I don't see logic as empirical in the sense of being 'dependent on experience' — Wayfarer

I see logic as innate to the structure of the mind, an innate capacity. In that sense, I'm sympathetic to the generally platonist view. — Wayfarer

Husserl wrote a book called Formal and Transcendental
Logic. In it he attempts to untangle centuries old
confusions concerning the origin and nature of formal logic.

“ Its naive presupposing of a world ranks logic among the positive sciences. We were saying above that logic, by its relation to a real world, presupposes not only a real world's being-in-itself but also the possibility, existing "in itself", of acquiring cognition of a world as genuine knowledge, genuine science, either empirically or a priori. This implies: Just as the realities belonging to the world are what they are, in and of themselves, so also they are substrates for truths that are valid in themselves — "truths in themselves"”.

logic or reason, the capacity to understand terms such as 'the same as', 'greater than', 'because', and so on - are based on the mind's ability to grasp the relations of ideas. Those abilities can't be explained in materialist terms. — Wayfarer

Husserl argues that the above terms are not irreducible primitives of mind but are in fact products of higher levels constructions based on interaction with a world. ‘The same as’, ‘ greater than’ and ‘because’ are no more innate, world independent capabilities than the understanding of causality is a Kantian category of mind. When he performs the transcendental reduction, every sense associated with interaction with real or ideal
objects , such as ‘same as’ and ‘greater than’ , vanishes along with these objects What remains as irreducible is the structure of intentionality , the appearing of something in consciousness as what it is in the particular mode of givenness by which I intend it. Intentionality is neither the province of the mind in itself nor that of the material world . It precedes both of these derivative and inadequate ideas. It is the inseparable mutually dependent relation between a subjective (egoic) and objective pole of the intentional act.

“ Experience is the performance in which for me, the experiencer, experienced being "is there", and is there as what it is, with the whole content and the mode of being that experience itself, by the performance going on in its intentionality, attributes to it.”

Comparisons, differentiations , additions and subtractions are actions performed on already constituted formal objects. But how is it that we are able to experience an object as a singular unit , separated out from a
multiplicity of which we deem it to belong , such that we can proceed to perform these feats of logic? Husserl’s fist published work , the philosophy of arithmetic, offers a fascinating genesis of such seemingly irreducible concepts as that of the discrete , self-persisting object from mix more basic acts , wherein there is as yet no concept of formal object.

For instance, according to Husserl, the basis of any sort of whole of independently apprehended parts(a whole in the pregnant sense) is the collective combination, which is an abstracting act of consciousness uniting parts.

“Collective combination plays a highly significant role in our mental life as a whole. Every complex phenomenon which presupposes parts that are separately and specifically noticed, every higher mental and emotional activity, requires, in order to be able to arise at all, collective combinations of partial phenomena. There could never even be a representation of one of the more simple relations (e.g., identity, similarity, etc.) if a unitary interest and, simultaneously with it, an act of noticing did not pick out the terms of the relation and hold them together as unified. This 'psychical' relation is, thus, an indispensable psychological precondition of every relation and combination whatsoever.”(p.78)

He conducted these researches under a psychological rubric , leading to accusations of psychologism from Frege and others. Ten years later he understood his method to be phenomenological, correcting the impressions of psychologism without affecting the substance of his description of the constitution of totality. In Experience and Judgement, he conducts a similar investigation under the heading of apprehension of plurality.

In any such whole the parts are united in a specific manner. Fundamental to the genesis of almost all totalities is that its parts initially appear as a temporal succession.

