Yet quarks are supposed to be the constituent parts of massive objects. Where does all that mass actually come from? — Metaphysician Undercover

Most of the mass=energy of a proton is from the gluons.

all those "nothings" — Gnomon

…added up to a heck of a lot of crap!

Logic, though, doesn't tell us anything about an inference other than whether it is consistent with its premises (validity); it cannot tell us whether the premises are true.

The only way to test the truth of any premise is by empirical evidence. — Janus

Premises need not be descriptions of physical things, whose truth and falsity is judged according to empirical evidence. We can make premises which are descriptions of how logic works, and also premises concerning moral issues. The judgement of truth or falsity of these premises is not based in empirical evidence, so it isn't really correct to say that the truth of a premise can only be tested by empirical evidence. That itself would be a premise which cannot be tested, so the truth or falsity of it could not be judged. Whether empirical evidence, or knowledge about the immaterial, provides a more sound judgement is another question. Plato was insistent on the latter.

Science is based on a method of testing the truth or falsity of immaterial principles (hypotheses) through reference to empirical evidence. What science does not provide for us is any real principles for testing the validity of empirical evidence. Sure there are guidelines as to what constitutes an "observation\", and principles as to how experiments ought to proceed in a way to produce objective observations, but these are all based in "ought", so they can only be supported by strong metaphysics. Weak metaphysics produces inconsistency between one field of science and another, as to what constitutes a valid observation.

Most of the mass=energy of a proton is from the gluons. — PoeticUniverse

Yes, gluons have no mass in themselves, but they are responsible for, as carriers of, the strong force. The strong force, which binds quarks into massive objects, is mathematically equivalent to mass. So if quarks are separated there is a freeing of energy which exists in the hadron (massive object) as gluons.

The problem is that the strong interaction force is not well understood. It is "observed" to be unrestricted by distance, and because of this, quarks cannot actually be separated in experimental practise. No matter how far apart they are supposedly separated, the strong force still acts to hold them together, and no real separation can be observed.

The strong force acts between quarks. Unlike all other forces (electromagnetic, weak, and gravitational), the strong force does not diminish in strength with increasing distance between pairs of quarks. After a limiting distance (about the size of a hadron) has been reached, it remains at a strength of about 10,000 newtons [N], no matter how much farther the distance between the quarks.[7] As the separation between the quarks grows, the energy added to the pair creates new pairs of matching quarks between the original two; hence it is impossible to isolate quarks. The explanation is that the amount of work done against a force of 10,000 newtons is enough to create particle–antiparticle pairs within a very short distance of that interaction. The very energy added to the system required to pull two quarks apart would create a pair of new quarks that will pair up with the original ones. In QCD, this phenomenon is called color confinement; as a result only hadrons, not individual free quarks, can be observed. The failure of all experiments that have searched for free quarks is considered to be evidence of this phenomenon. — Wikipedia

I've proposed an alternative method of metaphysical speculation to the mainstream (i.e. Platonic) method you've undertaken. — 180 Proof

I must have missed your explication of that method. Can you summarize it for me? In what sense is it beyond physical"? Do you have a name for it?

My "metaphysical speculation" necessarily goes beyond Physics, because The Scientific Method doesn't address "ultimate questions". Moreover, my alternative Philosophical method is a combination of both Platonic Idealism and Aristotelian Realism. For example, Ari applied Plato's notion of Ideal FORM to real things. " Aristotle famously contends that every physical object is a compound of matter and form". And that is exactly what I'm doing with an "alternative" definition of "InFORMation". Whatever he meant by "form", it's clear that it's different from "matter". “by form I mean the essence of each thing and the primary substance” In my usage, Information is the "essence" of material things. And by that I'm referring to the immaterial mathematical Structure, that our minds interpret as Geometry & Topology (i.e. Shape or Form). That Essence is Ideal in the sense that it exists as an Idea in a Mind, which makes it as real as anything else in our mental & mathematical models of reality. :smile:

Metaphysical speculation is, simply put, the pondering of ultimate questions about the universe. https://miuc.org/the-value-of-metaphysics-and-of-metaphysical-conversation/

