is there a difference in the subjective experience of the believer who tends to believe in true beliefs, versus one who tends to believe in false beliefs? — Pantagruel

Presumably you're talking about one who believes false beliefs which turn out to be true? Otherwise I'd have thought the difference was obvious - the believer in false beliefs will far more frequently find things do not turn out as they expect.

Is someone who believes in false beliefs guilty of the sin of bad-faith, that is of believing something which he knows at some level to be not worthy of belief? In that case, it would seem rather that he has not even really achieved belief at all, but merely the attitude of "wanting to believe." — Pantagruel

It depends what kind of thing you hold a belief to be. To me a belief is just a tendency to act as if, to to say "X believes that Y", just means "X has a tendency to act as if Y". By that definition wanting to believe Z rather than Y (as one currently does) is not bad faith, it's just a recognition of behaviour one wants to change - "I keep acting as if Y, but I think I'd get on better if I acted as if Z"

Presumably you're talking about one who believes false beliefs which turn out to be true? Otherwise I'd have thought the difference was obvious - the believer in false beliefs will far more frequently find things do not turn out as they expect. — Isaac

Per my 'catalog,' there appears to be quite a variety of conditions of beliefs. What I have in mind is to discover whether there may be a lot of people in the world who, in fact, cannot really be said to believe much at all. Rather, they only have things that they want to believe are true.

I do agree, as you say, that belief is "a tendency to act." That's definitely one of the main directions in which I'm heading. However, regarding things "not turning out" as expected, this is not an absolute measure. People can believe conterfactually and still believe and be willing to act - consider normative beliefs. Ought is, in an important sense, a contradiction of is.

Is someone who believes in false beliefs guilty of the sin of bad-faith, that is of believing something which he knows at some level to be not worthy of belief? — Pantagruel

Ask them. Though they’re unlikely to answer truthfully. But from my experience talking with people like this, it seems that they do really believe what they say. There is no level at which they think it’s false.

I don’t think it’s possible to hold an attitude of “wanting to believe” for very long. I think people in general and especially on this forum underestimate man’s intolerance of contradictions. I don’t think anyone can believe something for long if they know that at some level it is false.

I’d say it’s more difficult to hold a contradictory position than a legitimate one. Qanons, Flat earthers and Bartricks truly believe what they say. Much to everyone’s dismay and bewilderment.

Ask them. Though they’re unlikely to answer truthfully. But from my experience talking with people like this, it seems that they do really believe what they say. There is no level at which they think it’s false. — khaled

I don't know. I try to put myself in this position and evaluate my own beliefs based on this proposed methodology, I guess a phenomenological analysis of belief. Personally, I really don't find that I have a lot of "concrete" beliefs. I believe that some ways of acting are right and others wrong. I can't even begin to imagine the psychological and epistemological state of mind of someone who believes the earth is flat. I think that is more of a reaction to an overall state of affairs in which not a lot of things are really understood at all.

Can you truly be said to believe beyond the scope of your understanding? I don't think so. I maintain that a lot of people are in a limbo of bad-faith, and really do not even know what they believe. Hence they fall back on the things that they want to believe, and pretend that those are their beliefs.

In any case, this is a psychological not a philosophical question. As I don’t know much about the field I can’t comment, except with my own experience.

Personally, I really don't find that I have a lot of "concrete" beliefs. I believe that some ways of acting are right and others wrong. I can't even begin to imagine the psychological and epistemological state of mind of someone who believes the earth is flat. I think that is more of a reaction to an overall state of affairs in which not a lot of things are really understood at all. — Pantagruel

Or the person has different epistemic priorities and different epistemic standards than a philosopher.

A bit of folk wisdom says "If you stand for nothing, you will fall for anything." I imagine that for many people, this is such an important motto and certainty such an important character trait, that they impel them to declare certainty by standards that are alien to a philosopher.

This also explains why the general image of philosophers is so negative: people generally seem to think of philosophers as indecisive, idle doubters, lacking character strength.

