three different kinds of belief noted above — creativesoul

Hi. Looking at your first post in the formal debate. Here's what I see. I'm no expert.

I'm having trouble ferreting out the three kinds of belief. A numbered list would be clearer.

Is it:

1)statements of belief about events
2)statements of belief about descriptions thereof
3)language less belief about events

?

I'm just not sure. So a numbered list would clear that up.


Banno's conflation of key terms could possibly be fleshed out a little better since it's such an important point: possibly with a list of terms and a description of each conflation.


Other than that, the presentation looks good. (Of course, writing of any kind can always get clearer and more to the point, but that's more of a long-term project (for all of us.))

This:

It paves the way for anthropomorphism by virtue of claiming that language less creatures are capable of holding something to be true. They are not. — creativesoul

--is a difficult position for me to accept since it appears to me that animals are capable of holding this and that to be true. But that's my taking issue with your position and not with your presentation.

If I do have an agenda, here it is — javra

In the formal debate, creative says Banno said this:

"A state of affairs is equivalent to a true proposition."

When I mentioned an agenda, I was thinking of Banno. Something like a deep-seated desire to look at everything in the universe through the lens of language.

I don't feel like you have an agenda here.

I uphold an evolutionary cline in the abilities of life. — javra

That's a healthy agenda to my view. :)

"Cline" is a nice word.

At the end of the day, though, I agree. And it's not high up on my list of priorities regarding beliefs/opinions that need to be maintained and justified. So it's known. — javra

Right. Interesting as all of this belief talk is, it doesn't seem very important. More important to my mind (in the Facebook age) is the psychology of belief.

I see more of a love of wisdom in modern psychology than in modern (especially analytic) philosophy.

Truth is best understood through T-sentences: "P" is true iff P — Banno


"P" is the name for a proposition, P is the proposition. ""The cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat. The first is mentioned, the second, used. The firs tis spoken about, the second, spoken with. — Banno

This is confusing. You're saying the name is true iff the proposition? What does that even mean? You seem to be saying that something is true if it is simply spoken. — Harry Hindu

The T-sentence is simply the minimal formulation of the correspondence notion of truth. "P" is the statement or proposition, 'iff' means 'if and only if', and P is the state of affairs or actuality. So "P" is true if and only if P. "It is raining" is true if and only if it is raining. It's very simple and totally commonsense; just our ordinary "correspondence" understanding of truth; where what we say is true if it corresponds to the described actuality.

I see more of a love of wisdom in modern psychology than in modern (especially analytical) philosophy. — ZzzoneiroCosm

:grin: I second that. Then again, there is the philosophy of mind to take notice of psychology, at least in principle.

Interesting as all of this belief talk is, it doesn't seem very important. More important to my mind (in the Facebook age) is the psychology of belief. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yup. Hmm. Tentatively addressed, I figure it this way. Can there be belief without trust? I can't discern it if there is. Belief that = trust that. Belief in = trust in. Trust is a funny concept. It's essential to who we are and yet, philosophically, more or less a mystery. Trust can be betrayed. Including by one own very self; like when one trusts that one has set the alarm-clock but has not. One wakes up and might feel self-sabotaged. We humans gain most of our instantiations of trust. Many lesser animals have their instantiations of trust inherited genotypically: e.g. a duckling innately trusting that the silluete of a bird of prey indicates danger wheres that of a goose does not; else its innate trust on what it imprints on.
It gets even more intense in terms of innate trust when it comes to insects. We, on the other hand, are birthed with little preset, innate trust - but yet exhibit it in (for example) trust that caregivers will caregive as needed, this from the moment we first emerge into the world. Most all the rest we build up over time. A lot of what we trust is habitual to us. But to form these habits of trust, we typically initially consciously ponder, deliberate, the issue with some momentary degree of uncertainty: choosing what to trust and what not to trust.

A small hint of background to the following idea: belief is trust (at least for the most part: belief is a thing; trust is a process). Belief/trust can then be a) inborn, phenotypically obtained via genetic inheritance, b) inherent in what we do (like a habit) and formerly learned in part via inborn beliefs/trust, or c) enactively made via conscious deliberation and choice founded on (b), and thereby becoming (b) after the fact.

