Are you going to say you can converse with a sponge? — Wayfarer
I don't see why it would be – moral intuitions about killing don't center on the suffering of the killed, for obvious reasons. Also, there would only be a sense in which a p-zombie doesn't suffer. — The Great Whatever
Okay, so how about hurting them?
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If that's what you mean - that someone can suffer without pain qualia - then I'd like to know what you mean by "suffering," because I would identify it with having certain experiences, and I assume that having an experience just is having a particular set of qualia. — Pneumenon
If by "hurt" you mean "injure," then no. If by "hurt" you mean "cause pain to," then yes, for that kind of pain at least. — Pneumenon
"It is not wrong to perform an act on a p-zombie that would harm a non-zombie by means of causing them to have painful qualia that equate to suffering." How's that? — Pneumenon
Philosophical zombies are living things that lack consciousness. — Michael
So it's not possible to hurt someone with congenital insensitivity to pain? Surely that they suffer physical injury is relevant, even if there's no pain? — Michael
As are sponges. The difference is, you're supposed to be able to converse with them. That is not a straw man argument, to say so simply shows you're not representing the concept properly. — Wayfarer
If they were a zombie, it wouldn't matter if they were injured or cut into small pieces and fed into the waste disposal, because they're not persons.
I am attacking your claim that p-zombies are dead because they're not conscious. — Michael
On what grounds do you justify the claim that it is only wrong to injure something if it is a conscious human (which I assume is what you mean by "person")? — Michael
And what about animals? Are they persons? — Michael
They're not conscious. That is the definition of 'zombie'. They appear to be conscious, but they're zombies. They act like 'conscious beings' but they're not. Again, that is why they're called 'zombies', a.k.a. 'the living dead'. — Wayfarer
They're also subjects of experience, but not persons.
Maybe our difficulty in discussing the 'hard problem' is physiological. Maybe a number of philosophers are p-zombies. — The Great Whatever
The point about zombies is, they're dead. — Wayfarer
As we get better at sussing out phenomenological differences, more of them may become part of common knowledge. What is so absurd that we might find out that there's a large divide between people, some of whom can experience and some of whom can't? — The Great Whatever
I would expect that two people with very different experiential states could behave overtly the same. — Hanover
This is really an over-read of what is occurring. Aphantasiacs most certainly can experience things. — Hanover
I wouldn't expect them to behave the same, and in practice, no computer can make it past a few minutes under a Turing Test. If you're asking hypothetically whether they could behave the same, which is to ask whether there could be a computer that so mimicked human overt behavior that it was indistinguishable from a human with internal experience, I don't see why not. That is just to posit a p-zombie.Would you expect someone with no experiential states to behave overtly the same as those that have them? — Michael
Since I answered in the affirmative, this question is inapplicable. However, hypothetically, had I answered as you'd have assumed I would, my response would be to agree with you. If certain overt behaviors are necessarily linked to certain internal states, then obviously they are dependent upon one another.If not, is that because experiential states are the only things that can cause such behaviour or because experiential states necessarily emerge from the only things that can cause such behaviour (e.g. particular brain activity)? — Michael
But that seems such a straw man. Why would anyone suggest that overt behavioral differences are critical when assessing the significance of internal states? It would suggest that a quadriplegic with no muscle control whatsoever, but who has fully intact mental function is no different than a dead man. That I cannot act on my thoughts does not makes my thoughts not matter.Of course, this question only really matters if your claim that "there's a world of difference between having limited internal experience and entirely lacking the ability to experience" refers to a world of behavioural differences. — Michael
This is really an over-read of what is occurring. Aphantasiacs most certainly can experience things. — Hanover
Well, I never said they couldn't, so I'm not sure of the relevance. — The Great Whatever
What is so absurd that we might find out that there's a large divide between people, some of whom can experience and some of whom can't? — The Great Whatever
Now, if there are partial p-zombies demonstrably, why is it so odd that there might be actual p-zombies? Maybe the philosophers who claim not to have, or understand qualia, literally don't have them. And the conversational 'trigger' that made them realize this was someone talking about the 'hard problem.' — The Great Whatever
If all you're saying is that there are great variations in phenomenological experience, I do think that's an interesting scientific fact, but I don't know how it matters to this philosophical question any more than the well accepted fact that there are great variations in how well different people's perceptions work as well as their intellect in deciphering the meaning of their experiences. — Hanover
It would mean it is epiphenomenal, as the p-zombies like Dennett seem to operate just as well as those who firmly believe we have qualia. — darthbarracuda
These differences may be at the heart of the misunderstandings surrounding the existence of, or how to interpret, certain sorts of intuitive evidence. — The Great Whatever
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