Janus: Collingwood is not a metaphysician.
T Clark: Why not?
Janus: Because he's wrong.
T Clark: Why is he wrong?
Janus: Because he's not a metaphysician. — T Clark

No, that's not what I;m saying at all. I'll correct it for you so you can better understand what I am saying.

Janus: Collingwood is not a metaphysician.
T Clark: Why not?
Janus: Because he's not doing anything that would conventionally be considered, according to either the ancient or modern conceptions, metaphysics.

Janus: Collingwood is not a metaphysician.
T Clark: Why not?
Janus: Because he's not doing anything that would conventionally be considered, according to either the ancient or modern conceptions, metaphysics. — Janus

In the Essay, Collingwood summarizes Aristotle's metaphysics and then derives his directly from it. I've read it several times and I don't understand it all, but I can see he didn't just wave his arms and say "abracadabra presto chango" and pull his metaphysics out of a hat. That's about as far as I can take it. I don't have what it takes to evaluate his results.

OK, I didn't remember that, but it's years since I read it. If I can find the reading time I'll take another look.

OK, I didn't remember that, but it's years since I read it. If I can find the reading time I'll take another look. — Janus

I don't think this answers the question anyway. I don't know enough to tell if he did a good job or not. It doesn't really matter, to me at least. As I've noted throughout this thread, I like the way Collingwood takes on the question of what underlies our understanding of reality, no matter what you call it. If it's not metaphysics, although I'm comfortable it is, it's still what I want to talk about.

So we can leave it there for now. You say you may reread him. I'm aiming to also. The kind of language he uses and claims Aristotle uses does not come naturally to me. We can talk about it in a future thread.

:up:

Janus: Collingwood is not a metaphysician.
T Clark: Why not?
Janus: Because he's not doing anything that would conventionally be considered, according to either the ancient or modern conceptions, metaphysics. — Janus

That may be because the other metaphysicians never actually understood what they were doing, while Collingwood did.

As I noted, for me, theistic religion's place in metaphysics is ambiguous. My solution? Don't worry about it. — T Clark

That's you, but it is a luxury that a historian like Collingwood could not afford. Faith exists as a historical force and needs to be reconned with. Besides, he was evidently a Christian himself and cared about it a great deal.

Your historian is responsible for his own metaphysics. — T Clark

He will simply not be able to publish in a scientific journal as his peers will 'cancel' him due to his heterodox metaphysics. So it's not just his problem. Other historians will make it their business.

Let me take another example: a Chinese physicist demonstrates that over there in China, E=MC3. Or a Zimbabwean mathematician proves that, over there in Zimbabwe, Pi equal 12.

Do you consider that as fine and liberating -- they are just using other frameworks and that's all? Or do you consider instead that the laws of physics and math ought to be universal, with no exception made for Zimbabweans and Chinese?

That's you, but it is a luxury that a historian like Collingwood could not afford. Faith exists as a historical force and needs to be reconned with. Besides, he was evidently a Christian himself and cared about it a great deal. — Olivier5

If my memory is correct, Collingwood does deal with God by using him as one of the absolute presuppositions for science. I'm not sure about that. I'm rereading it now and I'll check. My comment wasn't about Collingwood or any other metaphysician. I was speaking for myself. As I've noted previously, the existence of God is a matter of true or false. As such, it is not a metaphysical question. I don't know how Collingwood would respond if it were put to him in those terms.

Your historian is responsible for his own metaphysics.
— T Clark

He will simply not be able to publish in a scientific journal as his peers will 'cancel' him due to his heterodox metaphysics. So it's not just his problem. Other historians will make it their business. — Olivier5

The point I was making is that it is not my job to tell the historian what metaphysics he should use. If he chooses one that puts him outside what is considered the mainstream, he may have trouble being taken seriously.

As far as I can tell, my metaphysics is somewhat out of the ordinary. I don't think I've convinced anyone that I'm on the right track. I'm ok with that. When time comes when I have to fit into a conversation with people who don't share my particular views, I generally don't have any trouble. As I've noted and Collingwood wrote, a particular metaphysical approach is used to address specific questions at specific times in specific situations. One of the absolute minimum requirements for a metaphysical system is that it should allow people with similar interests to talk to each other. I can generally work with that.

Let me take another example: a Chinese physicist demonstrates that over there in China, E=MC3. Or a Zimbabwean mathematician proves that, over there in Zimbabwe, Pi equal 12. — Olivier5

That's not metaphysics - it's science and mathematics. They are positions with truth values. Metaphysics does not have truth value.