"Information" is not "Work". — 180 Proof

That may be true of Shannon's definition of "information", as an empty carrier of meaning. But in my usage, and that of credentialed physicists, such as physicist Paul Davies, Information is both Causal and Meaningful. He edited a book by a dozen scientists & philosophers entitled "From Matter to Life: Information and Causality". So, if he is correct that Information has Causal powers, then that causal process is what we call "Work". :wink:

Explain why a physical brain [i[physically[/i] "burns a lot of" physical "energy" — 180 Proof

In the process of Enformation (change of form) the brain burns energy to Change (en-form) the state of neurons. Note -- I resurrected an "obsolete" form of the verb "to inform" in order to emphasize the en-ergy aspect of the process. To En-Form is to cause a change of Form. Which is what Energy does. However, in my thesis, Energy is not "physical", but "meta-physical" ; not in a spiritual sense, but because it is knowable only by mental inference from its effects on matter, so we can't detect energy directly. We infer, or imagine, the invisible Cause from observation of physical changes in matter. :chin:

Energy is the relationship between information regimes
https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/22084/how-is-information-related-to-energy-in-physics

Almost all the forms of energy are invisible
https://www.quora.com/Why-are-most-forms-of-energy-invisible-to-the-naked-eyes-while-we-can-see-heat-as-fire-for-example-What-make-some-forms-seen-and-other-not

anti-idealism isn't necessarily physicalism — 180 Proof

Hmmm, interesting! I suppose you mean that Anti-idealism is Realism. But I could call it "Naive Realism". And my alternative would be "Information Realism". :cool:

Naive Realism :
In social psychology, naïve realism is the human tendency to believe that we see the world around us objectively, and that people who disagree with us must be uninformed, irrational, or biased.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Na%C3%AFve_realism_(psychology)

Information Realism :
This abstract notion, called information realism is philosophical in character, but it has been associated with physics from its very inception.
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/physics-is-pointing-inexorably-to-mind/

PS__I'm enjoying your challenges to my thesis. It helps me to weed-out errors in reasoning, and to find different ways to describe counterintuitive and non-mainstream concepts. :joke:

…added up to a heck of a lot of crap! — PoeticUniverse

Which includes those imaginary Quarks and Gluons, and all invisible Forces for that matter. But hey, icky & gummy crap can be used to stick & glue things together. :joke:

"Gluon :a subatomic particle of a class that is thought to bind quarks together."

"We now postulate that the particles carrying this force, called gluons,"

crap — Gnomon

My Space Vacation:

Premises need not be descriptions of physical things, whose truth and falsity is judged according to empirical evidence. We can make premises which are descriptions of how logic works, and also premises concerning moral issues. The judgement of truth or falsity of these premises is not based in empirical evidence, so it isn't really correct to say that the truth of a premise can only be tested by empirical evidence. That itself would be a premise which cannot be tested, so the truth or falsity of it could not be judged. — Metaphysician Undercover

Only premises that are descriptions of physical things or the behavior of observable things can be tested, though. Descriptions of how logic works are observations of how we think and are tested for veracity against observations of how we think. Moral premises are judged against standards of compassion, social harmony and against how we feel about things. All of this requires observation. The premise that the truth of premises can be tested only by observation is itself based on observation of how we test premises. It is supported by the fact that we cannot come up with any other way to test premises.

All true, but the point about falsifiability is to be able to differentiate scientific or empirical hypotheses from those that are not. Examples that he gave were psychoanalysis and communism which can't be falsified as they're so loosely defined they can accomodate all kinds of counter-factuals (ergo not really 'scientific' although that is hardly news by now.) But the fact that an idea is not 'falsifiable' doesn't mean it's automatically invalid, that anything that can't be empirically falsified is empty. That's very close to positivism or verificationism. — Wayfarer

I think the examples you give: psychoanalysis and communism are tested by observing their results. Such testing is empirical but it cannot be as definitive as testing in physics or chemistry. Testing of theories in geology and biology are somewhere in between; not as definitively testable as physical and chemical theories, but more definitively testable than psychoanalytic theories or the predictions of communism.

I wouldn't say that untestable ideas are invalid. Logical validity is to do with form, not content, so even nonsense syllogisms can be valid. In any case, considerations of validity aside, untestable ideas may be highly creative, and poetic and inspiring, so they are not necessarily without value.

