I've watched a lot of his videos, but when he described Bohr and Heisenberg's ideas as 'kooky', that's an instant dealbreaker as far as I'm concerned. I saw another of his videos on Schrodinger's Cat a few weeks back, also felt it was weak. He's really good on the physics, not so much on philosophy.

I think you're using philosophy as a license to ignore the work of physicists. Not good.

All you can say is that consciousness was taken very seriously as a factor in QM by some if the founders of the science, so those who speak in terms of woo are out of their depth.

All you can say is that consciousness was taken very seriously as a factor in QM by some if the founders of the science, so those who speak in terms of woo are out of their depth. — frank

:up:

This is a much better primer than the video (which incidentally I now recall I did watch most of a couple of weeks back.)

As Marin notes, Schrödinger’s lectures mark the last of a generation that lived with the mysticism controversy. As Marin explains, quantum mechanics up to World War II existed in a predominantly German context, and this culture helped to form the mystical zeitgeist of the time. The controversy died in the second half of the century, when the physics culture switched to Anglo-American. Most contemporary physicists are, like Einstein, realists, and do not believe that consciousness has a role in quantum theory.

Although it's been reincarnated (pardon the pun) in many new-age circles, although they're bound to be controversial.

Quantum mechanics is a physical theory, but the nature of theory is never a matter for physics. It's the true nature of the wavefunction which is at issue - if it were cut-and-dried, there would be no competing interpretations. — Wayfarer

The interpretation of the wavefunction is not the issue. That already assumes primacy of our conceptions, rather than demonstrating it. However we think about it, the maths comes out the same, the predictions come out the same, therefore the regularity and physicality of what we're describing is the same. This is why, at least at present, the interpretation of the wavefunction is not a scientific problem, because all interpretations are currently indistinguishable. (This doesn't mean we'll never have physical grounds for whittling it down in future, e.g. the recent glut of Wigner's friend experiments.)

There's a huge difference between disagreement about what the single objective reality is, given the constraints of limited and imperfect phenomenology, and there not being a single objective reality.

As per the quote I posted in my first response, I think as a result of Cartesian dualism in popular thought that a lot of people are caught up in a perceived opposition between spiritual and material.

'The material' is identified with Science, 'the spiritual' is identified with Religion - and these issues of interpretation are then viewed through that prism, often unconsciously. Hence the hostility towards the mystical interpretations of physics - 'mysticism! woo!!'. It's doubly threatening, because of it being associated with science, which is supposed to be a defender of an empirical rationality.

This is why, at least at present, the interpretation of the wavefunction is not a scientific problem, because all interpretations are currently indistinguishable. — Kenosha Kid

You mean, they don't make any difference to the outcomes. But they're certainly not indistinguishable as ideas. Don't you think that the Everett formulation that the Universe literally splits or divides into copies of itself when a measurement is made has philosophical implications? Don't you think there's a difference between what the 'Copenhagen' school makes of it, and the Everett makes of it? You're saying there's no difference between the two?

There's a huge difference between disagreement about what the single objective reality is, given the constraints of limited and imperfect phenomenology, and there not being a single objective reality. — Kenosha Kid

A quantum experiment suggests there’s no such thing as objective reality, MIT Technology Review, March 2019.

There's a huge difference between disagreement about what the single objective reality is, given the constraints of limited and imperfect phenomenology, and there not being a single objective reality.
— Kenosha Kid

A quantum experiment suggests there’s no such thing as objective reality, MIT Technology Review, March 2019. — Wayfarer

I have already referred to this a couple of times. I have a feeling you might be the kinder if reader that magazines have in mind when they keep running covers that say WAS EINSTEIN WRONG?

The Wigner's friend experiments are interesting. What they suggest is that you could measure the alive/dead cat, even tell me you have done so such that I know collapse has occurred for you, but I could still in principle verify that collapse has not occurred for me.

There are a number of assumptions:
1. The wavefunction is an ontological one
2. Collapse occurs
3. Non-destructive measurement (a disputed technique) is reliable.

But even if it all holds up (and part of me wants it to, because it's precisely the kind of interpretation-selecting measurement I spoke of), there's still no issue for a single universal wavefunction. There's nothing objectionable about me being in a superposed entangled state and you being in a pure state in the same universal wavefunction (what would be problematic is if this were true and we were entangled, which is precisely why you can only tell me _that_ you've made a measurement and not _what_ measurement outcome you obtained in Wigner's friend).

Hyperbolic click-bait titles aren't the answer here. Your subjective reality may be different to mine, but no one is disputing this. But nor is anyone saying the cat might have been a dog, it depends on the observer. Ultimately, after I've made my measurement, you and I have to agree.

