Yes. I think Berkeley was wrong about this. He was either misdescribing his own powers of imagination to make a rhetorical point, or, like Grandon, lacked a power of generalization that I seem to have. I don't find that I need to imagine some particular concrete triangle – the qualities I imagine can be more or less fuzzy – a triangle 'neither equilateral, nor isosceles, 'nor scalenon' seems possible to picture, not as some sharp visual image (which no visual images are anyway), but as a kind of blurry pre-visual mass.

"Scientific studies have suggested that regions involved in speech and language are smaller, while regions involved with numerical and spatial processing are larger." - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein%27s_brain

Not according to what I've read about him, or his brain. Why disagree?

That feels a lot like a zebra with some stripes. I don't know. I think you either visualize a triangle, or you visualize a hazy triangle that would have some exact angles if you dispersed the haze. I think his point stands, for sure.

I don't think you can have the zebra with exact stripes and the triangle with hazy angles.

Like what are you visualizing when you visualize the abstract triangle with no particular angles....If you're actually visualizing, that shit has actual angles. Otherwise, you have a vague image with a concept nestled up alongside. I don't see a way out of this. Unless you're claiming you can visualize a triangle that geometry doesn't apply to?

On board with this description. But I think this imaginative capacity is something very different than visualization. In that sense, Berkeley would've been right. But the proper response wouldn't be to confirm or deny the possibility of visualizing an abstract triangle, but to say that dealing with abstract triangles involves a capacity different than 'visualization'. As in: you can't apply the sense-impression model here.

I'd say that's exactly what he's doing. The vision is of the abstracted idea of triangle. It has no geometry in a visual sense.

The idea of triangle is used to substitute for any visual image, for it is known a priori to signify a visual/pattern of a three cornered shape of three sides. It's this abstraction which is visualised-- not the visual, but a meaning of commonly expressed by many different visuals.

Not according to what I've read about him, or his brain. Why disagree? — Wosret

OK, granted there is the suggestion his Broca area was "funny" in a way that would explain a developmental delay in expressive speech, But what I mean - and why I disagree - is that Einstein was pretty articulate as an adult. And it would be just as plausible that part of being very smart when young is that it can inhibit attempts to speak because the ideas are bigger than the capacity to put them into words.

So see for example this summary of his alleged language difficulties, which both still allows for some possible neuro-structural reason for delayed expressiveness, and yet gives evidence for top-of-the-class level performance - http://www.albert-einstein.org/article_handicap.html

Yeah, a vague image. In the same way I don't need to decide on how many stripes the zebra has, I don't need to decide exactly on the triangle's shape.

I've been reading a lot of fiction lately, and I've noticed I can have a visual presence in the story while barely deciding on any visual details, if I don't want to imagine anything – so just the visual outlines of the scene appear to me. The characters might not even have any specific eye, hair, or skin color, or height.

I think that it's simpler, and less fellating, based on both the knowledge that he wasn't super quick to pick up language, and his language brain regions are smaller than average, while his spacial and mathematical ones are bigger than averages suggests that he leaned more into these faculties because of a deficit in his speech faculties. I doubt that he was just too brilliant to figure out "dog" and "cat" because he needed his first words to be about complex physics or something...

But the proper response wouldn't be to confirm or deny the possibility of visualizing an abstract triangle, but to say that dealing with abstract triangles involves a capacity different than 'visualization'. — csalisbury

More to the point, why suppose that the existence or ability of something depends on it's ability to be visualized? I can't visualize a tree falling in the woods with nobody around, but I can conceive of it. I'm sure Hellen Keller was able to conceive of things without utilizing visual or auditory signs.

I bow to your expertise. God knows why I ever had my own neuroscience column in a major journal.

That is wise. Not to make you question the legitimacy of your whole life, but I can have that effect.

I was just using it as an example in the literature of philosophers assuming a certain capacity for visualization on the part of their readers.