I can't make much sense of the idea that information is ontologcally basic. at least not exclusively. Information informs; what is it informing and what is it informing about?

My thoughts exactly! Who is being informed and by what?

although I will add that I can see merit in this formulation:

“by form I mean the essence of each thing and the primary substance” In my usage, Information is the "essence" of material things. And by that I'm referring to the immaterial mathematical Structure, that our minds interpret as Geometry & Topology (i.e. Shape or Form). That Essence is Ideal in the sense that it exists as an Idea in a Mind, which makes it as real as anything else in our mental & mathematical models of reality. — Gnomon

I posted a snippet upthread which might be worth including again as it makes a similar point:

I think the examples you give: psychoanalysis and communism are tested by observing their results. — Janus

But Popper's point was that all kinds of results could be accomodated by both theories, which is why he used them as examples of the kinds of theories that purport to be scientific or empirical, but actually are not, because they can't be falsified by observation.

But Popper's point was that all kinds of results could be accomodated by both theories, which is why he used them as examples of the kinds of theories that purport to be scientific or empirical, but actually are not, because they can't be falsified by observation. — Wayfarer

I was thinking along the lines that psychoanalysis is believed to help people work through their mental problems. So you could do case studies to see if that is the case. I believe such studies have been carried out on the various psychotherapies, and I recall reading that CBT has generally appeared to be the most effective kind of therapy.

To test whether communism would work to make for more harmonious communities and general improvement of happiness you would first need to establish a community that works according to communistic principles freely chosen by the people, not imposed by force.

As I said before, I think there is a continuum of definiteness of testability across the various domains of inquiry. Take the idea of enlightenment as knowing-the-ultimate-truth; that cannot be tested at all; how could you ever know by observation whether someone knows the ultimate truth (whatever that might even be thought to mean). But enlightenment as non-attachment and non-reactivity can be tested by observing the purportedly enlightened one's behavior.

There is a "demarcation problem" that philosophers of science are still grappling with. The boundary between science and pseudoscience or non-science cannot definitively be established, so I think it is best thought of as a continuum. Any speculation which in principle cannot be even with minimal definiteness tested by observation would count as non-science. Where something would seem to be able to be tested, for example astrology, but the testing cannot coherently, consistently, plausibly and unequivocally link the predicted results with the purported causes would count as pseudoscience.

I was thinking along the lines that psychoanalysis is believed to help people work through their mental problems. So you could do case studies to see if that is the case — Janus

Yes, but Popper's point was that no matter what came up, you could accomodate it or explain it, so Freudian psychoanalysis wasn't a predictive theory at all. (He compared it to the theory of relativity, which was confirmed in part by Eddington's observations of solar parallax.)

Anyway I wasn't wanting to divert the thread into a discussion of psychoanalysis or marxism, but only to make the point about why Popper invoked the criterion of falsifiability in the first place. You brought up 'how could non-physicalist ideas even be tested' or something along those lines, so I was trying to show that the criterion of falsifiability in Popper's sense is not relevant to philosophical rationalism. The fact that metaphysical ideas are not testable does nothing to negate them, as ideas on that level can only be judged according to their philosophical merits.

Take the idea of enlightenment as knowing-the-ultimate-truth; that cannot be tested at all; how could you ever know by observation whether someone knows the ultimate truth (whatever that might even be thought to mean). — Janus

It can't be tested in the third person.

Any speculation which in principle cannot be even with minimal definiteness tested by observation would count as non-science. — Janus

As if the scientific criteria are the only criteria by which anything can be judged to be real. Which is as I've often said, pretty well an exact definition of positivism:

a philosophical system recognizing only that which can be scientifically verified or which is capable of logical or mathematical proof, and therefore rejecting metaphysics and theism.

Science is a way to organize experience in a repeatable manner, such that we have some confidence in the mind-independence of some phenomena. Of course, this independence cannot fully be actualized, but postulated.

One problem with relying too much on science as a worldview is that it must overlook personal (private) experience. I suspect this is part of the reason why psychology as a science, has not made as much progress as other fields, the phenomena get too complex eventually.

I don't know if it's even possible to negate a metaphysical perspective.