Look at Oprah's What I know for sure, for instance. Epistemologically, this is a nightmare, but for the ordinary person, this is probably what "knowing the truth" is all about.

In any case, this is a psychological not a philosophical question. As I don’t know much about the field I can’t comment, except with my own experience. — khaled

Everything is ultimately psychological (subjective). I'd say it is a 'psycho-philosophical' question....

The question is, is there a difference in the subjective experience of the believer who tends to believe in true beliefs, versus one who tends to believe in false beliefs? Is someone who believes in false beliefs guilty of the sin of bad-faith, that is of believing something which he knows at some level to be not worthy of belief? — Pantagruel

I don't think so.

An example: I was once waiting in line at the grocery store. I was second in line. So I was waiting, standing still in my spot at the checkout counter, looking around, waiting for the time to pass. When suddenly an older man cut in front of me, placing his items on the counter, ahead of mine, while the cashier still wasn't done with the items of the customer before me. I told him that he cut in front of me, that it was my turn. He insisted that I wasn't waiting in line at all, that I was idly looking around. I told him that it wasn't even my turn, that the cashier wasn't even done with the previous customer. The man didn't care. He kept repeating that I was idly looking around, and that I wasn't really waiting in line (and that as such, he had every right to cut in front of me).

I didn't get the impression he felt the least bit bad about his claims or the beliefs he held and expressed. I think it's similar with flat-earthers and so on.

I'd concur with this assessment, but my personal perspective is that philosophy is ultimately validated by its re-integration into the scope of the inclusive human reality. So what is valid for a human being qua human being is the ultimate measure. (I've always believed this, but currently reading Max Scheler who is mainly interested in this, the nature of the human being).

edit: I have run an online training session for the next couple of hours, so I won't be able to reply for a bit to further posts....

Knowing is the mental capacity to half something, so brain has a statistical advantage over the whole of this something.

I don't really care what the dictionary says knowledge is, or dictionaries for that matter; it is useful to ledge definitions but is truly not how mind works (the mind utilizes impulses and frequencies more over human symbology).

If knowing is this, then knowledge is what comes prior.

If you know what the sky is, then you must have acquired knowledge about the sky; thus, knowledge is the intrinsic data of experience.

To conclude, there's nothing wrong with belief but belief is in a different realm than knowledge, it belongs in the realm of wisdom. Knowledge is more a logical continuum. If we have to believe in a fact for it to be realised, we'd never realise anything and all we'd know is nothing. Knowledge is harsh nature we have to face; some of us deal with it better than others; it prevails over our sense.

Hmmm. Excellent example. I had an almost identical experience. A local lawyer, 6 foot 6 and a real prick, did the exact same thing to me a few years ago. He clearly knew that he was in the wrong, however he didn't care.

Just because someone says that they believe something doesn't mean that they actually do believe that, does it? This is the rather subtle question of mental state that I am investigating.

The question is, is there a difference in the subjective experience of the believer who tends to believe in true beliefs, versus one who tends to believe in false beliefs? Is someone who believes in false beliefs guilty of the sin of bad-faith, that is of believing something which he knows at some level to be not worthy of belief? — Pantagruel

A very good question. To answer your first question, we'd have to be aware that we currently have no false beliefs or thoughts. I'd think that it is incredibly unlikely that we currently don't have (at least) many false beliefs. Given that it's very likely that we do have false beliefs, I don't think that there is subjectively any difference between having a false belief or a true one.

A different question is if someone knows or is aware that they are bamboozling someone on purpose. In these cases you can say it's bad faith.

A different question is if someone knows or is aware that they are bamboozling someone on purpose. In these cases you can say it's bad faith. — Manuel

I'd agree that we may have false beliefs, which is why as a good Cartesian, I strive to work from a position of not committing to a belief precipitously. I do realize that on a philosophy forum there may well be fewer people who fall into the category of 'bad faith' with their own beliefs than in the general population. Still, there must be a spectrum of types of belief and I think, if we excavate deeply enough, it may be possible for anyone to reach the point at which we are no longer believing something, but only wishing to believe it. Do I really believe that the essence of my consciousness is a transcendental entity, or do I only wish that to be true?