That may be because the other metaphysicians never actually understood what they were doing, while Collingwood did. — Olivier5

Do you mean they didn't understand the logic of the systems they created? Or they didn't understand that their systems were grounded on groundless axioms?

As I've noted previously, the existence of God is a matter of true or false. As such, it is not a metaphysical question. — T Clark

I'm not sure what you mean by saying that absolute propositions are not true or false. Can you give an example? It seems to me that the truth-aptness of the existence of God is equivocal. It would depend on what you mean by "exist". Empirical propositions on the other hand are unequivocal, except in extremis or radical skepticism.

I'm not sure what you mean by saying that absolute propositions are not true or false. Can you give an example? — Janus

My thoughts about metaphysics began to take shape in a thread I started about four years ago - "An attempt to clarify my thoughts about metaphysics." It grew out of the attraction I felt towards the Tao Te Ching. The metaphysics in that text is very different from one I had always been aware of as an engineer. That one was from science.

The difference between the two is the difference between the different grounds of being in each. The ground of being in the Tao Te Ching is the Tao, the undifferentiated unity which is the natural state of existence before humans get involved. For science, it is objective reality, which represents the multiplicity of concrete phenomena that would make up the universe even if there was no consciousness.

Although they seem contradictory, I didn't feel any conflict in using both ways of understanding. I could hold them both in my mind at the same time. That's when I started to think about the fact that they weren't true or false. Sometimes it made sense for me to think in one way and at other times the other. That's what made it clear that neither was true or false.

At about the same time, after I had started developing these ideas, someone recommended Collingwood's essay to me. I felt right at home.

The difference between the two is the difference between the different grounds of being in each. The ground of being in the Tao Te Ching is the Tao, the undifferentiated unity which is the natural state of existence before humans get involved. For science, it is objective reality, which represents the multiplicity of concrete phenomena that would make up the universe even if there was no consciousness.

Although they seem contradictory ... — T Clark

But from the point of view of a kind of Kantianism--particularly Schopenhauer's--these two are consistent. At least, they're consistent if science's objective reality is not taken as the ground of being. My guess is that this is quite a common stance even among scientific people. It was something like Kant's view, and Kant himself was an astronomer and cosmologist who claimed never to be denying the reality of empirical reality (science's objective reality).

You know the story: we perceive and model the world in the way we do owing to the way that we must do according to our perceptual and conceptual faculties. We never get beyond that to see the world in itself, the ground of being. What we have then, and what we study scientifically, is empirical reality, i.e., real and objective but bound reciprocally with human beings. (Whether this is coherent or not is another story).

It was Schopenhauer who took it a step further and asserted positively that the thing in itself, that which is beyond human perception and concepts, is an undifferentiated unity. He might have been encouraged in this by his reading of Eastern philosophy.

Although they seem contradictory, I didn't feel any conflict in using both ways of understanding. I could hold them both in my mind at the same time. That's when I started to think about the fact that they weren't true or false. Sometimes it made sense for me to think in one way and at other times the other. That's what made it clear that neither was true or false. — T Clark

So it seems to me that it doesn't necessarily follow from one's ability to hold both positions at the same time that they are neither true nor false. They might be doing different things, and are true in their own ways, meaning at their own levels of description or within their own scope. In a similar way, you can think of a painting as a certain configuration of pigments, and you can describe it that way in great detail, but you can also think of it as a moving portrait or beautiful scene or whatever. Different levels or modes of description, both having true or false statements. (I suspect you're an emotivist who doesn't believe artistic judgments have truth value, but I don't think that's relevant here; maybe I should have thought of a better example).

they didn't understand that their systems were grounded on groundless axioms? — Janus

Yes, they may not have understood as clearly as Collingwood did that they were dealing with axioms for human knowledge.

As far as I can tell, my metaphysics is somewhat out of the ordinary. — T Clark

So you do have some metaphysics then. It's not a salad bar.

Something tells me defining metaphysics is like trying to find a common thread in the items of a folder labeled miscellaneous. Good luck with that!

A quick one: metaphysics is chronophobia. — StreetlightX

Cliophobia even more so.