But the proper response wouldn't be to confirm or deny the possibility of visualizing an abstract triangle, but to say that dealing with abstract triangles involves a capacity different than 'visualization'. As in: you can't apply the sense-impression model here. — csalisbury

As usual, the conventional thing is to try to deal with a dichotomy by reducing it to one or the other of two options. So in labelling the mind, either we are dealing with one common faculty or two very different ones.

Yet my point is that a dichotomy - a symmetry breaking that leads to hierarchical organisation - is in fact the proper natural option. The brain is organised by this logic. And so that is what our language would most fruitfully capture. Rather than fighting the usual lumper vs splitter battles, we should be amazed if any "mental faculty" wasn't divided in this mutually complementary fashion. That is the only way anything could exist in the first place. The idea of one hand clapping makes no sense.

So yes, I have to use conventional language to communicate here. I have to talk about abstract vs concrete, or conceptual vs perceptual - the terms of art of philosophy. But I don't actually think about brain architecture in the literally divided fashion this implies. I would prefer systems jargon like talk of global constraints and local freedoms. But I know also where using that outsider jargon gets me. :)

Anyway, the whole sense-impression deal gets you into a computational/representational model of mind that my ecological and anticipatory modelling approach rejects. Which makes my understanding of conception very different too. And it is a fact both phenomenological and theoretical to me that abstraction in thought involves the relaxation of constraints.

So a proper mathematical conception of triangleness does shed specific details and yet still leaves behind a "Cheshire Cat's grin" as its "true gist" that I can then manipulate in ways that - under a brain scanner - will show up as concrete activity in expected places. Or in fact - as it ceases to be an effort with practice - the activation involved shrinks in a fashion that it seems those parts of the brain aren't even doing anything much.

Think of expert chess players who can see all the dangers and opportunities with a glance at the board. They don't have to work stepwise through a succession of future moves - like a computer. The general patterns are immediately obvious. They can focus in on some narrower gameplay and visualise that in the level of detail required.

And all mental activity is like that. A rough gist is good enough to get started - throw down the preliminary detail-light sketch. Then flesh that out with detail as required. Add in the information that is further constraint on various uncertainties. Its standard engineering - hierarchical decomposition from broad intention to exact model.

If we start to build computers that think the same way, then we might need to get worried.

Um yeah. I think I will file that under "more fellating".

Lol, yeah, I knew it was more fellating, and you weren't actually questioning the legitimacy of your life. Yourself that time.

If we start to build computers that think the same way, then we might need to get worried.

. They wouldn't be conscious though(I'm not saying this is any less worrying).

You give a nice summary of thought processes, I would agree and indeed follow an equivalent process to the chess player in creating my art work. However I would add another two perspectives, (which are essentially covered in your account, but not specified).

Firstly, like how you describe a thorough thought processing going on unconsciously with its results emerging in the conscious thinking process fully formed, effortlessly. I would suggest that this entire unconscious processing system can through training be brought into conscious thinking activity, where required, or as an alternative to the purely unconscious or effortless means. This is something I do for various reasons, including being able to observe and manipulate the process.

Secondly, there may be transcendent intuitive processes going on which are subtle(from the neuropathology perspective) and which may play an important role in anchoring a being within the experiential context of the body. I realise this probably seeks to go beyond current scientific thinking, but can be considered philosophically.

I always thought that "photographic memory" didn't literally imply visual memory, but really accurate memory

I would think that true photographic memory is possible. Not in the sense that there is a person who is recording accurate photographic knowledge many times each second, as a movie camera does, in photographic frames. But rather that there are certain images that are in some sense photographically recorded. Perhaps to record critical experiences, in a moment of crisis, or ecstasy.

There is evidence of exact replication of experience in the bower bird, who can hear a unique sound once and then endlessly mimic the sound precisely like a digital recording.