I think maybe the most accurate way to describe this is that I believe that this should be the case. Most people who are in the position of bad-faith I'm postulating I think mistake believing that something should be true is the same as believing that it is true. Maybe allowing themselves to confuse 'speculative belief' with 'definite belief'?

Still, there must be a spectrum of types of belief and I think, if we excavate deeply enough, it may be possible for anyone to reach the point at which we are no longer believing something, but only wishing to believe it. Do I really believe in that the essence of my consciousness is a transcendental entity, or do I only wish — Pantagruel

Ah. I think I understand now what you have in mind.

Honestly? We would like to think that we are rational, open-minded people and that if some evidence comes along showing that one or several of our deeply felt beliefs are wrong, we would not have a choice but to change accordingly. Perhaps this is the case in some instances.

But I think we tend to follow thought patterns or traditions that we tend to find attractive or useful or meaningful in some manner or other. In this deep sense, I'm much more skeptical. It's not as if constantly having to change our deepest intuitions, values or traditions is easy or even in some cases desirable. It takes time and commitment to reach one's views in these matters.

But I think we tend to follow thought patterns or traditions that we tend to find attractive or useful or meaningful in some manner or other. In this deep sense, I'm much more skeptical. It's not as if constantly having to change our deepest intuitions, values or traditions is easy or even in some cases desirable. It takes time and commitment to reach one's views in these matters. — Manuel

Yes, just so. I think the biggest battle is the one we fight with our own preconceptions. The fact that background beliefs become pre-judicative makes them very resistant to excavation.

is there a difference in the subjective experience of the believer who tends to believe in true beliefs, versus one who tends to believe in false beliefs? — Pantagruel

I don't think that's the best question to ask. It seems to me the real issue is the relative strength of epistemic justification. This filters out the lucky guesses, and doesn't depend on the unstated premise that the truth is actually available to judge whether or not the belief is false.

I don't think that's the best question to ask. It seems to me the real issue is the relative strength of epistemic justification. This filters out the lucky guesses, and doesn't depend on the unstated premise that the truth is actually available to judge whether or not the belief is false. — Relativist

Hmmm. I think what we are talking about here orbits around the way that beliefs begin as vaguely intuited and hypothetical and gradually evolve into explicit and eventually validated. So I'm not sure exactly where epistemic justification enters into the picture. At the point of knowledge, epistemic justification is absolutely essential. But I think to what extent beliefs must be epistemically justified isn't clear (as I've said on other threads). Beliefs are more fundamentally psychological than knowledge, and I think authenticity (and bad faith) may be more critical to the validation of beliefs.

I think the biggest battle is the one we fight with our own preconceptions. The fact that background beliefs become pre-judicative makes them very resistant to excavation. — Pantagruel

And that's the big problem. Given how much time we may invest in a certain way of thinking that adopts certain belief sets, how are we going to discern when it is worth un-attaching ourselves to these beliefs, taking into consideration how much more time and effort is required to readjust ourselves? I think the younger we are, the easier it is to go through such big changes - not that it's easy in that case either.

But the more years accumulate, the more difficult it's going to be to change as you've spent more time with your beliefs while not yet seeing a good reason to abandon them.

OK, then when you said:

"is there a difference in the subjective experience of the believer who tends to believe in true beliefs, versus one who tends to believe in false beliefs?"

--are you applying this to the initial, intuitive hunch, or to a later stage in the belief formation process?

Let me give a personal example. We use our mind to observe reality and thereby formulate hypotheses and arguments. But our minds are themselves probably the most complex products of that reality and the access which we have to them (qua consciousness) is itself the the most sophisticated product and result. I just read Max Scheler's version of this intuition last week: "The mind itself is the self-revelation of the highest sort of being."