Might be unclear, but I'm throwing this out there for the sake of sharing. Not currently looking to argue for it. But if its of interest as a possible alternative to other perspectives, there you have it. Belief is a concrete instantiation derived from the general process of trust. Or so I currently believe. :smile:

Yeah, I remember looking forward to replying to something you said earlier, then I could not find it. Could you repeat it, or link it, or somehow otherwise fill me in? — creativesoul

This is the comment I was referring to:

↪creativesoul
Is your disagreement with Banno only that you take him to be claiming that all beliefs are in propositional form, as opposed to claiming that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form? Because I imagine you would agree that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form. If this is so, then I can't see what you two could be disagreeing about. — Janus

I later made the comment below, which I would be interested to hear your response to:

How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief. — creativesoul

Say a prehistoric animal is thirsty and remembers where it last drank. Then it starts moving in the direction of the water. Is it not expecting the water to be where it was last time? I would say expectation is a kind of propositional form, insofar as it is intentional (in the phenomenological sense of being of or about something) even in the absence of symbolic language. — Janus

It's been explained to Harry before.

OK, I missed that; did he understand it?

It seems not.

Might be unclear — javra

Clear to me. Looks pretty straightforward. One thing I might mention re this:

...but yet exhibit it in (for example) trust that caregivers will caregive as needed, this from the moment we first emerge into the worl — javra

If an infant, to any significant degree, trusted his caregiver to caregive he would probably scream less bloodcurdlingly and less often. Bloodcurdling screams you might call evidence of distrust. :)

At any rate, an aside. Your ideas re trust seem solid.

Thanks. :grin: And a noteworthy aside! :up:

Be well.

A psychology of belief would look at why we hold the beliefs we hold, what are the psychological motivations, why do folks hold beliefs for which there is scant to no supporting evidence, why do we become so entrenched in our beliefs, why do we defend our beliefs so passionately, why do people who hold beliefs contrary to our own seem sometimes like total fucking morons and/or cocks. Especially fascinating is the psychology of mass belief: why large groups of people come to believe ridiculous things and in ridiculous people. From Gilgamesh to Trump. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Indeed. Understood. Trump is a symptom of much deeper issues in the US I'm afraid. I think that I've a fairly decent grasp of how the ground was cultivated over the nation's history, with particular interest on the past fifty years in order to give Trump a foothold, but that's too far off the main topic here... for now at least. Perhaps we could circle back later if the right circumstances arise.

I'm having trouble ferreting out the three kinds of belief. A numbered list would be clearer. — ZzzoneiroCosm

That makes perfect sense, for they were further set out in the second post.

1.)Beliefs about events, particularly those that can happen in places and times where naming and descriptive practices are non-existent. Believing that a mouse is behind a tree serves as an example thereof. These might be described as language-less beliefs, for they are not at all about language.
2.)Beliefs about events that can be and/or are uttered by an unreflective* language user(*say someone learning how to use names and descriptive practices such as a young child). One who sees a mouse run behind a tree and then states "A mouse is behind the tree" offers one such example.
3.)Beliefs about whether or not some statement is true.

The first two are about events. The third is about language use, particularly whether or not some statement is true.

This:
It paves the way for anthropomorphism by virtue of claiming that language less creatures are capable of holding something to be true. They are not.
— creativesoul

--is a difficult position for me to accept since it appears to me that animals are capable of holding this and that to be true. But that's my taking issue with your position and not with your presentation. — ZzzoneiroCosm

On my view, the only things we hold to be true(in the relevant sense) are statements. On yours, are there other things that are capable of being held true, such that a language less creature would be capable of doing so?

The T-sentence is simply the minimal formulation of the correspondence notion of truth. "P" is the statement or proposition, 'iff' means 'if and only if', and P is the state of affairs or actuality. So "P" is true if and only if P. "It is raining" is true if and only if it is raining. It's very simple and totally commonsense; just our ordinary "correspondence" understanding of truth; where what we say is true if it corresponds to the described actuality. — Janus

That's the way I've always understood it. However, that understanding has been challenged as incorrect by a few around here.

The cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen.

The meaning of the sound of the electric can opener is what the cat holds to be true. He believes it means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. In that sense, you might say the sound of the electric can opener is a statement of meaning to the cat. But that's kind of an abuse of language.

I don't think we need to insert the notion of a statement here.

Is your disagreement with Banno only that you take him to be claiming that all beliefs are in propositional form, as opposed to claiming that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form? Because I imagine you would agree that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form. If this is so, then I can't see what you two could be disagreeing about. — Janus

I've little to no issue with the claim that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form. That's what we do when taking account of another's belief. My issue arises when we conflate the content of our reports with the content of what we're reporting on.

I later made the comment below, which I would be interested to hear your response to:

How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief. — creativesoul

Say a prehistoric animal is thirsty and remembers where it last drank. Then it starts moving in the direction of the water. Is it not expecting the water to be where it was last time? I would say expectation is a kind of propositional form, insofar as it is intentional (in the phenomenological sense of being of or about something) even in the absence of symbolic language. — Janus

Yeah! That's the one I could not find. I think that expectation is belief about what's not yet happened. I'm not at all keen on the idea of propositional form somehow existing in such a way that a language less creature's belief could be a kind thereof.