“Succession in time constitutes an insuppressible psychological precondition for the formation of by far the most number concepts and concrete multiplicities - and practically all of the more complicated concepts in general.”(Phil of Arithmetic, p.29) “Almost all representations of multiplicities - and, in any case, all representations of numbers - are results of processes, are wholes originated gradually out of their elements. Insofar as this is so, each element bears in itself a different temporal determination.”(p.33) “Temporal succession forms the only common element in all cases of multiplicity, which therefore must constitute the foundation for the abstraction of that concept.”(p.30)

While the first step of constitution of a multiplicity is the awareness of the temporal succession of parts, each of which we are made aware of as elements “separately and specifically noticed” , the collective combination itself only emerges from a secondary act of consciousness. This higher order constituting sense changes what was originally a temporal succession into a simultaneity by ‘bringing' back ‘ the previous parts via reflecting on them in memory. Husserl says that a combination of objects is similar to the continuity of a tone. In both cases, a temporal succession is perceived through reflection as a simultaneity.

“For the apprehension of each one of the colligated contents there is required a distinct psychical act. Grasping them together then requires a new act, which obviously includes those distinct acts, and thus forms a psychical act of second order.”(p.77) “It is essential that the partial representations united in the representation of the multiplicity or number be present in our consciousness simultaneously [in an act of reflection].”(p.33)

Thanks! Very informative. I must get hold of a Husserl reader so i can get a better grip on this material.

A reader, or, start from scratch, never mind the title: “Cartesian Meditations”, 1931.

You probably don’t need to start from the beginning, as I did, so if not........never mind.

By the way Dan Zahavi is a very good Husserl scholar, he transmits Husserl in a way that is very accesible and (mostly) intelligible.

He has many articles for free at Academia.edu, you might be interested at looking at some of them.

↪Kenosha Kid
Superposition is an epistemological situation, right? — frank

There are important constraints on an epistemological view of QM. The main difference between a superposition and classical ignorance is that a superposition exhibits interference effects (an analogy is with a superposed photo).

In the Wigner's Friend scenario that described, the friend reports to Wigner that she has recorded a definite result (without reporting what it is) but for Wigner, the cat and the friend's lab remains in superposition, continuing to exhibit interference effects.

The PBR theorem "shows that models in which the quantum state is interpreted as mere information about an objective physical state of a system cannot reproduce the predictions of quantum theory." Which is to say that interpretations understood in that epistemological sense (and assuming QM is correct) are impossible.

(Neo-)Copenhagen interpretations get around it by saying that you can't talk about the state of reality independent of measurement.

... if you adhere to the shut-up-and-calculate philosophy or the Copenhagen interpretation (which I think of as shut-up-and-calculate minus the shutting-up part) then the PBR result shouldn’t trouble you. You don’t have an ontology: you consider it uninteresting or unscientific to discuss reality before measurement. For you, ψ is indeed an encoding of human knowledge, but it’s merely knowledge about the probabilities of various measurement outcomes, not about the state of the world before someone measures. — Get real - Scott Aaronson, Nature Physics, June 2012

What we know, including what we understand the world to be, is a cognitive act, a constructive effort on the part of the embodied mind. — Wayfarer

As long as this "embodied mind" is not a separate sort of thing, I don't think anyone would dispute this. Maybe MWI or other "epistimological quantum mechanics interpretations" fans but I would think that the idea that we construct the world is pretty common now. Not to say that's it's all made up, but that we play an integral part in what the world looks like ontologically not just epistemologically.

There are fundamental, general and simple logical principles, such as the law of identity and the law of the excluded middle, which must be true in all possible worlds. — Wayfarer

Again, I don't see the need to place logical principles in the world. I would say even these simple logical principles are akin to sight and hearing. Reasoning is a capacity, not something that's "out there". And again, we humans have made multiple logics, not just formal logic. This isn't to say we made up the laws any more than we "made up" sight or hearing. We have a capacity of reasoning. Reasoning isn't "out there".

Not a separate sort of object from matter. — Wayfarer

I think we agree more than we disagree but just use different words for things.

:up:

I’ve read essays and excerpts about Husserl, and Dermot Moran’s edition of ‘Crisis of the Modern Sciences’.

according to Husserl, the basis of any sort of whole of independently apprehended parts (a whole in the pregnant sense) is the collective combination, which is an abstracting act of consciousness uniting parts. — Joshs

There's a resemblance to Kant's 'synthesis', isn't there?