Now this is one thing that I do believe, strongly, fundamentally, and foundationally. It has been intuitively obvious to me almost since I began to be able to think. And I don't feel that this is wishful thinking on my part. To me, this is what reality reveals. As to the persistence or permanence or transcendence of that mind, that to me is not intuitively obvious in the same degree. I think I believe that the mind is also a transcendental entity, but that may be a reach. I don't quite see why it necessarily follows or is a corollary.

Knowledge is usually defined as true belief with sufficient evidence. So knowledge is an objectification of belief. — Pantagruel

Isn't the use of "true" here presuming what you ask to find? If knowledge is validated by something other than belief, how could it be the "objectification of belief?"

The question is, is there a difference in the subjective experience of the believer who tends to believe in true beliefs, versus one who tends to believe in false beliefs? Is someone who believes in false beliefs guilty of the sin of bad-faith, that is of believing something which he knows at some level to be not worthy of belief? In that case, it would seem rather that he has not even really achieved belief at all, but merely the attitude of "wanting to believe." — Pantagruel

I think here you're concerned with what validates a religious belief, what criteria can be appealed to, to differentiate true and false beliefs, or whether it even matters, subjectively.

In 2009 comparative religion scholar Karen Armstrong published A Case for God. This was not an exercise in Christian apologetics - it was grounded in historical arguments and comparative religion. But the point she made is that the incorporation of the idea of God into early modern science - such as Newton's frequent invocation of 'God's handiwork' and many other examples - massively distorts the meaning and role of religious belief. Basically, belief in God became propositional - and it was not long before it became obvious it was a proposition with no formal substance. Newton believed that God set the universe in motion and regulated its movements. Many churchmen leapt at this as scientific validation of the faith. But of course within a few generations, others had no trouble dispensing with such an hypothesis; LaPlace famously 'had no need of that hypothesis'.

This is where, Armstrong argues, the emphasis on belief as propositional knowledge originated, and it was definitely a two-edged sword. Just as those who believed saw it as validation, those who didn't saw it as dispensing with the need for such beliefs.

But, she says, in other cultures, and even in earlier Christianity, religious belief was not intended as propositional knowledge, which is part of what she calls 'logos', logic and science. It's properly part of 'mythos', which is the mythical re-telling of human existence, encompassing suffering, redemption, mystery, and many other felt realities which can't be incorporated by logos.

You see this all the time in arguments about God's existence. The implicit sense is that, if God exists, then He must be 'out there somewhere' - and if He's not, then what does such a belief even mean?

Armstrong explains

When a mythical narrative was symbolically re-enacted, it brought to light within the practitioner something "true" about human life and the way our humanity worked, even if its insights, like those of art, could not be proven rationally. If you did not act upon it, it would remain as incomprehensible and abstract – like the rules of a board game, which seem impossibly convoluted, dull and meaningless until you start to play.

Religious truth is, therefore, a species of practical knowledge. Like swimming, we cannot learn it in the abstract; we have to plunge into the pool and acquire the knack by dedicated practice. Religious doctrines are a product of ritual and ethical observance, and make no sense unless they are accompanied by such spiritual exercises as yoga, prayer, liturgy and a consistently compassionate lifestyle. Skilled practice in these disciplines can lead to intimations of the transcendence we call God, Nirvana, Brahman or Dao. Without such dedicated practice, these concepts remain incoherent, incredible and even absurd. 1

In respect of the question of validating belief, the requirement is to 'swim' it, or walk the talk, not try and treat it as an hypothetical proposition. Which, of course, is a risk, and a commitment.

Interesting. I like the last especially, "risk, and a commitment."

I'd have to concur with not over-emphasizing the importance of propositional knowledge. Fundamentally, beliefs are not propositional, and neither is knowledge. Everyone has beliefs, and everyone has knowledge, even if they can't express them. Risk and commitment. Nice.

But, she says, in other cultures, and even in earlier Christianity, religious belief was not intended as propositional knowledge, which is part of what she calls 'logos', logic and science. It's properly part of 'mythos', which is the mythical re-telling of human existence, encompassing suffering, redemption, mystery, and many other felt realities which can't be incorporated by logos. — Wayfarer

This is a powerful idea if it is used well.