Yes, but Popper's point was that no matter what came up, you could accomodate it or explain it, so Freudian psychoanalysis wasn't a predictive theory at all. — Wayfarer

But it is a predictive theory, The theory is that is you remember and confront past emotional traumas that have been repressed because they were too difficult to cope with, then you will overcome the psychological blocks and complexes that those repressions are sustaining. As I said it is not definitely testable, but there is no other way to decide if that theory is on the mark or not. It cannot be decided by thinking about it.

No theory, not even relativity (which along with quantum theory is one of the most predictively successful theories ever) can be known to be true, in any case. All we can know is whether it works in the sense that what is predicted is observed.

The fact that metaphysical ideas are not testable does nothing to negate them, as ideas on that level can only be judged according to their philosophical merits. — Wayfarer

If even scientific theories cannot be known to be true, how much less can metaphysical speculations be known to be true? There is no agreement among philosophers, much less than there is among scientists, so how could a metaphysical idea be judged according to its "philosophical merits"? Who decides what constitutes philosophical merit, and by what criteria?

It can't be tested in the third person. — Wayfarer

It can't be tested at all. If you believed you knew an ultimate truth how could you know it is true, and how could you know it is ultimate?

As if the scientific criteria are the only criteria by which anything can be judged to be real. Which is as I've often said, pretty well an exact definition of positivism: — Wayfarer

Where have I said anything about anything being real? We are discussing truth and its relation to testability.

So take a scientists who believes in only what the evidence shows. The world is made of quantum fields. That's what the evidence says exists at bottom. It's a fluctuating space that vibrates. It's a physical thing that we'll never see, can only get at thorough (physical) mathematical equations and offers no hints that a rock, much less an organism would ever arise. — Manuel

But quantum theory and particle physics is consistent with chemical theory, and chemical theory is consistent with geology, cosmology and biology. I see them as just being different domains or levels of description and explanation.

I suspect this is part of the reason why psychology as a science, has not made as much progress as other fields, the phenomena get too complex eventually. — Manuel

I agree, and the further problem is that people do things for reasons, which is a whole different ball game than what is involved in studying events, processes and the behavior of things in terms of causes.

Yes, you can find consistency and some scientists like to be able to think in terms of reduction. The thing is, almost all physicists would agree that, based on physics alone, you would never be able to predict a biological phenomena emerging, much less a complex mammal.

And we may call physics "physical", but I like to point out that these things are discovered through equations and then verified by observational evidence. The issue is that I cannot think of something less "physical" than mathematics. So we have an ideal theory formation (equations we come up with) combined with physical observation. Looks like messy metaphysics to me.



It's strange. I often feel I understand a human being better when I'm told why they did something, say, I discover John was mad or Jane was excited, because John was fired and Jane got promoted.

But this "understanding" is way different than understanding a scientific theory.

crap — Gnomon
My Space Vacation: — PoeticUniverse

Did you meet Elon Musk out there?

I was pleasantly surprised to see how much enthusiasm there is on the forum for this contentious topic. Especially after it petered-out at least twice before. The expressed opinions seem strongly divided between Science & Pseudoscience, or between Physics & Metaphysics, with some fer it, and some agin it, and only a few on the fence.

However, the intention of my thesis was to bring Metaphysics back into the fold of Science, if not exactly Physics. But centuries after the "Enlightenment", the gap is still wide, among those who care enough to even argue about Ideal concepts that have no immediate effect in the physical world. Metaphysics won't make your cell phone work, or put food on your table. But deep thinkers seem to think it's important to think about such non-things. To some, it's a vermin to be eradicated with rat poison, while to others it's the creamy icing on the worldview cake. :smile:

"genetic information" and "entelechy".
I have referred to both of those ideas in my thesis. For example, I describe what Plato called Ideal FORM, in terms of Generic Information. That label is intended to include metaphysical Memes as well as physical Genes, as carriers of Information. In my thesis, both fall under the heading of EnFormAction.