Kant characterizes synthesis as “the act of putting different representations together, and grasping what is manifold in them in one cognition” (A77/B103); it is a process that “gathers the elements for cognition, and unites them to form a certain content” (A78/B103). — SEP

Also, the very idea of ‘formal objects’ and ‘formal logic’ is an expression characteristic of philosophical discourse, seems to me.

Reasoning is a capacity, not something that's "out there". — khaled

Except for the fact that it enables us to discover hitherto unknown things that are (which is the exact meaning of 'discover'). The stoics said that reasoning is more than a capacity of thought, because it's also a principle of cosmic order. Reason is efficacious because the reason that orders the world is also a characteristic of the reason that is internal to the mind. But I don't think that is comprehended by modern materialist philosophy.

The stoics said that reasoning is more than a capacity of thought, because it's also a principle of cosmic order. Reason is efficacious because the reason that orders the world is also a characteristic of the reason that is internal to the mind. — Wayfarer

Point is, there is no use in talking about "the reason that orders the world". There will always be doubt about that. I remember Donald Hoffman claiming that whenever he tried to simulate evolution on a machine using some sort of "game system", the organisms that ended up surviving were ones that did not understand "the reason that orders the world" but who instead just managed to find a "reason internal to the mind" that specifically suits their survival needs and nothing more.

As such, I don't care about "the reason that orders the world". Maybe it is the same as the reason in my mind, or maybe the reason in my mind is just an "evolutionary shortcut", a hack, a parody of the real thing optimized for survival. Either way, I don't have access to "the reason that orders the world" so I don't care about it.

It is not necessarily true that reason is efficacious because the reason in our minds is the same as "the reason that orders the world" if anything, there is evidence that if our reasoning is efficacious, it is precisly because it is not the reason that orders the world as that would be unnecessarily complicated and not conducive for survival.

I don't care about "the reason that orders the world". — khaled

I guessed. :wink:

Because I have no access to it (or more accurately, I can't tell if I do or not). You claim you have access to it? Your argument for that was:

Reason is efficacious because the reason that orders the world is also a characteristic of the reason that is internal to the mind. — Wayfarer

Which is basically an evolutionary argument. Also a faulty one.

Intentionality is neither the province of the mind in itself nor that of the material world. It precedes both of these derivative and inadequate ideas. It is the inseparable mutually dependent relation between a subjective (egoic) and objective pole of the intentional act. — Joshs

I want to call that out. I can see why the ‘mind in itself’ and ‘material world’ are regarded as ‘derivative’.

Comparisons, differentiations, additions and subtractions are actions performed on already constituted formal objects — Joshs

I want to call that out too. I think the qualification ‘formal’ is key here. Use of the qualifier ‘formal’ denotes this as a specifically philosophical expression.

I was just reading an article:

While the temperature at a point on Earth is what it is, regardless of whether you measure it, electrons have no definite position until the moment you observe them. Prior to that, their positions can only be described probabilistically, by assigning values to every point in a quantum field that captures the likelihood you’ll find an electron there versus somewhere else. Prior to observation, electrons essentially exist nowhere — and everywhere.

“Most things in physics aren’t just objects; they’re something that lives in every point in space and time,” said Dijkgraaf. — Quanta

I would say, instead of ‘aren’t just objects’, that they ‘just aren’t objects’. They’re not objects until they’re formalised - given form - by observation; they’re ‘made manifest’. Which is, strangely enough, a kind of Platonist view.

(Neo-)Copenhagen interpretations get around it by saying that you can't talk about the state of reality independent of measurement. — Andrew M

That is the point that I was trying to make. I think it calls into question Kenosha Kid’s view that there is ‘one objective reality’ which all interpretations try to approximate or interpret. I agree that reality may be one, but that unity must necessarily transcend subject-object dualism, meaning that it’s out of scope for naturalism as such.