Fun fact:

Idealism: everything is mind. Ergo, matter = mind
Materialism: everything is matter. Ergo, mind = matter

In the sense above, in both cases, mind = matter. There's no difference at all between idealism and materialism.

Why assume that matter and mind are distinct?

Until someone can tell me where matter "stops" and mind "begins", this distinction doesn't make sense.

Another thing altogether is to say that mind (consciousness specifically) doesn't really exist, in a manner like Dennett argues, that everything is an illusion.

In that scenario we can only contrast a version of the world in which experience exists and one in which it does not. But this distinction between mind and matter can't be coherently formulated, I don't think.

Ultimately, after I've made my measurement, you and I have to agree. — Kenosha Kid

Isn’t that exactly what the article I linked to calls into question? ‘Back in 1961, the Nobel Prize–winning physicist Eugene Wigner outlined a thought experiment that demonstrated one of the lesser-known paradoxes of quantum mechanics. The experiment shows how the strange nature of the universe allows two observers—say, Wigner and Wigner’s friend—to experience different realities.’ It then goes on to say that the two subjects can experience different objective realities, not have two different subjective interpretations of the same thing…. So the two realities are at odds with each other. “This calls into question the objective status of the facts established by the two observers,” say Proietti and co.’

If I’m misunderstanding what they’ve said please explain it better.

And I would never presume to say that Einstein was wrong about matters of physics, but I believe that his philosophical stance has been called into question by later science.

Why assume that matter and mind are distinct?

Until someone can tell me where matter "stops" and mind "begins", this distinction doesn't make sense.

Another thing altogether is to say that mind (consciousness specifically) doesn't really exist, in a manner like Dennett argues, that everything is an illusion.

In that scenario we can only contrast a version of the world in which experience exists and one in which it does not. But this distinction between mind and matter can't be coherently formulated, I don't think. — Manuel

I just found it funny that idealism and materialism were actually claiming the same thing but in different ways. After all, if idealism (all is mind) is true, matter is mind and if materialism (all is matter) is true, mind is matter. Could you please point out where I've goofed up?

No, I think in essence you are correct. It's just that sometimes when I see "mind" as opposed to "matter", I just type automatically. It's not a critique.

Just emphasizing that back in 17th and 18th century, you could make such a distinction. But by now it's not very substantive.

The only thing to stress in these metaphysical disputes would be how much consciousness matters, no pun intended.

:cool:

If anyone's still interested: The original point of the thread was to ask what the consequences of the different metaphysics are. So far there's really been one attempt at answering this by Javra who said that a materialist metaphysics cannot support purpose. I don't agree, but at least it was an attempt at answering.

Anyone else? It's not like I can stop you from turning it into another QM thread but I'd like to remind everyone those go nowhere.

No, I think in essence you are correct. It's just that sometimes when I see "mind" as opposed to "matter", I just type automatically. It's not a critique.

Just emphasizing that back in 17th and 18th century, you could make such a distinction. But by now it's not very substantive.

The only thing to stress in these metaphysical disputes would be how much consciousness matters, no pun intended. — Manuel

There's something off about it, I can feel it. Luckily or unluckily, I can't seem to put my finger on it. As far as I can tell, I'm stuck! Thanks for the help though. Much appreciated. G'day.

I skimmed this discussion but didn't spot anything relevant to my question. Could you point me to a specific post?

I though I gave a reply somewhere in the thread. In any case, let me start again.

If Dennett is right in his "materialism", the view that the phenomena of the mind are illusion or bad theoretical postulates, then it should follow that one should react very little to a loved on dying or seeing people being massacred in a war.

I mean, if it's all mere reaction to stimuli and the like, then the loved one is merely a bag of chemicals, so we should be rational and think to ourselves that, I thought this person was unique, funny, smart, perceptive and so on, but I'm wrong, all it was was cleaver reactions to external stimuli. So let me not slip into the fallacy that human beings are in any way special at all.

If mind was an illusion, then most of the things I love in this life color experience, music, novels, travel all of it is just fake.

With extreme "idealism", I could start saying the words "quantum consciousness", as if that says anything, and believe I'm being profound, when I'm saying nothing at all.

Then this would be delusional, a wrong way to think about the world.

If Dennett is right in his "materialism", the view that the phenomena of the mind are illusion or bad theoretical postulates — Manuel

Eliminative materialism isn't the only materialism.

I mean, if it's all mere reaction to stimuli and the like, then the loved one is merely a bag of chemicals, so we should be rational and think to ourselves that, I thought this person was unique, funny, smart, perceptive and so on, but I'm wrong, all it was was cleaver reactions to external stimuli. — Manuel

A person can be funny and also be merely a bag of chemicals. IE reductionist materialism.

Why assume that matter and mind are distinct?

