What's not appealing in the sense that you're using that term is the suggestion that beliefs must have some merit just because they're strong beliefs or common beliefs. That approach would suggest that we should still be performing rituals, making sacrifices, etc. to ensure a good harvest, to stave off natural disasters, etc. — Terrapin Station

But I did not say that beliefs must have merit because they are strongly held beliefs. I said that emotivism does not account for the phenomena under consideration -- and in particular, that it sort of just ignores or explains away the fact that moral statements are of the form of propositions, and propositions are truth-apt.

From where I stand the usual explanation for this is that moral statements are only apparently truth-apt, but not really truth-apt -- they are expressions of emotion like "boo" or "hurrah", or some such. It saves the theory, but from my perspective it's a convenient just-so story.



EDIT: I'd also just like to note that the line of thought I've been pursuing here is error theory, which is just a little funny to categorize as a strongly held belief that is some kind of sacrosanct tradition.

I think if goodness is a property it must exist in the supernatural realm.

I don't think you understood my comment, which is partially my fault for using the word "merit."

What I mean is that you're suggesting that just because it's strongly felt or widely held (assuming that's the case, of course) that moral utterances are expressing propositions in the sense of sentences that can be true or false, then there must be something to the idea that they are expressing propositions in the sense of sentences that can be true or false.

In other words, you're suggesting that the ubiquity or strength of a belief (that moral utterances are expressing something true or false) makes it more likely that the belief is acurrate rather than mistaken,

Because otherwise, the ubiquity and/or strength of the belief has nothing to do with what's really the case ontologically, which would make it a red herring to even mention.

. . .and given that there is no "supernatural realm" (unfortunately, because I like the idea of things like ghosts), then there is no objective property of "goodness."

I did misunderstand you, but I don't think this follows. It's not because it's a widely held belief that I say moral statements are truth-apt. It's because of the form that they take -- they are of the same form as any other proposition.

So a convention re language-usage somehow determines what's the case ontologically? How?

Since it is the case that all morality consists of thought/belief, and all thought/belief consists of that which is not existentially dependent upon the thinking/believing subject, as well as that which is, thought/belief is neither. If thought/belief is neither, and all morality is thought/belief based, then all morality is neither.

and all thought/belief consists of that which is not existentially dependent upon the thinking/believing subject, as well as that which is, thought/belief is neither. — creativesoul

I haven't the faintest idea what that bit is saying.

Morality is thought and belief. Thought and belief are neither objective nor subjective. Morality is neither.

Thought and belief are neither objective nor subjective — creativesoul

What definition of "subjective" would you be using there? (Well, what definition of both terms I should ask)

Your favorite. I despise the dichotomy.

Under the definition I use, how are thought and belief not subjective? Not that the term matters, by the way. What matters are the upshots of what it's pointing out ontologically.

Under the definition you use everything ever said is subjective. It matters because the notion of objectivity is the basis of all your objections here.

That's false. Maybe you try should understand my views, then, before trying to criticize or even paraphrase them.

Clarify then... what comes through a subject that is not subjective?

Well, I've been restricting myself to the nature of moral language -- namely that moral statements are not special with respect to other statements. So a convention with respect to language would effect on the ontology of language, naturally enough, though we are beginning to run around in circles since usually we don't take language as an object of some sorts.

So in saying that moral statements are truth-apt, the phenomena under consideration is moral language -- whether or not moral statements have a semantics or no. By analogy I'd say something like "All people born under the sign of cancer are moody and perceptive", or other astrologicial statements have meaning, are truth-apt, because of the form they take. The statement itself, of course, is false, and may even include names without an existing referent -- such as the case with Zeus.

But the statements still have meaning. I understand what they are saying, and they are true or they are false.


A bit long winded, but the point here is that in the sense of the wider world I wouldn't say my position commits me to the notion that linguistic convention commits me to the ontological reality of moral facts, or some such. It just accounts for the apparent fact (though it can be explained away) that moral statements are propositions.