As such, I don't care about "the reason that orders the world". Maybe it is the same as the reason in my mind, or maybe the reason in my mind is just an "evolutionary shortcut", a hack, a parody of the real thing optimized for survival. Either way, I don't have access to "the reason that orders the world" so I don't care about it. — khaled

The philosophical mind has the desire to know. So such statements are very unphilosophical.

That is the point that I was trying to make. I think it calls into question Kenosha Kid’s view that there is ‘one objective reality’ which all interpretations try to approximate or interpret. I agree that reality may be one, but that unity must necessarily transcend subject-object dualism, meaning that it’s out of scope for naturalism as such. — Wayfarer

What I find is the biggest problem with the materialist view is that it inevitably leads to determinism. The determinist perspective is "that there is 'one objective reality'", and this objective reality encompasses all of the past and future, in an eternalist sort of way.

This perspective completely ignores the very real, important and significant, difference between past and future, which we know very well through our experience. Ignoring this difference, and the fact that the undetermined nature of the future gives us the capacity for freely willed actions, while the fixed nature of the past renders us helpless in any desire to change what has already occurred, presents us with a very skewed conception of "one objective reality". The difficulty in understanding "objective reality" is the need to know how the undetermined becomes determined at the moment of the present.

The philosophical mind has the desire to know. So such statements are very unphilosophical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Only a fool would want to know something they know they can’t know.

You don’t have an ontology: you consider it uninteresting or unscientific to discuss reality before measurement. — Get real - Scott Aaronson, Nature Physics, June 2012

So with the Copenhagen Int., we can talk about superposition, but we aren't talking about reality. That's so weird.

I don't have access to "the reason that orders the world" so I don't care about it. — khaled

I don’t care about that which orders the world either, and I do not have access to it. But I wouldn’t say reason orders the world in the first place, which grants me access to it, whatever its composition or use.

Reason doesn’t organize.....order.....the world; it only informs me of the consistency and legitimacy of the ordering. And THAT I certainly do care about.

the shut-up-and-calculate philosophy or the Copenhagen interpretation (which I think of as shut-up-and-calculate minus the shutting-up part) — Get real - Scott Aaronson, Nature Physics, June 2012

Haha that's excellent!

There's a resemblance to Kant's 'synthesis', isn't there? — Wayfarer

Husserl from Philosophy of Arithmetic:


“Already Kant used the word "synthesis" (combination) in a double sense: first, in the sense of the unity of the parts of a whole, whether these parts are properties of a thing, parts of an extension, units in a number, and so on; second, in the sense of the mental activity (actus) of combining. Both significations are intimately related in Kant because, in his view, every whole, of whatever kind it may be, is developed from its parts by means of the spontaneous activity of the mind.

"Synthesis" therefore signifies simultaneously, for him, com­bining and the result of combination. That we presume to observe combinations in the phenomena themselves, and to extract them therefrom by means of abstraction: that is only an illusion. It is we ourselves who have furnished the combinations, and, of course, by means of the "pure concepts of the understanding," the categories.

“The theory of synthesis with which we have just become ac­quainted is untenable and is based upon essential misunderstand­ings. Kant failed to notice that many combinations of content are given to us where no trace of a synthesizing activity that produces connectedness of contents is to be found. Lange, again, pays no attention at all to those cases where composite representations owe their unity solely and only to synthesizing acts, while in the primary contents a combination is not present or does not come into consideration. According to him all combination is supposed to occur in the content, and of course in virtue of the form of space encompassing all content. This is false. The very concepts mul­tiplicity and number resist this view. The combination of the colligated contents in the multiplicity, and of the enumerated ones in the number, is not a spatial combination, just as little as it can be taken for a temporal one - and, we can immediately add, just as little as any other combination within primary contents.