Whereas Aristotle may have imagined "entelechia" in terms of an animating World Soul, I prefer to describe that teleological force in Nature as positive "Enformy", to replace the made-up label in Physics : "Negentropy". Although it sounds dismissive, just giving it a name is an indirect admission of a mysterious positive force, driving Evolution toward some unknown future state. And despite attempts to denigrate Metaphysics as "supernatural", Entropy is as natural as Energy. It just happens to be defined in terms of Information Theory, instead of Thermodynamic Theory. :smile:

Information is Generic in the sense of generating all forms from a formless pool of possibility : the Platonic Forms.
http://bothandblog2.enformationism.info/page29.html

An entelechy is an internal force or principle that drives a being toward its destiny.
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/entelechy

Enformy :
In the Enformationism theory, Enformy is a hypothetical, holistic, metaphysical, natural trend or force, that counteracts Entropy & Randomness to produce complexity & progress.
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html



Because of the "Hard Problem" of Consciousness, Physics has no good explanation for the existence of Memes in the world. It's a "cultural analog" to Genes, but the evolutionary leap from molecules lto Genes, and from Genes to Memes are not explained by the analogy. So, it remains an "explanatory gap" to be filled by some Potential. But, was that pre-real potency physical (particular) or meta-physical (general)? The latter is a "Meme of the Gaps" solution to a philosophical mystery. It assumes that concepts are not made of Atoms or Bosons.

Just as genetic information is encapsulated in a protein form, a meme requires a physical medium (e.g. neuron) -- but the meaningful content of the capsule is not physical. it's relational, like Mathematics. So, what is Math made of, if not Information (the power to enform)? That's a rhetorical question, I already know the usual "it's all physical" answer, as a term of Faith in Science. :cool:

Aristotle may have imagined "entelechia" in terms of an animating World Soul — Gnomon

I don't associated the idea of the 'world soul' with Aristotle in particular, but definitely with the idea of 'animating principle'.

entelechy, (from Greek entelecheia), in philosophy, that which realizes or makes actual what is otherwise merely potential. The concept is intimately connected with Aristotle’s distinction between matter and form, or the potential and the actual. He analyzed each thing into the stuff or elements of which it is composed and the form which makes it what it is (see hylomorphism). The mere stuff or matter is not yet the real thing; it needs a certain form or essence or function to complete it. Matter and form, however, are never separated; they can only be distinguished. Thus, in the case of a living organism, for example, the sheer matter of the organism (viewed only as a synthesis of inorganic substances) can be distinguished from a certain form or function or inner activity, without which it would not be a living organism at all; and this “soul” or “vital function” is what Aristotle in his De anima (On the Soul ) called the entelechy (or first entelechy) of the living organism. — Brittanica

I suppose this would nowadays be dismissed as vitalism, but it makes intuitive sense to me. The problem is that this so-called vital function doesn't exist on the level of molecular transactions, so it can't be measured objectively, so to all intents it is dismissed as a figment.

If even scientific theories cannot be known to be true, how much less can metaphysical speculations be known to be true? There is no agreement among philosophers, much less than there is among scientists, so how could a metaphysical idea be judged according to its "philosophical merits"? Who decides what constitutes philosophical merit, and by what criteria? — Janus

Big questions, but this is what philosophy is for. As I might have mentioned I've been reading a blog I've discovered by a Dutch author - don't know if he's an academic but seems to have read everything - take a look at Leibniz's Question, the Crisis of Physicalism, and the Return of Absolute Idealism. It describes pretty well the point I'm up to. I've also been studying Bernardo Kastrup's 'analytical idealism' which is in accord with a lot of what is written there. There's definitely a sea change happening in philosophy and science - 'the old is dying, the new is struggling to be born'.

I don't associated the idea of the 'world soul' with Aristotle in particular, but definitely with the idea of 'animating principle'. — Wayfarer

Sorry, Aristotle gave a definition of "soul", so perhaps I mis-spoke. Anyway, his notion of Entelechy sounds like another word for the motivating animating vital force of the world. Some Physicalists and Realists on this forum don't mind reifying metaphors into material forms. :smile:

Reify : make (something abstract) more concrete or real.