. . .and given that there is no "supernatural realm" (unfortunately, because I like the idea of things like ghosts), then there is no objective property of "goodness." — Terrapin Station

Some people believe in a non natural realm so won't have ruled this out.

I think goodness as a preference is not entirely coherent. It is trivially true that if we enjoy X we might consider it Good in one sense, because pleasure is a positive sensation that can easily be conflated with the good.

But I don't think preference can instill moral status on something. Like as before I have distinguished between things I enjoy and things I moralize about. I don't think you can just make something good by having positive attitude towards it.

I think teleology is a much stronger anchor for the good where something can fulfill a purpose optimally. the problem with nature is it allows everything that happens so nature does not restrict behaviour we consider bad.
That is why I think only a transcendent standard that was not part of nature would have the power to judge nature so to speak. If the mind transcends nature then maybe we can do that.

Clarify then... what comes through a subject that is not subjective? — creativesoul

I'm not clear re what "comes through a subject" would refer to, so we'd have to clarify that.

I use "subjective" to refer to something occurring mentally. So re humans, for example, it's something that occurs in one's brain functioning in a mental capacity. Saying something, if we're literally talking about saying something, has a component that's clearly not just one's brain functioning in a mental capacity--among other things, it involves producing soundwaves with one's throat, mouth, etc. That's not just someone's brain functioning in a mental capacity.

Well, I've been restricting myself to the nature of moral language -- namely that moral statements are not special with respect to other statements. — Moliere

Even if you're doing that and you don't care about what's really going on ontologically, you can't just ignore meaning. Meaning is determined by how an individual thinks about the language in question.

Some people believe in a non natural realm so won't have ruled this out. — Andrew4Handel

Yeah, but those people are wrong.

Teleology is nonsense by the way. Just dump the Aristotle, really. He said a lot of stuff that was severely in error. If you keep deferring to Aristotle you're going to wind up making mistake after mistake and not really understanding anything.

I'm not ignoring meaning. In fact you could say my entire objection to emotivism hinges on meaning -- since I'm claiming that moral statements are meaningful, that that meaning is derived from their form as a proposition, and so they have the meaning of being true or being false (Regardless of whatever other meaning they may also have).

"It is raining" has the same truth-aptness as "It is good", and "I think it is raining" 's meaning is different from "It is raining".

that that meaning is derived from their form as a proposition, — Moliere

That part is wrong. Again, meaning is determined by what an individual has in mind.

Well, that's pretty far astray from here, I must say. :D I can agree to disagree. But you can see, I think, where my line of reasoning is going, yes?

I understand your view, but you're arguing based on something that's wrong and very misconceived. (And it's also very simplistic, really.) I don't agree to disagree. I want you to not have views that are wrong.

A desire that's bound to result in frustration, I might warn. But if you want to continue this line of thinking I'd suggest a new thread on meaning, so as not to get too off-base for @Banno's topic of inquiry. I think that another tangeant on meaning would detract from the overall discussion on Moore, "... is good", and so forth -- even if other views, such as beliefs about meaning, surely will influence the way we think through a problem.

We've already done a bunch of threads on meaning.

At any rate, so your interpretation of what people are doing with language--your beliefs about what they mean, without bothering to ask the people in question--doesn't determine what's the case with either how they're actually using language or with what's going on ontologically with utterances such as "x is good (morally)."

Teleology is nonsense by the way. — Terrapin Station

Teleology is very useful if you want to learn how to drive a car.

Some people believe in a non natural realm so won't have ruled this out.
— Andrew4Handel

Yeah, but those people are wrong. — Terrapin Station

What is your argument against a non natural realm?

Teleology is very useful if you want to learn how to drive a car. — Andrew4Handel

Since only people have purposes, per however they think about the same, teleology, the belief in purpose in a much broader, objective sense, is useless for driving cars.

What is your argument against a non natural realm? — Andrew4Handel

Complete absence of evidence for anything supernatural. Also, some of the things posited are incoherent.

Complete absence of evidence for anything supernatural. Also, some of the things posited are incoherent. — Terrapin Station

How does the mind fit into the natural realm since we do not have an explanation for it and mental phenomena?