I'm not at all inclined to speak in phenomenological terms. So, if the conventional notion of intention means being of and/or about something, then I find it best to talk in those terms, unless "intention" adds explanatory power that is otherwise somehow missing without it. — creativesoul

To talk in terms of intension (I think this is the proper spelling) just is to talk in terms of being about or of something. For me terminology is not so important as what's being said.

I don't know why you're directing this at me when if you read Banno's quote, he said that ""P" is the name for a proposition, P is the proposition. — Harry Hindu

You'll have to take that up with @Banno; I don't know what he had in mind.

Or an even more foundational starting point:

The form of a languageless belief is propositional.
The content of a languageless belief is non-propositional.

ahem, backing up


1. Languageless beliefs exist.
2. The form of a languageless belief is propositional.
3. The content of a languageless belief is non-propositional.
4. A languageless belief, though non-propositional in content, in taking the form of a proposition can be apprehended or expressed in the form, and with the content, of a proposition by a language-using creature.


The distinction between form and content seems to be the crucial one in regard to the debate in question, which centers on content.

1. Languageless beliefs exist. — ZzzoneiroCosm

That's a phrase that is thrown around with gay abandon, as if it were understood.

What is seems to mean is that we ascribe beliefs to creatures that do not have language.

2. The form of a languageless belief is propositional. — ZzzoneiroCosm

We ascribe beliefs to creatures that do not have language; the form of all beliefs is: This is true; were this is a state of affairs, a statement or indeed a proposition - whichever suits your pet grammar.

3. The content of a languageless belief is non-propositional. — ZzzoneiroCosm

There's much ambiguity in this thread as to the "content". Generally, and widely, the content of a belief is understood to be the targeted state of affairs, statement or proposition: what it is that is believed.

Hence "The content of a languageless belief is non-propositional" is not so much false as ill-formed.

4. A languageless belief, though non-propositional in content, in taking the form of a proposition can be apprehended or expressed in the form, and with the content, of a proposition by a language-using creature. — ZzzoneiroCosm

This ought be re-parsed as simply that we ascribe beliefs, and all the ensuing intentional structure, to creatures that do not have language.

That's a phrase that is thrown around with gay abandon, as if it were understood. — Banno

It's an assumption or inference. I'm comfortable with it as a starting place.

content of a belief is understood to be the targeted state of affairs — Banno

This sounds like a good description of the non-propositional content of a languageless belief. It may be objects, mental images, emotions, memories, sensations - but it's some state of affairs and it isn't language.

This ought be re-parsed as simply that we ascribe beliefs — Banno

We've already assumed or inferred that languageless beliefs exist so we don't need to couch it in terms of ascription.

This sounds like a good description of the non-propositional content of a languageless belief. — ZzzoneiroCosm

What is the case is what can be placed into propositional form. That's what "what is the case" means.
— Banno

Okay, that makes sense. Thanks. :smile: — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yes, non-propositional content (states of affairs) "can be placed into propositional form."

What is the case is what can be placed into propositional form. — Banno

It may be more accurate to simply say: What is the case has the form of a proposition. In the case of an unknown state of affairs we can then say that it has the form of a proposition but its content is unknown.

Then it would be:

Non-propositional content (states of affairs) have the form of a proposition.

How's this definition of a proposition?:

Moore claims:

In the one case what is apprehended is the meaning of the words: Twice two are four; in the other case what is apprehended is the meaning of the words: Twice four are eight… Now by a proposition, I mean the sort of thing which is apprehended in these two cases…. I hope it is plain that there certainly are such things as propositions in this sense.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/#history

I don't know what he had in mind. — Janus

No more than that "P" is a reference to P, and not P itself.

Propositions are a more abstract entity, being supposed as what is common between certain statements. So "the cup is on the shelf", "la taza está en el estante" and "bikarinn er í hillunni", I am told, are all different sentences in distinct languages that all express the same proposition. One might say that the proposition gives the meaning of a statement, but meaning is perhaps an even more contentious term than proposition. My preference would be to talk in terms of propositions as statements that can be either true or false, with the understanding that to a large extent the words statement and proposition are interchangeable, and with the option of returning to this issue if necessary. — Banno

No more than that "P" is a reference to P, and not P itself. — Banno

I thought it would be something along those lines; which makes sense.