The Platonic doctrine of the world soul was rejected by aristotle.
https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/world-soul-anima-mundi

Entelechy :
the realization of potential.
the supposed vital principle that guides the development and functioning of an organism or other system or organization.
Note -- apparently I expanded that narrow notion to include the Cosmic Organism. Doesn't that make sense? I suppose he "rejected" Plato's ideal soul, because he was trying to be a Realist, instead of an Idealist. But, I don't see anything necessarily Ideal about the concept of directional momentum in the expansion of a Singularity into a Cosmos. Of course if you try to explain how that teleology came to be programmed into a speck of Potential, that might get Meta-Physical, in the sense of probing beyond the physical boundary of our world. But physicists do that with Inflation and Multiverse theories. So, why not philosophers? :wink:

Information - Consciousness - Reality :
He then offers two ways of understanding this dynamic world : in Aristotelian terms as “the entelechy of existence”, and the metaphor of “the rhizome of reality”. Later, he mentions a more technological way to think of reality, as a mathematical structure forming “the software that connects us, that enables all distributed systems, including life itself”. However, he seems to think of this evolving complexifying mechanism as more like a living cosmic organism.
http://bothandblog7.enformationism.info/page18.html

Of course if you try to explain how that teleology came to be programmed into a speck of Potential, that might get Meta-Physical, in the sense of probing beyond the physical boundary of our world. — Gnomon

There's a tendency of thought called 'orthogenesis' - 'Orthogenesis, also known as orthogenetic evolution, progressive evolution, evolutionary progress, or progressionism, is the biological hypothesis that organisms have an innate tendency to evolve in a definite direction towards some goal (teleology) due to some internal mechanism or "driving force". According to the theory, the largest-scale trends in evolution have an absolute goal such as increasing biological complexity. Prominent historical figures who have championed some form of evolutionary progress include Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and Henri Bergson.' https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orthogenesis

I think that in mainstream science the idea is deprecated, although the entry is worth looking at as there still seems to be some controversy about it. It's similar to the term 'teleology' which due to its association with Aristotle is strictly verboten in scientific reasoning, but then the term 'teleonomy' had to be coined to capture the fact that organisms are inherently purposeful. (Replaces 'purposiveness' with 'apparent purposiveness' - typical materialist double-speak.)

Take a gander at https://www.thenewatlantis.com/authors/stephen-talbott . Interesting essays on philosophy of biology.

Your idea of "meta-physics" may have value in philosophical discussions, but it isn't "metaphysics" as we normally use the word. We've been through all this before. I don't think we'll get anywhere going through it again". — T Clark
Since, in my wordy posts, I haven't been able to convince that there is another way to define "Metaphysics", here's a less verbose version : :chin:

Physics is about analyzing a system into pieces and parts (practice).
Meta-physics is about generalizing pieces & parts into systems (theory).

I must have missed your explication of that method. Can you summarize it for me? In what sense is it beyond physical"? — Gnomon

I guess you didn't read this post

negative metaphysics, as I propose with good reasons ↪180 Proof, surpasses (anachronistic) 'positive metaphysics'. — 180 Proof

or the embedded link (rabbit hole to Oz!) therein.

Do you have a name for it?

Impossibilism (will do, I guess) – membership-rules of the Null Set as a speculative criterion for understanding (instead of a 'categorical construct' e.g. essences, universals, transcendent entities, etc).

edit:

Immanentism – negative ontology as a speculative criterion for the understanding which enables-constrains praxes, or agency. :smirk:

Now, you're just getting nasty. So, I'll back-off the stinky word "Metaphysics", and present my aromatic turkey dinner in the form of Karl Popper's notion of non-falsifiable Worlds 2 &3 as noted in the reply to Janus below. — Gnomon

My only complaint has been your confusing misuse of the word "metaphysics." As for your ideas themselves, I don't have strong feelings either way.

Yet quarks are supposed to be the constituent parts of massive objects. Where does all that mass actually come from? — Metaphysician Undercover

Quarks have mass. I do remember reading that the mass of the quarks making up larger subatomic particles; i.e. protons, neutrons, and mesons; add up to less than the mass of the particle itself.

In Gnomon's defense, he offers definitions and glossary links to every term he uses. You don't have to agree with him but you can't say that he's not trying.

Atoms or Bosons — Gnomon

I will explain quarks and bosom energy tomorrow, along with the some old sexist problems caused by the quark names.

In Gnomon's defense, he offers definitions and glossary links to every term he uses. You don't have to agree with him but you can't say that he's not trying. — Wayfarer

In my responses I have noted that, although he uses "metaphysics" in a way I don't think is appropriate, he is careful to define what he means by the words he uses. I appreciate that.