No, I think that's wrong. The widely known fact that dogs don't see colours as we do does not put a dent into anyone's conception of perception.

No, I think that's wrong. The widely known fact that dogs don't see colours as we do does not put a dent into anyone's conception of perception. — jamalrob

Maybe not dogs, but birds and insects do, since they can see colors we can't. As for dogs, there is smell and those big ears they have.

It seems you are rather stuck — Marchesk

Coming from the guy who's been making the same arguments for at least 5 years. :wink:

Coming from the guy who's been making the same arguments for at least 5 years. — jamalrob

I deleted that part, as it's a bit unfair. But some people do take perceptual relativity seriously.

Agreed.

Coming from the guy who's been making the same arguments for at least 5 years. — jamalrob

I seem to recall @Marchesk being a direct realist at one point. I'm sure I remember us arguing about it a long time ago.

That's a surprise. I seem to remember having pretty much the same debate with him since I joined the old forum.

I guess that means I've been making the same arguments for years as well.

Back when Banno would start one his famous 100 page discussion about apples or chairs on mountains.

That's a surprise. I seem to remember having pretty much the same debate with him since I joined the old forum. — jamalrob

At some point in the distant past, the idealists corrupted my mind, so as a compromise I started arguing for indirect perception.

That's a sad story.

That's a sad story. — jamalrob

IMO, your argument works better if you jettison the indirect/direct distinction as mistaken by both camps, which I think you've been saying in a way.

Maybe.

Maybe. — jamalrob

If the direct realist is committed to defending naive realism, then yes. On of my biggest difficulties with this debate over the years is the meaning of "direct realist". When I go read about it on SEP or watch a YT video discussing it, the understanding seems to be a defense of the naive view. But on here, it's very nuanced relational stuff, where I'm no longer sure what is direct or sometimes even real about it.

(Direct realism) The properties of perceptual content of a perceptual event are identical with those of what the perceptual event is directed towards..
(Indirect Realism) The properties of perceptual content of a perceptual event are not-identical with those of what the perceptual event is directed towards. — fdrake

I think, I hope, i don't have to be claiming that the blind man's world is made of stick vibrations. Merely that the world he detects is the world, and not a representation of the world.

would anyone demand that to be direct, the table-top would have to project a rectangular shape on to the retina? Is there actually a naive position that is somehow corrected by the idea that perception happens from a perspective and in a certain way? — jamalrob

I think this is perhaps the crux of the problem, and the point that @fdrake was working towards. If the direct realist is going to say "we don't literally mean 'direct' as in the images on the retina are the same as the objects in the world", then the indirect realist objection is somewhat undermined. But it works the other way too as the indirect realist can say "we don't mean 'indirect' as in there's literally no relation between the perceived objects and those in the real world" and so the direct realist objection is undermined.

But to have a perception of an object which is modified in some way (and even fabricated to some extent) from the real-world source of the sensations which precipitated the perception, is most definitely 'indirect'.

There is (without a shadow of doubt now) some other influence on the image/conception we consciously have of the object other than the sensations we originally received from it. Our prior knowledge influences the image we create and our prior knowledge is not restricted to being about 'that object'. It might be about others like it, or even unrelated to the object at all.

That is, as far as I can tell, basically the definition of indirect - took a route with significant nodes, didn't go from A straight to B, had some turning points along the way...

So what exactly is the distinction the indirect realist is supposed to be making that the direct realist wants to deny? That's what I'm still not getting here?

I think, I hope, i don't have to be claiming that the blind man's world is made of stick vibrations. Merely that the world he detects is the world, and not a representation of the world. — unenlightened

If someone took up the kerb and replaced it with a pile of books of similar size and shape, the blind man's conception of the object he detected would be indistinguishable from the concrete kerb. His prior expectations have influenced his conception of the world. He expects there to be a kerb there, he's received no signals to the contrary so he conceives of a kerb there. If you asked him to 'read' the object at his feet he would not proceed to do so, he would simply presume you were mad. So how can he be detecting 'the world'? He has a concrete kerb where a pile of books is.

You might argue that his model is still derived from 'the world', but that would just be straw-manning the indirect realist argument. No one is saying that perception is not initiated by signals from the outside world.

If "the world he detects is the world, and not a representation of the world" what would the counterfactual be. Take your claim to be false, what would be the case to show that it was false? What would a 'representation of the world' be like that differs so much from how things in minds actually are?

If someone took up the kerb and replaced it with a pile of books of similar size and shape, the blind man's conception of the object he detected would be indistinguishable from the concrete kerb. — Isaac

As it happens, I think you underestimate the subtly of what a stick user can detect, and the vibration of stick on book, stick on concrete, and stick on stone are very different. But I am short sighted and cannot read signs in the distance, but that doesn't mean that I am seeing a badly drawn picture, just seeing badly. Obviously even a shortsighted person detects at a distance beyond the reach of a stick, but not as far as the edge of the universe.

I make the same claim of the world I detect through the more extensive and complex vibrations that my eyes are sensitive to. And that that world is the same world a bat navigates by the vibrations of echo-location.