Like what are you visualizing when you visualize the abstract triangle with no particular angles....If you're actually visualizing, that shit has actual angles. Otherwise, you have a vague image with a concept nestled up alongside. I don't see a way out of this. Unless you're claiming you can visualize a triangle that geometry doesn't apply to?

I agree, when one visualises a triangle, there is a specific dimensional image in the minds eye and there can't be am image, a visual image, that is not a specific imagined dimensional object. In aphantasia, presumably this is absent and an alternative imaginative process fills the gap.

I'm sure Hellen Keller was able to conceive of things without utilizing visual or auditory signs. — Marchesk

In her case, it would have helped that she was hearing and sighted until she was two. And before she was taught a finger-spelling system by Annie Sullivan, she was using her own made-up system of signs, like a shiver for ice-cream and miming putting on glasses for her father. So there was a neural basis established for both language and those conceptual modalities.

That's redefining consciousness to be behavior. It's not at all what most people mean by consciousness. Nor is it traditionally what is meant in philosophy.

...

This is again redefining consciousness to mean brain activity. It is not the same meaning, not remotely.

It's an easy way to try and win a debate, though. Just change the meaning of the term under question and claim there's no hard problem. But it's bad philosophy. — Marchesk

That's not how it works. If you were to go back to some relevant period in history and tell the people there that stars were luminous spheres of plasma held together by their own gravity, would it be right for them to reject your claim on the grounds that that's not what they mean by "star" and that you're just redefining the word? Of course not. The word "star" refers to some real thing in the world that we just might believe to be something other than what it is (e.g. a hole in the sky, or whatever it was they believed). And in this case, the word "consciousness" refers to some real thing in the world that we just might believe to be something other than what it is.

In this case, the behaviourist or physicalist is saying that the real thing that we refer to by the word "consciousness" is behaviour or brain states, and that if we believe it to be something else then we're mistaken. You can argue that consciousness isn't these things, but you can't argue that their position relies on a redefinition of "consciousness".

So there was a neural basis established for both language and those conceptual modalities. — apokrisis

But why should language require visual or auditory signs? Humans utilize those two senses heavily, but that doesn't mean they're necessary for language.

In this case, the behaviourist or physicalist is saying that the real thing that we refer to by the word "consciousness" is behaviour or brain states, and that if we believe it to be something else then we're mistaken. You can argue that consciousness isn't these things, but you can't argue that their position relies on a redefinition of "consciousness". — Michael

It is a redefinition of consciousnes because consciousness means subjectivity, and those two things are objective.

So what the behaviorist and physicalist are arguing is that consciousness doesn't exist. But they want to keep using the word, and here the problem is that English allows more than one meaning for conscious, which would be awake versus asleep for the behaviorist.

Notice how Dennnett wants to quine qualia, but still wants to use consciousness to mean functional states. If you quine the subjective away, then human beings are p-zombies, and Dennett has said as much.

A p-zombie by definition is lacking consciousness in the subjective meaning of the word, which is what the behaviorist/physicalist is arguing when they say that consciousness is behavior or brain activity, full stop.

That's not how it works. If you were to go back to some relevant period in history and tell the people there that stars were luminous spheres of plasma held together by their own gravity, would it be right for them to reject your claim on the grounds that that's not what they mean by "star" and that you're just redefining the word? Of course not. The word "star" refers to some real thing in the world that we just might believe to be something other than what it is (e.g. a hole in the sky, or whatever it was they believed). And in this case, the word "consciousness" refers to some real thing in the world that we just might believe to be something other than what it is. — Michael

I know where you got that from. It's from the eliminative materialism, where beliefs and desires are eliminated from an explanation of in favor or neurological explanations for behavior. But if the discussion is over intentionality in philosophy of mind, then eliminating intentional states means you are redefining what mind is.

We seem at cross purposes. I wasn't talking about the ability to imagine the sounds, sights or feelings of language as such. But sure, braille is another possibility. You could have a feeling of bumps under your fingertips as the equivalent of an inner voice.