We have metaphysics in order not to despair of the real. — Thus Spoke 180 Proof

Janus: Because he's not a metaphysician. — T Clark

And so Collingwood doesn't really count as a metaphysician, whatever else you might think he counts as. At most he counts as a kind of historian or historiographer of metaphysical thought, which as I have already pointed out, is not the same thing as a metaphysician. — Janus

Collingwood made a compelling argument for his account of metaphysics. It - his account - is pedigreed, distinct and definite, clear, concise, makes complete and entire sense, and works. No one is obliged to buy it. But those who turn up their noses at it should at least understand it, to begin with, and offer a decent alternative understanding of "metaphysics." Either that, or the term is essentially meaningless, meaning whatever anyone wants it to mean. Fortunately, Collingwood's ideas are easily accessible in one excellent, not very long and relatively easy to read book.

So if you dismiss him, what is your definition of metaphysics?

So you do have some metaphysics then. It's not a salad bar. — Olivier5

If it were a salad bar, it would still be metaphysics. We all get metaphysics whether we like it or not.

the term is essentially meaningless, meaning whatever anyone wants it to mean. — tim wood

As I've noted, this is what I've come to think is true.

Hey, you're just supposed to tell me when I'm a jerk and tell us about Russia. You're not supposed to give me substantive responses to my posts... Actually, this is a really good response. Makes me think.

But from the point of view of a kind of Kantianism--particularly Schopenhauer's--these two are consistent. At least, they're consistent if science's objective reality is not taken as the ground of being. — jamalrob

Hm... I am aware that many western philosophers have a concept similar to the Tao. Kant's "thing in itself." I've heard that Schopenhauer does too. I've been rereading Collingwood's metaphysics essay. In his discussion of Aristotle's metaphysics, he describes the concept of "pure being," which has a lot in common. One of my favorite refrains - There is only one world. Add to that we are all human. Of course there will be parallels between philosophical systems.

science's objective reality is not taken as the ground of being. My guess is that this is quite a common stance even among scientific people. — jamalrob

I don't think this is true. I think scientifically oriented people do see objective reality as the ground of being, to the extent they've ever thought what "ground of being" means or if it exists. You certainly see that here on the forum a lot.

You know the story: we perceive and model the world in the way we do owing to the way that we must do according to our perceptual and conceptual faculties. We never get beyond that to see the world in itself, the ground of being. What we have then, and what we study scientifically, is empirical reality, i.e., real and objective but bound reciprocally with human beings. (Whether this is coherent or not is another story). — jamalrob

You say "...we perceive and model the world in the way we do owing to the way that we must do according to our perceptual and conceptual faculties." I think that's similar to what I mean when I say that there is only one world and we are all human. If you're saying that all philosophical systems have to be consistent with each other, I'll probably agree with you. In a sense, you're restating my premise. If they're all the same, we get to pick what's best for us. Yes, I know that's not what you're saying. At least it's not what you think you're saying.

How is empirical reality different from objective reality? Actually, I can see how they're different, but I don't think many, most, materialist (physicalist, realist) minded people do.

It was Schopenhauer who took it a step further and asserted positively that the thing in itself, that which is beyond human perception and concepts, is an undifferentiated unity. He might have been encouraged in this by his reading of Eastern philosophy. — jamalrob

As I noted, it is my understanding that this idea is not uncommon among philosophers. I was reading about noumena once and it struck me how similar they are to the Tao, so I checked on the web. I found a paper that compared the two concepts. It wasn't a very good paper, but the idea is out there.

So it seems to me that it doesn't necessarily follow from one's ability to hold both positions at the same time that they are neither true nor false. — jamalrob

Hm... (again) People have been arguing materialism vs. idealism for thousands of years. If one is right and one is wrong, tell me which is which. If which one is true is an open question, tell me how that question get's resolved. I just read somewhere recently that mathematicians tend to be idealists while scientists tend to be physicalists. Whether or not that's true, it's at least plausible. And that doesn't even address all the other isms out there.

They might be doing different things, and are true in their own ways, meaning at their own levels of description or within their own scope. — jamalrob

I'm not certain that's different from what I'm saying. As Collingwood wrote:

Metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or groups of persons, on this or that occasion or groups of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking.

Is that different from your comment?

Good comments. Made me work a bit. This was fun.

If it were a salad bar, it would still be metaphysics. We all get metaphysics whether we like it or not. — T Clark

Right. Similarly, even professing the absence of necessity for a meta-framework is a type of meta-framework, like the empty set is a set.