If "the world he detects is the world, and not a representation of the world" what would the counterfactual be. Take your claim to be false, what would be the case to show that it was false? — Isaac

Well if the blind man or the bat could pass through barriers that I could not or vice versa, that would be evidence that we were detecting different worlds, possibly.

No one is saying that perception is not initiated by signals from the outside world. — Isaac

Then what is the argument? Because at least some of the time, that is exactly the argument; that we cannot tell the difference between a dream and reality. Look back and see that discussion at some length.

Is the blind man's perception direct or not? Is it direct if he uses his hands with no stick? This is where I want an answer. Is touch direct perception? At what length of stick or fingernail does it become indirect?

What in general intervenes between world and experiencer to make experience indirect? The usual answer, so far, is that it is a model, image or representation. And the question then is how that representation is perceived. If I do not directly perceive the world, do I directly perceive the representation, or do I merely perceive a representation of the representation? Why is it less problematic to perceive a representation of the world than to perceive the world?

think you underestimate the subtly of what a stick user can detect, and the vibration of stick on book, stick on concrete, and stick on stone are very different. — unenlightened

That may well be the case, but it would only stand as a counter argument if you're suggesting that it would be literally impossible to pull of such a ruse. That the stick was so subtle as to be able to detect any and all changes. If not, then all you've done is shown that I chose a bad example.

Well if the blind man or the bat could pass through barriers that I could not or vice versa, that would be evidence that we were detecting different worlds, possibly. — unenlightened

Who said anything about detecting different worlds? Detecting a representation of the world is not the same as detecting a different world. All its saying is that the concept or image that you have is not a faithful copy of the world, it is modified by factors unrelated to the current state of affairs.

at least some of the time, that is exactly the argument; that we cannot tell the difference between a dream and reality. — unenlightened

Schizophrenics cannot tell the difference. Unless you're excluding them from 'we' then there is such a case. Which means examining how we make such distinctions is a worthwhile endeavour.

Is the blind man's perception direct or not? Is it direct if he uses his hands with no stick? This is where I want an answer. Is touch direct perception? At what length of stick or fingernail does it become indirect? — unenlightened

At the point where the data is not faithfully translated. My eyes, ears, fingers, the blind man's stick, all just send signals to the relevant cortices of the brain - filtered, but direct. We are completely unaware of their doing so, we have no concious connection to that process. Within those cortices the signals are combined with backward-acting signals from parts of the brain completely unconnected to the data received from the object. This combination of two (or more data streams initiates action (still without any concious awareness) - it might be a tilt of the head, a shifting of the gaze, a move of the fingers. This provides more information (filtered by the expectations from the backward-acting neural connections), which is in turn subject to modifications by parts of the brain unconnected from the actual object. Finally after what might be several hundred iterations of this process we gain a concious image or concept of the object (we can name it, imagine interactions with it etc).

The process has several hundred opportunities for information not related to the object being sensed to alter the final concept we become conciously aware of (the one we name, plan with, talk about etc). How is that not 'indirect'?

What in general intervenes between world and experiencer to make experience indirect? — unenlightened

Hopefully I've answered that question above.

the question then is how that representation is perceived. — unenlightened

With the part of the brain responsible for receiving signals from the various sensory cortices. If you're really interested in the heirachical brain model I can go into it, but I sense perhaps not.

perceive the representation, or do I merely perceive a representation of the representation? — unenlightened

No, you directly form your concept of the image from the various cortices involved in the analysis one level below. In the sequence A>B>C>D, D does not receive signals direct from A, but it does from C. It's not a complicated system, we don't throw our hands in the air and say "well if D does not receive direct signals from A then I suppose nothing receives direct signals from anything".

Why is it less problematic to perceive a representation of the world than to perceive the world? — unenlightened

It's not about how problematic it is. There is a point prior to our becoming aware of the properties of an object where data unrelated to that object (in the world outside our minds) can alter the data we originally received from it. That's basically as close to a certainty as we're going to get in neuroscience at the moment, it's not really up for debate at the moment. So if the object we all talk about, plan with, name, recall, etc is formed from both signals from the actual object and signals from elsewhere in our brain unrelated to the object, then our model of the object must be indirect. It is not directly related to the object but related to both the object and our prior expectations of it. It is an amalgamation of the two, and so not a direct representation.

But to have a perception of an object which is modified in some way (and even fabricated to some extent) from the real-world source of the sensations which precipitated the perception, is most definitely 'indirect'. — Isaac

I think you go wrong here. What exactly is modified? Taking you at your word, you mean the perception is modified. I don't know what this means. The perception is the result of, or is constituted by, modifications of light, electrical impulses, and so on, but that doesn't say anything about a modification of perception or experience as such. Is there a raw, unmodified perception?

I address this in the "Sensation" section of the article:

http://articles.thephilosophyforum.com/posts/the-argument-for-indirect-realism/#sensation

By the way, I think my argument here works even if what you meant was that the source is modified in the process of perception, and that the perception is somehow a modification of the object.