I'm curious, and you may well decline to do this, but if you were a skeptic, hypothetically making a case against the notion of God (however this looks) what would be some directions you think might be fruitful? This question was put to theologian David Bentley Hart and he immediately said, 'The problem of suffering, especially the innocent and children dying of cancer.' or words to that effect.

Thoughts?

The problem of evil is tangential to the OP.

How I interpret the OP is, as I said, arising from the felt need to validate belief - presumably religious belief. What I think Karen Armstrong shows is that the sense in which 'belief' is used in today's world is itself problematical.

I want to pick up on this point:

Fundamentally, beliefs are not propositional, and neither is knowledge. — Pantagruel

I would take issue with that, because knowledge in the sense of technology and science is propositional. You propose an hypothesis or a theory or a formula, and then you test it against the observation, experiment or result. Left-hand is the proposition, right-hand side the result. Just like Popper says in 'conjecture and refutation'.

That's why, from the positivist perspective, metaphysical claims are nonsensical - there's no 'right-hand side' to test them against! According to the positivists, like Carnap and Ayer, they comprise words that might be gramatically coherent but carry no actual meaning as they don't refer to anything observable or testable.

I think that's why you have to look at the issue from broader perspective. I think to understand metaphysics is iitself a meta-cognitive act; you're actually understanding something about the nature of cognition, not simply taking what is given in perception as being the ground of meaning.

Fair enough.

One man, Agrippa. Case closed. If your curiosity still isn't satisfied, then consider people's tendency to swallow veridically-challenged falsehoods (aka flattery) hook, line, and sinker. I surmise the reasons for this are rather simple:

1. Counterfactuals can't be about the past, the past is and there's nothing you can do about it. Likewise, counterfactuals can't be about the present, what is is. That leaves only the future as a possible state of affairs in which counterfactuals can be true. Ergo, when someone is told a lie, usually a white lie, fae treats it as a future possibility that can be actualized given one makes the right choices. The word "plan" seems apposite to what I'm trying to get across.

2. If you really look at it, living a lie isn't really a problem if one eliminates the risks involved in doing that which are injury or death, injury and death to be understood in the broadest sense of those words. In other words, if the dangers of believing lies are zero, anyone would prefer to live a life of fantasy i.e. in a false reality.


3. This isn't a reason for why people might want to hear lies but it's quite mind-blowing by my reckoning. When people put truth at the forefront what they're actually doing is endorsing the correspondence theory of truth. Compare this to the way falsehoods are sustained or escape detection which is by weaving a coherent story around it which is just another name for the coherence theory if truth.

My two cents worth.

In other words, if the dangers of believing lies are zero, anyone would prefer to live a life of fantasy i.e. in a false reality. — TheMadFool

The American Republican party and its supporters illustrate that on a daily basis. :-) (Sorry, don't want to derail, but couldn't resist.)

Belief has no value without practice. That is borrowed from the "faith without action is dead" quote.
The existence of atoms is a belief. The fact is, there still doesn't exist a method for observing atoms or their constituents. Therefore, it's more like scientists want to believe in the existence of atoms. The value of such a belief is in how close it approximates to our interactive reality. The working hypotheses about atoms give close approximations for the reality in our closest (hence relevant) environment/proximity — it also hints at why quantum mechanics seems to make things appear to be 'outta wack'.

Another example is how Newton's calculations on gravity are great for applications here on earth but become insufficient when applied to quantum mechanics.

Regardless of belief and/or faith, our experiences have very close approximations. For example, we all live in a world where medicine saves more people than God/Gods with respect to health. Also, God/Gods (as representations of a greater reality) provide greater comfort (through hope) for the majority of people (including the self-proclaimed non-believers) in times of need/desperation than reason.

The question is, is there a difference in the subjective experience of the believer who tends to believe in true beliefs, versus one who tends to believe in false beliefs? — Pantagruel

Depends on the kinds of applications the beliefs afford?