Well, sure, you can double-down and bite the bullet. But can you see why someone might find the theory unappealing? It seems somewhat elaborate and unnecessary to claim its all emotion, on the face of things, and goes against what we mean by moral statements. — Moliere

Besides neglecting statements and all this above, emotivism cannot take account of conflicting wants/preferences and moral duty.

Sometimes it is "Boo, it is good"...

Clearly "Hurray" and "Boo" cannot account for what's going on with everyday moral considerations.

Alright Banno... I do not understand how one arrives at the claim that "is good" is unanalyzable. Can you set it out in simple terms?

I'm reading/studying the link...

:wink:

So your task would be to explain either how we get to "x is human well being" without it being a judgment, preference, evaluative property etc., — Terrapin Station

It can be a possible (functional) explanation for why particular actions are right or wrong just as Newtonian Mechanics and Einsteinein Relativity are possible explanations for why apples fall out of trees. Apples presumably fell out of trees before there were any humans around to offer explanations or even perceive them. Similarly, actions can conceivably be moral (or not) absent any explanation or even recognition of that.

So the issue then is what explanation best captures what is going on when we use moral terms and how we might test possible explanations.

I think one relevant question is whether people's ordinary use of of moral terms connotes objectivity or subjectivity. For example, if Bob changed his mind about slavery, would he say that slavery used to be moral until he changed his mind, or that it was never moral and he was previously wrong to think that it was?

...they probably do mean "it is good' is true', — Janus

If they're thinking about statements of thought/belief, rather than simply asserting their own.

Insofar as people believe that moral utterances can be true or false they're simply mistaken. They have mistaken beliefs about the ontology of moral utterances. — Terrapin Station

I would argue that anyone who holds that moral utterances cannot be true or false have mistaken beliefs about thought and belief.

My approach is that true claims correspond to actual events(what has happened or is happening).

...When one tells another that there is a cat on the mat, if they're speaking sincerely and truthfully, then there ought be a cat on the mat.

Meaning is important here. — creativesoul

This utterance of ought above is not the standard/typical/garden variety moral utterance, is it?

And yet it makes perfect sense, given that we know the meaning of the statement. Why would it be any different regarding the earlier promise?

When one promises another that there will be a rose garden, if they're speaking sincerely and truthfully, then there ought(one day) be a rose garden, simply because that's what it means.

Similarly, actions can conceivably be moral (or not) absent any explanation or even recognition of that. — Andrew M

Conceivability needs a bit more detail than just stipulating that something is conceivable, no?

I would argue that anyone who holds that moral utterances cannot be true or false have mistaken beliefs about thought and belief. — creativesoul

Sure, and then what you'd offer as empirical support would be?

Conceivability needs a bit more detail than just stipulating that something is conceivable, no? — Terrapin Station

I'm just pointing out that things can have intentional properties without first requiring that they be recognized (or judged, preferred, evaluated, explained, etc.), which is what you seemed to be challenging.

Sure, and then what you'd offer as empirical support would be? — Terrapin Station

Why do you impose such limitations upon yourself?

Even if that were the case, anything with an intentional property isn't going to be objective, which is what he was shooting for, unless intentionality is no longer "the mark of the mental."

At any rate, claiming that something that seems to only make sense as a judgment, or assessment, or evaluative property, etc. is not actually anything like that, but has a property of intentionality, where we just don't know about it, doesn't help on the conceivability end, because we still haven't the faintest idea how it's supposed to make sense that we're talking about morality, where we're allowing that we're talking about something intentional (otherwise now you've also created a burden of explaining non-mental intentionality), but where we're not talking about a judgment, etc.

It's an empirical claim. As such, it requires empirical support.

Even if that were the case, anything with an intentional property isn't going to be objective — Terrapin Station

This is just the point at issue. People use moral terms as if morality were objective.

The Aristotelian claim is that a functional purpose can fit that criterion, namely well-being. Just as animals can act in ways that increase or decrease their survival prospects, so too can humans act in ways that increase or decrease well-being.

Alternatively, if moral terms merely express emotional attitudes then it raises the question of what purpose the connotation of objectivity serves. Why don't people just say "yay" or "boo"?

Why don't people just say "yay" or "boo"? — Andrew M

First, people don't normally just say "Yay pizza" or whatever. They say things like "Pizza tastes good," "Pizza is the best," etc. Do you believe that by virtue of that, "Pizza tastes good" is significantly different than "Yay pizza" would be?

so too can humans act in ways that increase or decrease well-being. — Andrew M

Re this, what does it have to do with morality?

The spirit in which it's forwarded is akin to a scientific examination. It's not based on whether anyone finds it appealing or not. We want to know what the phenomenon really is. — Terrapin Station

By appealing I mean that the account is convincing, explains all the phenomena under consideration, or some such -- it makes an appeal to our rational judgment, not that the conclusion is unsavory or unwanted.

The problem with emotivism is that it does not account for moral phenomena -- in particular, it does not explain why it is that people hold moral beliefs as if they are true or false. It misses out on the semantics of moral statements: they are true or false. Perhaps, in the end, moral phenomena are decided by emotions, and emotions are non-cognitive, so how people reason about moral phenomena is through non-cognitive means. But this still leaves out the fact that moral statements are of the form of propositions, and that people treat them as if they are true.

Even if we think there is no fact to the matter that seems to be a big flaw in what emotivism accounts for. You can append a theory that such statements are only apparently truth-apt, but in fact are not -- but that strikes me as too convenient.

When I say "It is raining" does that, on your view, mean the very same thing as "I think it is raining"?