…it also is to be emphasized that the entire underlying intuition, for Lange as for Kant - according to which a relational content is the result of an act of relating - is psychologically untenable.
Inner experience, and it alone is decisive here, shows nothing of such 'creative' processes. Our mental activity does not make the relations. They are simply there, and, given an appropriate direction of interest, they are just as noticeable as any other type of content. Strictly speaking, creative acts that produce some new content as a result distinct from them are psychological monstrosities.

Certainly one distinguishes in complete generality the relating mental activity from the relation itself (the comparing lfrom the similarity, etc.). But where one speaks of such a type of relating activity, one thereby understands either the grasping of the relational content or the interest that picks out the terms of the relation and embraces them, which is the indispensable precondition for the relations combining those contents becoming observable. But whatever is the case, one will never be able to maintain that the respective act creatively produces its content.

One may perhaps reply to us by pointing precisely to those synthetic acts which we have above verified in representations of number, and which, as we will yet see, are identical with our “collective" combinations. In their case it is indeed the act alone that is supposed to procure the combination. - In a certain sense this is quite correct. The combination of course subsists solely and only in the unifying act itself, and consequently the represen­tation of the combination also in the representation of the act. But there does not exist besides the act a relational content different
from the act itself, as its creative result, which the view we are attacking always presupposes.”


…it is clear that designation of numbers as purely mental creations of an inner intuition involves an exaggeration and a distortion of the true state of affairs. Numbers are mental creations insofar as they are results of activities which we exercise on concrete contents. But what these activities create are not new, absolute contents which could then be found again somewhere in space or in the "external world." Rather, they are peculiar, relational concepts, which can only be produced again and again, but which absolutely cannot be simply found somewhere already completed.”

Comparisons, differentiations, additions and subtractions are actions performed on already constituted formal objects
— Joshs

I want to call that out too. I think the qualification ‘formal’ is key here. Use of the qualifier ‘formal’ denotes this as a specifically philosophical expression. — Wayfarer

Not sure what you mean. How would you define a formal
object in Husserl’s sense?

But I wouldn’t say reason orders the world in the first place, which grants me access to it, whatever its composition or use. — Mww

Agreed.

Again, I don't see the need to place logical principles in the world. I would say even these simple logical principles are akin to sight and hearing. Reasoning is a capacity, not something that's "out there". — khaled

It was Wayfarer that was trying to conceive of an “order out there”, so I pointed it out that it’s useless to talk about such a thing because you’ll never have access to it.

Reason doesn’t organize.....order.....the world; it only informs me of the consistency and legitimacy of the ordering. And THAT I certainly do care about. — Mww

Agreed with a minor nitpick. I would say the argument that our reasoning capacities can be trusted since there is evolutionary advantage in having good reasoning is valid. But not the argument that our reasoning or senses are complete. There’s been research showing that if you set up a “survival game” with multiple AI, the AI that survives longest is the one that has managed to “simplify” the game into as few variables as possible, neglecting vast parts of reality in favor of only being able to detect the things that matter for survival since computation power = need for more food and so is sometimes not worth it. The idea that it is evolutionarily advantageous to have an accurate and complete representation of reality is just plain false in many cases. Accuracy? Yes. The simplification must still be true, even if it’s not the full picture. Completeness is often unnecessary.

It was Wayfarer that was trying to conceive of an “order out there”, so I pointed it out that it’s useless to talk about such a thing because you’ll never have access to it. — khaled

There is an argument that says the world must be ordered, for the simple reason our understanding is very seldom in conflict with it. With that being granted, and granting that “logical principles are not out there” is true, as you say, then we are given a method for explaining why there is seldom any conflict between experience and that which is the extant objects of it.

I agree with wayfarer if he says it is conceiveable that there is order out there, which makes perfect sense iff it is we who order, which, of course, we do. But it isn’t reason, it’s intuition, the subconscious part of the human cognitive system, responsible for it.

So....there is order out there, because we put it there. Or, it could be that we just recognize the world as it conforms to the order we ourselves have. Either way, and no matter what, without us and our system, the world, ordered or otherwise, is ontologically, epistemologically, and completely, irrelevant.

