(Two years since previous post)

If beliefs attain definite content absent the formation of statements which describe them at the time, why would the content of those beliefs depend upon hypothetical objects which are made later? — fdrake

Quite right. Good post. :up:

If someone restricts intentional state content to declarative sentences' propositional content (eg, making beliefs only target propositional content or propositions) it removes both the character of that content and the means of its interpretation. — fdrake

Another good post. I will have to read you on something I care more about. :grin:

EG, if I claimed that my partner makes me feel a special way and I called it "blimblam", and I described it as a composite of homeliness, horniness, care and calm. You'd know how to use the word. It's not my blimblam thoughts and sensations that are doing the work in the setting up the use of the word, it's leveraging the public criteria we share that characterise the use of those sensations and feeling words we both already know. — fdrake

Aye.

If you're going to do a debate you should agree on a motion. All key terms in the OP's question are vague, and each of you can use that to hedge.

[...]

If you continued like that, Banno could assert his definition of belief, you could assert your definition of belief, and there's a strong chance you'll both address none of the other's points and retreat to hedges. — fdrake

Prophecies are always better when they are written down. :lol:

fdrake seems to be in the way here. Bring it. — Banno

Famous last words.

I should think that creativesoul won the debate, if only because Banno construed his own position in the form of a particularly bald tautology. That and it seems that Banno has capitulated in the meanwhile.

But the curious thing is that I tend to think Banno's position is correct—the non-tautologous variety. I would want to render propositions this way:

1. All beliefs are intellectual.
2. All that is intellectual is propositional.
3. Therefore, All beliefs are propositional.

Third, I am not convinced there are non-propositional beliefs... I tend to think that implicit beliefs are propositional. For example, if I am driving and I brake when a child runs into the street, I am acting on the belief that, “If I brake I will not hit this child,” even though this belief is not explicit or formulated or conscious. Admittedly the thinking would not need to be discursive or consciously carried out. It is fast thinking, but it nevertheless involves a mental act. — Leontiskos

Obviously I am not thinking about propositions in terms of statements, for I am including unformulated affirmations or acknowledgments. But regardless of the conception of propositions, there seems to be a substantive disagreement with @creativesoul here.