Philosophers talk about whether p-zombies are metaphysically possible, but what a priori grounds do we have for ruling out the possibility that they're actual? — The Great Whatever
Chalmers (The Conscious Mind, Oxford Unversity Press, Oxford 1996) has argued for a form of property dualism on the basis of the concept of a zombie (which is physically identical to normals), and the concept of the inverted spectrum. He asserts that these concepts show that the facts about consciousness, such as experience or qualia, are really further facts about our world, over and above the physical facts. — 'Human Zombies are Metaphysically Impossible' – William Robert Webster
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