The reason there even is metaphysics, is because it is impossible to tell whether the world is ordered with the absolute certainty we think for it, or the world is as it is and our thinking conforms to it. So all we have with which to judge, is the least contradictory of two established doctrinal methods: idealism or materialism. Anything else is some combination of both with one or the other the superior.
—————-

I would say the argument that our reasoning capacities can be trusted since there is evolutionary advantage in having good reasoning is valid. But not the argument that our reasoning or senses are complete — khaled

In general, yes, they can be trusted. We seldom experience a thing today, and then worry about what our experience will be tomorrow, of the same thing. Still, humans are famous for errors in judgement, that being one of reasoning’s capacities.

As weak as they are, I think our sensory system is complete, insofar far as we are affected by the external world with the system we have. We’d be more or differently affected with a better of different system, but then, we wouldn’t be human.

As for our reasoning being complete....hell, I wouldn’t know about that. There would have to be something to compare it to, seems like. Other intelligent species might have a more complete system, but how would we find that out?

My two thalers worth......

Idealism conflates – confuses – epistemology (maps) and ontology (territory) which is why it's useless except as self-flattering belief system. For instance:
• Interpretations of QM are not theoretical models.
• Interpretations of QM are how we speculatively close the gaps in our (current) knowledge of QM.
• Interpretations of QM tell us about ourselves – scientific reasoning – and nothing more about the world outside the remit of QM.
Maps (e.g. interpretations of QM) =/= territory (planck-scale facts) because the territory also includes every possible map (and making of maps) of the territory. We non-idealists – realists (@Banno) – don't suffer from this peculiar "idealist" confusion (or woo-of-the-gaps, abstractions-reifying delusion).

Hmmm - I need to do more reading on that subject. I don't really get the gist of Husserl's criticism on that point.

How would you define a formal object in Husserl’s sense? — Joshs

All I’m saying is that you will only find the term ‘formal object’ in philosophical discourse. I would have to look up the definition to offer one, but it has to do with how the identity of objects are designated.

I agree with wayfarer if he says it is conceiveable that there is order out there, which makes perfect sense iff it is we who order, which, of course, we do. But it isn’t reason, it’s intuition, the subconscious part of the human cognitive system, responsible for it. — Mww

Isn't this related to what is famously called the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences? Mathematical reason often enables prediction of outcomes which could never be discovered in its absence. The questions of whether the Universe 'obeys' mathematical laws or whether numbers are real are deep questions and still open questions. But the predictive power of mathematical hypotheses can't really be called into question. And that to me indicates that mathematical reason discerns an order which is already present in the universe, not 'imposed' on it.

There is an argument that says the world must be ordered, for the simple reason our understanding is very seldom in conflict with it. — Mww

Sure agreed.

Either way, and no matter what, without us and our system, the world, ordered or otherwise, is ontologically, epistemologically, and completely, irrelevant. — Mww

:up:

As weak as they are, I think our sensory system is complete, insofar far as we are affected by the external world with the system we have. — Mww

I mean, we can't see UV waves for one but we're still affected by them. I think it's obvious our sensory system is not complete even when it comes to things that can affect us. Maybe the "food requirement" for having eyes that can detect UV and infrared was not worth the survival benefits. Maybe it is worth it but we just haven't evolved to that point yet.

Maybe our reasoning is incomplete in the same sense too, but so far there hasn't been anything we couldn't comprehend with it. Then again, I think the real evolutionary breakthrough humans have isn't our logic, but our malleability. We have made multiple logics for different uses, even when they are not intuitive, and eventually made them intuitive. We don't have a "single mode of logic".

Interesting article.

You are more well-versed than I, so I’m not about to bore you to tears with stuff you already know, or infuse you with metaphysical precepts you already hold. You’ve said it yourself, and I agree without equivocation....science has ostracized the subject, and doesn’t even realize the fault in doing so.

So briefly.....