I think you go wrong here. What exactly is modified? Taking you at your word, you mean the perception is modified. I don't know what this means. The perception is the result of, or is constituted by, modifications of light, electrical impulses, and so on, but that doesn't say anything about a modification of perception or experience as such. Is there a raw, unmodified perception? — jamalrob

It means the perception is not a faithful mirror of the object, and therefore can't be direct. If we're not aware of objects as they are, then we don't have direct awareness.

It means the perception is not a faithful mirror of the object, and therefore can't be direct. If we're not aware of objects as they are, then we don't have direct awareness. That's the point. — Marchesk

I get the point, but I think it's not a good one. There is no mirroring going on. Why would you expect direct perception to produce faithful reflections? That's so far from my position I'm not sure how to address it.

We await @fdrake's monster post with eager anticipation.

Why would you expect direct perception to produce faithful reflections? — jamalrob

That's the basic position of direct realism. And why are direct realists at pains to defend directness? Because of epistemological concerns that indirect realism raises.

Because

That's so far from my position I'm not sure how to address it. — jamalrob

Because you're not a direct realist. I don't know why you defend it.

Because you're not a direct realist. I don't know why you defend it. — Marchesk

I think the article is quite clear that I'm attacking indirect realism more than advocating direct realism. Indirect realism is a way of thinking about things that does a horrible injustice to the way we perceive the world. Direct realism is better, almost by default.

So what exactly is the distinction the indirect realist is supposed to be making that the direct realist wants to deny? That's what I'm still not getting here? — Isaac

From what I recall of similar arguments in the past, the conversation always faltered over the meaning of "direct" and "realism". It would inevitably run aground on semantic disputes.

Maybe Harry was right and we should have tried to agree on the definition of terms first. My bad since I started this thread.

I think the article is quite clear on that. It's a way of thinking about things that does a horrible injustice to the way we perceive the world. — jamalrob

I mistook your critique of indirect realism as a defense of direct realism, even though you briefly mentioned some correlationist stuff at the end. So if I understand you correctly, within a correlationist understanding of the empirical world, we do have direct awareness. But it's a relational one, because that's how perception works.

There isn't a veil of perception hiding us from the world, there is just the empirical world we all live in. The transcendental stuff outside of humans is another matter, and we can't use perceptual talk to reference it.

at least some of the time, that is exactly the argument; that we cannot tell the difference between a dream and reality.
— unenlightened

Schizophrenics cannot tell the difference. Unless you're excluding them from 'we' then there is such a case. Which means examining how we make such distinctions is a worthwhile endeavour. — Isaac

So now you're making the argument you just told me was a straw man.

Pass.

What exactly is modified? — jamalrob

The data from the sensory organs relating to the object as it is in the world.

you mean the perception is modified. — jamalrob

I think, for the sake of clarity, it's best if we all stick to 'perception' as encompassing the entire process, so no, I don't mean the perception is modified. I mean the perception constitutes an amalgamation of two (or more) data sources, only one of which is the actual object in the world.

The perception is the result of, or is constituted by, modifications of light, electrical impulses, and so on, but that doesn't say anything about a modification of perception or experience as such. — jamalrob

Yes, but it is also the result of prior expectation which may well have absolutely nothing to do with the object under consideration.

Let me try an example. Say I'm looking at a table which is larger than my field of vision. I only glance at it. To anyone who inspects it closely, it is brown with a grey border. The table I see (the one I describe to others, plan to eat off, recall later etc) is completely brown, even at the edges. This browness is not a property of the table in the real world. It's a property of previous tables of similar sorts. My vision at the periphery does not register colour, my brief glance wasn't enough to take in the edges. But the table I have in mind (the one I describe to others, plan to eat off, recall later etc) does not just have no edges, or blank edges. It very clearly has brown edges. It has the edges I was expecting to see, not the ones generated by the wavelength of light from the actual table.

We can call this a 'direct' representation of the table (just a mistaken one), but if we do I'm not sure what 'indirect' would mean in this context.

From what I recall of similar arguments in the past, the conversation always faltered over the meaning of "direct" and "realism". It would inevitably run aground on semantic disputes. — Marchesk

I see. Possibly the solution is to focus on some practical consequence of either view, some behavioural reflection of the different beliefs.

So now you're making the argument you just told me was a straw man. — unenlightened

How so? The assertion is only tangential, I was trying to show how it's important in some fields to get a grasp of the effect different stages in the perception process have on our final concious image of an object/scene. If it's straw-manning your position then you can either explain how or we can just drop the entire angle. It's got nothing to do with the rest of my post, which you've not yet responded to.

I think jamalrob is arguing that how an object looks, tastes, feels only applies to perception. There's no such thing as what an object looks like without someone seeing it. The indirect realist goes wrong by assuming there is, and then proposing the additional mental intermediary. But there's no need for the intermediary if the act of seeing is what something looks like.

If that sort of argument works, then the debate is rendered moot. There's still a realist question of what objects are independent of perception, but they aren't like perceptions.