Aphantasia and p-zombies

The Great Whatever

Here's an account by a man who, at 30 years old, realized that other people could visualize things without seeing them.

https://www.facebook.com/notes/blake-ross/aphantasia-how-it-feels-to-be-blind-in-your-mind/10156834777480504/

He never could, and was unaware that anybody else could. He thought that phrases like 'mind's eye,' were figures of speech.

The medical term for this condition is called aphantasia. What's curious about this is how long it lasted in his lfe undiscovered. Visualization is such an active and present piece of our waking lives – how did it never 'come up in conversation' that this man was missing some basic element of human experience?

Well, it seems like things that are private aren't optimized to be expressed publicly in language. In fact, the man documents how hard it is to get people to describe precisely what it is they experience when he asks them about this ability which was, to hum until this point, mysterious. It takes some sort of odd occurrence or breakdown to even understand that this major disconnect in experience has any real world implications. Otherwise, things just 'work.' And in fact they seem geared to work and paper these sorts of things over.

Now, what's interesting about this is that this man is a partial p-zombie. There are certain sorts of qualia that he simply doesn't have. And what's more, he was unable to understand that he didn't have them, because the notion that anyone did didn't occur to him. Some conversation explicitly raising the subject had to prompt him to realize what he was missing.

Now, if there are partial p-zombies demonstrably, why is it so odd that there might be actual p-zombies? Maybe the philosophers who claim not to have, or understand qualia, literally don't have them. And the conversational 'trigger' that made them realize this was someone talking about the 'hard problem.'

Maybe our difficulty in discussing the 'hard problem' is physiological. Maybe a number of philosophers are p-zombies. These same philosophers might scoff at the idea that such a thing is possible – but this is in part because like the man who was aphantasiac, they would say 'of course all human beings experience' just like he'd say 'of course all human beings imagine things.' But they are using the words in a way that people who can experience don't quite understand them – and on those terms, they don't understand them.

Philosophers talk about whether p-zombies are metaphysically possible, but what a priori grounds do we have for ruling out the possibility that they're actual?

Hanover

↪The Great Whatever

I'm unimpressed by this example. There's a world of difference between having limited internal experience and entirely lacking the ability to experience. There are also plenty of people who can't internally visualize. They are called blind people.

The Great Whatever

↪Hanover

Aphantasiacs can't replicate experiences 'internally' in any sensory modality, even when their sensory modalities are perfectly healthy.

It also isn't just an 'example' – we now know that a certain percentage of the population is aphantasiac.

As we get better at sussing out phenomenological differences, more of them may become part of common knowledge. What is so absurd that we might find out that there's a large divide between people, some of whom can experience and some of whom can't?

Note that those who couldn't might not be aware they can't, just like the guy was unaware he couldn't visualize things, because the idea that he should be able to never occurred to him.

Wosret

Yeah, I have that. Though I have had like a handful of visualizations in my life. Otherwise it's all empty up there, or more like a buzz that I can't quite catch, and then when stuff comes out, it wasn't exactly premeditated, more like it comes from no where, or all intuition. Though in writing I of course will write and delete many things before I decide on something. I can figure plenty out in my head though, but I just kind of have to "think" about it, like, give it a minute.

Wayfarer

Philosophers talk about whether p-zombies are metaphysically possible, but what a priori grounds do we have for ruling out the possibility that they're actual? — The Great Whatever

Because if you asked them 'how do you feel', then they wouldn't be able to answer.

The Great Whatever

↪Wayfarer

But of course they would know – they know the sorts of things people say, and say one of those, based on what's happened to them in the past.

Wayfarer

↪The Great Whatever

RIght - so they would lie, or mimic. But that is not the same as knowing. Do you think they would pass the turing test?

The Great Whatever

↪Wayfarer

That depends on what's in the test. The guy with aphantasia passed the visualization 'Turing Test' for 30 years – none of his friends or loved ones had any inkling he couldn't visualize things, and neither did he.

Wayfarer

↪The Great Whatever

But nevertheless, if you asked him 'how do you feel'? or 'what is your favourite movie?' or 'do you prefer dogs or cats?' he would at least have some basis for answering. I mean, you could answer any of those questions without the ability to visualize an image, but how would a 'zombie' answer them, if it has no 'inner life' or mind? How many questions would it take before you began to think 'hey, there's something really fishy about this person.'

The Great Whatever

↪Wayfarer

Presumably, you'd start to think something is fishy if you asked them about something like the hard problem, and they insisted they didn't know what you were talking about, or acted in such a way that made you suspicious they had no qualia.

Actually, in talking about this sort of thing with some people, there responses are often split in just such a way. Some, when they try to get a handle on what's being talked about, start to sound like aliens – their reflections on and descriptions of experience are odd, as if there's a crucial piece missing. Other people just 'get' the thrust of the problem immediately.

Marchesk

Makes me wonder if Daniel Dennett has aphantasia. I recall reading where someone was talking about how certain philosophers were skeptical that human beings could actually visually rotate images in their mind, even though they claimed to be able to do so. There is now experimental support for visual rotation, but the author remarked that he realized some philosophers lacked the ability to visualize, and so they assumed everyone else was the same.

Also reminds me of Temple Grandin, who is the opposite of aphantasia. She's a visual thinker, and language is a secondary means of understanding that has to be translated from imagery. She compared her mind to a holodeck. But she had great difficulty understanding certain philosophical writings. They were too abstract.

I'm a poor visualizer, but I do visualize. Would love to know what it's like to have the equivalent of a holodeck in my mind. Would really help with certain skills.

Marchesk

↪The Great Whatever

Do aphantasiacs dream? I thought everyone dreamed with the exception of a rare genetic condition that prevents sleep (which leads to death eventually).

What about inner dialog? I have an inner dialog going throughout the day. It's hard for me to imagine other people not hearing their own thoughts, outside of meditation. Aphantasics don't hear their thoughts? Do they have memories? Can they tell themselves a story?

Wosret

It's about visualization only, at least for me. I don't suppose that I'm great with smells or taste either, but I remember feelings, and sounds well. Those are my best senses, and I'm good with language, I think at least.

I do dream, though I don't remember them often, but they aren't visual either, I just have a sense of what was going on. Same with hallucinations, I don't actually see things that aren't there, I just get really confused, and keep thinking things are there that aren't, or stuff is going on that isn't. I never had a continuous hallucination for this reason probably, because I can't actually see things that aren't there when I look for them.

The Great Whatever

↪Marchesk

The guy in the article says he doesn't dream, but self-reports of dreaming frequency are well-known to be unreliable. I think some aphantasiacs have involuntary visualizations, too, but I can't remember where I heard that.

The Great Whatever

I have an inner dialog going throughout the day. It's hard for me to imagine other people not hearing their own thoughts, outside of meditation. Aphantasics don't hear their thoughts? Do they have memories? Can they tell themselves a story? — Marchesk

I remember a debate on a philosophy forum once in which someone alluded to hearing songs in their head, in the sense of 'having a song stuck in your head.' Someone responded and said this was a bad way of speaking, that it's just thinking about a song, you can't actually 'hear songs in your head' and that this was a philosopher's confusion etc. etc. But the first guy was like, no, you don't get it, people literally have a quasi-auditory experience of music.

Philosophy relies a lot on intuitive evidence – it's interesting that it's remained so uninterested in variation in the power of different people to access that evidence.

Marchesk

omeone responded and said this was a bad way of speaking, that it's just thinking about a song, you can't actually 'hear songs in your head' and that this was a philosopher's confusion etc. etc. But the first guy was like, no, you don't get it, people literally have a quasi-auditory experience of music. — The Great Whatever

I get songs stuck in my head as well. It's not a philosophical confusion either. I literally have a quasi-auditory experience. Anyone who says otherwise is simply wrong, although maybe they don't have such experiences. Most people do, I suspect. Which is why the phrase is popular.

Marchesk

The guy in the article says he doesn't dream, but self-reports of dreaming frequency are well-known to be unreliable. — The Great Whatever

Dennett in his early career defended the notion that dreams are a coming-to-seem-to-remember upon awakening. That we don't actually experience dreams while asleep, but rather the false memories are creating during awakening.

That's prima facie absurd for most people who have decent recall of dreaming, particularly lucid and semi-awake dreaming. Also, the dream studies support dreaming as an experience while asleep. But it's interesting how far distinguished philosophers like Dennett will go out of their way to deny subjective experiences.

Pneumenon

If p-zombies do not experience and thus do not suffer, is it morally permissible to kill them?