Besides neglecting statements and all this above, emotivism cannot take account of conflicting wants/preferences and moral duty. — creativesoul

I think the line of thinking would be to say that we have conflicting emotions, and moral duty is just another emotion, a sort of pleasure, that some people have.

But I agree that "Boo" and "Hurrah" don't quite capture the emotions, even if they are the logical equivalent.

People use moral terms as if morality were objective. — Andrew M

People use gustatory language as if gustatory properties were objective ("the pizza is delicious").

People use language inconsistently.

The problem with emotivism is that it does not account for moral phenomena -- in particular, it does not explain why it is that people hold moral beliefs as if they are true or false. It misses out on the semantics of moral statements: they are true or false. Perhaps, in the end, moral phenomena are decided by emotions, and emotions are non-cognitive, so how people reason about moral phenomena is through non-cognitive means. But this still leaves out the fact that moral statements are of the form of propositions, and that people treat them as if they are true. — Moliere

What's not appealing in the sense that you're using that term is the suggestion that beliefs must have some merit just because they're strong beliefs or common beliefs. That approach would suggest that we should still be performing rituals, making sacrifices, etc. to ensure a good harvest, to stave off natural disasters, etc.

People use gustatory language as if gustatory properties were objective ("the pizza is delicious"). — ChrisH

Exactly, as well as aesthetic utterances.

Again, if someone thinks that kicking the pup is fine, then I wouldn't say they have a different preference to me in the way I like vanilla and they like banana. I, and I hope you, would say rather that there was something quite wrong with them.

...as if pizza were not delicious.

Again, if someone thinks that kicking the pup is fine, then I wouldn't say they have a different preference to me in the way I like vanilla and they like banana. I, and I hope you, would say rather that there was something quite wrong with them. — Banno

Keeping things philosophical, epistemologically, what would be the support for their being something "wrong with them" where that's not about the feelings of the person making that judgment?

feelings — Terrapin Station

Think about why you used this pejorative.

What word might you choose instead? Beliefs? Decision? Judgement?

Weird that you'd see it as a pejorative.

I did also use the word "judgment" by the way.

At any rate, so the epistemological support?

I also used the word "judgment" by the way. — Terrapin Station

Yep. I'm more or less agreeing that it is an odd question - asking for support for their being something "wrong with them" where that's not about the judgement of the person making that judgment...

It's like asking for a justification that one does not believe in.

But, what sort of support does one need to make the judgement that kicking a puppy is wrong? What could be more basic. less in need of justification?

And given that we must start somewhere with our moral system, why not start with not kicking puppies?

First, people don't normally just say "Yay pizza" or whatever. They say things like "Pizza tastes good," "Pizza is the best," etc. Do you believe that by virtue of that, "Pizza tastes good" is significantly different than "Yay pizza" would be? — Terrapin Station

You can try the sentences in different contexts to see if they're different.

(1) I used to like pizza but now I don't
(2) Pizza used to taste good but now it doesn't

The first sentence seems to say something about your changing preferences, the second seems to say something about the quality of pizza these days (or perhaps a change in your taste buds).

so too can humans act in ways that increase or decrease well-being.
— Andrew M

Re this, what does it have to do with morality? — Terrapin Station

Kicking puppies or robbing people is generally understood to decrease their well-being. Well-being (eudaimonia) is central to Aristotle's (and arguably Plato's) ethics and political philosophy. It also has parallels in utilitarianism and consequentialism (e.g., as human welfare).

People use gustatory language as if gustatory properties were objective ("the pizza is delicious").

People use language inconsistently. — ChrisH

That's one possible explanation. Another is that people use language in more nuanced ways than they're often given credit for.

Well-being (eudaimonia) is central to Aristotle's (and arguably Plato's) ethics and political philosophy. — Andrew M

Sure.

Apply the open question... Are well-being and good the very same? Could one have well-being and yet not be good? Could one be good and yet not have well-being?

Take a look at With luck, the last thread on abortion., in which copious argument is used by @Rank Amateur in defence of the immoral claim that a piece of tissue has greater worth than the dignity of a person.

Is it good to rely on such extensive exegesis? Does this make one's moral choices more transparent or simply fog them over?

Apply the open question... Are well-being and good the very same? Could one have well-being and yet not be good? Could one be good and yet not have well-being? — Banno

Are they synonomous? No. Are they related? It would seem so. So it is valid to investigate what that relationship might be. Our moral reports are data that we seek to explain.

A similar question can be asked about what is real. Is it synonomous with what we perceive? No. Yet we suspect there is a relationship. So we propose theories and explanations that would make sense of our perceptual reports.

Is it good to rely on such extensive exegesis? Does this make one's moral choices more transparent or simply fog them over? — Banno

Yes, an argument can get too far removed from the data it is seeking to explain. It doesn't follow that the data is self-explanatory. Moral disagreement, as with perceptual disagreement, is a thing.

Is it good to rely on such extensive exegesis? Does this make one's moral choices more transparent or simply fog them over? — Banno

Can good just be deflated a principle of "non-harm" and "helping others" on one hand and some sort of "happiness principle" on the other? For example, why do people advocate not kicking a puppy for fun? Because it causes unnecessary harm. Why do some people say one ought to cultivate virtue, because of some perceived long-term happiness. Why do some people say to pursue pleasure? Because of some form of happiness.

Thus perhaps "the good" is a combination of the principle of non-harm (or helping others in some cases), and some sort of perceived avenue for long-term happiness on the other. That seems to answer a lot of questions as to what falls into the "good" category in the realm of ethics and morality.

So I guess my answer to get around the open-ended argument is to simply deflate it to those two main definitions. The Good simply is some prescription for non-harm/helping others and obtaining happiness.