Propositions are... — Banno

Thanks. :smile:

All languageless belief, though non-propositional, takes the general form of a proposition and can be apprehended or expressed in the form of a proposition by a language-using creature. — ZzzoneiroCosm

All things we name and describe, though some are non-propositional in their content, take the general form of a proposition when taken account of with naming and describing practices.

This ought be re-parsed as simply that we ascribe beliefs, and all the ensuing intentional structure, to creatures that do not have language. — Banno

Indeed. We most certainly do. Can we be wrong, and if so in what way?

This ought be re-parsed as simply that we ascribe beliefs, and all the ensuing intentional structure, to creatures that do not have language — Banno

Indeed. We most certainly do. Can we be wrong, and if so in what way? — creativesoul

Does the cat (fallen among language-users) have a beetle in its box? Maybe, maybe not.


Of course we can be wrong.

We can be wrong without knowing in what way we can be wrong.

If it's certainty you're looking for you had better start with ascription. Otherwise, you'll have to begin with an inference or assumption: there are languageless creatures who hold languageless beliefs.

Does the cat (fallen among language-users) have a beetle in its box? Maybe, maybe not. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I would think that the private language arguments are inapplicable to language less belief.

I would think that the private language arguments are inapplicable to language less belief. — creativesoul

If it isn't public - if it's truly private - then it ought to drop out of consideration. That's my understanding of one implication of the beetle in the box.

Wittgenstein was likely aiming at certainty too.

What form do propositional attitudes take in the human's mind if not scribbles and the sounds of spoken words? — Harry Hindu

Without recruiting scribbles or sounds (even noetic scribbles or sounds) a proposition takes this form: subject-predicate.

The subject-predicate form can be apprehended - held in the mind - reflected upon - in the total absence of scribbles and sounds (even noetic scribbles and sounds).

It's much easier to do this with the help of scribbles and sounds. That's probably why we invented them.




I'm not sure what to do with that word 'attitude.' I know I don't like it. And it doesn't seem to be necessary. I think it's okay to just drop it.

when taken account of with naming and describing practices. — creativesoul

I don't think you need this bit. I don't think the naming and taking account play a role.

It should just be:

All things [states of affairs], though some are non-propositional in their content, take the [ ] form of a proposition. — creativesoul

I think it's clearer to say 'states of affairs' as opposed to 'things'.


I might be ready to say, boldly: reality has the form of a proposition. Meaning only that it has this form: subject-predicate.

(It's a wild and shocking assertion and seems indisputable but somehow not very important. Kind of like: shrug, sure, we already knew that; back to more important things, like what can I do to make some meaning out of my life.)

Less boldly: We can only think and speak about reality using the subject-predicate form.

Hence: the form of a belief is propositional (since a belief is a part of reality). The form of a languageless belief is propositional (since a languageless belief is a part of reality), though its content (unknown perceptions, thoughts, feelings, emotions, sensations) are non-propositional (because they are an unknown and can't be apprehended).

(I'm making an attempt to synthesize Banno's and Moore's definition of a proposition.)




To clear up my own confusion: especially as regards form and content.

The form of reality is propositional: subject-predicate.

A proposition (what is apprehended in a statement) must have some known content. Otherwise, nothing can be apprehended.

Without some known content nothing can be apprehended. If a proposition is what is apprehended in a statement, and nothing can be apprehended, we aren't dealing with a proposition.

That portion of reality called the unknown is non-propositional because its contents are unknown and some contents of a proposition (what is apprehended in a statement) must be known. Otherwise, nothing can be apprehended and there is no proposition.

There is an actual distinction to be drawn and maintained between holding something as true and holding a belief, for they are not always the same, even though some beliefs are held to be true. — creativesoul

I'm not sure that I see the difference. To hold a belief would be the same as the act of believing. I'm sure that we can agree that there are beliefs that we acknowledge as existing without holding them as true (believing). In these cases we would hold them as false (disbelief) or indifferent (we just don't know if the belief is true or false). The reason why we have debates is because we agree in the existence of many beliefs, but their truth value is what we are debating.

I would say: an attitude that can be put into the form of a proposition. But I'm not sure. I'm just following along. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Redundant and not helpful. Then it appears that, like Banno, you have no idea what you're talking about either when you say that belief is an attitude towards some proposition or something that can be put in the form of a propositional attitude.

