I'm saying what I said, not what you said or are saying.

Me: "I would like a cup of tea",

You: "so, you mean, an arbitrary person would like a cup of coffee?"

Me "er, no, I am saying that I would like a cup of tea".

You: "so you mean that if an arbitrary person would like a cup of coffee, then you'll have a cake?"

Me "er, no... don't worry about it"

We have a room of 100 people.

If I say, "Most people in the room like some band," we can read that two different ways:

(1) A majority of people in the room like the same particular band, the Beatles.
(2) A majority of the people in the room have some band they like, the Beatles for Joe, Led Zeppelin for Sue, Nirvana for Pete, etc., but they all like a different band.

I'm trying to clarify which way you were using "most people."

Why this is so difficult to understand I don't know.

Me: if the reason of most people represents something to be the case, that is good evidence that it is the case.
You: "so you mean that if Mr Most People represents something to be the case, then it is the case?"

Me: "No, I said if the reason of most people represents something to be the case, then that is good evidence that it is the case"

You: "Oh, so you mean if Mr Most People's reason represents something to be the case, then you'll have a cup of coffee and a cake".

Do you understand that it wasn't clear to me, and it still isn't, how you were using "most people"? Yes or no

I don't know how you expect to have a discussion with anyone if you won't bother to clarify simple things they're asking about.

first off, you might want to press the arrow under peoples posts so they get a notification you replied to them otherwise they might not notice you replied (like what just happened to me for example)

Why else do we consider someone insane who takes seriously that that their tea may be thinking something? — Bartricks

First off, we don’t, we consider them a panpsychist. We consider people insane if they report talking tea (if thinking something is treaded as synonymous with having an experience of some sort)

1. If the reason of most people represents something to be the case, that is good evidence that it is the case other things being equal — Bartricks

Is false. You should know this considering you’re an antinatalist.... What most people intuitively think presents no evidence something is the case. Evidence of something being the case is evidence of something being the case.

1. If an object is material, then it is divisible
2. My mind is not divisible
3. Therefore my mind is not material — Bartricks

The conclusion isn’t inconsistent with panpsychism though. Panpsychism proposes consciousness as a property of matter. The fact that consciousness isn’t divisible when matter is doesn’t go against that at all, because consciousness is not identical to matter according to panpsychism.

If the reason of most people represents a proposition, P, to be true, then that is good evidence that P is true.

Does that make it easier to understand? And do you see why it is not open to rational dispute?

At the moment I'm not trying to dispute anything. I'm trying to figure out just what the claim is. Are you saying that it has more weight if there's agreement? Yes or no.

I need to run for a while, by the way, but I'll check out the answer when I get back.

Yes, thanks, I had sometimes forgotten to press that buton.

Panpsychist is normally reserved for academic philosophers (many of whom are insane, incidentally) who've arrived at their conclusion via careful - though in my view, very bad - reasoning, rather than because it seems to them that their tea is thinking. If it seems to you that your tea is thinking, then I assure you that you're insane. There's what we might call 'rational' panpsychism and then there's 'phenomenal panpsychism'. The former is a philosophical position that some perfectly sane, but not especially rational philosophers hold. The latter is symptomatic of serious mental disorder.

Premise 1 has an 'other things being equal' clause. It isn't met in the case of the morality of procreative acts. It is met in this case, however. Premise 1 can't reasonably be denied. For if you've got an argument for its falsity, then you just confirm it.

One thing is 'evidence' for the truth of a proposition only insofar as it appears to be providing us with some epistemic reason to believe that other thing, which is something only our reason can tell us about. Hence why the principle is true. If you deny it, you'll find you don't have any evidence for anything.

Your last point commits a category error. I am talking about the mind - the object, whatever it may be, that is bearing our conscious states. You're conflating conscious states with the object they're the states of.

No.

I should add, phenomenal panpsychism would not be symptomatic of a serious mental disorder if panpsychism is actually true. But it isn't, as my arguments demonstrate.

I too must run away for a sleep, but will check back tomorrow.

Er, yes. See argument and get over yourself.

Yes, you can mean them metaphorically - and that's how a charitable person would interpret you if you said "how heavy is Beethoven's fifth" or "what does the pizza think like?" — Bartricks

Haha, yes but I meant I agree that the dish is literally unconscious (non-conscious if you prefer), while the music is metaphorically heavy.

Anyway, human animals (brains, at the cost of distorting the situation) are among the things we can rightly describe as literally conscious. 'Mind' is best dropped in careful discourse, or glossed as 'conscious object' (e.g. person).

the point is that sensible objects cannot literally think anything, just as Beethoven's fifth cannot literally weigh anything. — Bartricks

What about human animals i.e. persons? Are they not sensible objects? I can't gloss 'sensible objects' as 'things'?