There is an objective reality independent of human thought.
Alternatively, existence is inseparable from human interaction.
Physical laws that apply now have always applied and will always apply everywhere.
There is no absolute point of view or scale.
The universe has a living essence, a personality, which some people call God. — T Clark

Those are examples of ideas & opinions, which are by definition : Meta-Physical. But are they "rules" or "laws" governing subjective reality? That's what I thought you meant. :smile:

even professing the absence of necessity for a meta-framework is a type of meta-framework, — Olivier5

Did you think I ever professed "the absence of necessity for a meta-framework?" I never did.

Those are examples of ideas & opinions, which are by definition : Meta-Physical. But are they "rules" or "laws" governing subjective reality? — Gnomon

Some thoughts:

Ideas and opinions are not "by definition" metaphysical.

In the OP I described my view of metaphysics as the "...set of rules, assumptions we agree on to allow discussion, reason, to proceed..."

I also like Collingwood's definition:

Metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or groups of persons, on this or that occasion or groups of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking.

Schopenhauer who took it a step further and asserted positively that the thing in itself, that which is beyond human perception and concepts, is an undifferentiated unity — jamalrob

:love:

Firstly I haven't dismissed Collingwood, I've just said that I don't think what he's doing in that book counts as metaphysics, according to the "ordinary" definitions of classical and modern metaphysics. Secondly, I've a;ready copied and pasted the headings from the SEP article on Metaphysics that show the range of concerns of metaphysics as they are generally understood.

I have read Collingwood's book and I still don't really understand what it could mean to say that metaphysical propositions or axioms are not true or false, unless you were to follow the positivist line in saying they are "not even wrong". But I don't think that's what Collingwood means. If you think you can explain it, then by all means have a go.

I have read Collingwood's book and I still don't really understand what it could mean to say that metaphysical propositions or axioms are not true or false, unless you were to follow the positivist line in saying they are "not even wrong". But I don't think that's what Collingwood means. If you think you can explain it, then by all means have a go. — Janus

What he means, and all he means, as I understand it, is that in any system of thinking there are presuppositions. Ordinary relative presuppositions are those that are presupposed in any question. I have an example from just this evening. I could not find my car coming out of the grocery store. "Where is my (GD) car?!" Presupposed is that I have a car - which is true. And that it was there somewhere in the parking lot and not stolen. Not stolen, true, but there, false. I had taken a different car and was looking for the wrong one.

But a critical point: Collingwood makes clear that presuppositions aren't important because they're true or false, but instead for their efficacy in grounding questions - that they are presupposed. Above, my question as to the location of my car was grounded in the presuppositions that a) there exists such a car, and b) it's where I think it is. If I do not presuppose these, then I'm not looking for my car or any car.

As is happened, I pretty quickly came to question one of my presuppositions; i.e., about what car I was looking for. And that means that ordinary presuppositions can themselves be questioned. That is, not only are they important for their efficacy, but also it can matter whether they are true or not, keeping in mind that efficacy and true/false are two independent qualities, and the efficacy the primary important quality.

Absolutely presuppositions are those basic and fundamental grounding presuppositions whose value is only in their efficacy. They never come into question as to their truth or falsity. Thus above, absolutely presupposed is that there is such a thing as a car. If, for example, it had been my car and it was stolen, and I called the police to make a report, none of us would question whether there was such a thing as a car. The existence of cars, in that context, is an absolute presupposition. And among Collingwood's points is that absolute presuppositions are rarely or never made explicit and never questioned, but instead are just absolutely presupposed. And they're not really axioms. Axioms are adduced in argument and made explicit.

In terms of his religion, and RGC was a variety of Christian, he made the point that questions about the existence of (a Christian) God are for a Christian nonsense questions, because for that individual, God is an absolute presupposition, which (he argues) is why the Christian begins his creed with, "We believe..," and not, "God exists." Which makes many of the professions of fundamentalists who think they're Christians about the existence of God either simply ignorant nonsense, or professions of private faiths mistaken for Christianity.

In terms of natural science, he notes that in the history of natural science it has been absolutely presupposed that some events have causes and some do not, and then later that all events have causes, and finally, "in modern physics the notion of cause has disappeared" (An Essay on Metaphysics, 49).

For Newton, then, some events caused, some not. For Kant, all caused. For modern physics, no events caused. And this not up for debate because Collingwood's metaphysical analysis shows these all a matter of historical fact.

