can wonder about within yourself. Simply put - I have a thought. I have a body. How do they interact? How does my conscious decision to "stand up" turn into actual physical movements?

I think the fact is that is happening, is a basic feature of the mind-matter system, so isn't really mysterious. — Pantagruel

The issue isn't whether it's mysterious or not, I'm asking how it works. Just because something "is happening" should we not look for the mechanism(s) involved?

— GLEN willows

Embedded cognition is systems theoretic in nature. Many people view systems theory as offering a new paradigm of reality in which some traditional problems - such as the mind-body - are not so problematic. Laszlo calls his version bi-perspectivism. It definitely can be viewed as a variety of pan-psychism, although one solidly rooted in empirical science.

Fantastic. This gives me an area to read up on. Thanks. So systems theory would suggest matter and non-matter are all part of the same system....put very simply?

Well, more specifically, reality can be viewed as consisting of complex-adaptive systems across any theoretical domain, and these share properties ilke autopoeisis, homeostasis, and are amenable to analysis using non-linear methods. So mind and matter are not viewed as severed but as operational components of systems in which they mutually operate. Ervin Laszlo's Introduction to Systems Philosophy is a great read.

edit: you can borrow it here if you create an account https://archive.org/details/introductiontosy0000lasz

Ervin Laszlo's introduction to systems theory is a great read.

Perfect. I have read somethings on systems theory. I'll read then Laszlo and cross-reference Laszlo/dualism on good, or laszlo/mind-body problem.

On first blush, my question is this "regardless of what systems are at work, the parts of the system must be able to interact, no? I'm sticking with my OP because I find these discussions can go off-road and become very abstract.

So. The brain itself is a system of neurons that connect with dendrites, and are triggered by things like the optic nerve registering input. How does he integrate non-material consciousness with neurons and the synaptic system that then creates thoughts. This is obviously the common sense scientific view...I'm open to others.

I'd suggest reviewing Laszlo, focusing on bisperpectivism. You need a good overview of systems theory to move beyond the highlights I offered. See if the problem presents itself differently.

Thanks. Just for the sake of this specific thread, are there any specific references to my original issue - dualism - that you could point to?

Here's a link to a TPF debate (and another link therein to a discussion of that debate) concerning the relative strengths and weaknesses of "substance dualism" (i.e. mind-body duality) and "property dualism" (i.e. dissolution of the mind-body problem).

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11335/substance-dualism-versus-property-dualism-debate/p1

More links are embedded along the way to other resources IIRC.

NB: An aside on "panpsychism" that might interest you (noy just my post but the thread as well).
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/584575

that’s seems to be the panpsychist view

thanks…but is the materialist view fairly represented. I’ve seen materialists get pretty quickly dismissed on this forum.

Yeah. Often dismissed, never refuted. How would a p0m0ist / antirealist / idealist or platonist (or New Ager) even begin to address philosophical / methodological materialism (rather than play paddy cake with a caricature or parody)?

nope - you’ll have to say that again, pretend I’m a 12 yr old.

There are folks who claim that a 'materialist paradigm' does not rationally account for everything – they are correct – so they dismiss and replace it with an 'immaterialist paradigm' focused on what the 'materialist paradigm' leaves out. The problem folk like me have with their 'immaterialist paradigm' is that it does not rationally account for anythng including what's left out of the 'materialist paradigm' – they just fiat 'immaterial stuff' (e.g. spirit, mind, ideas, energy, information, etc) and tell just-so stories about 'material stuff' (e.g. bodies, things, events, facts, atoms-in-void, entropy, etc) really being illusions, mirages or hallucinations (e.g. maya). Yeah yeah, but how do they know that? :roll: Well anyway, some folks prefer a paradigm which rationally accounts for something rather than a paradigm which rationally accounts for nothing, and those folks are often disparaged as (dogmatic / dirty) "materialists" by the usual suspects: TPF's own Quantum-Woo Crew. :eyes: :sparkle: