Here:

https://people.socsci.tau.ac.il/mu/danield/files/2010/07/selection-paper.pdf

Or: https://edoc.bbaw.de/opus4-bbaw/files/244/20mD5eCLI1Ih2_195.pdf

Basically Chomsky has everything ass-backwards: in his efforts to make communication a mere auxiliary of language - rather than its raison d'etre - he metaphysicalizes it and places it outside of any natural evolutionary account. It's why you are reduced to platitudes like: 'it evolved because gene changes' and 'it happened by chance' (what's next? Water's wet?). That's the only level of specificity Chomsky's theory of language allows because beyond the bare minimum without which its theological essence would become obvious, Chomsky has to say these things otherwise his theory's anti-scientific status would become clear as day. Chomsky's account of language is basically an allergic reaction to behaviourialism which he responded to by hermetically sealing language off from the world and entombing language in asocial brain-vaults considered as nothing more than meat carriers for immutable and Platonic language 'modules' that appeared one day out of thin, mythical air. It's vulgar Platonism forcibly shoved into a linguistic costume.

Agree. I always appreciate Manuel’s contributions.

Thanks, appreciated. :cool:

I mean, it helps to read Russell, Locke, Hume, Cudworth in addition to all you mention, lectures, interviews and so on.

Not that he can't be understood without all the extra work, far from it, but as you read these people, you realize that what he cites and interprets, tends to be spot on. Which doesn't mean one can't disagree with him, of course you can.

It's just that there's a lot of misunderstanding about Newton, Descartes and Hume in academia, it's surprising when you read primary sources or detailed scholarship.

One could call a percept a "quale", but Chomsky doesn't. A percept means a moment of experience, such as you reading this sentence as you currently are. Or looking at the window and seeing green grass, or hearing a car zoom by, etc.

I'm unclear why this is confusing, outside of the terminology itself. It's been overwhelmingly taken for granted up until the 20th century, when it suddenly became a problem to a small group of people. — Manuel

percept is usually understood as the product of mind's interpretation of sensory stimuli, the awareness of an object or event, such as grass outside your window or a car zooming by. This is distinct from the stimulus or the raw sense data (if that's a thing). And it is again distinct from the "what-it-is-likeness" of experience, which is what Nagel, Searle, Chalmers, etc. put forward as the phenomenal experience, or qualia, the thing outside the reach of physical accounting (unless we wave our hands and invoke something like "panpsychism"). (If all this seems confusing, then I've made my point.) Chomsky doesn't engage with any of this. He mentions the "hard problem," but he doesn't actually talk about it. Whatever his "mysteries" are (he never clearly and consistently articulates what they are), they aren't that.

I thought the whole argument was meant to show that experience isn't necessary for a human being to exist as they do. But I also do not see the force to this argument, nor understand the attention given to it. — Manuel

Well, what the argument means to show is that phenomenal experience (which p-z's hypothetically lack) cannot be accounted for by materialism/physicalism as presently understood, and therefore materialism/physicalism is false/incomplete. (How it does that is what I don't quite understand.) Again, Chomsky doesn't engage with any of that. As far as he is concerned, materialism has been dead since at least Newton, but not for any reasons having to do with the "hard problem." For his definition of physicalism he picks that horn of Hempel's dilemma which anchors it to present-day physics, and he associates materialism specifically with pre-Newtonian natural philosophy, thus defining it into irrelevance.

percept is usually understood as the product of mind's interpretation of sensory stimuli, the awareness of an object or event, such as grass outside your window or a car zooming by. This is distinct from the stimulus or the raw sense data (if that's a thing). And it is again distinct from the "what-it-is-likeness" of experience, which is what Nagel, Searle, Chalmers, etc. put forward as the phenomenal experience, or qualia, the thing outside the reach of physical accounting (unless we wave our hands and invoke something like "panpsychism"). (If all this seems confusing, then I've made my point.) — SophistiCat

I think that those are perhaps too many distinctions, which makes the topic more difficult than it needs be. The first sentence you write makes sense to me, and is what I take Russell to be talking about.

"This is distinct from the stimulus or the raw sense data". Why isn't the sensory stimulus raw sense data?

The whole "what it's likeness" is a complication here. It's supposed to point out that "there is something it is like" for a person (you, me, anyone) to see the colour red, or read this sentence. I can see red and am writing and reading this sentence, is there "something it is like to do this"? Sure, I guess, I don't think it says much, but I don't doubt my experiences.

Yes, Chomsky says little about this, outside of mentioning this quote of Russell's or citing Strawson's essays and books, he doesn't see a big problem here.

As far as he is concerned, materialism has been dead since at least Newton, but not for any reasons having to do with the "hard problem." — SophistiCat

Because then it meant that it was an intuitive description of the world - and crucially excluded the mental.

Since that doesn't hold up any longer, then if we want to use the word "physical", we can adopt Strawson's use of the word and say, that the physical is everything that is, unless someone can say way something isn't physical. This includes experience, at the highest grade of certainty.

Or we can say that physicalism is what physics studies and that experience is an illusion or not real. This is incoherent to me, but, it's an option.

By then it becomes terminological, and not too substantive, I think.

To be clear, it's not that consciousness isn't a hard problem - it is - but so is gravity, electromagnetism, creativity, free will, and so on. There isn't the hard problem, but many.

Well, what the argument means to show is that phenomenal experience (which p-z's hypothetically lack) cannot be accounted for by materialism/physicalism as presently understood, and therefore materialism/physicalism is false/incomplete. (How it does that is what I don't quite understand.) — SophistiCat

That's correct. Not false, simply not all-encompassing.

Why don't they ask for a "physical explanation" of why music makes us feel good? Or a "physical explanation" of why we have dreams? And so on.

It's becomes a bit silly. Physics is the study of abstract properties of matter, and this phenomena are simple structures, nothing as complex as biology. It isn't reasonable to expect it to explain things way outside its purview.

his efforts to make communication a mere auxiliary of language - rather than its raison d'etre — StreetlightX

basically an allergic reaction to behaviourialism — StreetlightX

I was thinking he gets to the former from the latter via the competence/performance distinction...

Can I just ask, what’s going on here philosophically? You accuse Chomsky of promoting various sorts of pseudo-science, which suggests you see the role of philosophical analysis of linguistics as demarcation. Is that how you see what you’re doing here?

I’m just always confused by these discussions that pit one scientist against another. We’re amateurs at philosophy, and presume to pick winners and losers in various fields we’re even less qualified to judge than philosophy, not only that but presume to say who’s a real scientist and who’s a charlatan, even if he’s been teaching at MIT for a lifetime and the acknowledged leader of his field (though never without controversy).

Is linguistics so easy that we can swoop in and settle all the outstanding issues in the field of an afternoon? Is it slightly easier or slightly harder than the other topics we discuss on this forum, such as evolutionary biology or quantum physics?

This is all a far cry from that philosopher who felt his only advantage was that at least he didn’t think he knew what he didn’t.

Indeed. Much like the Bible, in fact. Often revered but never read. Adam Smith also jumps to mind.

in his efforts to make communication a mere auxiliary of language - rather than its raison d'etre - he metaphysicalizes it and places it outside of any natural evolutionary account. — StreetlightX

You keep repeating that, but it's still incoherent. He's said repeatedly that language is a biological capacity, and one that evolved. That's not metaphysics or mysticism or theology.

What he is saying -- as you correctly point out -- is that language is not simply about communication. He defines (1) language as a biological, computational system -- a system for the expression of thought, and (2) that it might have evolved rapidly. Gives plenty of reasons for these claims. Could be completely wrong, but it's not theology.

Incidentally, when looking at the function of language by observing characteristic use, it's not at all obvious that its primary function -- or raison d'être -- is for communication. It's true that we talk to ourselves all day long, but how much of that gets communicated (whether through speech or sign)? And how much of that is simply phatic communication? Rather, it seems the "function" of language is to link interface conditions, where the computational system is optimal in linking the interface but non-optimal in terms of communication -- and there's a lot of evidence for this. But thanks for the references, I'll check them out.

@Manuel - forgive me for this tangent on language. I should probably start a new thread.

It's in the final part of this essay, but is only touched upon. You can continue here or start a new thread.

Both are fine with me.

I'm thinking a few of the chapters in New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind as well as the first two chapters in Power and Prospects are really good on this topic.

Or whatever essay you have in mind. It's all good.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/2254605

Appreciate it.

From that article, regarding metaphysics:

I would like to discuss an approach to the mind that considers language
and similar phenomena to be elements of the natural world, to be studied
by ordinary methods of empirical inquiry. I will be using the terms "mind"
and "mental" here with no metaphysical import. Thus I understand "men-
tal" to be on a par with "chemical", "optical", or "electrical". Certain phe
nomena, events, processes and states are informally called "chemical"
etc., but no metaphysical divide is suggested thereby. The terms are used
to select certain aspects of the world as a focus of inquiry.

This is why it's baffling that he can be accused of metaphysical chicanery. He's done more to de-mystify language than almost anyone else in fact.

:up:

I tried to attribute a metaphysics to him in my work. :groan:

That quote is practically a classic for me. The issue is that, his conclusions seem magical to many, who think innate ideas, physic continuity and other ideas, can't be explained by current science (maybe ever).

People who disagree with him tend to be externalists, which is contrary to what scientists actually do.

:up:

I tried to attribute a metaphysics to him in my work. — Manuel

In a sense we all have a metaphysics. But to describe generative grammar as metaphysical is just nutty.

Agreed.

Can I just ask, what’s going on here philosophically? You accuse Chomsky of promoting various sorts of pseudo-science, which suggests you see the role of philosophical analysis of linguistics as demarcation. Is that how you see what you’re doing here? — Srap Tasmaner

It's not demarcation - it's simply because Chomsky literally is wrong about everything. Seriously. If Chomsky said something about language, the truth of the matter will be the diametrically opposite of what he said. Chomsky says language is an individual/cognitive capacity; it's not, it's a social one; Chomsky says language is geared for the expression of thought; it's not, it's geared towards communication; Chomsky says language is characterized by universals; it's not: it's characterized by sheer diversity and not a single universal outside of the universality of diversity. Chomsky's whole program is a theory in search of data; an a priori that tries to curve-fit language into its ludicrous, idealist, metaphysical program. I mean it: if you take what Chomsky says about language, and then do the exact reverse of anything he says, you will arrive at quite a good picture of how language actually functions in the real world.

There is no one who has set the study of linguistics backwards by a matter of decades more than Chomsky. If there is any advantage in studying him, it is to know what to avoid at all costs when it comes to the study of language.

He's said repeatedly that language is a biological capacity, and one that evolved. That's not metaphysics or mysticism or theology. — Xtrix

Of course he claims that. Otherwise he would be shown for the charlatan he is. But what he says and what he does are two very different things. The question is whether his theories about language do in fact lend themselves to being understood biologically, or evolutionarily, in any sensible capacity. They do not. Confusing Chomsky's lip-service to science with it actually being science is exactly how he gets away with all the bullshit he's peddled for years. Don't look at what he says about his theory - look at how the theory functions, what it entitles one to say. It does not entitle Chomsky to make any claims to science whatsoever.

It's true that we talk to ourselves all day long, but how much of that gets communicated (whether through speech or sign)? And how much of that is simply phatic communication? — Xtrix

This is a total non sequitur. It's like saying that because the function of ears are to hear, it cannot possibly be the case that eyes are also meant to perceive things. So there is pathic communication. What does this say about language? Literally nothing (incidentally: Chomsky's pet vocabulary is bunkum - what does this say about intelligibility? Literally nothing). In any case any the specificity of language is its symbolic function. Language introduces the negative into communication: one can communicate about what is not present at hand (I'm not referring to Heidegger); it allows one to say what cannot be shown, and represents a massive gain (along a certain dimension) of communicative capacity. There is, in other words, a functional specificity to language. It is not just any communication tool; it is very specific kind of communication tool.

The question is whether his theories about language do in fact lend themselves to being understood biologically, or evolutionarily, in any sensible capacity. — StreetlightX

Indeed. And since they do, your fabrications are just that.

Don't look at what he says about his theory - look at how the theory functions, what it entitles one to say. — StreetlightX

It "entitles" one to say a great deal, which is why Chomsky is so influential and his theories have been highly fruitful.

You're not a linguist, and in fact haven't shown you really understand Chomsky's work; nor have your childish insults really been substantiated in any way. So if it once again boils down to some strange vendetta you've developed, I'm not interested.

They do not. — StreetlightX

Ladies and gentlemen...science.

It's true that we talk to ourselves all day long, but how much of that gets communicated (whether through speech or sign)? And how much of that is simply phatic communication?
— Xtrix

This is a total non sequitur. It's like saying that because the function of ears are to hear, it cannot possibly be the case that eyes are also meant to perceive things. — StreetlightX

What? I genuinely don't understand what this sentence is supposed to mean.

I mentioned characteristic use. I'd say that the ears' characteristic use is hearing, and eyes seeing -- which could tell us something about their primary function.

Similarly, the characteristic use of language is internal -- 99% of it. We know that. You can, in fact, check this yourself. So if we want to talk about its "raison d'être", it's function -- it's hardly about communication.

So despite whatever you meant to say, your claim is more like "the eyes' raison d'être is to cry." I suppose we can make up a story that says the 1% of the time we're communicating, phatically or otherwise, is the actual function of language. But there's no evidence for it.

As I said before, there's evidence that suggests that the computational system is not optimal in communication -- it's optimal in linking interfaces. Plenty of work on this.

Chomsky says language is an individual/cognitive capacity; it's not, it's a social one — StreetlightX

This is meaningless. Language can be used to communicate (as can non-verbal behavior), and so is social. It can only be acquired in the presence of a language -- so that's certainly social. But it's still a cognitive capacity. It's genetically determined, which is why children can develop a language and non-human primates cannot, for example. This is not controversial.

Chomsky says language is geared for the expression of thought; it's not, it's geared towards communication — StreetlightX

There's little evidence to support this, as I've already mentioned. Externalization happens maybe 1% of the time. To argue this is what language is "geared towards" is just a fairytale.

Chomsky says language is characterized by universals; it's not: it's characterized by sheer diversity and not a single universal outside of the universality of diversity — StreetlightX

Chomsky does not say language is "characterized by universals" -- this too is completely meaningless. What you mean to refer to is universal grammar, which is simply the name for the theory of the genetic component of language. That language is a universal human property -- i.e., that it's found in every human culture -- is hardly controversial.

Similarly, the characteristic use of language is internal -- 99% of it. We know that. You can, in fact, check this yourself. — Xtrix

This is funny because it is so wrong and so commonly known a misconception that it is nothing other than a metaphysical prejudice - it's like opening the fridge door to check if the fridge light is on, only to find that lo and behold, it is every time! Not only do some people simply not have an internal dialog, any phenomenology of this 'dialog' will recognize it as a low-grade, scattered and fleeting use of 'language' that is more a matter of fragments and shards rather than language-use proper. It is certainly nowhere near what is needed to explain the genesis of grammar. Again, just as everything Chomsky says about language is wrong such the opposite is the case in reality, so too is it the case here: it's not that communication is an 'externalization' of language which first finds its home internally; it's that the 'internal' use of language is an internalization of language-use which developed as a communicative capacity between humans in the first place. Taking 'internal dialog' as the 'characteristic use of language' is about as sophisticated as considering the Sun revolving around the Earth because that's what you see everyday: a cute bit of so-called 'obvious' folk psychology, but completely wrong when even minimally investigated.

There's little evidence to support this, as I've already mentioned. Externalization happens maybe 1% of the time. To argue this is what language is "geared towards" is just a fairytale. — Xtrix

Yeah, except for all the mass of evidence for it, which, despite your out-of-thin-air claim to the contrary, there is. I've cited two papers, and you're welcome to read both Dor's and Jablonka's independent work on the topic, which shows quite clearly how syntactic constraints developed as normative rules to coordinate communication between speakers - i.e. an empirically grounded mechanism that actually explains why and how grammar takes on the particular forms it does, rather than theory-laden pre-postulates about 'universal grammars' pulled out of this air. I realize you literally can't name any linguists apart from Chomsky or Everettt, only one of whom you've ever read - slavishly - but your ignorance of the evidence does not, in fact, translate into the absence of it. But I suppose this is a particularly Chomskian move, considering the paper in the OP: to make one's utter ignorance into an other people's problem.

What you mean to refer to is universal grammar, which is simply the name for the theory of the genetic component of language. — Xtrix

Wait, you think UG simply refers to the fact that 'there is a genetic component to language'? My God. I didn't realize I was literally arguing with someone who has no idea what he is talking about. UG does not refer to the mere fact of there 'being a genetic component to language'. That would be trivial and dumb, and thank God even Chomsky is not so vulgar as to describe it as such. It is meant to explain how this genetic component (whatever it is, which Chomsky never, ever expounds on because he cannot), accounts for the various grammatical structures found in language. I didn't realize I had to explain this but clearly I'm assuming more competence on this subject than you minimally exhibit.

Not only do some people simply not have an internal dialog, — StreetlightX

What people? We’re talking to ourselves all day long. Just introspect for a while. We don’t usually notice we’re doing it — but that’s irrelevant. We don’t usually notice we’re breathing either.

any phenomenology of this 'dialog' will recognize it as a low-grade, scattered and fleeting use of 'language' that is more a matter of fragments and shards rather than language-use proper. — StreetlightX

It is indeed scattered. The mind thinks all kinds of things. Similarly, we constantly talk to ourselves.

Again, this is going on close to 100% of the time— that’s just a fact. If language “proper” means what gets communicated, then you’re essentially saying that 1% of the time that we’re actually communicating constitutes proper function. I realize that may be commonly thought — but it’s just a mistake.

it's not that communication is an 'externalization' of language which first finds its home internally; it's that the 'internal' use of language is an internalization of language-use which developed as a communicative capacity between humans in the first place. — StreetlightX

But again, this common story has almost no evidence in favor of it. In fact you’ll find that many of the mechanics of the language system are poorly designed for communication — a fact Chomsky points out repeatedly. You can see this in parsing programs, as an example. Computation efficiency is favored over ease of communication.

Also worth keeping in mind is that nearly every organism on earth, including the insects, have some form of communication. Human speech and sign are unlike anything seen in other species. No other species have language. Given the generic similarity of humans and non-human primates, one could reasonably assume— if the communication story is correct — that apes can learn how to sign if given the opportunity. This too has been tried and has failed.

So whatever is going on with human beings, our ability to think seems interconnected with language — and is unique in nature. It’s mostly an internal process that sometimes gets externalized. But to say language is simply communication is like saying communication is just writing — there’s little reason to do so.

Taking 'internal dialog' as the 'characteristic use of language' is about as sophisticated as considering the Sun revolving around the Earth because that's what you see everyday: a cute bit of so-called 'obvious' folk psychology, but completely wrong when even minimally investigated. — StreetlightX

Forget Internal dialogue and look at the amount of time spent speaking. Compare that to thought. We’re thinking and talking (internally) literally all the time. In fact for any meditators out there, this is one of the first things you notice — along with other mental phenomena.

So you have it backwards. Minimal investigation shows exactly this. Again— that it’s scattered and habitual and mostly unnoticed is irrelevant. It’s still a fact, regardless of the story we tell about language and thought: we simply spend the vast majority of our lives NOT speaking externally.

shows quite clearly how syntactic constraints developed as normative rules to coordinate communication between speakers — StreetlightX

This is almost laughable. By this premise, our communication today should lead to new developments in our language capacity. The genes will come later — once the communication and “normative rules” get internalized.

I’ll check it out to see if it’s indeed as ludicrous as you’re describing. I hope you’re misunderstanding that like you’ve misunderstood and fabricated nearly everything else so far.

What you mean to refer to is universal grammar, which is simply the name for the theory of the genetic component of language.
— Xtrix

Wait, you think UG simply refers to the fact that 'there is a genetic component to language'? My God. I didn't realize I was literally arguing with someone who has no idea what he is talking about. UG does not refer to the mere fact of there 'being a genetic component to language'. That would be trivial and dumb, and thank God even Chomsky is not so vulgar as to describe it as such. — StreetlightX

“Universal grammar is just the name for the theory of the genetic component of the language faculty.” — Noam Chomsky

:lol:

https://youtu.be/vbKO-9n5qmc

Almost verbatim. Didn’t have to look very far, either.

Yeah yeah— This only means Chomsky is as dumb and vulgar as me, etc. No chance that perhaps you’re misunderstanding — as you’ve demonstrated repeatedly.

If only you could teach him a thing or two about linguistics and show him how it’s really done.

There is no one who has set the study of linguistics backwards by a matter of decades more than Chomsky. — StreetlightX

Says someone who goes on about “arrogance.”

The father of modern linguistics? A charlatan and fool. Why? Because it’s not to my liking.

Yeah yeah— This only means Chomsky is as dumb and vulgar as me, etc. — Xtrix

Well, point to you, I concede!

Jokes aside, I was right about the fact that you cannot read: the quote rightly refers to the fact that UG refers to "the genetic component of the language faculty", the genitive here referring not to language simpliciter but to Chomsky's technical term for the so-called invariant and computational part of language which he just so happens to identify with the genetic component of language tout court. One could see, however, how a vulgar reader could confuse the two, insofar as Chomsky himself would like to arrogate his idealist phantasm - really better named the Linguistic Soul to bring out its status as metaphysical hocus pocus - to the status of genetic fact. So I take my concession point back, and Chomsky can resume his rightful place as being mildly more intelligent than his internet stalwart.

What people? We’re talking to ourselves all day long. Just introspect for a while. — Xtrix

I don't think it's quite right or fair to elevate your mental illness to the status of general linguistic theory. Like I said, there are plenty of people for whom this internal dialog is minimal or even absent entirely. Again, the contingent pathologies of your idiosyncratic self-chatter isn't science, sorry to have to break it to you. No doubt this fact will not get in the way of you making your wrong theory unfalsifiable by both asking people to introspect before dismissing any inconvenient case where, having done just that, they apparently just 'don't notice' what you say is 'obvious to everyone'. But the sheer contradictions of your positions are yours alone to deal with, no matter how many slap-dash riders you use to patch them over.

Your imaginary head-friends do not a theory of language make. And in any case the idea that thinking is co-extensive with 'inner speech' is basically a child's understanding of thought. No one takes it seriously. To quote Dennett: "Our access to our own thinking, and especially to the causation and dynamics of its subpersonal parts, is really no better than our access to our digestive processes ... Consciousness is not just talking to yourself; it includes all the varieties of self-stimulation and reflection we have acquired and honed throughout our waking lives. These are not just things that happen in our brains; they are behaviors that we engage in". (From Bacteria...). And in any case, those who do in fact study 'inner speech', recognize as a matter of course that it is nothing other than internalized - albeit it transformed in the process - external or social speech - i.e. language.

Also worth keeping in mind is that nearly every organism on earth, including the insects, have some form of communication. Human speech and sign are unlike anything seen in other species. No other species have language. Given the generic similarity of humans and non-human primates, one could reasonably assume— if the communication story is correct — that apes can learn how to sign if given the opportunity. This too has been tried and has failed. So whatever is going on with human beings, our ability to think seems interconnected with language — and is unique in nature. — Xtrix

Which is why I have already addressed this by noting that language is not just any communicative tool, but one with specific design functions geared towards social coordination across distances in space and time. Language is unique in nature - but this is not a point against it's communicative grounding, but one for it. And it's true that Chomsky does seem to think language is badly designed for communication - but of course, that's precisely because language is not a general purpose communication tool - it fails badly at analog complexity and intensity but is exceptional at extensive, digital communication of types and kinds. But of course because of Chomsky's own failure of imagination, he imputes his own failure to grasp this point as a failure of language's communicative capacity tout court. But, like yours, Chomsky's failures are his alone.

The genes will come later — once the communication and “normative rules” get internalized. — Xtrix

Look, I realize that your understanding of linguistic theory and evolution has not itself evolved past the 1970s when Chomsky could in fact be taken seriously, but yes, that is precisely how the Baldwin effect works. Maybe you can read about it once you have expanded the range of linguists you are able to cite past exactly two.

Jokes aside, I was right about the fact that you cannot read: the quote rightly refers to the fact that UG refers to "the genetic component of the language faculty", the genitive here referring not to language simpliciter but to Chomsky's technical term for the so-called invariant and computational part of language which he just so happens to identify with the genetic component of language tout court. One could see, however, how a vulgar reader could confuse the two, insofar as Chomsky himself would like to arrogate his idealist phantasm - really better named the Linguistic Soul to bring out its status as metaphysical hocus pocus - to the status of genetic fact. So I take my concession point back, and Chomsky can resume his rightful place as being mildly more intelligent than his internet stalwart. — StreetlightX

You make it awfully difficult to admit, but yes — you’re right. I should have said the language faculty, or system. It would be like saying that there’s a theory about the genetic component of vision, when what should be said is the visual system — which is obviously related, but not the same thing. Fair enough.

That being said, I think what’s more relevant here is the “theory” part of that sentence. The statement was in response to the claim that Chomsky asserts language is “characterized by universals.” Other than assuming (1) all humans have language (which thus is a universal feature) and (2) that there’s a genetic component to this capacity, I have no idea what that means. Either you disagree with (1) and (2), which I assume you aren’t, or by “universals” you’re referring to universal features (like negation or noun/verb phrases). I assumed the latter — and if so, that’s misleading.

What people? We’re talking to ourselves all day long. Just introspect for a while.
— Xtrix

I don't think it's quite right or fair to elevate your mental illness to the status of general linguistic theory. Like I said, there are plenty of people for whom this internal dialog is minimal or even absent entirely. — StreetlightX

Mental illness? The article you cite itself says that the vast majority of people do indeed talk to themselves. Why you would characterize the vast majority as mental illness and not the exceptions is strange.

If you wanted to seriously pursue this line, then there’s interesting things to be said about the deaf, who obviously don’t think in verbal terms. (At least those born completely deaf.)

But all of this is missing the point. In all people, whether deaf or otherwise, social communication — through speech or sign — is hardly characteristic use. You can elevate that 1% or so of the time when we’re speaking or signing as characteristic of language, but that’s like arguing the primary function of a screwdriver is to open paint cans.

Again, the contingent pathologies of your idiosyncratic self-chatter isn't science, — StreetlightX

As if internal dialogue is somehow a peculiarity of mine. This is just nonsense.

Also, from your source:

One theory proposes that people who do not produce inner speech are unable to activate those networks without also activating their motor cortex.

Another theory is poor introspection, which refers to a person's ability to examine their own mental processes.

According to this theory, everyone produces inner speech, but some people are conscious of it whereas others are not.

Personally I think there’s something to this, but it’s not relevant — except to show how absurd it is to claim inner speech is somehow “idiosyncratic” or “mental illness.” I realize you value “winning” an argument above all else, but there’s no reason to resort to absurdities in that pursuit.

And in any case the idea that thinking is co-extensive with 'inner speech' is basically a child's understanding of thought. No one takes it seriously. — StreetlightX

Nor do I. Which is why I never once said it.

And in any case, those who do in fact study 'inner speech', recognize as a matter of course that it is nothing other than internalized - albeit it transformed in the process - external or social speech - i.e. language. — StreetlightX

Presumably you mean Vygotsky. But this is strange — because at no point did I say “talking to yourself” isn’t internalized speech. I also talk to myself in English and not Spanish, etc. I learned to speak English as a child, and so my internal speech will, naturally, be in English. This tells us exactly nothing about the capacity to acquire language, its evolution, or — relevant to what’s being discussed — characteristic use, which is almost completely internal.

To characterize language as external speech is therefore still pretty strange. Again, it’s asserting that language is primarily a means of communication. But since speech is so infrequent, and communicative efficiency is so often sacrificed for computational efficiency, it’s an odd claim. Language can be used for communication— of course. But so can gait. It’d be equally odd to claim, therefore, that walking is primarily a social/communicative phenomenon.

Which is why I have already addressed this by noting that language is not just any communicative tool, but one with specific design functions geared towards social coordination across distances in space and time. — StreetlightX

Same can be argued about clothing. That can communicate a lot too, and has very specific functions.

It’s true that language also has specific and unique communicative functions. But again, whether this lends support for characterizing it as primarily a means of communication is, at minimum, debatable.

that is precisely how the Baldwin effect works. — StreetlightX

The capacity to acquire language already exists in infants. Once learned, they internalize that language — whatever it may be. English, Swahili, whatever. While every other animal has means of communication, they don’t have language. If language is simply the internalized system of complex social communication, which evolved gradually, then each step along the way had to somehow effect genetics — otherwise non human primates could learn language (as once thought, and probably still thought). But that’s not the Baldwin effect — that’s Lamarckism.

When we think of words, we often see a string of letters. That too is internalized. Numbers are internalized. The alphabet and mathematical symbols are relatively recent phenomena. Should we assume the capacity for writing and mathematics followed the invention of writing and mathematics?

Really interesting stuff. I'm only a three pages in but it's very dense and I've already had to look up a bunch of stuff. I never gave it much thought when I used words like body and matter. I guess it's one of those things you take for granted. I guess I assumed it's whatever is made of atoms. But I can see how gravity sort of disrupted other ideas about it. I just thought we had a different definition now. but after looking it up on wikipedia, it's true that matter has several definitions. I thought chomsky was a linguistic, not a philosopher.....he seems to be making a big argument and I'm surprised this isn't debated more. Good idea for the thread!

Thanks.

Yes, I think this essay is very important, it points to historical aspects in philosophy which are barely known.

Because of this, a lot of debate arises that are based on incoherent ideas.

If you have any questions, need clarification or want more sources or videos or anything like that, I'll be happy to help.

Other than assuming (1) all humans have language (which thus is a universal feature) and (2) that there’s a genetic component to this capacity, I have no idea what that means. — Xtrix

Then I would suggest that you do not know what Chomsky means. UG is not just the mere idea that there is a genetic component to language. It specifies - gives specificity to - this genetic component, by suggesting that it is composed of - depending on when exactly one were to ask Chomsky, since he keeps dropping elements as they become more and more inconvenient and obviously implausible - sets of rules or principles by which 'external' language becomes articulated. He calls this "I-language" ('internal language'), as distinct from 'E-language' ('external language'). The technicalities of it are whatever, but the whole schema can be captured by recognizing that it is basically a renovated substance-accident model that's just Aristotle linguistically redux'd.

The ridiculousness of the schema comes clear in Chomsky's insistence, often made, that there really is only 'one' language, whereas the actually existing diversity of languages are basically epiphenomena. In Kantian terms, Chomsky posits a linguistic noumena that underlies the linguistic phenomena, with the former accounting - magically - for the latter. As for the role of culture and society, it does nothing more than bring out this or that feature of I-language already there from the start ('parameters'). This is of course, pure metaphysics, and of the worst kind too - the kind that people used to mock when they posited that it was by means of 'dormitive virtues' that opium put people to sleep. Chomsky's answer to how language comes about is basically the same: language works by means of 'linguistic virtues' - a re-doubling of the explanandum in the explanans as though anyone with half a brain ought to be persuaded by this stupidity.

Incidentally, the fact that Chomsky is basically rehashing 17th century metaphysics - if not ancient Greek metaphysics - in linguistic garb might explain why, having been mired in that useless bog for his entire career - he also considers the failure of that outdated nonsense to say something about our capacities to understand things. It's almost as if the essay in the OP is nothing other than a projection writ scholarly.

But all of this is missing the point. In all people, whether deaf or otherwise, social communication — through speech or sign — is hardly characteristic use. — Xtrix

'Characteristic use' is irrelevant, even if I were to grant that it is in fact, characteristic use - which is neither here nor there. I use my computer everyday, but this says nothing about how it came to be as it is. The same is true of language: the issue is to account for why grammar is as it is. Chomsky's answer is basically a theological one: grammar appeared one day out of the blue, by a means lost in time, fully formed, and society just activates this or that already-latent potential in contingent and accidental ways. But this of course is no better than the positing of a linguistic Soul - a bit of unobservable magic that Chomsky by fiat claims to be identical to biology although exactly how that biology relates to language is someone else's problem, and not Chomsky's. It has no explanatory power, not one iota of it, no more than 'God did it'.

To understand language as social at it's core however, it to actually account for the mechanism by which grammar takes the shape it does, rather than believing in magic: because grammatical constraints are normative categories that specify what ought to be relayed in communication, society actually has a role as a selective mechanism (as in 'natural selection') which shapes grammar from the outset. This places language in time, in history, rather than essentializing it as having formed whole-cloth and positing - though an act of the mind alone - some linguistic Soul residing deep in the genes.