I'm not at all inclined to speak in phenomenological terms. So, if the conventional notion of intention means being of and/or about something, then I find it best to talk in those terms, unless "intention" adds explanatory power that is otherwise somehow missing without it.

The cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen.

The meaning of the sound of the electric can opener is what the cast holds to be true. He believes it means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. In that sense, you might say the sound of the electric can opener is a statement of meaning to the cat. But that's kind of an abuse of language.

I don't think we need to insert the notion of a statement here. — ZzzoneiroCosm

You're correct that our positions differ here.

I wonder how the sound becomes meaningful to the cat on your view?

I wonder how the sound becomes meaningful to the cat on your view? — creativesoul

From a mentalistic point of view, the cat remembers the sound and associates it with food.
The association gives the sound meaning. It only requires us to assume or infer that cats have memories and can make associations.

The Skinnerian view would avoid mentalism and focus on the cat's behavior and conditioning.

Interesting. On my own view, the cat draws correlations between the sound and eating afterwards, and that's how the sound becomes meaningful. The notion of association works okay here too. To be clear, that is a very basic and incomplete account, for those meaningful correlations are far more complex by virtue of including far more things, but simplicity is good for now.

I'm still struggling to understand how the cat holds the meaning to be true.

To me, it hears the sound, it believes it is about to eat as a result of drawing much the same correlations that made the sound meaningful to it to begin with.

While I hold that language less belief can be true, I think that holding something as true requires a.)something that can be true in addition to b.)an animal capable of holding something as such. Seems to me that meaning is not the sort of thing that can be true, and the cat is not capable of holding something to be true.

A bit more background regarding my position...

Meaning is required for correspondence with the way things were, are, and/or will be. Meaning is required for coherency. Meaning is required for truth conditions. Indeed, it seems clear to me that meaning and truth are inextricably entwined in belief. However, holding something to be true and holding true belief seem to have remarkably different necessary preconditions.


I wanted to say a bit more about this...

The cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen.

The meaning of the sound of the electric can opener is what the cast holds to be true. He believes it means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. In that sense, you might say the sound of the electric can opener is a statement of meaning to the cat. But that's kind of an abuse of language.

I don't think we need to insert the notion of a statement here. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I agree that statements are not always necessary in order for a capable creature to attribute meaning(for things to become meaningful to that creature).

Do you hold to the conventional notion of proposition as what's common between two statements saying the same thing in two different languages(expressing the same proposition)?

b.)an animal capable of holding something as such. — creativesoul

I think here is the point of disagreement.

So the question seems to be: What is the psychology of "holding a belief"? Should the notion of holding a belief be included in an account of a cat's psychology?

Which makes me wonder if you think a dog can hold a belief. Or an ape. Is it a question of psychology? It seems it must be, if a human can hold a belief. It must be a difference of psyche.


The thing the cat is "holding to be true" is this: The sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. How does a cat go about "holding it to be true"? Does he think about the can opener away from mealtime and in his mind practice the association of can opener to tasty treat to firm up or stabilize the association? Does he sometimes hear a noise similar to the can opener and perk up and "question" the noise to see if it was indeed the can opener? Can that be called holding a belief?

All of this is unknown and takes us far away from philosophy into the realm of animal psychology.

Do you hold to the conventional notion of proposition as what's common between two statements saying the same thing in two different languages(expressing the same proposition)? — creativesoul

I don't really have much of a background in this kind of philosophy. I just try to follow along and ferret out where the disagreement is. I don't get a lot of nourishment (a feeling of increased wisdom) out of analytic philosophy but it's good exercise for the brain. It seems to be barking up the wrong tree to me. But it's just the analytic-continental counterpoise. I like the continentals.

Be well. — creativesoul

You too along with your mentor

The put into the form of part is obviously essential and possibly not what Banno wants to underscore: in the case of a cat holding beliefs, it would take an actual human having first studied the cat's behavior to put the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude.* It would be weird to argue a cat can put a belief into the form of a propositional attitude. There's some agenda behind such a strange phraseology.

*I don't mean writing it down, just to be clear. In his human mind already rife with propositions he apprehends or imagines the cat's behavior in the form of a propositional attitude. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Again, I need "propositional attitude" defined.

Youre saying the cat has a belief prior to it being put into the form of a propositional attitude (whatever that is), which means beliefs are not the propositional attitude but are something that can be put into the form if one. The objective here is to define beliefs, not what form they can be put into after the fact. So youre not explaining what a belief is. You're explaining that beliefs can be referred to with propositional attitudes (whatever that is). I want to know what form the cats belief is in prior to some human putting it in the form of a propositional attitude (whatever that is).

