A premise I find unattractive and unnecessary is that a 'mind' is a thing or substance at all. 'Mindful', 'mental' or (more to my taste) 'conscious' is a property of things, most obviously human animals.

What things to call conscious is the problem.

I came here to be insulted, so feel free. :wink:

You may wonder what the dish thinks like, but your reason - or at least, the reason of most of us - declares loud and clear that such wonderings make as little sense as wondering how heavy Beethoven's fifth symphony is. That is, they reflect category errors.
4h — Bartricks

I disagree, I think they are analogous. 'Heavy' is of course applied to music only metaphorically, but that doesn't matter here. The point is that in both cases (dish and piece of music) we are trying to classify correctly. It's pretty clear that the dish is unconscious, while the music is (in this particular case) heavy.

I am not guilty of any wishful thinking - it is you who is guilty of that, — Bartricks

Actually, my wishes would be that consciousness isn't material, that the notion of nonphysical things can make sense, that we continue after bodily death, that things like ghosts are real/that we could become ghosts, etc., but I can't believe any of that stuff even though I wish it were true.

I was reading and I noticed Psalm 49:16 because it spoke a new insight to me while I am reflecting upon our conversation.

It says "God will redeem my soul from the power of Sheol, for he receives me". So I'd like to explain what I see in this, because it shows that the soul is more than just a mind:

The Psalmist is not saying that God will redeem his soul from Sheol, but from the power of Sheol. So in understanding that key difference, we can see that he does not say he has descended to Sheol before God redeems his soul, but rather that his soul is in danger of being taken by the power of Sheol. So Sheol has some power that threatens his soul, and it is from that power that he says God will redeem his soul.

Without getting too much into the speculative topic of Sheol, because it is speculative and off-topic, I'm just looking at what makes a soul vulnerable to it's power. It is essentially remorse or regret, or bitterness over one's own failings. It is the inability to stand strong against attacks on our character in light of God's judgement. It is when we have fallen into such a state, that we begin fighting against the very law of God itself, in order to justify ourselves and by necessity, to condemn God. It happens because there is no justification in ourselves on account of the knowledge we have, that we have failed to do righteousness.

So the soul is vulnerable to the power of Sheol, not as a command from God to throw it into Sheol, but on account of what it thinks of itself - or rather, I should say that we are vulnerable to being consumed by the power of Sheol on account of what we think of ourselves, and because of that, we are unable to come to God with good conscience. It is that very insecurity that is the power of Sheol, because as I mentioned, we are forced to turn to devious ways to justify ourselves (to escape from being condemned by ourselves when we also feel powerless against it), and in that process, we become corrupted in thinking and when it grows, hypocrisy and denial of truth.

So the soul certainly is the self, but it is more than a mind alone - because in this case, we can see that our very name (reputation) contributes to the soul's strength and character. The soul is comprised of the name (reputation) of a person as well as his mind, because it is according to the person's own awareness of his name in the world, that Sheol takes liberties to accuse him.

The Psalmist writes that God will redeem his soul from the power of such destruction "because God receives him" - and in so saying, recognises that his having faith in God is the strength of character he needs in order to stay hopeful for the day in which his deliverance from the power of Sheol is brought to completion. He also says that it is God's work to do that.

So his soul has come under attack from Sheol on grounds that he believes are ultimately untrue, and he trusts that God will deliver his soul from that power by bringing about justice - clearing his name so that Sheol will be unable to bring any further claims against him. In that strength is salvation (and that is why baptism is at the core of Christian faith). In contrast, he says in the preceding verse that the "image" of the self-confident is destined to "decay in Sheol" when the light of day comes.

All I can suggest, is if at some point you read again what I have written, it should make more sense. I also have not said that the mind is the brain, but that it resides in the brain because it is the centre of operations for the body, and a powerful computer. But whether every brain has a mind (which I think is a safe assumption), and whether a mind can exist without a brain (which might be difficult to prove), I think are the best questions to ask.