The Great Whatever

Dennett in his early career defended the notion that dreams are a coming-to-seem-to-remember upon awakening. That we don't actually experience dreams while asleep, but rather the false memories are creating during awakening. — Marchesk

This can't be tenable with modern scientific evidence. I once read an article by a guy who claimed dreaming was a purely linguistic phenomenon – that there was nothing to dreaming but reporting that one dreamt the next morning. Pretty retarded.

↪Pneumenon

I don't see why it would be – moral intuitions about killing don't center on the suffering of the killed, for obvious reasons. Also, there would only be a sense in which a p-zombie doesn't suffer.

Marchesk

I once read an article by a guy who claimed dreaming was a purely linguistic phenomenon – that there was nothing to dreaming but reporting that one dreamt the next morning. Pretty retarded. — The Great Whatever

That's an example of doing bad philosophy.

Wayfarer

If p-zombies do not experience and thus do not suffer, is it morally permissible to kill them? — Pneumenon

zombies are dead already, so it wouldn't make any difference. That's part of their shtick.

Michael

zombies are dead already, so it wouldn't make any difference. — Wayfarer

If you're referring to life in the biological sense then this isn't true; having consciousness isn't a requirement to be alive.

Michael

There's a world of difference between having limited internal experience and entirely lacking the ability to experience. — Hanover

Sure, but is that difference one that would lead to behavioural differences? It seems to me that if it would then either experiences are (uniquely) causally efficacious or experiences are a necessary by-product of the (unique) causes of human behaviour (e.g. brain activity).

So which is it? Are experiences (uniquely) causally efficacious? If so, is that because experiences are physical things (e.g. identical to brain states) or because non-physical things can have a (unique) causal influence on the physical world? Or are they a necessary by-product of the (unique) causes of human behaviour (e.g. brain activity)? If so, how would one verify (or falsify) such a thing? Obviously we can't look to behaviour (or brain activity).

Michael

I'm referring to 'zombies' - 'a corpse said to be revived by witchcraft, especially in certain African and Caribbean religions'. The point about zombies is they're already dead. Otherwise, what are they? Manniquins with computers in them? Would that count? — Wayfarer

So you were just making a joke? My bad.

Wayfarer

So you were just making a joke? — Michael

The point about zombies is, they're dead. That's why they're used as a 'thought experiment' - they look like 'a being' but they're not actually beings. They're simply simulcra, or mannequins, or something - they move and speak but are dead. I don't know why people bring up 'zombies' if that is not the point.

Michael

The point about zombies is, they're dead. That's why they're used as a 'thought experiment' - they look like 'a being' but they're not actually beings. They're simply simulcra, or mannequins, or something - they move and speak but are dead. I don't know why people bring up 'zombies' if that is not the point. — Wayfarer

We're talking about philosophical zombies, not "corpses said to be revived by witchcraft, especially in certain African and Caribbean religions". You're conflating.

Philosophical zombies aren't dead. They're just not conscious.

Wayfarer

↪Michael

The difference being what? A 'philosophical zombie' has no inner life - no thoughts or feelings. That's what makes it a zombie. Otherwise, it would be called 'a person'.

Michael

The difference being what? A 'philosophical zombie' has no inner life - no thoughts or feelings. That's what makes it a zombie. — Wayfarer

Three posts ago you defined a zombie as a corpse revived by witchcraft. Now you're defining it as something with no inner life. You're conflating.

Wayfarer

↪Michael

I gave the original definition of the term 'zombie', which has been adapted for the purposes of a thought experiment because it is said to lack any kind of inner life, thought, mentation, etc. it's very straightforward.

Michael

I gave the original definition of the term 'zombie', which has been adapted for the purposes of a thought experiment because it is said to lack any kind of inner life, thought, mentation, etc. it's very straightforward. — Wayfarer

And in saying that this philosophical zombie is dead because the original definition of the term "zombie" included the term "corpse" is conflation. The philosophical zombie isn't a corpse. It simply doesn't have an inner life. And having an inner life isn't a requirement to be alive. The biological definition of "life" is one that references things like homeostasis, organization, metabolism, growth, adaptation, response to stimuli, and reproduction. That's why we say that plants are alive, and are not required to choose between animals either having consciousness or being dead.

Just look at the sponge. It's a living, non-conscious animal. Or are you going to say that either it's conscious or it's dead?

Wayfarer

Just look at the sponge. It's a living, non-conscious animal. Or are you going to say that either it's conscious or it's dead? — Michael

Are you going to say you can converse with a sponge?

Aphantasia and p-zombies

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