Not according to what I've read about him, or his brain. Why disagree? — Wosret
But the proper response wouldn't be to confirm or deny the possibility of visualizing an abstract triangle, but to say that dealing with abstract triangles involves a capacity different than 'visualization'. — csalisbury
But the proper response wouldn't be to confirm or deny the possibility of visualizing an abstract triangle, but to say that dealing with abstract triangles involves a capacity different than 'visualization'. As in: you can't apply the sense-impression model here. — csalisbury
. They wouldn't be conscious though(I'm not saying this is any less worrying).If we start to build computers that think the same way, then we might need to get worried.
I would think that true photographic memory is possible. Not in the sense that there is a person who is recording accurate photographic knowledge many times each second, as a movie camera does, in photographic frames. But rather that there are certain images that are in some sense photographically recorded. Perhaps to record critical experiences, in a moment of crisis, or ecstasy.I always thought that "photographic memory" didn't literally imply visual memory, but really accurate memory
I agree, when one visualises a triangle, there is a specific dimensional image in the minds eye and there can't be am image, a visual image, that is not a specific imagined dimensional object. In aphantasia, presumably this is absent and an alternative imaginative process fills the gap.Like what are you visualizing when you visualize the abstract triangle with no particular angles....If you're actually visualizing, that shit has actual angles. Otherwise, you have a vague image with a concept nestled up alongside. I don't see a way out of this. Unless you're claiming you can visualize a triangle that geometry doesn't apply to?
I'm sure Hellen Keller was able to conceive of things without utilizing visual or auditory signs. — Marchesk
That's redefining consciousness to be behavior. It's not at all what most people mean by consciousness. Nor is it traditionally what is meant in philosophy.
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This is again redefining consciousness to mean brain activity. It is not the same meaning, not remotely.
It's an easy way to try and win a debate, though. Just change the meaning of the term under question and claim there's no hard problem. But it's bad philosophy. — Marchesk
In this case, the behaviourist or physicalist is saying that the real thing that we refer to by the word "consciousness" is behaviour or brain states, and that if we believe it to be something else then we're mistaken. You can argue that consciousness isn't these things, but you can't argue that their position relies on a redefinition of "consciousness". — Michael
That's not how it works. If you were to go back to some relevant period in history and tell the people there that stars were luminous spheres of plasma held together by their own gravity, would it be right for them to reject your claim on the grounds that that's not what they mean by "star" and that you're just redefining the word? Of course not. The word "star" refers to some real thing in the world that we just might believe to be something other than what it is (e.g. a hole in the sky, or whatever it was they believed). And in this case, the word "consciousness" refers to some real thing in the world that we just might believe to be something other than what it is. — Michael
We seem at cross purposes. I wasn't talking about the ability to imagine the sounds, sights or feelings of language as such. But sure, braille is another possibility. You could have a feeling of bumps under your fingertips as the equivalent of an inner voice. — apokrisis
It is a redefinition of consciousnes because consciousness means subjectivity, and those two things are objective.
So what the behaviorist and physicalist are arguing is that consciousness doesn't exist. — Marchesk
But I still think even the idea that there are people without qualia, who differ in some minimal functional way from those who do, is still one people rule out a priori. — The Great Whatever
Isn't that the same thing as redefining consciousness? Or are behaviorists merely claiming that certain behaviors are indication of consciousness? That you can't have a conscious organism without some resulting behavior, thus p-zombies are impossible? That it would make no sense for a p-zombie philosopher to be discussing qualia. — Marchesk
No they're not (always). They're saying that the real thing that we refer to by the term "consciousness" is just behaviour/brain states and not some non-physical thing. Just as the real thing that we refer to by the term "star" is a ball of plasma and not some hole in the sky. — Michael
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