It could also just be that what I call mind, you call consciousness and what I call consciousness you call mind. I've said that consciousness includes mind, heart and gut, so if you could say that mind includes mind, heart and gut but that consciousness is seated in the brain - then that's what is happening.

the ceteris paribus clause is in there because there are circumstances under which we have good reason to think a rational representation counts for nothing. For instance, imagine that I have a drug that induces in anyone who takes it the powerful rational intuition that 2 + 3 = 6. I then give that drug to everyone. Well, now everyone will have the powerful rational intuition that 2 + 3 = 6, yet it doesn't count as any kind of evidence that 2 + 3 = 6. Why? Because the best explanation of why we are getting that intuition is not that it is true, but that we ingested a drug that induces it.

Anyway, putting aside cases like that, if our reason represents something to be the case, then that is good evidence that it is the case.

Why is that true? Well, because you can't argue for anything without presupposing its truth. Try it. Try arguing against it without using an argument - that's obviously impossible. Yet that's what you would need to do in order to challenge it, for an 'argument' is an appeal to a representation of reason (how do we know that this kind of argument - if P, then Q; P; therefore Q - is valid? Well, because our reason represents it to be).

So although you can say that you don't buy it, you do - or you do if you reason about anything at all.

I suggest that you read my arguments and try and challenge one.

Yes, you can mean them metaphorically - and that's how a charitable person would interpret you if you said "how heavy is Beethoven's fifth" or "what does the pizza think like?"
That's completely beside the point, though. For the point is that sensible objects cannot literally think anything, just as Beethoven's fifth cannot literally weigh anything. Thus my mind cannot literally be my brain (or any other sensible thing).

I do not understand why you are quoting the bible at me. I could not care less what the bible says about anything. It has no probative force. I am only interested in what reason says, not what some crazy book written by people who know less than we do says.

you can't argue for anything without presupposing its truth. — Bartricks

Suppose this is the case.

What does it have to do with the idea that "if most people represent something to be the case, that is good evidence that it's the case"?

Alright, here we go:

all extended objects - such as my brain - can be divided — Bartricks

How do you envisage that it might be possible to divide your brain but not your mind?

Take for an example, that you can divide a tree and you will have two living trees. But we do not assume that trees have a mind (though, consciousness is pretty safe to assume).

So a central nervous system (ie: brain) is a basic requirement for a mind in the field of consciousness.

Yet, if your brain can be divided and you would have two functioning brains, how can it be that you will have only one mind? What if those two parts of the brain were located in different bodies and those bodies taken to other places? Would they be thinking the same?

(I also suspect maybe you have meant that your mind can exist in your brain even if some of your brain is taken away from it, in which case I don't think it really can be said that the brain has been divided).

Could you explain that a bit more?

Nothing. The premise says "if the REASON of most people represents something to be the case, then that is good evidence that it is the case, other things being equal".

Nothing. — Bartricks

If it has nothing to do with it then it's not at all what I'm asking for.

I'm telling you that I don't at all accept your premise.

I'm presuming that you accept it. Why?

Actually, you are wrong about that (so far as the field of spirituality goes, which is fundamental to psychology and philosophy). The more I learn about the Hebrew language, the more I admire what they knew. But of course, you do need to read it in light of the right spirit.

Try attacking a premise of my argument, rather than a premise that you wrote and that I didn't.

Can't you just tell me why you accept that premise (the premise that you wrote as the start of your first two arguments)? It's a simple question. Why do you accept that premise?

It is not clear to me which premise you are disputing, for you mention a premise but then address yourself to a different one.

So, here is the argument:

1. All extended things are divisible
2. My mind is not divisible.
3. therefore my mind is not an extended thing

I think you're trying to challenge premise 1, but it is not clear to me how you are doing so. You mention trees and you note that they are divisible. Well, trees are extended objects. So that's no challenge to premise 1. To challenge premise 1 you need to describe an object that is both obviously extended, yet equally obviously not divisible.

That seems impossible for a very simple reason: any extended thing occupies some space, and any region of space is infinitely divisible.

I don't accept that premise- it is not a premise of any of my arguments. It is one you wrote. Copy and paste one of my premises - don't rewrite it, you'll mess it up - and ask me why I accept it and I'll tell you. But don't write something of your own and then ask me why I accept it - that's crazy.

Oy vey not another one of these friggin nutballs.

You wrote this, which I already quoted: ""If the reason of most people represents something to be the case, that is good evidence that it is the case other things being equal."