To say that it would be weird for a cat to put a belief in the form of a propositional attitude is a strange thing to say when it appears that the cat doesnt need to do so in order to have a belief per your own explanation.

What form do propositional attitudes take in the human's mind if not scribbles and the sounds of spoken words?

The T-sentence is simply the minimal formulation of the correspondence notion of truth. "P" is the statement or proposition, 'iff' means 'if and only if', and P is the state of affairs or actuality. So "P" is true if and only if P. "It is raining" is true if and only if it is raining. It's very simple and totally commonsense; just our ordinary "correspondence" understanding of truth; where what we say is true if it corresponds to the described actuality. — Janus

I don't know why you're directing this at me when if you read Banno's quote, he said that ""P" is the name for a proposition, P is the proposition." You're saying that "P" is proposition and P is the state-of-affairs "P" is about, refers, or points to. If P is not the case, then "P" is false. That is what I said:

Right, so "P" is the proposition, and P is what the proposition points to. If what "P" points to is not the case, then "P" is false. If P is the case, then "P" is true. — Harry Hindu

Banno then replied with what I quoted in my post that you quoted. So no, Banno did not explain truth in the way you just did, which is how I've been explaining it as well. So Banno is not being honest.

Again, I need "propositional attitude" defined. — Harry Hindu

I would say: an attitude that can be put into the form of a proposition. But I'm not sure. I'm just following along.

The objective here is to define beliefs — Harry Hindu

You might say: A belief is a thought pattern and an emotional pattern and you might tack on a behavioral pattern (which in some cases would include language).

b.)an animal capable of holding something as such.
— creativesoul

I think here is the point of disagreement.

So the question seems to be: What is the psychology of "holding a belief"? Should the notion of holding a belief be included in an account of a cat's psychology?

Which makes me wonder if you think a dog can hold a belief. Or an ape. Is it a question of psychology? It seems it must be, if a human can hold a belief. It must be a difference of psyche. — ZzzoneiroCosm

While I agree that that is one point of divergence between our positions, I'm not keen on invoking psychological terminology. It seems unnecessary, and looks to be quite unhelpful for the task at hand. It has made the issue even more complex than it already is, and in doing so increased entities without adding clarity. I do not share the belief that the task aims at the unknown, or unknowable. Although acquiring knowledge of language less belief requires a stringent methodology replete with certain specific criteria based upon actual differences, it's certainly not a 'fait accompli' situation. The questions can be put as...

1.What sort of things are held to be true?
2.What does holding things to be true require such that some creatures are capable of doing so while others are not?

There is an actual distinction to be drawn and maintained between holding something as true and holding a belief, for they are not always the same, even though some beliefs are held to be true. This may seem to be splitting hairs, but it is imperative to do so for that distinction both honors and subsequently bridges the gap between belief and thinking about belief, whereas the latter requires language use, and is necessary for holding something to be true. Such belief is about language use, and amounts to a charitable reading of Banno's position(belief as an attitude towards some statement/proposition such that they believe it to be true).

I cannot possibly stress how many 'different' historical philosophical problems arose from neglecting that actual distinction(between belief and thinking about belief). From Plato/Socrates to Aristotle to Locke, Hume, and Kant to Descartes, Heidegger, Husserl, all the way through Frege, Russell, Witty, and Moore to Gettier to Quine, Davidson, Rorty, Chalmers, Searle, Dennett, and beyond, there's been a gross misconception of belief at work, and accounting malpractices thereof have been and remain the result.

The thing the cat is "holding to be true" is this: The sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. How does a cat go about "holding it to be true"? Does he think about the can opener away from mealtime and in his mind practice the association of can opener to tasty treat to firm up or stabilize the association? Does he sometimes hear a noise similar to the can opener and perk up and "question" the noise to see if it was indeed the can opener? Can that be called holding a belief?

All of this is unknown and takes us far away from philosophy into the realm of animal psychology. — ZzzoneiroCosm

"The sound of the electric can opener means that there might be something tasty in the kitchen" is an accounting practice. Attributing that practice to a language less creature is a mistake; a conflation of belief and thinking about belief. What you've suggested is an example of thinking about belief. All thinking about belief requires language use.

While I've no issue agreeing that that account is an accurate enough one regarding what the sound means to the cat, I do not agree that the cat also holds the account to be true. The cat cannot hold an accounting practice to be true, for it cannot understand such practices, and in order to hold something as true, one must first understand what's being held so. At the very least, one must believe they do.

In this example, it makes perfect sense to me for us to say that when the cat hears the can opener it believes it is about to eat, thinks so, even expects to, or perhaps that it thinks or believes there is or will be food in the kitchen, so it goes to check.