I'm not a zombie-denier, by the way. I'm not calling any dishes (or even e.g. insects) conscious.

I'm just inviting you to refrain from turning a property (or class of objects) into a thing. I.e. turning consciousness into a thing, or things.

You KNOW there's an error - what, because you have special knowledge given to you in dreams or something?

No, you're not challenging either premise. You're just singularly failing to grasp basic logic.

here's my argument:

1. A is divisible
2. B is not divisible
3. therefore, A is not B.

You: so, I am going to challenge A. Imagine an A, if you will. It is divisible, is it not. Now, why do you think that B divides when A divides.

Me: that's not what I think and that doesn't challenge A. That confirms A. And I said that B is indivisible, not divisible.

You: but help me here, why do you think that B can be divided by dividing A.

Me: er, I don't think that - I think the exact opposite. Which premise are you disputing?

You: I am trying to show you the way, trying to give you my some flavour of my immense wisdom, for I am impressed at scholars who knew next to nothing and so made us stuff that would only impress a five year old, but who do need to be read in the right spirit to be appreciated - that is, a spirit of total and utter ignorance.

Me: what are you on about?

I'm not turning consciousness into a thing. It isn't a thing. I am quite sure of it. Consciousness is a state of a thing, not a thing.

Now that you know that I'm not reifying consciousness, which premise do you dispute and why?

Now that you know that I'm not reifying consciousness, — Bartricks

Then why do you refer to your mind as though it were an entity?

If you will not answer my questions, you are forcing me to attempt to show you in absence of facts. Is that what you want to do?

No, you beg the question by suggesting that we drop the word 'mind' .
The mind is, by definition, that object - whatever it may be - that is bearing conscious states.

When it comes to animal bodies we do not attribute conscious states to the bodies, rather we attribute minds to the bodies. Hence why we wonder what might happen to our minds after our bodies crumble to dust. And hence why we can coherently wonder the same about animal minds.

The issue is exactly what a mind is. This isn't a matter that can be settled by stipulation or by empirical investigation. We have to consult our reason.

I have presented three arguments that imply the mind is an immaterial thing, a soul. So I have shown how, in three separate ways, our reason represents our minds to be immaterial objects.

To challenge this evidence you need either to challenge a premise or show that the arguments are not valid.

What question? I am finding you extremely difficult to understand.
Why not just say which premise you are disputing - and just focus on one at a time.

Do you agree that all extended objects can be divided? If the answer is 'yes' then you agree with me.

Do you agree that minds cannot be divided? If the answer is 'yes' then you agree with me.

OMG -the mind IS an entity. By definition, it is the OBJECT that is bearing your conscious states.

Conscious states are NOT objects.

Minds ARE objects.

Conscious states are states.

Minds are objects.

Conscious states are states of an object called a....wait for it....MIND.

What question? I am finding you extremely difficult to understand. — Bartricks

This one:

You say that a brain can be divided by mere fact that if you cut a piece off it, then it has been divided. The physical brain that was once one piece, now exists as two pieces. But, only one of those pieces is still functioning as a living brain .. what has happened to the other piece? — Serving Zion

.. if you just answer that question, it will lead to the next, and so on. I will lead you to see the problem.

I don't understand that question or its relevance.

I said that the brain - you know, the meaty thing in your head - can be divided. I said that all extended things can be divided. This is not deniable.

I then said that the mind - the thing you think with - cannot be divided.

I then concluded - validly - that the mind is therefore not an extended object.

Now why are you asking me where bits of brain might be. I don't know - the last place you put it, probably.

To help you, if we agree that object A is a cube, and we agree that object B is a sphere, then we can conclude that object A is not object B, yes?

Why? Well, because if an object is a cube, then it is not also a sphere. Thus, if A is a cube and B is a sphere, we know that A is not B.

If an object is divisible, then it is not also indivisible.

So, if my BRAIN is divisible - and it obviously is - and my MIND is not divisible, then.....my MIND is not my BRAIN.

Well, it does matter. Because if it is not put into an environment where it can be sustained as a living thing then it decays. It is no longer a brain.

Plus, when dealing with such hypotheticals, it is naturally difficult.

So give a real example. Which part of the brain can be removed while the brain that is left continues to function so that the person can have a mind? .. and more to the point, so that the mind can function as it did before so that nobody can say they have lost a part of their mind?

Which premise are you disputing -just answer me that. Until you do, I'm not answering any more of your questions as you're just ignoring the arguments I've given.

Mind is a metaphysical thing, while brain is a physical thing. But the relationship between brain and mind is such that the mind relies upon the brain (I think.. but isn't that what we are discussing to establish?)

Both 1 and 2, I think. I said that before.