I'm asking you why you accept that. Stop stalling and just say why you accept that. If you don't know why, that's fine--I'm not going to hold that against you (as opposed to playing games where we have to go through all of this crap to even talk about it). Just be honest and straightforward and we can move on from there.

Well, if you want my help, you will need to work with me on it, because as I said earlier, you are drawing views from a philosophical ground that I don't have. But, we are discussing the same reality, so there is no right reason why we cannot find agreement.

Yes, you said I am testing your Premise 1.

How is it that you say a brain can be divided, in such a way that you also think it should create a dividing of the mind?

Yes, that's what I wrote. But you changed it to "if most people represent something to be the case, then that's ood evidence that it is the case". Can't you see the rather big difference between those two?

The one I wrote is true, the one you wrote is obviously false.

Why is my one true? Because you can't argue for anything - anything at all - without presupposing its truth.

Just to be clear, for I fully imagine you won't grasp this: all evidence, all arguments for anything, presuppose its truth. So it is as true as it is possible for anything - ANYTHING - to be.

Why is my one true? Because you can't argue for anything - anything at all - without presupposing its truth. — Bartricks

Goddammit, man, I just asked you what "You can't argue for anything without presupposing its truth" has to do with ""If the reason of most people represents something to be the case, that is good evidence that it is the case other things being equal" and you said "Nothing."

If not "Nothing," can you tell me what the two are supposed to have to do with each other?

I am working with you.

I don't think you understand the argument. Here it is again:

1. all extended objects can be divided
2. My mind cannot be divided
3. Therefore my mind is not an extended object.

It's logically valid - that is, its conclusion (3) is necessarily true if the premises (1 and 2) are.

So the only issue is whether they're true.

1 is true for the reason I just explained. If an object is extended then, by definition, it takes up some space. Any region of space can be divided. Thus all extended objects, by their very nature, are divisible.

But now you ask me why I think that the mind CAN be divided - but I clearly stated the precise opposite. My mind cannot be divided. That's premise 2!

If A can be divided but B cannot, then A is not B, yes?

Ok, I can show you where the error is.

You say that a brain can be divided by mere fact that if you cut a piece off it, then it has been divided. The physical brain that was once one piece, now exists as two pieces. But, only one of those pieces is still functioning as a living brain .. what has happened to the other piece?

is your little brain hurting?

That premise - the one you're having such difficulties even writing accurately, never mind understanding - says that if our reason represents something to be the case, then that is good evidence that it is the case.

Now, baby steps....so, someone who denies it will have to insist that if their reason represents something to be the case, that is not good evidence that is the case, yes? Now, how....will.....they......ARGUE....for that claim....without....appealing.....to......REASON?

Over to you. You tell me how to argue for something without using an argument. I'm all ears. Take me to school daddio.

Why do you assume there's an error? Clearly you're someone who thinks they know what's what BEFORE inspecting the evidence. I only hope you're not a detective.

What error are you showing me? Which premise are you challenging? 1 or 2?

Wait a minute, are you saying that "most people" in your premise isn't about people collectively, but that it's rather another way of saying, "For most arbitrary individuals, if their reason represents something to be the case, that is good evidence that it is the case other things being equal"?

I actually know there's an error. The challenge is to bring it to you (as a detective) when you are acting as the judge who is also the defendant, and to convince you of it (because that is what you say you want, by bringing it forward for discussion). So if you follow where I am leading you by answering the questions, I will bring you there.

I am challenging both premise 1 and 2 at this stage.

In other words, you're not saying "P is more likely to be true if most people reason that P," but rather, "If some individual, S, reasons that P, then most likely P" (ceteris paribus)?

Why do you keep changing my premises? What is the word 'arbitrary' doing in there?

The premise I am appealing to has a name. It is called the "principle of phenomenal conservatism". It says "if something appears to be the case, that is prima facie evidence that it is the case".

I know that someone people like labels and think they count for something, so now, perhaps, you'll start to take it seriously. For all I have done is take that principle - a principle presupposed by ALL rational inquiry - and apply it to the representations of our faculties of reason.

Are you an Aspie? I'm just trying to clarify that whether you were using "most people" to necessarily refer to a collective of people asserting the same thing, or whether we're talking about individuals asserting different things. I initially understood you to be referring to a collective.