Until someone can tell me where matter "stops" and mind "begins", this distinction doesn't make sense. — Manuel

:up:

Or more importantly, why that distinction would be needed.

If mind was an illusion — Manuel

Makes no sense no matter how you look at it imo.

Eliminative materialism isn't the only materialism. — khaled

I know, but since I think most materialisms are incoherent, outside of Strawson's, then I could signal out one which I think has some implications for ordinary life.

A person can be funny and also be merely a bag of chemicals. IE reductionist materialism. — khaled

It's not that a person is not chemicals, in part, it's just that these are different levels of description. The level at which we interact with people in a day to day basis, is not the level at which we usually think of them as chemicals. It is much more complex and rich than that, or so it seems to me.

But then that's why we have so many aspects to study: physics, chemistry, psychology on to history and literature. Each one "up" encompasses more and more complexity, while often sacrificing depth in many respects.

Or more importantly, why that distinction would be needed. — khaled

It's not. At least not on these metaphysical terms. Epistemically we can speak of the experiential aspects of life (consciousness, mental going ons, thoughts, dreams, qualia) and the non-experiential aspects of life, those aspects of life which lack experience such as a rock or or particles or anything else we think has no experience. Putting panpsychism aside, of course.

it's just that these are different levels of description. The level at which we interact with people in a day to day basis, is not the level at which we usually think of them as chemicals. It is much more complex and rich than that, or so it seems to me. — Manuel

And which part of this is not supported by a reductive materialism?

we can speak of the experiential aspects of life (consciousness, mental going ons, thoughts, dreams, qualia) and the non-experiential aspects of life, those aspects of life which lack experience such as a rock or or particles or anything else we think has no experience — Manuel

Right again, which part of this contradicts a reductive materialism? As long as consciousness, mental goingons, etc are not identified as a "different type of thing" then you can still be a materialist and talk about them.

And which part of this is not supported by a reductive materialism? — khaled

Well you can try to reduce mental goings on with brain states, brain states to electro-chemical activity then reduce these to atoms and reduce atoms to quarks and these in turn to fields. I don't what would be gained or illuminated by doing this. At the end one is just left with fundamental equations...

Right again, which part of this contradicts a reductive materialism? As long as consciousness, mental goingons, etc are not identified as a "different type of thing" then you can still be a materialist and talk about them. — khaled

I don't know how reducing mind to brain or brain helps much. It depends on what you want to study. If you are a perceptual psychologist, studying chemistry is not of much use. Likewise if you're a chemist, I don't know how psychology will help with chemistry.

And which part of this is not supported by a reductive materialism? — khaled

The neuroscience doesn't work with a reductive approach due to multiple realizability.

The question is whether or not it's possible not whether or not you'd want to do it. It's probably a waste of time to do, agreed.

Care to elaborate? What does "the neuroscience not work" mean?

Read the entire sentence. Google the part you don't understand.

I know what multiple realizability is. I know what neuroscience is. I know what reductionism is. But I don't know what the sentence means.

Again, what does "the neuroscience doesn't work" mean?

Neuroscience conflicts with a reductive approach. Does that help?

Agreed. :ok:

My best guess is that you're trying to say we can't reduce something like "pain" to a single neurological state. Sure. But I never claimed we could. As in we could reduce any and all forms of pain to this or that specific neurolocial state. That would be absurd considering how different even human brains are from each other. We can't explain a cow's pain in terms of human brains. But what we can do is reduce every instance of pain to a neurological state. If not the same one. I never claimed all instances of pain can be reduced to "Chemical X going to place Y".

You'll need something like the concept of emergence to cover the diverse physical basis.

You'll need something like the concept of emergence to cover the diverse physical basis. — frank

I never claimed it's possible to cover the "diverse physical basis" neurologically. I claimed that every instance of a mental event can be reduced to a physical event. Not that we can reduce every instance of a mental event to a single neurological event.

And I would disagree. I don't think you need strong emergence. Just more robust definitions. So instead of trying to reduce something like pain to a single neurological state, you can define it in terms of behavior. So being in pain due to X is acting to avoid X for example. That's an example of a definition that would cover the diverse physical basis. At best I would say this is weak emergence.

I never claimed it's possible to cover the "diverse physical basis" neurologically. I claimed that every instance of a mental event can be reduced to a physical event. Not that we can reduce every instance of a mental event to a single neurological event. — khaled

Then you're using 'reduction' in an unusual way. What you're describing is nonreductive physicalism.

So instead of trying to reduce something like pain to a single neurological state, you can define it in terms of behavior. So being in pain due to X is acting to avoid X for example. That's an example of a definition that would cover the diverse physical basis. — khaled

Few would accept that definition at this point.