For us, the only certainty is logical, and because mathematics is a form of logic, we are assured mathematics itself is certain, which in turn assures us that which is grounded in mathematics is certain.

I don’t find the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural world remarkable at all, because it is a logical system investigating it mathematically. The world isn’t mathematical; we are. If experience isn’t contradicted by observation, and observation is explained mathematically, then the system is justified.

I mean, we can't see UV waves for one but we're still affected by them. — khaled

Ahhhh, yes, I see what you mean. Can’t argue with that.

You are more well-versed than I — Mww

I doubt that. This particular article was one of those I discovered through this forum or its predecessor, and it's become an interest of mine.

The world isn’t mathematical; we are. — Mww

I think that's an artificial distinction. The point is that we can predict, ascertain, control, discover, all through the application of mathematics. That is intrinsic to the mathematization of nature that was initiated by Galileo and is basic to modern scientific method. So I don't see how this can said to be only an attribute of the human mind. It's the predictive capabilities which suggest otherwise.

Mathematics does play [a] sovereign role in physics. This was already implied in the statement, made when discussing the role of applied mathematics, that the laws of nature must have been formulated in the language of mathematics to be an object for the use of applied mathematics. The statement that the laws of nature are written in the language of mathematics was properly made three hundred years ago;[8 It is attributed to Galileo] it is now more true than ever before. — Wigner

Put another way, it's not just how 'the mind' works, but that there's a corresponding order in nature. Sure, it's a mystery - Einstein exclaimed 'The eternally incomprehensible thing about the world is its comprehensibility.' Wigner likewise speaks in terms of 'the miracle' of the appropriateness of mathematics. I have never understood how or why this would be called into question.

Only a fool would want to know something they know they can’t know. — khaled

Even if you know that you will never know the answer to a specific question, you can proceed in the direction toward finding the answer, and potentially help others, who are not so helpless as you, to find that answer. That the answer will not be found by you does not mean that it will not be found, so this ought not prevent you from working toward finding it. There's an interesting aspect of knowledge, it's cumulative, and not restricted by the limitations of the individual.

In this particular case, there is no direction towards the answer. Rather, every direction is as good as any other. And this is true of everyone. It's not about the limitations of the individual but the limitations of being human. You would know this if you read what the quote was referring to instead of wasting time by taking it out of context.

(Neo-)Copenhagen interpretations get around it by saying that you can't talk about the state of reality independent of measurement.
— Andrew M

That is the point that I was trying to make. I think it calls into question Kenosha Kid’s view that there is ‘one objective reality’ which all interpretations try to approximate or interpret. — Wayfarer

I didn't see that quote in this thread, but I think the Wigner's Friend scenario that described suggests one solution to be that Wigner and his friend both correctly describe reality from their particular contexts (as a superposition and a definite result respectively). Perhaps an analogy can be made with differing relativistic length descriptions of the same object for Einsteinian relativistic observers.

I agree that reality may be one, but that unity must necessarily transcend subject-object dualism, — Wayfarer

:up:

meaning that it’s out of scope for naturalism as such. — Wayfarer

For modern naturalism maybe. But I'm partial to an Aristotelian four-causes naturalism that is broader in scope (no separable is/ought distinction, for example). Per SEP, "Nature, according to Aristotle, is an inner principle of change and being at rest (Physics 2.1, 192b20–23)." This opposed the Heraclitan and Parmenidean positions of the day that exclusively emphasized universal flux and universal stasis respectively (which to some extent are reflected in modern-day materialism and idealism).

I'm partial to an Aristotelian four-causes naturalism — Andrew M

And I'd be inclined to agree with that. It was the loss of the idea of formal and final causation that is the problem with modern scientific metaphysics, such as it is.

(Actually I'm reading a very interesting philosophy of physics book, Nature Loves to Hide, Shimon Malin, which attempts to situate quantum physics in the broader context of Western classical philosophy. Pity you're not nearby, I'd lend it to you.)