But more to the point of the metaphysics itself, Collingwood's argument, which he develops out of a consideration of Aristotelian metaphysics - thus the pedigree - is that the proper subject of metaphysics is the identification of the absolute presuppositions held at a given time by any given group of people. Including me, with my car, for those who think that the study of absolute presuppositions is somehow limited to ancient history. And this subject matter is ferreted out through analysis of historical record.

An example of the current value of modern research would be the role of capital battleships in modern navies (since about 1750 through current), and the functions and purposes of the navies themselves.

Thus Collingwood makes definite what he thinks metaphysics must be, and why. And no doubt such work is done, whether so named or not, or even whether understood as what it is by the people doing it(!) But, he argues, necessary it is, and far better done by people who understand it to be their job, understanding what exactly their job is.

And all of this a corrective, and arguably a necessary corrective, for all of those who claim that metaphysics just means whatever anyone says it means, whenever they say it, which is itself only one the top three or five excuses for plain ignorance. But all of this well-presented mainly in his Essay..., also his The Idea of Nature, and The Idea of History.

A benefit for any attentive reader is that, having read, he or she is forever inoculated against all manner of dogmatic nonsense.

Ideas and opinions are not "by definition" metaphysical. — T Clark

Of course, ideas & opinions have a physical substrate, but the neurons themselves are meaningless. So, my comment was directed at the subjective meaning, not the objective container. If ideas were physical, mind-reading might be as simple as an MRI readout, or drinking a brain cocktail. Therefore, by my definition (see below), Ideas are literally non-physical. Brain is an information processor, but Mind is the meaningful output. :nerd:

PS__I just read an article about Arc proteins in the human brain, which are descendants of ancient viruses, and are essential for retention of long-term memories, even though the physical proteins are destroyed after a short "life-cycle". Somehow the memories are passed along to the next generation of Arc protein. Just as viruses are not alive, technically, these lumps of protoplasm are not ideas or memories --- but merely temporary containers for bits of information.
https://getpocket.com/explore/item/all-your-memories-are-stored-by-one-weird-ancient-molecule?utm_source=pocket-newtab

Substrate : an underlying substance or layer. That which supports something.

Meta-physics :
The branch of philosophy that examines the nature of reality, including the relationship between mind and matter, substance and attribute, fact and value.
1. Often dismissed by materialists as idle speculation on topics not amenable to empirical proof.
2. Aristotle divided his treatise on science into two parts. The world as-known-via-the-senses was labeled “physics” - what we call "Science" today. And the world as-known-by-the-mind, by reason, was labeled “metaphysics” - what we now call "Philosophy" .
3. Plato called the unseen world that hides behind the physical façade: “Ideal” as opposed to Real. For him, Ideal “forms” (concepts) were prior-to the Real “substance” (matter).
4. Physics refers to the things we perceive with the eye of the body. Meta-physics refers to the things we conceive with the eye of the mind. Meta-physics includes the properties, and qualities, and functions that make a thing what it is. Matter is just the clay from which a thing is made. Meta-physics is the design (form, purpose); physics is the product (shape, action). The act of creation brings an ideal design into actual existence. The design concept is the “formal” cause of the thing designed.
5. I use a hyphen in the spelling to indicate that I am not talking about Ghosts and Magic, but about Ontology (science of being).
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page14.html

IS THIS WHAT A MEMORY LOOKS LIKE ?
https://virtuul.com/news/how-viruses-may-have-shaped-the-human-brain/

For Newton, then, some events caused, some not. For Kant, all caused. For modern physics, no events caused. And this not up for debate because Collingwood's metaphysical analysis shows these all a matter of historical fact. — tim wood

I understand that if Newton supposed some events to be caused and some not, and if Kant supposed that all events must be caused, and if modern physics supposes that no venets are caused, then the truth of those suppositions will not be questioned. But that is not the same as to claim that they are neither true nor false.

A benefit for any attentive reader is that, having read, he or she is forever inoculated against all manner of dogmatic nonsense. — tim wood

That is obviously what you believe has happened to you, but beyond that it just sounds like more "dogmatic nonsense".

Of course, ideas & opinions have a physical substrate, but the neurons themselves are meaningless. So, my comment was directed at the subjective meaning, not the objective container. — Gnomon

Yes, I also am talking about meaning, not the physiology of nervous system.

I don't believe your understanding that all mental phenomena are considered metaphysical is consistent with any generally accepted definition of the word. I don't see any way to reconcile my understanding of the word and yours. I guess we'll have to leave it at that.