I'm not sure what to do with that word 'attitude.' I know I don't like it. And it doesn't seem to be necessary. I think it's okay to just drop it. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yup.

You might say: A belief is a thought pattern and an emotional pattern and you might tack on a behavioral pattern (which in some cases would include language). — ZzzoneiroCosm

So a belief has nothing necessarily to do with attitudes and propositions? Its not a trick question. I'm just trying to reconcile what you are saying now with what you have said before.

I'm not sure if even this is helpful. Are there any thought, emotional and behavioral patterns that are not beliefs? If so, then what kind of thought, emotional and behavioral patterns are beliefs compared to ones that are not beliefs? How would I tell the difference between a thought, emotional and behavioral pattern that is a belief and a thought, emotional and behavioral pattern that isn't a belief?

Without recruiting scribbles or sounds (even noetic scribbles or sounds) a proposition takes this form: subject-predicate. — ZzzoneiroCosm

And what form do subject-predicates take, if not scribbles or sounds?

Can you point to a subject-predicate in a language that you don't know? What do languages that you don't know look like and sound like? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds?

The subject-predicate form can be apprehended - held in the mind - reflected upon - in the total absence of scribbles and sounds (even noetic scribbles and sounds). — ZzzoneiroCosm

What form does the subject-predicate take in the mind if not the form of scribbles and sounds? To say that they are held in the mind or reflected upon just means that you're talking to yourself in your head. You hear a voice saying the words and the sound is the form the proposition takes in your mind.

It's much easier to do this with the help of scribbles and sounds. That's probably why we invented them. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yes, it is much easier to symbolize complex experiences for thinking and especially for communicating. We can think of democracy without words. It would be picturing in your mind people voting, candidates making promises for your vote, counting votes, etc.

This is also how using words can be redundant. If you and I are staring out the window at the rain, you can say, "It is raining." Because I can see that it is raining, hearing you say it would be redundant information. So I can believe it raining without using any words at all. I simply look out the window.

What form does the subject-predicate take in the mind if not the form of scribbles and sounds? — Harry Hindu

The form of images or memories of objects, sensations, emotions, feelings, and their relationships.

So a belief has nothing necessarily to do with attitudes and propositions? Its not a trick question. — Harry Hindu

I'm muddling through this and now think the word attitude is problematic and should be dropped.

Instead, in regard to belief, I might say: a belief has the form of a proposition: subject-predicate.

Nevermind the attitude.

What form does the subject-predicate take in the mind if not the form of scribbles and sounds? — Harry Hindu

So I can believe it raining without using any words at all. I simply look out the window. — Harry Hindu

This seems to be you answering your question.

This ought be re-parsed as simply that we ascribe beliefs, and all the ensuing intentional structure, to creatures that do not have language
— Banno

Indeed. We most certainly do. Can we be wrong, and if so in what way?
— creativesoul

Of course we can be wrong.

We can be wrong without knowing in what way we can be wrong. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Undoubtedly, it is quite possible(probable even) to be wrong without knowing in what way. However, discussing some of the ways that we can be is not impossible, and I find it necessary for understanding all belief, from the language less about events to those about events including language use through those about belief and language use itself.

If it's certainty you're looking for you had better start with ascription. Otherwise, you'll have to begin with an inference or assumption: there are languageless creatures who hold languageless beliefs. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I granted that we ascribe beliefs to language less creatures because we do, and I like to work from agreement. That was one.

We could also 'start' with an assumption or inference, but I'm not keen on saying that we're starting this endeavor with any of those suggestions. Afterall, we are where we are in this discussion as a result of a long history of socially constructed narratives, and without such a history the words we're using would be meaningless. The starting point of belief formation, if there is such a thing(it sounds wrong as a result of belief having no spatiotemporal location) is none of the three suggestions.

There is an actual distinction to be drawn and maintained between holding something as true and holding a belief, for they are not always the same, even though some beliefs are held to be true.
— creativesoul
I'm not sure that I see the difference. — Harry Hindu

As a result of watching it happen, a cat and it's owner both believe that a mouse is behind a tree. Only the owner(assuming they are a competent language user) holds "a mouse is behind a tree" as true. Both have the belief about the events and situation, but only one holds the belief to be true, for the other simply does not have the capability to do so.