Having learnt language through social use, and then putting that learning to use in 'inner speech' is perfectly consistent with the theorized developmental pathway of 'inner speech'. As the article outlines - it begins with public speech (inter-social communication: 'mama, dada'), then private speech (talking to oneself out-loud), then 'inner speech'. That we end up 'using' the latter so much says nothing about why or how it got there. Again, your perspective is the same as the peasant who sees the sun rising every day while claiming that really, it's the sun that revolves around the earth, because that's the 'characteristic' phenomenology. It sure is, but it's also utterly irrelevant.

e. If language is simply the internalized system of complex social communication, which evolved gradually, then each step along the way had to somehow effect genetics — otherwise non human primates could learn language (as once thought, and probably still thought). But that’s not the Baldwin effect — that’s Lamarckism. — Xtrix

Unsurprising, for the follower of a priest, this is the same kind of rhetoric that creationists use to question evolution in general: "what's the use of half an eye"?. But what we know is that cultural evolution can far outstrip genetic evolution, without any necessary one-to-one relationship. In fact it is precisely this mismatch in pace that explains the Baldwin effect - cultural evolution confers an advantage without any corresponding genetic change, which then serves as a selective mechanism for genetic variation at the level of biology. That's nothing Larmarky about this, and is in fact just how evolution works past first year biology.

I ended up opening a thread in linguistics sub reddit and after reading all 90+ comments, the gist that I grasp about the subject corresponds with one friend of mine who went to graduate school in linguistics:

“Almost everyone who comments on UG can’t even define it. It just means ‘innate capacity for language’ That’s all it means.”

I’m mostly fed up with the subject, linguistics needs a centralized institution that decides and standardizes what all the terms mean just like Chemistry does as one of the comments pointed out. Hope they get their shit together on the subject in future decades.

https://www.reddit.com/r/linguistics/comments/sa0tan/why_is_there_no_clear_definition_of_universal/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=ios_app&utm_name=iossmf

For a fun debate about universals, along with all the ways in which they are characterized, Evens and Levinson's essay, on the Myth of Language Universals - along with replies both for and against, is a very good read:

https://www.umass.edu/preferen/You%20Must%20Read%20This/Evans-Levinson%20BBS%202009.pdf

Tomasello's reply - lovingly titled "Universal Grammar is Dead" - is wonderful:

"Universal grammar is, and has been for some time, a completely empty concept. Ask yourself: what exactly is in universal grammar? Oh, you don’t know – but you are sure that the experts (generative linguists) do. Wrong; they don’t. And not only that, they have no method for finding out. If there is a method, it would be looking carefully at all the world’s thousands of languages to discern universals. But that is what linguistic typologists have been doing for the past several decades, and, as Evans & Levinson (E&L) report, they find no universal grammar.

...For sure, all of the world’s languages have things in common, and E&L document a number of them. But these commonalities come not from any universal grammar, but rather from universal aspects of human cognition, social interaction, and information processing – most of which were in existence in humans before anything like modern languages arose. The evolution of human capacities for linguistic communication draw on what was already there cognitively and socially ahead of time, and this is what provides the many and varied “constraints” on human languages; that is, this is what constrains the way speech communities grammaticalize linguistic constructions historically (what E&L call “stable engineering solutions satisfying multiple design constraints”)."

UG is a farce; reading Chomsky to understand language is like reading Galen to understand biology: Chomsky's 'universals' are as scientific as Galen's 'humors' - and just as laughable.

I don’t have any stake on this so I can only talk second-hand about the subject from personal conversations and reading comments by linguists, but all UG was coined to mean is the initial state of the language learner, what is the biological capacity for language. Not language universals. That’s why some people refer to it as the Faculty of Language to be less misleading. There’s a long back and forth in the comment section in the link I provided.

but all UG was coined to mean is the initial state of the language learner, what is the biological capacity for language. Not language universals. — Saphsin

This is both true and not true. True in the sense that UG was meant to mean the "biological capacity for language", but not true in that what was/is understood as "biological capacity" is a particular sense of what this term means - as I mentioned in my post to Xtrix above. And of course, the idea that universal grammar does not concern itself with universals, well, I'll leave you to make the inference. The very last line of Tomasello is relevant here:

Why don’t we just call this universal grammar? The reason is because historically, universal grammar referred to specific linguistic content, not general cognitive principles, and so it would be a misuse of the term. It is not the idea of universals of language that is dead, but rather, it is the idea that there is a biological adaptation with specific linguistic content that is dead.

As there is no consensus yet in what particular sense, thus the distinction between UG & theories of UG as pointed out by different people in the thread. UG just denotes an object of study, not a theory of how language is determined by the biological capacity. This isn’t so much an argument from authority (someone is more knowledgeable than me so their conclusion is correct) as much about testimonies of how the term is used in their field. I don’t see why I shouldn’t believe what they’re saying.