We seem at cross purposes. I wasn't talking about the ability to imagine the sounds, sights or feelings of language as such. But sure, braille is another possibility. You could have a feeling of bumps under your fingertips as the equivalent of an inner voice. — apokrisis

I read an interesting short science fiction story set in the future where humans travelling in deep space come across a five million year old escape pod of an alien race thought to be extinct. The pod held an alien in cryostasis. The humans revived it. It was a crab like creature that had no eyes or ears. It primarily detected the world through smell or taste, but it's race was much more advanced.

It ended up using pieces of the pod to synthesize materials and plants, then sampled one of the humans for DNA to grow a human hybrid child that had a vastly larger number of neurons throughout it's body (similar to the alien crab). The child then learned human language, history, technological capabilities and politics from the ship's AI at high speed in a short period of time. After that, it interface with the alien and then communicated its desires back to the humans through the hybrid child.

The humans realized at first they were going to have troubles communicating with the alien because it had no sight or vision, and was crab-like, but luckily the alien was smarter than them.

It is a redefinition of consciousnes because consciousness means subjectivity, and those two things are objective.

So what the behaviorist and physicalist are arguing is that consciousness doesn't exist. — Marchesk

No they're not (always). They're saying that the real thing that we refer to by the term "consciousness" is just behaviour/brain states and not some non-physical thing. Just as the real thing that we refer to by the term "star" is a ball of plasma and not some hole in the sky.

"Consciousness" isn't one of those words that we create a meaning for and then either correctly or incorrectly use to refer to real things in the world (e.g. "atom", which originally meant "indivisible" but which we then incorrectly applied to particles which are in fact divisible). It's one of those words that we use to refer to real things in the world which we then either correctly or incorrectly make sense of (e.g. "star").

But I still think even the idea that there are people without qualia, who differ in some minimal functional way from those who do, is still one people rule out a priori. — The Great Whatever

Without some qualia, you mean. But then, our mental functioning differs in many ways as it is, so perhaps we should just talk about individual variability of qualia.

We have the reverse situation with synesthesia: there is a small minority of people, with respect to whom the rest are "partial p-zombies" in that they lack the qualia of associating colors to sounds. This ought to be a pretty overt trait though: after all, it is easy to describe and one can see how it might come up in a conversation. , when did you first realize that you did not visualize like most others did?

I don't see sounds in a automatic way the way synesthetic people do, although I mentally associate colors to some musical notes. D, my favorite, is blue. But this might also be a verbal association: having a perfect pitch, I am used to "hearing" the names of the notes whenever I hear them played.

Isn't that the same thing as redefining consciousness? Or are behaviorists merely claiming that certain behaviors are indication of consciousness? That you can't have a conscious organism without some resulting behavior, thus p-zombies are impossible? That it would make no sense for a p-zombie philosopher to be discussing qualia. — Marchesk

I am no expert, but AFAIK behaviorists see behavior (understood more or less generally - possibly even including neuronal events) as the explanatory terminus for psychology. Mental concepts, if they have any validity at all, should be reducible to behavioral concepts.

No they're not (always). They're saying that the real thing that we refer to by the term "consciousness" is just behaviour/brain states and not some non-physical thing. Just as the real thing that we refer to by the term "star" is a ball of plasma and not some hole in the sky. — Michael

So when we talk about inner, private, subjective states, we're really just talking about behavior or brain states, according to behaviorists or physicalists. Where behavior or brain states are objective.

That's exactly like saying that when we talk about belief/desire, we're really talking about brain states. But they're not the same concepts.

So then the question is what's the referent both sides are talking about? When Dennett argues that consciousness is functional states, and Chalmers argues that consciousness is qualia not reducible to physical, behavioral or functional states, how can they be referring to the same thing?

I understand the star analogy, but what would be the star in this case, since one side means qualia, and the other means behavior or brain activity? I'm not seeing a common referent. Rather, I see the same word "consciousness" being used differently.